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ABSTRACT 
 
On 1st September 1931, the most serious mutiny affecting the Chilean Navy in 
nearly two centuries of existence broke out. The various books and articles which have 
examined this subject have used as their sources the local press and the participants´ 
own stories. Just in a few cases, historians have had access to official documents, 
because they were seldom published or access was restricted until now. This has led to 
gross factual mistakes in the existing historiography, leading to questionable 
interpretations and to the creation of legends still alive in Chile and elsewhere. This 
thesis discusses these topics. 
The Chilean Navy has in its archives a collection of 35 volumes (about 9,200 pages) 
of Courts Martial official documents and proceedings never studied by historians. The 
author used these sources under a special authorization for academic purposes.  
The following theories of the causes of the mutiny commonly expounded by 
contemporaries and subsequent historians have been researched: 
a. Participation of Marxist groups in the origin of the mutiny and 
exploitation of it.  
b. Participation of the two Chilean populist political groups in the 
movement’s generation (headed by the former presidents Arturo 
Alessandri and Carlos Ibáñez)  
c. Army and Navy officers’ participation in politics during 1924 to 1931 
and the consequence in the behaviour of the mutineers. 
Examination has also been made of connections with the mutiny on board HMS 
Lucia in Devonport in January 1931 which occurred while the Chilean battleship 
Latorre was being refitted at that port. Months later and being anchored in the port of 
Coquimbo, Chile, serious mutiny or revolt started on board Latorre and spread to other 
naval units as well as other Navy’s, Army’s and Air Force’s shore establishments. One 
week after the Chilean mutiny, the Invergordon mutiny started in the Royal Navy 
Atlantic Fleet. This thesis also compares both mutinies because they had many aspects 
in common.   
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
1.1. The Chilean Naval Mutiny of 1931 in brief. 
 
 General Carlos Ibañez’ regime ended suddenly on 26 July 1931 after weeks of civil 
unrest and financial problems resulting from the world-wide Great Depression. Four weeks 
later, the new Government decided on a salary reduction for all civil servants (Armed 
Forces included) to face the situation. This decision was badly communicated, in particular 
to two squadrons of the Chilean Navy anchored in Coquimbo. 
 As a result, the ship’s companies already in a state of unrest for several reasons to 
be discussed later, expressed their dissatisfaction by different means, including menaces 
through the presentation of collective complaints. Since this was an act specifically against 
the regulations, the Commander in Chief of one of the squadrons decided to call for a 
muster on 31 August 1931 to be attended by all the crew of his flagship plus delegations 
headed by commanding officers from the other units of this force. 
 He addressed them in a harsh way and after this some symptoms of unrest were 
visible, although the crews obeyed the dismissal order and returned to their normal 
activities. At the same time, he sent an officer to the other squadron also anchored in 
Coquimbo with news about what was happening in his force. 
In this other squadron everything seemed normal, although its Commander in Chief 
had reports that the ship companies were concerned about the announced salary reductions. 
He was about to send an official document expressing his concerns and doubts to the 
Ministry of the Navy. That evening there was a social meeting with civilians in the officer’s 
mess of O’Higgins ending at 21:00 while at almost the same time there was a boxing 
session on the deck of this flagship attended by crewmembers of different units. This 
activity and a hidden gathering of crewmembers in the other flagship [Latorre] enabled the 
spreading of the decision adopted by radicalized men to seize their vessels. 
At 04:00 on 1 September, the officers on duty and those who were asleep in their 
living quarters were surprised by armed mutineers who ordered them to hand over their 
personal weapons and to stay inside their cabins. The two flag officers awakened by the 
noise tried to dissuade the mutineers without success. The Commodore who made the 
above mentioned speech then tried to fire at the sailors who were menacing him without 
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success and he finally was imprisoned as the rest of the officers of both flagships. Some 
shots were also fired by the mutineers but only one of the officers on duty was slightly 
injured. 
The mutiny spread to the seven destroyers belonging to both naval forces. Three 
destroyers had to be boarded by mutineers from the flagships while these units aimed their 
heavy guns and floodlights to convince the undecided crews to join the subversion. Before 
05:00, all the units anchored in Coquimbo were under control of the rebels. A few officers 
who were authorised to stay ashore with their families were imprisoned at their arrival on 
their ships. 
The news of the events in that northern port did not reach the Government until 
17:00 on 1 September when a radio message from the mutineers was sent to the Ministry of 
the Navy in Santiago. The rebels expressed not only complaints about the salary reductions 
but also regarding other matters. In a later message, they even requested some measures of 
political character. The reaction of the government at the beginning was to negotiate with 
the rebels rather than adopting the use of force to stop the illegal movement. For this 
purpose, a Rear Admiral was assigned to go to Coquimbo and to meet the rebels ashore. 
After loosing a day travelling and discussing with the mutineers by means of messages, the 
Government yielded to the mutineers’ refusal to have meetings ashore and the Admiral was 
authorised to negotiate on board Latorre, the ship where the mutiny started. At the end, the 
negotiations broke down due to the rigid positions adopted by both the Government and the 
rebels, and the Admiral announced his decision to return to Santiago. 
Meanwhile, the mutiny had spread to Talcahuano where the Navy had an important 
base, and in a lesser degree to some vessels and shore establishments in Valparaíso and 
even to a nearby Air Force Base. Some surface vessels and submarines under mutineers’ 
control sailed from Talcahuano to Coquimbo, showing that the situation was worsening. 
This moved the Government to use force. Five Army regiments plus the naval 
officers organized as an infantry company assailed the rebels inside Talcahuano Naval Base 
on 5 September 1931. There were about ten casualties in each opposing force. The rebel 
ships and shore establishements in Valparaíso had been recovered by the Army the day 
before without any fighting. 
With Valparaíso and Talcahuano under full governmental control, the rebels on the 
ships in Coquimbo made desperate efforts to keep the mutiny alive. They received verbal 
support from leftist organizations and prepared for combat, threatening to open fire on 
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Coquimbo and the nearby city of La Serena. On 6 September, the Chilean Air Force 
assembled a force of about twenty aircraft at an airfield out of the range of the ships’guns. 
Nevertheless, the rebels fired a few guns in that direction until they were finally attacked by 
the aircraft. The bombardment of the rebel ships did not result in any damage to the ships 
themselves but caused two casualties on board due to fragments. The aerial attack 
demoralized the rebels and during that night some of the destroyers abandoned the rest of 
the mutinied ships, sailing to Valparaíso under their officers’ control. This caused the 
eventual collapse of the mutineers’ organization and the rest of the ships were turned back 
to their commanding officers. Finally all ships were called to Valparaíso and nearby ports 
where the rebel crewmembers were disembarked and taken under custody by Army troops. 
They were later prosecuted, condemned, and sentenced to harsh penalties. 
The mutiny had important political consequences and left the Chilean Navy in a 
weakened situation as it will be explained later. After this event a brief period of instability 
in Chilean politics started again as it had during the Government of Arturo Alessandri-
Palma [1920-1925]. Later the country returned to normality in 1932 living through difficult 
economical and social times until 1933. 
 
1.2. A discussion of the literature covering the period of the Mutiny. 
 
More than seventy five years have elapsed since the outbreak of the most serious 
mutiny in the history of the Chilean Navy and the events are still controversial. 
 Most of what has been published in this period of three quarters of a century is 
based on the press and the memoirs of a few protagonists. The rest of the participants 
preferred to remain silent about this unfortunate episode. On the other hand, important 
sources had not been available to researchers. Such is the case of the proceedings of the 
Courts Martial and the administrative investigations and other official papers. Only partial 
transcriptions were published by the press of that period. 
 The unavailability of these sources is the origin of several historical legends about 
some aspects of this naval mutiny. This thesis will give great importance to the transcripts 
of the Courts Martial, specifically to the statements made just after the events, before the 
truth had been somehow twisted, sometimes unconsciously. The diplomatic reports are 
valuable as well, because they are less emotionally or ideologically compromised. In 
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particular, the British sources are of exceptional good quality because there were about ten 
Royal Navy officers serving as advisors and instructors in the Chilean Navy in the 1926-
1932 period. In addition, there was an extensive consular network and a strong capability of 
analysis and synthesis in the British Embassy in Santiago and in the Government agencies 
in London. 
One of the subjects deserving attention is the impact of external influence on the 
mutiny. Trying to discover the influence of these events is very difficult, because of the 
scarcity and bad quality of sources. 
Various authors have disagreed about the nature of the Naval Mutiny of 1931. 
Germán Bravo-Valdivieso1 seems to join the conspiracy thesis probably as a result of the 
sources he used, particularly those of Edgardo von Schroeders-Sarratea2
Gonzalo Vial-Correa
 and other 
contemporary Navy men and politicians. For this author, the mutiny was clearly a plot 
organized by the Chilean Communist Party [ChCP].  
3
 Ricardo Donoso-Novoa
 offers a subtler analysis. He remarks that Comintern’s [see 
Glossary] influence in the Chilean and in the Invergordon mutinies is plausible but it is not 
fully proven. The Chilean Communist Party may not have helped organize the rebellion but 
it tried to capitalize on the mutiny after its inception and in its efforts to ameliorate the 
penalties to the mutineers.   
4
                                                 
1  Germán Bravo-Valdivieso. La Sublevación de la Escuadra y el Período 
Revolucionario 1924-1932. (Viña del Mar del Mar, Chile: Altazor, 2000). 
 devoted several pages to the mutiny in a long book 
focusing on the fifty years’ participation of Arturo Alessandri Palma in Chilean politics. He 
includes interesting information about the benefits given the condemned mutineers but 
numerous factual errors diminish his narrative. Because of his aversion for Alessandri, he 
accepts without further questioning von Schroeders’ assertion that Alessandrists exiles in 
 
2  Edgardo von Schroeders-Sarratea, El delegado del Gobierno ante el Motín de las 
Tripulaciones. (Santiago: Imprenta y Litografía Universo, 1933). 
 
3  Gonzalo Vial-Correa. Historia de Chile [1891-1973], 6 vols. (Santiago: 
Santillana, 1981). III: Arturo Alessandri y los Golpes Militares [1920-1925]. 
(1988)  pp. 75-76. 
 
4  Ricardo Donoso-Novoa, Alessandri Agitador y Demoledor, 2 vols. (México: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1952). II (1954) pp. 54-74. 
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Europe tried to foment a mutiny in the battleship Latorre while it was stationed in 
Devonport. Unfortunately, he does not supply any more information than Admiral von 
Schroeders’.   
Rodrigo Fuenzalida-Bade5
William Sater's article
 published a general Chilean naval history where he 
covers accurately the events, except for minor factual mistakes. He does not offer an 
interpretation, except giving some hints that the origin of the mutiny was the activity of 
political activists, meaning the conspirators visiting Latorre in Devonport and the civilians 
hired by the Navy to become storekeepers. Both subjects will be discussed later in this 
thesis.   
6
‘In short, there was no evidence showing that the former President was 
plotting a Naval Mutiny. If such proofs had existed, Montero certainly had 
raised charges against Alessandri, eradicating by this process his most 
powerful political enemy’. 
 claims that it is difficult to establish that Alessandri inspired 
the mutiny. He writes that it is true that this former President did not trust in the stability of 
the post Ibáñez provisional government but this is not proof that Alessandri was plotting, 
adding that: 
 
The present writer has a different interpretation about the above subject which will 
be explained in another part of this thesis [Chapter 12]. 
Carlos López-Urrutia7
                                                 
5  Rodrigo Fuenzalida-Bade, La Armada de Chile. Desde la Alborada hasta el 
Sesquicentenario, 4 vols. (Valparaíso: Imprenta de la Armada, 1978). IV, pp. 
1174-1175. 
 agrees with Sater that the mutiny happened within a general 
context of political instability and economical crisis but argues that the storekeeper ratings 
Manuel Astica-Fuentes and Augusto Zagal-Anabalón had fomented the mutiny. But these 
individuals, while important at the time of drafting the first subversive manifestoes, cannot 
be the main factors in causing the mutiny since they entered the Navy only a few weeks 
 
6   William F. Sater, W, ‘The Abortive Kronstadt: The Chilean Mutiny of 1931’, The 
Hispanic American Historical Review.  v. 60. n° 2 (1980).                                                                                    
 
7  Carlos López-Urrutia,  ‘The Chilean Naval Mutiny of 1931’, Revista Derroteros 
de la Mar del Sur (n.d) 
http://derroteros.perucultural.org.pe/textos/derroteros8/lopez.doc [acceded 1 
October 2009] 
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before: too little time to permit them gain enough influence over the rest of the crew to 
initiate an event of such magnitude.   
For Luis Vitale-Cometa, a Marxist historian, the 1931 mutiny could have been the 
ferment for the social struggles of its time but in no case was it a revolution because, he 
writes:   
‘The rebellion had at its beginning an economic character: avoiding a 
salary reduction. But as the confrontation became worse, the demands 
acquired a political tone. The sailors started fraternizing with the workers. 
Nevertheless, the rebellion leadership could not or did not want to reach an 
agreement with the worker’s organizations as FOCH and IWW8. This 
fundamental mistake of the mutineers led to their isolation and final defeat. 
In their field, the leadership of the worker’s movement did not know how 
to evaluate the importance of the rebellion in the Navy. Only a few of 
Santiago’s unions and Valparaíso...called for a general strike but the 
majority of the leaders maintained an expectant attitude disregarding an 
exceptional opportunity for heightening the social change process9
 
’. 
For the novelist and folk song composer of Marxist trend Patricio Manns the mutiny 
is simply a revolution. The title of two successful editions of his book La Revolución de la 
Escuadra [The Revolution of the Fleet] is revealing. He states:  
‘the mutiny in the Navy was not a spontaneous practical expression. Many 
previous disturbances...all of political or economical character created a 
road to the naval rebellion. The Fleet Revolution then mirrors in a visible 
way the spectre of a social upheaval, the exhaustion of the proletarian 
electors in the face of an imminent change following the triumphant 
October Revolution. Its tides arrived to this country with eloquent 
vehemence from its original focus in the far distant and obsolete Russia of 
the Tsars10
 
’. 
                                                 
8  FOCH, means Federación Obrera de Chile (Chilean Workers Federation). It was a 
federation of unions created in 1909 and later strongly influenced or controlled by 
the Communist party.  In 1919 the workers and unions closer to the anarchist trend 
created IWW Chile affiliated to IWW (Industrial Workers of the World) an 
organization founded in Chicago in June 1905 at a convention of socialists, 
anarchists, and radical trade unionists from all over the United States.  
 
9  Luis Vitale-Cometa, Interpretación marxista de la historia de Chile, 5 vols. 
(Santiago: LOM ediciones, 1983).  V (n.d.) p. 322. 
 
10  Patricio Manns, La Revolución de la Escuadra (Valparaíso: Ediciones de la 
Universidad Católica, 1972) p.19. 
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Manns does not prove his hypothesis probably because he is a political artist not an 
historian. The 1931 mutiny did not precipitate a great popular rebellion or a major political 
change in Chile. The communists, and the proletarian electors, far from being exhausted, 
participated enthusiastically in the 1931 and 1932 presidential elections. Moreover, Chile 
normalized its political life after the disruptions caused by the successive changes in 
government that occurred during 1932. The impact of the economic depression was 
attenuated during the second administration of Arturo Alessandri [1932-1838].  
Other authors of the same trend as Manns agree with him in assigning to the mutiny 
the character of a revolution. Such is the case of Hernán Ramirez-Necochea11
For Marcos Chamudes-Reitich, who was a member of the ChCP Central Committee 
in 1931, that year’s mutiny:  
. Other leftist 
authors have a slightly different point of view. 
‘was a spontaneous act and due to this, it was badly organized. Despite this, 
the party at that time devoted to reorganizing its cadres, estimated that it 
was a handy and precious opportunity to spread even more a slogan already 
abandoned. With the party’s hopeless tendency for repetition, it kept the 
idea of creating councils of workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors. In other 
words, the Chilean soviets12
 
’.  
Chamudes was afterwards expelled from the ChCP but his opinion is valuable 
because he witnessed what was happening inside this political organization. At the same 
time, he has a critical vision influenced by his exit from the party. His short narrative of the 
events is full of gross factual mistakes.  
More recently, Jorge Magasich-Airola13
                                                 
11  Hernán Ramírez-Necochea, Hernán, Obras Escogidas (Santiago: LOM Editores, 
2007). 
 a participant in the leftist political 
movements of the 1970s analyzed the sources he had available concluding that: ‘there is not 
enough proof or even clues enabling it to be sustained that the revolt was initiated by the 
communists. The witnesses and the facts show better that it was an autonomous 
movement’. He also states that it was: ‘an autonomous Navy men movement having 
 
12  Marcos Chamudes-Reitich, Chile, una advertencia americana (Santiago: Editorial 
PEC, 1972), p15. 
 
13  Jorge Magasich-Airola,  Los que Dijeron No, 2 vols. (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 
2008). I, pp.183-184 
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unfortunately a previous unknown organization’. His narrative too has several factual 
mistakes.  
Almost all the above quoted authors used exclusively Chilean sources. López 
additionally uses American sources. Sater does the same, adding some British sources. 
These last sources are particularly valuable since at that period there was a mission 
composed of about ten British officers serving with the Chilean Navy as advisors. In 
addition, there was a big network of consular agents and an intelligence analysis capability 
in the Embassy in Santiago and in the Foreign Office in London. Their opinions were 
biased by the possible influence of the social unrest stimulated by the communists in the 
British investments in Chile. The occurrence of similar mutinies in UK at the same period 
also had a bearing in the analysis registered in the British sources found. 
 Neither López nor Sater used Soviet sources inaccessible at the time they did their 
research. These are still difficult to access but there is some material in secondary sources. 
Thanks to the work of Olga Ulianova14
The lack of accessibility to the proceedings in the Courts Martial and in the 
administrative processes of 1931-1932 is another difficulty found in the study of this 
subject by authors already quoted. Only Germán Bravo had a partial access to a few 
volumes of a total of thirty six containing the proceedings. The rest had to limit themselves 
to partial chronicles published in the press about the trials.  
 who based her work on valuable primary Soviet 
sources, the scope of the communist participation in the Chilean mutiny is now better 
known. 
                                                 
14  Olga Ulianova, ‘El Partido Comunista Chileno durante la Dictadura de Carlos 
Ibáñez [1927-1931]: Primera Clandestinidad y “Bolchevización” estaliniana’, 
Boletín de la Academia Chilena de Historia. V. LXVIII (2002). 
 
 Olga Ulianova, Crisis e ilusión revolucionaria. Partido Comunista y 
COMINTERN, 1931-1934. (México, DF: Universidad Autónoma de México, 
2007). 
 
 Olga Ulianova, ‘Develando un mito: Emisarios de la Internacional Comunista en 
Chile’, Historia, Instituto de Historia, Universidad Católica de Chile. N° 41, v. I, 
January–June, (2008), pp. 99-164. 
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1.3. The theory of mutinies 
 
Mutinies are not a new phenomenon in naval life. As an introduction, there are 
several characteristics of rebellions against authority during the century before the one 
covered by this thesis which can be mentioned. In doing this, we will follow briefly one of 
Professor N.A.M Rodger’s reflections on the Georgian Period [1714-1830] in the Royal 
Navy stating that one type of mutiny in that period:   
‘Conformed to certain unwritten rules, which if they had been codified 
would have looked something like this: 
1. No mutiny shall take place at sea, or in the presence of the enemy. 
2. No personal violence may be employed [although a degree of 
tumult and shouting is permissible]. 
3.  Mutinies shall be held in pursuit only of objectives sanctioned by 
the traditions of the Service15
 
’.  
The Chilean Navy was created between 1813 and 1818 in the Emancipation Period 
coinciding with the last part of the fore-mentioned Georgian Period and had a strong British 
influence from its beginnings. In the first years of its institutional life there were several 
seditions not punished but once Vice Admiral Thomas Alexander Cochrane became the 
Commander in Chief of the squadron in 1818, mutinies and other episodes of indiscipline 
were prosecuted. Those found guilty were harshly punished. Among those mutinies, it may 
be mentioned the one affecting the corvette O’Higgins in 1819. Chilean crewmembers 
started the rebellion when they remained unpaid for a long period16
                                                 
15  N.A.M Rodger, The Wooden World. An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy. (New 
York: Norton, 1996), p.238. 
. In this case, the events 
took place while sailing to the theatre of operations and there was violence. The mutineers 
were tried in a cursory process and were found guilty and shot. The Spanish by-laws 
remaining current in the first century of republican life were applied in this trial. A couple 
of years after that case there was a mutiny in which British officers were involved. They 
were serving in Chile under contract but they wanted to go to Peru, a country then creating 
its own Navy. In this case there was no violence and the officers were tried in a Court 
 
16  Fuenzalida-Bade, 1978, I. pp. 121-122. 
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Martial following British rules, a privilege enjoyed by officers of that nationality. As a 
punishment, some of them were exonerated17
These two events briefly mentioned seem to show that the Chilean State started 
acting differently from Great Britain in cases of serious indiscipline even in the nineteenth 
century. This is remarkably notorious in cases when the mutineers acted violently. In the 
rest of that century there was no further collective indiscipline started by enlisted personnel. 
. 
 A modern study of the theoretical aspects of mutinies can be found in Bell and 
Elleman18
   Rose
. These naval historians recently published a book in which naval mutinies at the 
beginning of the twentieth century are analyzed by different authors, including the Chilean 
Naval Mutiny of 1931. In the foreword and in chapter thirteen the editors make a synthesis 
of the theoretical aspects of the problem. 
19 is another author who made an earlier study of naval and military mutinies. 
Rose claims that the word mutiny: ‘Evokes strong, even violent images of sailors taking 
over a ship from its officers or hapless soldiers facing a dawn firing squad20
‘If government abhor the word mutiny, the military does even more so, for 
the military’s ability to act effectively is founded upon the principle of 
discipline and mutiny is the antithesis of discipline. To the military, mutiny 
is utterly unthinkable. It is more than a breach of regulations; is the 
negation of the military essence
’ and that it 
creates verbal repulsion. Often the authorities and military leaders avoid using it, 
employing instead terms like ‘incident’, ‘affair’ ‘collective insubordination’, ‘strike’, 
‘disaffection’, ‘sailors unrest’ and other euphemisms. This author adds that: 
21
 
’. 
For Rose, the military does not like the word mutiny for three reasons, as mentioned 
above. One as being the antithesis of discipline; the discredit of the affected unit is another 
reason. The last one is the reluctance of commanding officers to use the word and 
jeopardize their careers. This third reason is due to the fact that there is a tendency to 
                                                 
17  Fuenzalida Bade, 1978, I. pp. 196-197. 
 
18  Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century. An International Perspective, ed. by 
Christopher Bell and Bruce Elleman (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
 
19  Elihu Rose, ‘The Anatomy of a Mutiny’, Armed Forces and Society N° 8 (1982), 
pp. 561-574. 
 
20  Rose, p.561. 
 
21  Rose, p.562. 
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believe that mutinies are the commanding officers’ fault as well as the officers up and down 
the chain of command. For Rose, the reluctance to use this word is extended by military 
and government institutions to a reluctance to provide information about mutinies. In Chile, 
the proceedings and records of the Courts Martial of the Naval Mutiny of 1931 have not 
been accessible to the public until now. Although the hearings in courts were public and the 
newspapers of the period published some partial accounts, the Navy has not opened its files 
until the research for this thesis began. 
Another problem in studying mutinies is the dissimilarities among them. Rose 
quotes Fletcher Platt writing ‘there is no such thing as a typical mutiny’ and adds that: 
‘this is partially true, since mutinies, like men, have attributes which 
permits at least some generalizations. The various factors which enter into 
analysis of mutiny may not be precise enough to be considered as social-
scientific variables yielding hard-and-fast propositions, nevertheless there 
are useful ways of organizing information that help describe and explain 
events and suggests insights into their meaning22
 
’. 
Rose then writes that: ‘one way of analyzing mutinies is to conceptualize it as a 
sequence of three phases: ‘the origin’ in which discontent of the troops arises and matures, 
‘the act’, during which the collective insubordination takes place and ‘the aftermath’ in 
which is found the consequences’. 
After analyzing each phase giving illustrative examples, he adds a diagram 
summarizing his theoretical approach to the subject. 
                                                 
22  Rose, p. 577. 
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The difficulties in using the word mutiny are also highlighted by Bell and Elleman. 
They quote Black`s Law Dictionary writing that mutiny is an uprising ‘against lawful or 
constituted authority, particularly in the naval or military service23
These authors also write that Great Britain had traditionally emphasised the 
collective or conspiratorial nature of mutiny. They quote the Naval Discipline Act of 1957 
describing mutiny as: 
’.  They also quote a 
professor of law at the US Military Academy suggesting that insubordinate acts did not 
themselves constitute mutiny unless they aimed to ‘usurp, subvert or override’ superior or 
military authority. Additionally, they quote the definition of mutiny as in article 94 of the 
United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. A person is guilty of mutiny when he ‘with 
the intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other 
person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty’. An individual might also be charged with 
this offence for creating ‘any violence or disturbance’ with the same intent. 
                                                 
23  Bell&Elleman, p.2.  
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‘a combination between two or more persons subject to service law …[a] to 
overthrow or resist lawful authority in Her Majesty Forces….[b] to disobey 
such authority in such circumstances, or with the object of avoiding any 
duty or service against, or in connection with operations against the enemy; 
or…[c] to impede the performance of any duty or service in Her Majesty 
forces….24
 
’. 
The problem in defining certain acts as mutinies arises when there is no seizure of 
the ship or when the acts are only a refusal to perform any duty. ‘Anxious mutineers often 
insist that their actions, particularly non-violent, are no more than a form of ‘strike’25
Then Bell and Elleman made a distinction between different types of mutinies
. In 
this case the crews are imitating maritime workers and these episodes are downplayed by 
the authorities as ‘unrest’, ‘dissatisfaction’ or ‘incident’. 
26
Bell and Elleman also define a third type of mutiny. It goes clearly beyond strictly 
naval concerns but stops short of revolution: 
. 
The first type of mutiny is: ‘essentially isolated or moderate acts of protest over service 
conditions’ and is labelled by sociologist Cornelis Lammers as mutinies of ‘promotion of 
interests’. The second type ‘has the aim fundamentally to alter the political status quo 
within a state’. Lammers categorize this type of mutiny as ‘either secession movement to 
gain autonomy or seizure of power movements, which represent a form of outright 
rebellion’.  
‘Mutineers have often attempted to influence or coerce their government on 
service or political issues without intending to directly challenge the 
authority or legitimacy of the Government. In democratic states, enlisted 
personnel have sometimes been willing to resort to mutiny as means of 
participating in the political process in a manner similar to their civilian 
counterparts27
 
’. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24   Bell&Elleman, p.2. 
 
25  Bell&Elleman, p.3. 
 
26  Bell&Elleman, p. 265. 
 
27  Bell&Elleman, p. 265-266. 
 
 
 25 
 
 
The following is a summary of the three categories of mutinies defined by Bell and 
Elleman: 
 
Type of 
Mutiny 
Goals Characteristics 
Naval [or 
Promotion of 
Interests] 
mutinies 
Sailors seek to improve or 
maintain their position with 
respect to income or other 
work conditions 
Grievances relate solely to naval issues, 
and may be relatively minor and 
mundane. 
Grievances may extend throughout the 
entire navy but are more commonly 
confined to a single ship or squadron. 
Usually resolved quickly and easily. 
Usually passive. 
Political 
mutinies 
Sailors seek either: 
[a] to improve conditions 
within the navy by exerting 
pressure on political authorities 
rather [or in addition to] their 
superior officers; or [b] to 
effect changes of a political 
[but not revolutionary] nature. 
Demands go beyond what a ship’s 
captain or even the naval high command 
can concede. 
Demands may be unrelated or only 
indirectly related to conditions of service 
in the navy 
Seizure of 
Power or 
Secession 
mutinies 
Sailors seek either: 
[a] to produce far-reaching or 
revolutionary changes in the 
composition or nature of the 
government; or [b] to entirely 
escape from the authority of a 
government  
Are most likely to occur in authoritarian, 
corrupt or weak states. 
Are most likely to involve violence and 
the outright seizure of ship [s] 
Source: Bell & Elleman, p.266.
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There are two relevant opinions in the above book about the origin of mutinies. The 
first belongs to Professor John Hattendorf  who writes in the foreword28
He also mentions the fact that the Navy of the age of sail developed an authoritarian 
system of discipline, reflecting the social values of that age. But this changed in the mid-
nineteenth century. Further changes occurred later. 
 that success in a 
war situation on board a ship requires audacity and tactical success on the part of the 
Captain. He adds that these attributes rarely come to bear unless the officers successfully 
manage their areas of responsibility, leading their men properly and, equally important, the 
junior officers and the seamen accept the leadership provided and agree at least tacitly to 
carry out the team effort in combat. 
‘By the twentieth century, vast changes had taken place within navies and 
their social fabric. Overall, navies had gradually become far more 
militarized than in centuries before and, at the same time, had became 
increasingly more reliant on the use of rapidly changing technologies. This 
in turn began requiring a far different type of seamen, with more advanced 
training and wider education to operate shipboard equipment.....29
 
’. 
Professor Geoffrey Till adds to the above that:  
‘since many twentieth-century sailors came from the industrialized and 
urbanized working class, they were by no means immune to the view and 
expectations of their former colleagues and neighbours ashore. As a result a 
two-way movement of influence could easily develop. Sometimes sailors 
would simply reflect the attitudes and expectations of normal civilian 
life….But influence could work the other way too….In  1931, during the 
Invergordon Mutiny, some British authorities were….haunted by the notion 
that the Bolshevik sailors would radiate out from Plymouth, Portsmouth 
and Chatham……to contaminate a British society made acutely vulnerable 
to sedition by global recession30
 
’.  
                                                 
28  John Hattendorf, ‘Foreword’, in Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century. An 
International Perspective, ed. by Christopher Bell and Bruce Elleman (London: 
Frank Cass, 2003) pp. xii-xv 
 
29   Hattendorf, p. xv. 
 
30  Geoffrey Till, ‘Series Editor´s Preface’, in Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth 
Century. An International Perspective, ed. by Christopher Bell and Bruce Elleman 
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This paragraph could be easily applied to the Chilean situation during the same 
period as will be demonstrated later. 
Bell and Elleman after analyzing other discipline problems in the rest of the 
twentieth century arrive at the conclusion that:  
‘major naval mutinies are probably a thing of the past for Western 
democratic states. Today’s all volunteer forces enjoy greatly improved 
conditions of service compared to their predecessors of even 30 years ago. 
They have access to clearly delineated and generally efficient channels for 
seeking the redress of grievances, in addition to a range of informal means 
to make their complaints known to higher authorities. When this is 
combined with institutional checks and balances, such as practice of 
outside inspections, there appear to be a few problems that existing 
‘systems’ will not be able to handle31
 
’. 
While the authors quoted above believe that in democratic and stable countries a 
major mutiny is less possible: 
‘The prognosis elsewhere is not as good. There are large proportions of the 
globe governed by unpopular, weak, or corrupt regimes. These states may 
be able to deter acts of collective insubordination by the threat of harsh 
punishment, but these measures only ensure that when the mutiny does 
break out, there is a high potential for rapid and dramatic escalation. The 
study of naval mutinies is, therefore, far from over 32
 
’. 
In Chile, after the Naval Mutiny of 1931 there was a period of political unrest and 
indiscipline in the Armed Forces lasting until the following year. It did not particularly 
affect the Navy as this service was extremely weakened after the mutiny, as will be covered 
in a later chapter. In the 1960s and 1970s there were acts of collective insubordination 
when the country was in a period of political turmoil. These events could be classified as 
‘political mutinies’ accordingly to the Bell and Elleman categories33 and the origin of those 
seditions could be the ‘political conditions’ of that age, as described by Rose34
 
. 
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1.4. The crime of sedition or mutiny in the Chilean Military Code. 
 
The Chilean Code of Military Justice became effective in the Army on 1 March 192635. 
On 30 October 1927 it became applicable to the Chilean Navy as well. Before this date, the 
Spanish Naval by-laws and the Army general by-laws were effective in this service36
 The Chilean legal system is based on written law, so the wording must be very 
precise and detailed. This is very important when deciding about offences or crimes and 
simple violations of the discipline by-laws. This explains why in the Chilean Code of 
Military Justice nine articles are used to define mutiny or sedition. This crime is defined in 
article 266 of the version current in 1931, in the following terms:  
. As a 
consequence, the Chilean mutineers of 1931 were tried under the above quoted code when 
it had only been in effect for four years. 
‘Servicemen37 at least four, who refuse to obey their superiors or who 
complain or make disrespectful or tumultuous petitions, or refuse to 
perform their military duties, shall be punished and held accountable for 
the crime of mutiny or sedition38
 
’.  
Later, the code establishes that the penalty will be higher for: ‘those who appear to 
be leaders, or be the instigators of the sedition, or are the most senior at the location39
‘Those leading the troops under arms or in the process of becoming armed 
who raise their voices in a subversive manner or incite others to commit 
this crime… [mutiny]… shall always be considered as instigators. If no one 
is discovered as giving the orders, the penalty’… [for promoting a 
mutiny]…‘except death penalty will be imposed on the six individuals 
considered to be instigators by the officers being present during the events. 
’. The 
code makes a distinction between the promoters and the mere performers of the crime. The 
definition of promoter is given in section 269, stating that: 
                                                 
35  Código de Justicia Militar (Santiago: Instituto Geográfico Militar, 1932). 
 
36  Mario Duvauchelle-Rodríguez, ‘La Justicia Naval Penal Chilena’,  Revista de 
Marina No. 115 (May-June 1998/3). 
 
37  The expression serviceman is used in the code meaning officer and non-
commissioned officer or enlisted personnel. 
 
38  Código de Justicia Militar, p.81. 
 
39  Código de Justicia Militar, p.81. 
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They will be exempted of these penalties if they name the real instigators 
are discovered by other means40
 
’. 
Under Chilean law, mutiny or sedition can also be committed by civilians because 
article 277 states: ‘any person, military or not, persuading or helping Armed Forces troops 
by any means, to commit acts of insubordination, shall be considered as guilty of sedition 
and instigator of this crime’. 
The Chilean Code of Military Justice also punishes those who do not actively 
oppose a mutiny. Article 274 states: ‘The serviceman who becomes aware of the committal 
or the attempt to commit the crime of mutiny and does not use all means at his disposition 
to actively oppose the mutiny, shall be punished by….’. 
The Chilean law also defines a second crime against obedience, which is in article 
300:   
‘The military serviceman that 1] does not keep discipline of the troops 
under his command or does not energetically restrain any military 
crime…2] or enables the escape of prisoners by inexcusable negligence 
…3] or does not comply with his military duties even without committing 
disobedience or the crime stated in article 294… shall be punished with the 
penalty of prison….41
 
’.  
The last section of the above article defines the crime of failure to comply with 
military duties and, as it may be appreciated, the definition is very wide and ambiguous and 
would cover mutinies when this crime is committed by less than four people. This offence 
is somehow equivalent to ‘dereliction of duty’ in the US Uniform Code of Military Justice 
The fine line between a mere transgression of discipline defined in by-laws and a 
crime, such as the failure to comply military duties, is not clear. Nevertheless, the above 
article is used every time that a serious situation occurs in which there is no specific crime 
defined in the Chilean Code of Military Justice to charge the offenders. In other words, if 
certain acts cannot be considered clearly as a mutiny, they may be judged as a failure of 
compliance of military duties and punished accordingly to the above article. 
As a summary, the Chilean military penal code effective in 1931 established that the 
crime of mutiny or sedition could only be committed by at least four or more military 
members and the participation of each could be as author, instigator or mere participant. 
The same offence could be also committed by the military who did not oppose the mutiny 
                                                 
40  Código de Justicia Militar, p.82. 
41  Código de Justicia Militar, p.89. 
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or who acted negligently in the repression of it. They could also be charged with failure of 
compliance of military duties when less than four members of the military committed the 
punishable act. The civilians could also commit the crime of sedition by promoting the 
mutiny or by helping the mutineers. 
Other less relevant parts of the Chilean law related to mutiny will not be commented 
upon since the above is enough to understand how the courts acted in 1931. 
 
1.5. An introduction to the following parts of this thesis. 
 
 Part I of this thesis will be devoted to the remote and immediate origin of the 
Chilean naval mutiny of 1931. The first chapter will deal with the 1879-1924 period giving 
a vision of the Chilean Navy serving a country ruled by a quasi parliamentary regime. 
During those thirty years this service was modernized in terms of organization and materiel. 
At the beginning of this period, the Navy supported the group that ousted President José 
Manuel Balmaceda-Fernández in the Civil War of 1891 and this created a special mentality 
in the naval officers that would be analyzed in this part as one of the concurring factors of 
the events of the 1924-1931 period. The lack of discipline in the Armed Forces is noted in 
this chapter as well because it was one of the factors in the environment that prefaced the 
ensuing mutiny.  
The next chapters of this first part deals with the 1924-1931 period in particular 
when two caudillos, Arturo-Alessandri Palma and General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo 
disputed the political supremacy, plotting against each other with the support of military 
and naval officers. Another subject is the long stay of battleship Latorre and other Chilean 
warships in Great Britain at the same time that there was a period of political and 
economical troubles leading to unrest in both labour and armed forces in that country. 
Finally, the immediate cause of the mutiny is analyzed, that is, the salary reductions during 
1930-1931. The author belives that Part I is essential for understanding what Elihu Rose 
calls the ‘background conditions for a mutiny’ [see section 1.3]. 
The second part of the thesis is devoted to the mutiny itself; it is divided into three 
chapters, each one devoted to a geographical location where the main events took place. 
The rebellion started on board ships anchored in Coquimbo and then it was propagated to 
other ships and shore establishments in Valparaíso and Talcahuano. The end of this 
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movement started when the Government recovered these last two ports, and the last chapter 
of this parts deals with the end of the rebellion. This part narrates what Elihu Rose calls ‘the 
act of protest’ and the ‘reaction’ [see section 1.3]. 
Part III is devoted to the aftermath. One chapter will deal with the consequences 
upon the Chilean Navy. They were very important because this service was weakened and 
could not recover until the end of the Second World War for the reasons that will be 
explained. The other chapter deals with the political consequences of the mutiny. It covers 
the importance attributed by leftist-oriented authors and groups and the influence on the 
politics of the 1930s. 
Finally, the author’s interpretation ends the thesis examining whether the events of 
1931 were really a revolution, as claimed by some authors, or was merely a mutiny. 
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 PART I: THE ORIGINS 
 
2. THE REMOTE ORIGINS OF THE MUTINY. 
 
2.1. The war against Perú and Bolivia (1879-1883) shaped an attitude in the Navy. 
 
 This conflict known in Chilean literature as the War of the Pacific almost involved 
Argentina until Santiago’s early victories discouraged Buenos Aires. 
The first phase of the war was essentially a maritime contest which ended when the 
Chilean Navy obtained a degree of control of the sea allowing land forces to invade 
Peruvian territory, including Lima. By 1880, Bolivia, for all interests and purposes, had 
abandoned the conflict and its onetime ally. By 1884, Chile had annexed Bolivia’s seacoast 
as well as occupied three Peruvian provinces. It would ultimately return one of these in late 
1920s in the period immediately before the mutiny. López-Urrutia42, Fuenzalida-Bade43 
and the author of this Thesis44
The final victory significantly shaped the victor’s attitude. As Collier and Sater 
concluded: ‘The already well-developed Chilean sense of superiority was much enhanced 
by victory. A new set of heroes took its place in the national pantheon
 have studied in detail the participation of the Chilean Navy 
in this conflict. 
45
                                                 
42 Carlos López-Urrutia, Historia de la Marina de Chile (Santiago: Andrés Bello, 
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that war’s survivors still served in the Armed Forces, a few even reaching the highest 
positions in the Navy and this influenced their attitudes giving strength to their opinions. 
2.2. The 1891-1924 period in Chilean politics. 
  
Within ten years of the conclusion of the War of the Pacific, the Navy would side 
with the Congress when the legislature rebelled against the chief executive, starting what 
became known as the Civil War of 1891 [see Glossary]. Early research by the author of this 
thesis46
 The losing side, the Presidential Party, was headed by President José Manuel 
Balmaceda-Fernández. It was defeated, although it enjoyed the support of almost the entire 
regular Army. As a consequence of war, most of the Army’s officers were cashiered 
although later, when a war with Argentina seemed quite possible, they were slowly 
recommissioned. Not surprisingly those officers who rebelled against President Balmaceda 
or entered the Army during the conflict reached the higher ranks. In the Navy the few 
officers who remained loyal to the President were exonerated at the end of the conflict. 
Later they were recommissioned but these officers did not reach the top. The policy 
followed by the victors regarding the defeated officers of both services was covered by the 
author in an early research article
 indicates that the Navy’s officer corps joined the rebels largely for personal reasons 
because this service enjoyed close relationship with legislators as well as the elites of 
Valparaiso, Chile’s most important port and the centre of international trade as well as 
domestic industry. This bloody conflict ended with a rebel victory, a fact that would have a 
significant impact in the Navy’s subsequent development and mentality. 
47
To understand the background to the 1931 mutiny we have also to study the post 
1891 organization of the Navy. The rebel Navy acted under the direction of Admiral Jorge 
Montt-Álvarez who also was elected as President immediately after the Civil War. After his 
presidential period, he directed naval affairs until 1913, leaving this service in the hands of 
his disciples. Montt had commanded a ship during the War of the Pacific as well as leading 
. 
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47  Carlos Tromben-Corbalán, ‘Sanciones y Amnistías en la Historia Naval de Chile’, 
Revista de Marina. 112/829,  (1995), pp.186-190. 
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the wining side of the Armed Forced in the Civil War of 1891. Thanks to his war record, he 
enjoyed immense prestige. 
 Montt reorganized the Navy after 1891 to correct the deficiencies he had observed 
in both conflicts. As a result of these changes, this service became socially and politically 
distant from Santiago and closer to Valparaiso48
[The Navy’s organization]...‘was an imperfect copy of the Royal Navy and 
essentially was in correspondence to the personality of Admiral Montt who 
become widely empowered with tis organization ......His dependence on  
the Minister of the Navy was mostly theoretical since his rule made the 
Navy a State within the State itself
. The new Navy, however, was not without 
problems. As José Toribio Merino-Saavedra says as a witness of that period: 
49
 
’. 
 That organization created by Montt in the political context of the 1890s outlived its 
validity but was still in force in 1924, a fact which dissatisfied junior officers trying to 
modernize the Navy. 
At the turn of the century, differences within the Catholic Church altered existing 
political ideas and fomented social change. While a majority of the executive officers 
shared a conservative catholic vision, the rest of the officers were more liberal and some of 
them even belonged to secret societies such as the Masonic Lodges, who were antagonistic 
towards traditional Catholicism. There were also a few Protestant officers, mainly the result 
of their family origins whose religions did not prohibit their belonging to such societies. 
Engineers, surgeons, supply and pilot officers generally tended to be less conservative than 
the executive officers.   
In 1924 and 1925, the Navy Roster of Officers50
                                                 
48  José Toribio Merino-Saavedra, Memorias del Último Director General de la 
Armada antes de la Dictadura. (Santiago: Dirección General de Prisiones, 1932), 
p.4. 
 [Escalafón de Oficiales Armada de 
Chile, 1924] numbered two vice admirals, eight rear admirals and twenty two captains. The 
 
49  Merino-Saavedra,  p.5. This author, as most of others of his age, writes in an 
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express. This is especially true for readers not familiar with the context. 
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the few naval officers who published his memoirs during this period. 
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two vice admirals and five out of the eight rear admirals had served in the final episodes of 
the War of the Pacific. All the flag officers and thirteen of the twenty-two captains in 1924 
fought in the Civil War of 1891 and some of them on ships participating in the rebellion 
against President Balmaceda. It is important to stress how significant it was in the 1920s to 
be a veteran of that conflict. 
Both wartime experiences influenced the mentality of those officers as well as that 
of the winning political groups after 1891, a class characterized by Vial Correa51
 Vice Admiral Francisco Nef-Jara was in 1924 the most senior admiral since Montt 
left this service in 1913. He was promoted to this rank in 1919 and he had seen action on 
board ships at the end of the conflict started in 1879. In the Civil War of 1891 he was a 
lieutenant on board various naval units. His second in command since the 1920s was Vice 
Admiral Miguel Aguirre-Gómez who had similar experiences in these conflicts as Nef. 
Another flag officer, Rear Admiral Luis Gómez-Carreño in addition of having served in 
warships in the War of the Pacific, had been a lieutenant in 1891 and saw action in the 
combat between naval units and land forces. Later he led a landing party that fought in the 
land battles of Concón and Placilla. In these last actions, Luis Langlois-Vidal
 as an 
oligarchy because it: ‘Handled the country alone, without anybody casting over them any 
political, economical, social or cultural shadows’. 
52
 The clash between conservative Catholicism of the senior officers and liberalism of 
the younger members of the Navy is a fundamental cause of the indiscipline of those years. 
, served as a 
midshipman under Gómez Carreño. He as a Rear Admiral was later promoted to the Navy’s 
higher position in 1925; in this period he would participate in brief but important political 
matters as will be covered later. 
The engineers constituted the most dissatisfied group of the Chilean naval officer 
corps. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, when the first steam ships arrived, 
engineers were looked down upon, considered mechanics because they lacked the advanced 
education which the executive officers possessed. Later, due to the technological 
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complexities, the Navy would have to invest substantial education resources, creating a 
School of Engineers, to improve the skills of these technical officers. This establishment 
achieved a high level of proficiency in the first decades of the twentieth century, graduating 
technically qualified engineers. Despite their skills, naval protocol and regulations 
discriminated against engineering officers in particulars such as uniforms, chain of 
command, and other matters.  An executive officer of that period, José Toribio Merino-
Saavedra, for example, had a very low opinion of the engineers. He writes:  
‘Regarding esprit de corps and discipline, they never had it and they 
created an antagonistic bloc to the executive officers that opened a breach. 
It was through this breach that the seed of indiscipline and subversion was 
introduced to break this important service…53
 
’ [the Navy]. 
No matter that the author of the above comment was a prestigious officer, whose 
opinion was listened to by the Navy Board [see Glossary] and even by the President, as it 
will be seen later, the author of this thesis does not share his view. Discipline broke down 
due to several causes as will be demonstrated later, and the attitude of the engineers was 
only one of them. Nevertheless, the above quote has been introduced to demonstrate the 
mentality of the contemporary executive officers. 
The naval engineers constitute an example of a group of Chileans, rising through the 
education provided by the School of Engineers, to the same intellectual and social level as 
those executive officers who graduated from the Naval Academy [‘Escuela Naval’]. Yet 
despite their educational achievements, the engineers suffered socially and professionally at 
the hands of the executive officers. 
The political, social, and economic problems of the 1920s were not exclusively 
Chilean.  Indeed, many of the ideological or political influences came from the northern 
hemisphere. In the post World War One era, the prevailing liberal ideology was displaced 
by nationalism, socialism, communism, and fascism in all its variations. Although 
somewhat delayed, eventually these influences reached Chile, arousing enthusiasm in the 
middle and lower classes. 
One example of the above came out of researching sources of that period when a 
foreign influence not often mentioned was found. It is General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship which started in Spain 12 August 1923.  
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Clarence Haring wrote in 1931: ‘..it is not improbable that events in Italy and in 
Spain suggested the military coup d’etat at Santiago in September 193154´. Frederick Nunn, 
another scholar also writes years later that Major Marmaduke Grove-Vallejos, a character 
who will appear often in the following chapters: ‘..led discussions on the political influence 
of the Spanish Army among officers of Santiago’s military garrison55’. The Chilean press56
Primo de Rivera’s regime was the first to recognizie the new government organized 
in Chile in September 1924 and this move was praised by the local press and the public. 
Soon after, the Chilean Army Aviation signed a contract to buy engines manufactured in 
Spain. According to Marina Casanova-Gómez
 
covered the first anniversary of General Primo de Rivera’s coup. Even liberal newspapers, 
such as La Nación, often published articles and statements of this General concerning the 
political situation in Spain. 
57
While the already-mentioned social and political changes occurred, the Chilean 
Navy grew significantly but in a chaotic way between the Civil War of 1891 and World 
War One and even later. 
 this contract was the result of the 
ideological closeness between the governments of Chile and Spain. 
The incentive for increasing the naval forces between 1891 and 1925 was a sort of 
South American navalism [see Glossary]. In Chile the incentive for this was that the 
victories in the nineteenth century demonstrated the influence of Sea Power. Another factor 
was the critical situation due to the border disputes, especially with Argentina. These 
factors provoked a disorderly growth of the naval forces. Several ships of advanced 
technology were added, and this made the deficiencies in quantity and technical skills of 
officers and men evident. In spite of the internal efforts of the Navy to obtain its personnel 
                                                 
54  Clarence H. Haring, ‘Chilean Politics, 1920-1928’, The Hispanic American 
Historical Review, v.11, N°1. (1931), p.1. 
 
55 Frederick M. Nunn, ‘Military Rule in Chile: The Revolution of September 5, 1924 
and January 23, 1925’, The Hispanic American Historical Review, v.47, N°1, 
(1967), p.3. 
 
56  Anon. ‘Un Gobierno Militar’. Revista Zig Zag. Santiago, 13 September 1923.  
 
57 Marina Casanova-Gómez, ‘Las relaciones Diplomáticas Hispano-Chilenas  
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by means of its schools, the solution adopted was to incorporate people directly from 
civilian life, including foreigners, especially for the engineering corps and for other 
technical branches and this would have consequences in 1931. 
A second phase to strengthen the fleet started in 1910 but it was delayed and 
influenced by the outbreak of the First World War. As a consequence, even after this 
conflict, the same method already described was used to overcome deficiencies in 
personnel procurement. 
The strain between Chile and Argentina, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
provoking the reinforcement of the naval forces, had diminished by the 1920s. 
Nevertheless, with Perú there were serious problems since the subject of Tacna and Arica 
was still pending, because the Treaty of Ancon58
As a summary, the Chilean society had been changing rapidly in the period between 
1891 and 1924, as in many other countries. The middle class and to a lesser extent, the 
popular sectors, had become more educated and, as a consequence, these sectors sought to 
improve the quality of their lives, participate more fully in the nation's political life, receive 
a greater share of public expenditures, and even rise in social status. Thanks to the wealth 
generated by the sale of nitrates, the quality of education improved as did the number of 
schools. It was during this period that the government built more public schools, hired 
foreign teachers and professors and sent students abroad to improve their knowledge. In 
, finally ending the War of the Pacific, left 
the final destiny of those two provinces, which were Peruvian before the conflict, as a 
pending subject. The treaty established that a plebiscite should decide the final sovereignty 
of each of those territories but the referendum never took place, due to reasons that are not 
to be explained here. In several occasions both countries tried to comply with this part of 
the treaty and in the 1920s it was expected that finally the plebiscite would take place. For 
this reason, the Chilean Armed Forces, and the Navy in particular, had to support the 
actions of the Government, keeping units deployed for long periods in the far distant 
northern ports from Antofagasta to Arica. Sometimes this deployment was due to an 
entirely different reason, such as supporting the local authorities in their efforts to maintain 
the social order in serious riots occurring from time to time in the nitrate, copper and iodine 
mines. In this last type of mission, the crews came into direct contact with the social unrest 
occurring in that period, keeping activists imprisoned on board the ships. 
                                                 
58 Peace treaty signed in Ancón, Peru on 20 October 1883. 
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many cases those who benefited from these programs, belonged to the middle class. The 
Armed Forces also participated in this process, enrolling better educated civilians, sending 
personnel abroad or receiving foreign instructors and advisors. 
It is possible that the majority of naval officers did not become fully aware of how 
education was changing the middle and lower classes. Certainly it is likely that level of 
education of the lower decks had improved and that this factor might have influenced how 
the rebels of the 1931 mutiny reacted. 
In summary, the Navy entered the second decade of the twentieth century with high 
ranked executive officers strongly influenced by the naval mentality resulting from the War 
of the Pacific and the Civil War of 1891. This behaviour, resulting from professional pride 
due to the results obtained in those conflicts was enhanced by liaisons with the predominant 
social classes, the oligarchy in Vial Correa’s wording. The rest of the officer corps did not 
share this vision, either because of education or social origin. Another characteristic of this 
period is the rivalry with the Army, something that was diminishing as the memories of the 
internal conflict of 1891 were fading away, but even in 1924, thirty years after that war, it 
was still possible to observe attitudes and facts pointing to this problem. 
The crews or enlisted personnel [see Glossary] did not make a conscious choice to 
join the rebel cause in the Civil War of 1891; they only followed their officers at their units. 
From 1891 until 1925, they did not show enthusiasm for any particular political party. But 
the officers’ political activity during 1924 to 1925 would set a precedent which lower deck 
personnel would emulate; they would no longer passively follow their officers’ orders.  
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3. 1924-1931: A PERIOD WHEN DISCIPLINE WAS BROKEN IN THE ARMED 
FORCES. 
3.1. Alessandri and the meddling of military and naval officers in political affairs 
 
The period between 1924 and 1931 is when the discipline in the armed forces was 
broken due to the participation of the officers in politics. This subject is covered in the 
literature from the standpoint of the political events. The author thinks that the historians 
covering this period do not explain what really happened in the Navy, although the events 
in the Army are better explained. For this reason it is necessary to devote certain space to 
the Navy in particular. 
Arturo Alessandri Palma, representing the hopes and expectations of popular sectors 
and the rising middle class, won the presidency in a very tight electoral contest. Soon after 
taking office in 1920, he clashed with the conservative opposition, which was very strong 
in Congress, and which blocked his legislative initiatives. Pressed by his electors and by the 
opposition, he chose to use the military to threaten a dissolution of Congress. He named 
members of the army as cabinet ministers and started visiting barracks where he indulged 
his populist speaking skills to arouse the public. The opposition, using social contacts in 
Valparaiso in the same way as happened in 1890 and 1891, responded by attracting 
elements within the Navy to their side. It should be remembered that the right was relying 
upon precedent since some admirals had participated in the Civil War of 1891 as junior 
officers. 
By 1924 the opposition had organized an anti-Alessandri conspiracy, while using its 
majority in the Senate, to block all legislation regarding retirement, promotions and pay 
that might benefit the military. The members of Congress, however, committed a crucial 
error since they began to debate a proposal to grant themselves an annual salary. Since the 
constitution prohibited paying legislators a salary, the congressmen stated that they were 
not discussing a salary but an emolument [‘Dieta Parlamentaria’ or Member of Parliament 
Emolument]. This issue came under discussion while the vast popular and middle class 
sectors were enduring a severe economic crisis, the result of the collapse of the nitrate 
markets, a principal source of government revenue.    
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The Navy shared the public’s disdain, Captain Carlos Andonaegui Guarda, the 
commanding officer of cruiser Blanco Encalada, then sailing off the Chilean coast on a 
midshipmans’ cruise, writes that the officers’ salaries were: 
‘..derisory, a Navy Captain in command of a ship earned $1,166.66 per 
month but he had to expend part of it paying the expenses inherent to this 
position on top of taking care of his family. The reader can make up his 
mind if this was possible. From my point of view, I would have to confess 
that I could not cope with it and I had to get help from my parental 
family…But even in this situation, we kept performing our delicate duties 
with sacrifice and abnegation. We had the hope that better days should 
come59
 
’. 
 It is worth saying that in the lower ranks the situation was even worse, particularly 
because for long periods the ships were stationed in the northern ports, due to the frequent 
tensions with Peru regarding the unsolved subject of the sovereignty of Tacna and Arica 
departments, and the serious labour unrest happening periodically in the nitrate ports. 
The following cover the political context and events from a general perspective, 
since what happened specifically in the Navy will be treated later. 
The Navy High Command, although not enjoying a close relationship with the 
President, made him aware of the danger of institutional stability that threatened the nation. 
Alessandri, distrusting this service’s political trends searched for elements within it that 
might support him, concentrating on those who supported his liberal political views and 
probably those who were freemasons. 
The immediate cause of the collapse of Alessandri’s presidency was an episode 
called the ‘Ruido de Sables’ in Chile’s history [see Glossary: ‘Sabre’s Noise’]. A 
considerable number of low ranking officers, belonging to the Santiago’s Military Garrison 
showed noisily their disagreement with the Congress when it tried to approve the ‘Dieta 
Parlamentaria’ while delaying the discussion of laws they considered beneficial to the 
Nation and the armed forces. These demonstrations were directed from the shadows by 
Major Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, the Director of the Cavalry School. 
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Ibáñez later became one of Chile’s leading politicians. One of his biographers60 
called him an ‘enigmatic caudillo’, since he was a very private person, who said little, who 
sometime acted quickly, but who on other occasions showed himself hesitant and irresolute. 
In 1924, he became convinced that the nation had to change the character of the political 
institutions, which in hands of irresponsible civil actors, had caused it untold grief61. 
Clearly, he would emerge as one of the leaders of a group of young and low ranking 
officers who would change Chilean politics. Vial-Correa62
Signs of unrest were evident in the Senate galleries on Tuesday, 2 September 1924 
and the following day. At the same time, some naval officers began to denounce the 
Parliament’s attempt to use a subterfuge to obtain salaries for themselves. 
 has studied thoroughly this 
character. 
Initially, Alessandri wanted to punish the officers who participated in the Senate 
demonstrations, but desisted, instead inviting a delegation together with their commanding 
officers to the ‘La Moneda’ palace [see Glossary]. There are two versions of this meeting. 
That of the President, who said that he only wanted to become aware of the complaints, and 
that of one of the officers, who claimed that the Head of State proposed the officers create a 
committee to draft a list of laws that the Parliament would either have to pass or the Army 
close the Congress. The fact is, apart from the differing versions, that the junior officers 
started meeting every time in a more organized fashion until they created the ‘Military 
Junta’ [later called Military and Naval Junta, see Glossary]. This was an organism 
completely out of the institutional framework and soon it would increase its participation in 
national politics. 
                                                 
60 Ernesto Würth-Rojas,  Ibáñez, caudillo enigmático, (Santiago: Editorial del 
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61  He was an Army major in 1924 who had participated in a military mission in El 
Salvador where he gained experience of being a political actor as well as a soldier, 
when he fought in Salvador's war with Guatemala. After returning to Chile he was 
a very cautious man never showing himself at the centre of the political stage. 
Indeed, until he became Minister of War in 1925, he had never held political 
office. 
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Two middle grade officers, majors Ibáñez and Marmaduque Grove-Vallejos, 
competed to control the Military Junta, initially from the shadows. Grove had been a 
student in the Naval Academy before joining the Army. This fact, as well as his social 
connections to prominent groups in Valparaiso, made him the ideal liaison with the Navy. 
As time elapsed, Ibáñez displaced Grove from the leadership of the military reformists and 
both subsequently followed political careers. Ibáñez became president of Chile in 1927, as 
well as the 1950s, while Grove served in the Parliament and helped found the socialist party 
in the 1930s. 
In the middle of the crisis, which started in September 1924, Alessandri tried to 
neutralize the actions of naval officers whom he considered hostile to his political views. 
Later in this section this subject will be covered in detail. The President also tried to 
overcome gracefully the political instability of those days, inviting active-duty officers to 
become members of the cabinet. 
General Pedro Pablo Bennett-Argandoña an eyewitness of that period wrote that on 
the 5 September 1925: ‘Two important acts occurred: the designation of a Junta or 
Committee representing the officers and the elaboration of a list of grievances that would 
be presented to the President63
Finally, late on 5 September 1924 a new Cabinet took office with General Luis 
Altamirano-Talavera as Minister of the Interior and Vice Admiral Francisco Nef-Jara as 
Minister of Finance, who also served as ‘Director General de la Armada’ [‘Navy’s Director 
General’: see Glossary]. Next day, the crisis did not diminish even with the new cabinet. 
The Military Junta tried to attract naval officers, sending emissaries to Valparaiso and 
Talcahuano, but these quickly discovered that the Navy was more interested in deposing 
’. Nobody knows who designated the members of the 
committee and probably the list was prepared by Ibáñez, Grove and other officers close to 
them. Bennett also supplements the list of this group with the names of the participants 
representing the different Army units and including significantly General Pedro Pablo 
Dartnell-Encina, the Commander of Santiago’s Garrison. Commander Julio Dittborn-Torres 
was the naval officer to participate in that committee but he never wielded much influence. 
Bennett’s book included a list of the committee’s requests. In other garrisons across Chile 
similar committees were created. 
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Alessandri and closing the Congress than in pressing for a program of political reforms or 
the approval of certain laws. The meeting of Army and Navy officers took place on 
Sunday, 7 September and it was agreed to incorporate three commanders and a lieutenant 
commander into the Military Junta. This marked a significant change because until then 
largely junior military officers had dominated the deliberative organism. 
While this happened in the Armed Forces and the Government, the rest of the 
country adapted to the new situation. 
Bennett noted that:  
‘The Military Junta commissioned several officers to go to labour centres 
to explain the scope of the military movement’ […and that these envoys…] 
‘expend a good deal of time’ […explaining…] ‘the benefits of it for the 
working classes64
 
’. 
 
The labour organizations initially refrained from political activity with the exception 
of the local chapter of I.W.W. Also, FOCH Santiago’s section, ended its analysis agreeing 
that it would remain expectant but without supporting the military movement started in 
September 1924.  
Monday, 8 September, was a very special day since the Congress finally approved 
eight laws that it had earlier refused to pass. Alessandri and the members of Congress 
thought that with the enactment of these laws the Military and Naval Junta would dissolve 
themselves and that the country would return to normality, a republic ruled by a president 
and assisted by a cabinet where high ranked officers were members. The junta, however, 
retained power because its reformist military officers, assisted by some anti-Alessandri 
naval representatives, refused to step down.  Although the rebels did not have a clear 
majority, the President resigned near midnight but the junta asked him to refrain making it 
effective immediately and to request instead a leave of absence for a limited period. The 
recently nominated cabinet offered its resignation as well but the President left La Moneda, 
seeking asylum in the American Embassy on 9 September at dawn. The Senate disregarded 
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his resignation, instead granting him a leave of absence for six months in addition to 
permitting him to travel out of the country65
In this situation, the Minister of Interior [see Glossary] became Chief of State as 
Vice President. General Luis Altmirano-Talavera succeeded Alessandri since he was Vice 
President [see Glossary] as the acting Minister of the Interior, but the pressure for the 
dissolution of the Parliament continued. Consequently a ‘Junta de Gobierno’ [or 
Government Junta, see Glossary] composed of Generals Altamirano and Bennett plus Vice 
Admiral Nef took office on 12 September 1924. This body assumed the power of the 
executive branch of Government. This same day a Santiago newspaper in its evening 
edition published an important document issued by the Naval and Military Junta which 
stated the rational for the military’s intervention in national politics. This statement, in the 
future, would be known as the ‘Manifesto of 11 of September 1924’. Its text can be found 
in Bennett
.  
66 and La Unión one of Valparaíso’s newspapers67
In these same days, La Nación, a Santiago newspaper supporting Alessandri, 
published several articles reporting frictions between officers of the different branches of 
the Armed Forces. On the same day that the manifesto appeared, a group of naval officers 
sent an open letter to the editor of La Nación which is worth citing because it reveals the 
political environment of that period:  
.  One of the most important 
facets of this document was its statement that the purpose of the military movement was to: 
‘Call for a free Constituent Assembly to elaborate a new fundamental law in accordance to 
the national aspirations’. This last declaration shows that this was a revolutionary 
movement in the sense that it sought to modify the political institutions, changing the 
Constitution first passed in 1833. In addition to the ‘Manifesto of 11 of September 1924’, 
the Military and Naval Junta also promulgated a ‘Statement to the Armed Forces’ which 
explained the Junta's actions.  It also hoped to maintain the integrity of the military's chain 
of command in the services which is a contradiction in itself because the Junta was an 
organization out of the regular structures of the Army or the Navy. 
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‘The Naval Committee has bitterly become aware of reports published in 
your newspaper suggesting the existence of differences between the Navy 
and the Army, regarding the great movement that has been created to 
reinstall the civic tradition in this country. Categorically and with energy 
we dismiss such an unpatriotic and tendentious attitude. On the contrary 
and energetically, the Navy and the Army, tightly united, will eagerly 
watch closely all the elements who are collaborating with their high 
purposes and those who obstruct them68
 
’.  
 Despite the good intentions to maintain harmony between the members of both 
services, in January 1925 a serious rupture shattered the tenuous unity and the origin of this 
serious problem will be explained in the following section. 
Early after the political change of the beginning of September a new initiative of the 
young officers belonging to the Military and Naval Junta took place. They started giving 
conferences on political and social issues to workers organizations that often requested this 
type of meetings. In those days, the Undersecretary of the Navy decided as well to issue a 
‘Manifesto to the Workers’69
 These types of conferences were given usually in public meetings taking place in 
squares or theatres. An example of this is the ‘Homage to the Navy and Army’, as it is 
called by La Unión, which took place in a theatre in Valparaíso on 25 September 1924
. 
70
 While this political activity was taking place, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, 
Rear Admiral Guillermo Soffia-Guzmán, arrived in Valparaiso. He disembarked 
. 
Several naval officers were present, among them, Vice Admiral Salustio Valdés-Cortez and 
Rear Admiral Luis Langlois-Vidal. There were different speakers among whom was 
Commander Lautaro Rosas-Andrade, a retired officer who would became Minister of 
Finance when Ibáñez rose to a position of authority in Government. Another orator was 
Lieutenant Commander Carlos Frödden-Lorenzen. His speech, which had clear political 
implications, strongly supported the Junta de Gobierno Altamirano-Nef-Bennett; 
amazingly, he talked representing the Navy despite the ‘Director General de la Armada’ 
being present. Years later, Frödden would hold high cabinet positions and would be 
mentioned as one of the factors precipitating the Naval Mutiny of 1931. 
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immediately from his flag ship and went to the Navy Club. The people attending that 
political meeting only became aware of the presence of this flag officer when it was 
finishing. Those in attendance then decided to go to the nearby club to acclaim him. Soffia 
accepted the cheering from a balcony, making a speech. Two lieutenants, Enrique 
Cordovez-Madariaga and Adirio Jessen-Ahumada, spoke as well from the same place. 
Accordingly to a summary published by La Unión, Cordovez said: ‘The change of regime 
produced in this country… in my opinion, has no precedent in the world history since it is a 
social revolution without bloodshed, partisan flags or caudillos71’. Jessen mentioned his: 
‘Desire of destroying the electoral machine working for so long in this country…’ [and he 
also extended] …‘.an invitation to the labour societies to cooperate with the new regime72
   One of the laws that the Congress so rapidly approved was one which established 
that officers in the Armed Forces could not stay in service longer than forty years. In the 
Navy this meant that the three vice admirals and one rear admiral had to retire and an 
officer of this last rank would become ‘Director General’. This law started a cycle of 
frequent changes in the high command, hindering the necessary continuity but, at the same 
time, facilitating the promotion to higher ranks. This goal was a cherished desire of the 
reformist officers in both services. Regardless of the new law, Vice Admiral Nef kept his 
position as a member of the government as well as Rear Admiral Luis Gómez-Carreño who 
stayed as Minister of War and Navy, both as retired officers recalled to duty. Analyzing an 
official document
’. 
Clearly these meetings in public places expressed the naval officers’ hostility toward 
politicians and in particular to Alessandri in some cases. 
73
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 it is possible to conclude that eight out of the ten serving vice admirals 
and rear admirals at the beginning of 1924 had to retire within twelve months. As a 
consequence of these forced retirements, those flag officers commanding the fleet units at 
the onset of the mutiny of 1931 were just lieutenant commanders at the beginning of the 
1920s. 
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 The internecine struggle between the Military and Naval Junta and the Government 
Junta continued into 1925. The reformers accused the later of being too close to the 
coalition called ‘Unión Nacional’ [National Union, see Glossary], headed by the 
Conservative Party; the Government Junta considered the Military and Naval Junta as a 
superfluous organization, in part because the legislature's acceptance of the reform package 
had removed the rationale for its existence. The Armed Forces, in short, should devote 
themselves only to their professional duties, leaving the Government Junta exclusively in 
charge of leading the state. This serious difference between the two juntas would precipitate 
another institutional crisis in January 1925 when a series of coups would plunge the nation 
again into a political maelstrom. 
 
3.2. January 1925, the peril of another civil war. 
 
When the crisis of September 1924 erupted, Admiral Nef, the Director General of 
the Navy received a call from President Alessandri. Unfortunately the communication was 
unsatisfactory. Probably for that reason, Gaspar Mora-Sotomayor, the Minister of War and 
Navy sent a letter to Nef asking him: ‘In the event of a movement causing a perturbation of 
the institutional stability’ [… to answer him whether…  ] ‘Admiral Soffia is a trustworthy 
person to be kept in charge of the fleet in case the above situation occurs74’. Later, he also 
inquired if it would be a good idea to concentrate the units of the fleet in Valparaiso, 
sending to Talcahuano those ships that might be useful to Rear Admiral Arturo Acevedo-
Lay, the base commander of the southern port of Talcahuano. Finally, he wrote to the 
highest authority in the Navy suggesting that he might do what he thinks is more 
convenient if he is satisfied with Admiral Soffia. Mora wrote also that if the Director 
General of the Navy was not satisfied with Soffia’s behaviour, he would have to propose 
the name of another admiral to the government to become commander of the fleet75
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75  The details about this letter and how it was delivered on 5 September 1924 are in 
a book written by General Enrique Monreal Nodeau who is an eyewitness of that 
period. 
 Enrique Monreal-Nodeau, Historia documentada del período revolucionario, 
1924-1925, (Santiago: Imprenta Nacional, 1929), pp. 147-149.  
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 At the same time, the President, unable to have a good telephone communication to 
the Navy’s higher ranking admiral, also chose to send him a letter on 5 September 1924. He 
asked about the attitude of the Navy towards the situation created by the Army’s young 
officers in Santiago. Accordingly to the only source available, the answer was: 
‘The Navy is a service of order and in any case, it will respect the 
Constitution.  In short, the Navy would not oppose the President but it 
could do nothing against the Army in case of a coup76
 
’. 
 It is very likely that the President and the Admiral were concerned about what 
happened in 1891 because both lived through that period as youngsters. Widening what was 
covered before [in section 2.2] it must be remembered that at the beginning of that year the 
Congress, dominated by the oligarchy, had stated that the President violated the 
Constitution while the country was in the middle of a serious political crisis. The fleet 
supported the Congress’s position while the Army remained loyal to the executive, thus 
precipitating a cruel civil war that ended President Balmaceda’s regime. 
 At the same time that the Director General of the Navy replied to the President; he 
gathered the Navy Board and communicated what was transpiring in the capital, stating 
that:  
‘A period of serious and disgraceful agitations has started in this country. It 
is impossible to foresee the consequences of shattering the Constitutional 
order and the guarantee of civil rights. The unleashed ambitions of parties, 
groups or institutions would struggle to gain power, damaging the external 
credit, the organization and the future of the country77
 
’.  
This statement by the senior admiral of the Navy indicated that although some 
officers of high rank might have had an unfavourable opinion of the government led by 
Arturo Alessandri, they regretted that the institutional integrity of the country had been 
broken.  Lower ranking officers in the Navy had a different position because according to 
Captain Merino-Saavedra this last group considered: 
‘The September military movement as a consummated fact… accepted by 
‘esprit de corps’ with the other service and with great enthusiasm. This 
reaction was logical since the benefits of the new laws regarding salaries, 
promotions and retirement had taken the services out of the stagnation of 
the past78
                                                 
76  ‘En Valparaíso’, La Unión, 6 September 1924.p.6. 
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77  Merino-Saavedra, p.6. 
 
78  Merino-Saavedra, p.6. 
 50 
 
More significantly, the Government and officers of the Army and the Navy were 
also plotting. The last group acted in Valparaiso as well as in Talcahuano. 
Accordingly to a source openly opposed to Alessandri79
While Nef had a loyal but uncompromising attitude towards Alessandri, the 
Commander in Chief of the Fleet Rear Admiral Soffia had a different view as reported by 
the press a few weeks after the events. Soffia was with his naval force in Talcahuano, while 
the flagship Latorre was being repaired when the September movement began and he 
learned the news via the local newspaper reports. He stated later to the press that: 
  the Executive Committee 
of the Naval and Military Junta had agreed to request the resignation of the President and 
the dissolution of both chambers of Congress as well as calling for the dismissal of those 
Army officers who were close to the President on 6 September 1924. This same day, about 
one hundred naval officers gathered in the Navy Club sent a supportive telegram to their 
colleagues assembled in the Army Club. The most senior of the officers signing this 
communication was Rear Admiral Luis Gómez-Carreño. 
‘I called for a commanding officers’ meeting that very same night in order 
to know their opinion…All of them said that they agreed with their 
comrades of the Army and that they considered that the movement was 
patriotic…At the next day, I gathered the officers of the flagship as well as 
the petty officers. I made a presentation about the events that were taking 
place in Santiago; I talked extensively about this and I made a report of the 
country’s situation, of the serious crisis affecting specially the humble 
homes and the lack of honesty of the men ruling the country80
 
’.  
This process of consulting the subordinates about political matters had become 
customary in that period, being indicative of the lack of discipline. In any case, such an act 
violated article 157 of the Constitution of 1833: ‘the public forces are essentially obedient. 
No armed corps may deliberate’. The same article, with identical wording, would be article 
22 in a new constitution which became law in 1925. Unfortunately, the law seemed a dead 
letter; the habit of the 1920s of consulting and deliberating about political events and the 
participation in acts of adhesion or rejection to different ideas, all of dubious legality, 
would be a causative factor of the naval mutiny of 1931 in the Talcahuano Naval Base. 
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At the end of Soffia’s presentation, those present requested the performance of an 
act to express their support to the military movement. The Admiral describes 
enthusiastically this manifestation of support, particularly when at the end of the ceremony 
a telegram arrived announcing that laws considered by the young officers as necessary had 
been approved by Congress. It must be remembered that such legislation was rapidly 
approved on 8 September and that was the last day that Alessandri remained as President. 
Soffia adds about those days that: ‘The position of the fleet was perfectly clear in a timely 
sent telegram of adherence to the military movement81
Days before his fall and learning of the attitude of the Commander in Chief of the 
Fleet, which indicated his support of the rebels, the President decided to remove him from 
command. Alessandri concluded that while Soffia and his officers supported the military 
movement, they opposed the President as head of state. Unfortunately, Alessandri´s use of 
some highly irregular practices would poison the atmosphere. 
’. This message did not call for the 
resignation of the president. 
The President, in collusion with the governor of Concepción [see Glossary] planned 
first to invite Soffia and Rear Admiral Acevedo, one of Alessandri’s supporters inside the 
Navy, to a meeting. Once convened, the government would imprison Soffia and offer 
command of the fleet to Acevedo. The plot did not work because Soffia, claiming he was 
ill, refused to attend but instead remained on board his flagship. He subsequently claimed 
that the meeting should have taken place on board his flagship because he was senior to 
Acevedo. He then summoned the officers’ meeting already narrated, starting the 
deterioration of discipline in the fleet. Accordingly to Vial Correa, Soffia:  
‘was afraid that the invitation for a meeting was an ambush designed to 
arrest  him. This is the origin of the legend that the pro Alessandri 
Freemasons (because don Arturo, Aguirre Cerda, Mora and Acevedo 
belonged to that organization) would try a counter coup using the fleet on 
the night of the 4 September but that Nef and Soffia aborted the conspiracy 
ending the naval career of Acevedo82
 
’. 
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Our interpretation is that the President and both of his ministers acted in the light of 
events such as those of 1891. They tried to solve the problem initially using a regular 
method and complying with a duty assigned to their positions. 
It must be recalled that the fleet at that time was participating in exercises near 
Talcahuano, when Latorre suffered a technical malfunction and had to go to that dockyard 
for repairs. When they docked, the officers became aware of the events in Santiago and 
Admiral Soffia summoned them, as well as all hands of the fleet, to indicate their support of 
the military movement. This act had special emotional characteristics in the flagship, as 
reported by an important witness of those days83
How did President Alessandri become aware of the political attitudes of Admirals 
Soffia and Acevedo? Zig Zag, a weekly magazine published on 27 September, noted that 
the President became aware of both admirals’ attitudes months before, while he and his 
party were on board battleship Latorre with them. The magazine wrote that after that 
meeting, the President became concerned about Soffia’s political views and this is why he 
decided to remove him from his command at the first signs of military unrest. 
 and Soffia, showing that the Commander 
in Chief of the fleet was disaffected toward Alessandri´s regime 
What other evidence exists about Soffia’s political ideas to justify Alessandri’s 
removing him from command? First, there is a statement of Captain Merino-Saavedra, 
already described as a valuable eye-witness of that period who wrote that this admiral was: 
‘One of the few officers belonging to a political party…arousing distrust among the officers 
for being conservative84
Admiral Acevedo denied participating in the manoeuvres to remove Soffia from the 
Navy. La Unión the conservative newspaper of Valparaíso, reported that the officers of the 
’. In short, Merino implies that Soffia belonged to the Conservative 
Party, a group clearly and strongly opposed to Alessandri’s Liberal Party. We must add that 
Captain Merino-Saavedra became commanding officer of Latorre, Soffia’s flagship, in 
November 1924 and both knew each other throughout their naval careers. We have not 
found any other evidence of political affiliation of this Admiral and our conclusion is that it 
is very likely that Guillermo Soffia, as a private citizen, supported the Conservative Party’s 
ideas and may be that this attitude was noticeable in his meetings with the President and 
naval officers of that period.  
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Talcahuano Naval Base sent a telegram to the Naval Headquarters in Valparaiso stating: ‘In 
view of the latest events, we support enthusiastically our collegues of the Army and we 
hope that the present Cabinet will achieve its program85
As other evidence of that period's political atmosphere, it must be said that 
Commander Olegario Reyes del Río, an active-duty officer and Commander Lautaro 
Rozas-Andrade, a retired officer, offered their own versions of the attempt to replace 
Admiral Soffia as Commander in Chief of the Fleet. They published the reply given by 
Vice Admiral Nef to the Government already quoted.  They also indicate they supported 
the idea that the Navy should join the military movement taking place in the first days of 
September 1924. Their ideas are openly stated in an article bearing their signatures
’. Among the most prominent 
signatures in this message are those of the Commander in Chief of the Naval District 
Admiral Acevedo and his Chief of Staff Captain Huerta-Lira. Clearly this message did not 
seek Alessandri's resignation; it is only supportive of the new Cabinet organized with the 
participation of naval and military officers. But, as we know, that resignation took place at 
the following day no matter that the majority of the Navy had not requested this action. 
86
The final outcome of the dispute between Soffia and Acevedo was that the 
government that succeeded Arturo Alessandri’s regime dismissed Rear Admiral Acevedo 
on 15 September
, a 
clear evidence of naval officers’ involvement in political actions. 
87
Captain Huerta-Lira as Chief of Staff of the Naval District before he replaced Rear 
Admiral Acevedo witnessed the climate of political deliberations in Talcahuano and the 
events on board Admiral Soffia´s flagship. As an example of the above, he points out that: 
, and he retired on 24 November 1924. His replacement as Commander 
of the Naval Base at Talcahuano was Captain Ismael Huerta-Lira. Later, when Alessandri 
returned to power, in March 1925, he appointed Acevedo to serve as the governor of first 
Antofagasta and then Santiago, which is an evidence of political affinity between them. 
‘The members of the Naval Committee were designated, almost 
unanimously, in a general meeting on board battleship Latorre and Captain 
José Manuel Montalva took the position of President. There were no 
engineers in this Executive Committee. After Latorre sailed to Valparaiso, 
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the meetings were very scarce and only the Executive Committee stayed 
active88
  
’. 
 The handling of differences between executive and engineering officers was 
introduced before [in section 4.1] and will be covered again later, since the chronological 
order will be followed again to cover the actual naval participation in the September crisis. 
On 6 September, the Military Junta agreed to send one of its leaders, Marmaduke 
Grove, to contact the Navy, trying to attract its officers to the movement started in those 
days by the junior officers of the Army. The Junta thought that since Vice Admiral Nef was 
recently nominated to the cabinet, the Navy would support the movement started by them. 
Lieutenant Colonel Alfredo Ewing, however, informed the Military Junta that when 
Alessandri announced for the first time in the afternoon on 6 September that he would 
resign. Nef, as ‘Director General’ of the Navy, stated he would not remain in the 
government if the President would abandon it89
Further evidence that some of the Navy’s officers wanted Alessandri’s resignation 
no matter Nef’s position is the following. Carlos Saéz-Morales, an Army Major, witnessed 
this period adding his version to Vial Correa’s
. 
90. Sáez says that Grove´s meeting with naval 
officers took place in the Navy Club on 7 September and there, Rear Admiral Gómez 
Carreño supposedly said to this military leader: ‘Tell Lucho91 Altamirano he could count 
on us if Alessandri would leave and the Congress would be closed92
                                                 
88 Ismael Huerta Lira, Informe del Comandante en Jefe del Apostadero Naval de 
Magallanes [sobre los sucesos ocurridos en Talcahuano entre SEP 1924 y ENE 
1925],  (24 de mayo 1925. Transcription from an unpublished typewritten report. 
Chilean Navy Archives. Valparaiso), p.1. 
’. The Admiral's 
testimony seems quite accurate. Several historians such as Vial Correa have written that 
Gómez- Carreño became disaffected with the President during his term in office. Grove 
says that while he was researching the Navy attitude, Guillermo Rivera, a prominent 
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politician of Valparaiso told him that day that: ‘Nef should never be considered as part of 
the new government since he would not accept the President leaving his position93’. If we 
stick to this second hand source, the deliberation to participate in political matters was 
considerable at that stage, also in the Navy, and it was evident that several high ranking 
members wished the President’s exit [except Nef and Acevedo]. Another evidence of this 
attitude is in secondary sources such as Monreal94
‘Francisco Huneeus Gana went to Valparaiso at the beginning of the 
year… [1924]… to check with those who were conspiring … [such 
as]…Gómez-Carreño and Soublette who favored a complete change of 
government, including, evidently Alessandri’s exit and the dissolution of 
Congress. The Navy feelings of strong opposition to the disruptive 
politician heavily influenced the President’s downfall
and Donoso who writes: 
95
 
’. 
It must be said that Donoso is an author strongly biased against Alessandri and this 
explains why he called the President a ‘disruptive politician’. 
General Bennett stated96
It is worthwhile to note how the cruiser Blanco Encalada, at that time serving as a 
training ship for midshipmen reacted. The vessel was anchored in Puerto Slight, close to 
Gulf of Penas, when its commanding officer wrote:  
 that there was a difference between the attitude of the 
Army and the Navy regarding the movement that started the government’s fall in 
September 1924. Initially, both the senior and the junior Navy’s officers supported the 
movement because it maintained naval discipline. The only discrepant views were 
Acevedo’s who supported Alessandri and Nef’s who wanted that Alessandri stayed in 
office making the changes pursued by the young military officers. The Army, however, was 
divided; the junior officers, particularly in Santiago’s garrison, supported the movement; a 
few generals would only join it later. The rest of the garrisons across Chile were not part of 
this movement. A witness to that period attributes this attitude to the fact that the Army, 
unlike the Navy which had the post of ‘Director General’, lacked a unified command. 
‘We intercepted a message announcing the coup on 5 September…an event 
that caused... [me]... a deep surprise, and ....a great concern. It was not 
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possible to have a clear idea of the events, because it was a long time since 
I had the last news from the centre of the country. I decided then to wait in 
that port to see how the events worked out and to keep calm acting 
prudently…An officer’s delegation approached suggesting the convenience 
of adhering to the new movement. I, in accordance of the above criteria, 
did accept the suggestion. At midnight a message was intercepted from the 
Director General to the Magellan Naval District requesting it to show itself 
in favour of the movement. With this document in hand, I was able to make 
a sound decision. I wrote then my personal commitment and those of my 
officers and crew97
 
’. 
Again, this quotation enables an appraisal of the disruptive spirit of that age heavily 
influencing the events in the Mutiny of 1931. It also enables it to be stated that the 
indiscipline was not only a problem of the fleet or in the ships and shore establishments of 
Talcahuano Naval Base. It was a more generalized problem and it had been concocted over 
a long period because the above took place in a ship that had been on an extended training 
cruise, isolated from other naval units. 
8 September constituted an important date since the Congress approved, without 
further study or discussion, the eight laws it had bottled up for so long. On the same day, 
several naval officers were incorporated into the Military and Naval Junta. There is some 
disagreement on this point: Ricardo Donoso98 named only a few, but General Bennett’s 
list99
General Bennett says that in the meeting in the Navy Club on 7 September the 
creation of a Committee was agreed as well as sending delegates to Santiago’s Naval and 
Military Junta. In Talcahuano a similar committee was created. Bennett gives only the 
 is the best because he is an important witness of that period, giving also the place 
where they were selected [see Appendix]. This means that the Military and Naval Junta was 
a group not clearly organized and having a variable membership of unknown origin. The 
engineers tried to become members of this deliberating body but the Army, fearing it would 
antagonize the Naval High Command rejected their petition. Ibáñez took notice of this fact 
and would contact the engineers later. As it has already been noted Alessandri submitted 
his resignation on 8 September, and over the course of the next two days a new government 
was consolidated. 
                                                 
97  Andonaegui, p.76. 
 
98  Donoso, v.I, p. 398. 
 
99  Bennett, p. 81. 
 
 57 
names of two members: Commander Alejo Marfán and Lieutenant Junior Grade Ramón 
Beytía, which is evidently incomplete information.  
Bennett wrote that in that event it was decided to name: ‘….commissions of officers 
to give conferences in worker’s centres and societies about the real story of the events 
producing the end of the politicking from the Government100’. Later, this source gave the 
following names, among others, as members of these commissions: Commander Arístides 
del Solar-Morel, Lieutenant Commanders Carlos Frodden Lorenzen and Adirio Jessen- 
Ahumada. All these officers would keep performing clearly political activities in the 
following days101
Two comments may be added to the above. The creation of such committees was 
clearly out of the disciplinary framework, considering the constitutional prohibition 
mentioned before. It shows also one characteristic of this period in particular because while 
the 1833 Constitution was valid, no other events of this type took place, except in 1891. 
Giving speeches to workers organizations was also an illegal activity for Armed Forces 
officers. 
 and even they would also have certain prominence in the Naval Mutiny 
of 1931. Officers in addition to those stationed in Valparaíso also participated in such 
activities as did Army representatives who spoke to railroad and custom house workers. 
Once President Alessandri became a guest in the American Embassy, the Navy 
pressed for his exit from Chile. According to General Bennett102
The 11th September 1924 was a very important day. As it was mentioned, the 
Altamirano-Nef- Bennett Government Junta was sworn in; it dissolved the Congress and 
issued a statement of its program. At the same time, the Naval and Military Junta published 
another statement in the Diario Ilustrado evening edition. This was a conservative 
newspaper published in Santiago. The document
, Rear Admiral Gómez-
Carreño arrived at Santiago on the 10 September informing the Cabinet that the Navy not 
only wanted Alessandri exiled, but it also wanted to dissolve the Congress. In effect, the 
following day Congress was closed and it would not convene again until the end of 1925. 
103
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intervention in politics. On this same day, a new Cabinet was sworn in, civilians occupying 
the Ministries of Interior and Finance, while Rear Admiral Gómez Carreño became 
Minister of War and Navy, replacing General Bennett. 
The civilian ministers requested the immediate dissolution of the Naval and Military 
Junta fearing that this body would try to dominate the Government Junta’s policies. They 
correctly noted, moreover, that this organization did not enjoy any legal basis for existing. 
The Navy insisted that Rear Admiral Gomez-Carreño be a minister, in order to 
compensate for the fact that two generals were serving on the Government Junta. Both 
services placed: ‘...Great hope about the acts …of the Admiral; he was the person wanted to 
purge the officer’s corps of bad elements without hesitation104
Over the next three months the military's opinion changed. The Minister of War and 
Navy, for example, ordered the arrest and expulsion of Daniel Schweitzer because this 
attorney staunchly supported Alessandri and because, summoned by the Santiago Military 
Garrison to warn him to cease any participation in political activities, he did not attend. 
Gómez Carreño's rationale was that since Schweitzer was a foreigner, he was forbidden 
from expressing opinions about Chilean politics
’.  
105
The same day, 11 September, the Naval and Military Junta finished its internal 
organization with a roster of a majority of Army’s officers plus a few members of the Navy 
and Police [see Appendix E]. The membership of this group was composed of a majority of 
young officers who were critical of the Government Junta. The remainder, a much smaller 
group consisted of the senior military, the naval and the police officer. The Military and 
Naval Junta decided, as a whole, to approve its decisions by seventy five percent of the vote 
instead the usual fifty one percent. Very soon Lieutenant Colonel Bartolomé Blanche-
Espejo and Commander Carlos Jouanne de la Motte du Portail became Under Secretaries of 
the Army and the Navy. General Bennet writes
.   
106
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 that Jouanne was the naval officer: ‘Who 
played the most important role in the Junta’. The lack of representation of the engineers in 
this or in other similar organizations did not go unnoticed in Talcahuano, where most of 
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these officers were concentrated due to the fact that the School of Engineers and the 
dockyards were located in that port. 
Captain Huerta-Lira called a general meeting on board cruiser O’Higgins to listen a 
report of the Talcahuano´s Executive Committee. ‘The great majority of the engineers 
objected to the existence of this Committee, calling for its abolition and claiming that they 
did not trust its president107
‘From that time on, the discussion transformed into a declared war between 
the executive officers in one side and the engineers in the other. One of the 
results of this conflict was a collective petition signed by no less than sixty 
of the engineer, pilot and supply officers…This application was duly sent 
to the higher levels of the Navy with a short report signed by myself 
because I was leading an unofficial meeting only as it was requested by 
those attending
’. When the Committee’s head, Captain José Manuel Montalva-
Barrientos, tried to refute these charges, the discussion became so heated that Huerta, the 
acting Commander in Chief, decided to cancel it. He also writes:  
108
 
’. 
The date of this meeting is unknown. It must have occurred at the end of the period 
between October and December 1924. Regarding the engineers’ problem, Rear Admiral 
Soffia stated in a Navy Board meeting on 3 October 1924 that the number of these officers 
should be reduced; an action that would upset them. 
The engineers’ unrest, arising in the midst of the disruption of the institutional 
order, became a public issue.  La Union published a couple of articles109
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 noting that the 
‘Instituto de Ingenieros’, an organization representing these officers, was demanding that 
the Navy give the engineers the same status as the executive officers. In the first of these 
articles, the author opposed the demands of the engineers. Accordingly to ‘Baden’ 
[pseudonym] there were too many engineers and these, being technical officers did not 
deserve a place in the chain of command. In the second article, the Director General of the 
Navy, Vice Admiral Valdés, excused himself from giving an opinion, claiming that he was 
not fully aware of the subject. He also added that he wondered that the engineers had made 
demands outside of the regular institutional framework. The Chief Inspector of 
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Engineering, Rear Admiral Engineer Diógenes Córdova responded to La Unión's charges, 
noting that ‘Instituto de Ingenieros’ was not part of the Navy, but was composed only of 
retired officers. While he too claimed that he lacked any information on the issue, he noted 
that Commander Edgardo von Schroeders-Sarratea, the Chilean Naval Attaché at London, 
had studied the situation of the engineers in the Royal Navy. His report supported the 
demands that the ‘Instituto de Ingenieros’ presented to the Government Junta. After 
praising von Schroeders, Córdova says that: ‘he writes that the subject of the Engineers was 
solved with the fairness and tact known by the British Empire when it takes care of 
problems affecting its Navy’.   
At the end of September another meeting of the Armed Forces officers and worker’s 
organizations occurred. La Union described the events writing110
Later he would say that during the period 1924 to 1925 he was a Christian socialist, 
not a communist and this seems to be true due to the subject, audience and place where 
those presentations were made and the publicity made by the conservative and catholic 
newspaper La Union of Valparaiso. At the same time, another meeting took place in a 
theatre at Santiago where Luis Emilio Recabarren the founder and leader of the ‘Partido 
Socialista Obrero’ later called Communist Party, said:  
 that in the theatre 
belonging to the Sacred Hearts Congregation the speakers were a member of the 
government and a retired general plus two workers José Luis Sepúlveda and Manuel Astica. 
Two months later Astica participated in the Convention of the Catholic Youth held at the 
Public Hall of the Federation of Catholic Missions. At that time, Astica presented and read 
a paper entitled ‘The social subject and the youth. The duty we should assume’. This 
speaker would reappear later as one of the leaders of the Naval Mutiny of 1931 [see 
sections 7.1 and 7.3]. 
‘The Army committed a seditious act punishable by the laws in order to 
make a whole reform in the functions of different activities in the country. 
The workers had the same purposes and if they had been the initiators of 
this movement, for sure they would not be in good situation now’…[and he 
finished saying that]…‘he considers highly attractive the program of the 
new Government111
 
’. 
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General Mariano Navarrete Ciris, returning to Chile from abroad, reported to the 
Minister of War, Admiral Gómez Carreño, at the middle of October. The Minister told him 
of his idea of restoring the Armed Forces to a state of discipline. He told him that he 
wanted the dismissal of the Naval and Military Junta. The Army officer fully agreed. Later, 
he would have an important role in the political and military events leaving his testimony in 
a valuable book112
In those days Gómez-Carreño and the Naval and Military Junta were pressing the 
Government Junta but for different reasons. The Minister wanted the junior officers ordered 
to return back to their duties and the Junta they organized objected that the Government 
was not satisfying their wishes of radical reconstruction. 
. 
A rift between both Juntas became evident at a social event of the Cavalry School 
on 25 October. This establishment was under the command of Ibáñez, the hidden leader of 
the movement that caused Alessandri´s exit from the Government the month before. At the 
event, Nef and Gómez Carreño were criticized in the presence of naval officers, and some 
members of the Army proposed that junior members of the Navy be admitted to the 
Military and Naval Junta. The naval guests showed themselves opposed to this idea. Ibáñez 
said that it was not in their intention to disturb the Navy. It was agreed that Commander 
Jouanne would travel to Valparaiso to explain the situation to the officers serving there. 
Vial-Correa and Donoso cover this event in their books but in our opinion, Sáez113
An Army-Navy Sport Championship, taking place in Santiago, revealed the 
differences between pro-Alessandri liberals and conservatives supporting the Government 
Junta. Days before the start of the event, a group of ladies requested permission to celebrate 
a mass before the event to express thanks for the new Government. Gómez-Carreño 
accepted. His agreement angered the liberals who considered that the planned Catholic 
ceremony was a political statement rather that a religious act. They argued also that 
celebrating mass in an Armed Forces event would be a demonstration of the affinity of the 
Military Government with the coalition headed by the Catholic Conservative Party. The 
junior officers of Santiago’s garrison preferred to avoid this religious act and finally it was 
 is more 
accurate and he is a valuable witness since he was present.  
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eliminated from the program114
We have already mentioned that the cruiser Blanco Encalada was making a training 
cruise along Chile’s littoral, ending in Valparaiso in October 1924. Its commanding officer, 
Captain Andonaegui-Guarda, did not participate in the political events and due to this we 
have quoted only a couple of his comments. The detachment of this officer regarding those 
events makes his observations more valuable. Fortunately he left them in an interesting and 
unpublished narrative. He says that at his arrival at Valparaiso:  
. Although this was a minor disturbance between two 
different political views, it demonstrated that the junior Army officers were adopting a 
more liberal stance than the conservative admirals represented by Gómez-Carreño. 
‘The political events progressed hesitantly….The Government Junta 
seemed to be obliged to follow the Naval and Military Junta. In this 
organism there were senior members with good intentions but there were 
also some excited officers sponsoring resolutions impossible to enact 
because they were inadmissible. No matter this, the flow of ‘Decretos 
Leyes’ [Orders of Council] kept coming, especially those meant to raise 
salaries and improve the career conditions for junior officers. To obtain 
their objectives it was essential to create vacant places in the officers’ lists 
to enable the promotions115
 
’ …[and this prompted many retirements]. 
 This rapid promotion of officers would have a consequence later.  
At the end of October, retirements and personnel changes took place in the Navy’s 
high command. Vice Admiral Salustio Valdés Cortez became Director General and he 
would have an important role in the events of the following months. The Naval and 
Military Junta decided also to solve its internal problems at the end of this month, selecting 
a committee to interact with the government. Among the members were Lieutenant 
Colonels Blanche and Ewing, Commanders Jouanne, Barros and Dittborn, Majors Ibáñez 
and Poblete, Police Chief Dinator and Lieutenants Lazo and Urizar116
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reported to the Government Junta on 4 November, raised the possibility that the conflict 
would disappear or, at least, it would be diminished. We must recall that the dispute was 
that the Government Junta and the Cabinet did not recognize the Naval and Military Junta 
as an organization within the State and this caused tensions and constant threats of 
resignation of those former high authorities. 
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An illustrative example of that environment was when General Altamirano scolded 
Lieutenant Lazo for being disrespectful. The junior officer answered that: ‘Since 5 
September nobody can talk about discipline in the Army117
As the menace to the existence of the Government Junta and the Cabinet from the 
most excited members of the Naval and Military Junta continued, Commander Jouanne 
specified to them in a meeting that:  
’. The Navy Commander Luis 
Escobar, present in this event, supported the General stating that the notion that the Armed 
Forces could not raise the issue of discipline was unacceptable. The entire affair was a 
demonstration of the state of confusion inside the services. 
‘Now it is my turn to talk representing the Navy. We are empowered to 
support the Naval and Military Junta as long as there is a Government 
Junta. If the Admiral and both Generals retire’…[from this Junta] …‘a new 
situation would be created and we would not be able to stay as part of the 
Naval and Military Junta118
  
’. 
The discussions continued until a solution to the clashes between both organizations 
was found in the form of a public statement worded as follows: 
‘The Naval and Military Junta states that it never claimed to act as an 
official organism of the State, but this does not preclude it from 
maintaining its collaboration with the Government Junta119
 
’.  
The above statement, drafted by the committee, did not please the full membership 
causing additional difficulties among both Juntas. The conflict arose relative to the 
projected reforms of the political institutions. The Government wanted to convoke a 
constituent assembly to approve the changes and the Naval and Military Junta thought that 
this method could jeopardize the reforms because such assembly would be directed by the 
same political parties that precipitated the situation the military movement wanted to 
prevent. General Bennett observed120
                                                 
117  Vial-Correa, v. III, 1988, p. 450. 
 this crisis from the perspective of being member of 
the Government Junta and he confirms that Admiral Nef had his resignation ready. When 
the rebel members of the Naval and Military Junta learned this, they finally ceased 
demanding changes.  
 
118  Sáez, v.I, p.131.  
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The clashes between both juntas had not finished as is demonstrated by the 
following statements. The first was issued by the Minister of the Interior denying that the 
Government had recognized the Naval and Military Junta, adding:  
‘There is no other political organism having part or all the empowerment to 
direct the State affairs in this transition period leading to the restoration of 
the democratic regime than the Government Junta121
 
’.  
The Government created a great unrest with the above statement and led to several 
meetings of the Military and Naval Junta but only one thing became known to the public. It 
was a statement from Vice Admiral Nef saying: ‘Our gratitude to the Army and Navy 
officers for their act of pure patriotism on the evening of Thursday122
Another event would reveal that the Government had a transient character. The 
Government Junta called for the direct elections of the President, Senators and Deputies. 
This was a change because Presidential elections were indirect until then. It was clear that 
the Government considered that Alessandri’s term in office had expired and that it did not 
want to subject the country to the same stress as in the indirect elections of 1920. The 
Government Junta thought as well that Chile should retain, probably with some 
modifications, those institutions created through the evolution of the 1833 Constitution, 
probably with some improvements. It was also evident that it disagreed with the radical 
changes sought by the junior officers, especially those of the Army.  
’ [he means 6 
November 1924] implying that their organization was in the process of being dismissed 
which is not entirely true. 
A new protagonist would appear in the political climate of the end of 1924, 
becoming more important in the following years. The Government discovered that the 
unions opposed the regime and that there were contacts between leftist elements and 
Captain Juan Millán-Iriarte a member of the Naval and Military Junta. Millán would 
contact naval officers later in Talcahuano playing an important role in the turmoil123
The unrest in the Navy continued. Talcahuano’s engineering officers opposed the 
nomination by the Bureau of Naval Personnel of Captain Montalva as the delegate to the 
. 
                                                 
121  ‘Falsos rumores circulados en la tarde de ayer sobre supuesta renuncia de un 
miembro de la Junta y del Ministerio’, La Unión, 7 November 1924, p.8. 
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final examinations in the School of Engineers. Captain Huerta, the Base Commander, 
successfully convinced Vice Admiral Valdés, when he visited the southern station together 
with Rear Admiral Luis Langlois the Director of the Bureau of Naval Personnel of 
nominating another officer.  
Huerta previously sent to Valparaiso a document drafted by the engineers attacking 
Captain Montalva for his performance as President of the Officers’ Committee. The visiting 
naval authorities stated that Huerta should have ruled in this case instead of sending the 
document to Valparaiso but the Base Commander disagreed, quoting the regulations. 
Finally, the two admirals met with the engineers, supply officers and pilots to explain to 
them that the Navy’s high command was concerned about their problems and that a 
commission would study the subject and recommend solutions. Among other aspects, it 
was already decided that the engineering officers would wear a star, the symbol of 
executive officers, on the cuffs of their uniforms. Huerta writes124 that this solution: ‘left 
those officers very satisfied’. That same afternoon, the General Director of the Navy met 
several executive officers as well. He talked about reconciliation among the officer corps 
and the privileges intended to be given to the engineers. The executive officers, however, 
stated their opposition to the intentions of the Navy’s high command. Later, Captain 
Montalva met the two admirals in a hearing and the same subject was discussed thoroughly. 
Admiral Valdés later met again with the engineers, supply corps and pilots officers to 
discuss an incident between them and Captain Montalva on board the cruiser O’Higgins. 
He said that he considered that the issue was closed, declaring that Montalva said he had 
never intended to offend anybody. The engineers attending accepted the Admiral’s 
resolution, but added that the Navy’s high command should have declared that Montalva’s 
intervention was inappropriate125
The events in Talcahuano demonstrate the volatile atmosphere within the officer 
corps and the high level of discord within the Navy. This problem became known by the 
leaders of the Military and Naval Junta in Santiago. Major Ibáñez would use this lack of 
unity to achieve his political goals later. 
. 
                                                 
124  Huerta, pp. 3-4. 
 
125  Huerta,  p.4. 
 
 66 
Meanwhile, the Proceedings of the Navy Board dated 3 and 22 October, 25 
November and 3, 4 and 22 December 1924126
Regrettably things did not improve: a new source of friction developed between the 
Minister of War and Navy and Carabineros’ officers over a letter seeking to nominate 
Lieutenant Colonel Alfredo Ewing as a candidate for the presidency. Vice Admiral Nef 
requested that Ewing be dismissed and Gómez Carreño carried it out immediately. The 
Government ordered General Navarrete to take the command of the Carabineros while 
retaining his post as Army’s Chief of Staff. The Naval and Military Junta supported Ewing 
but the naval members did not, claiming that they did not have any instructions from their 
commanders on how to act
 show how promotions and destinations were 
handled by the High Command of the Navy and the decision to reduce the admission of 
students in the School of Engineers following Rear Admiral Soffia’s proposal increased the 
anger of the engineers.  
127
The visit to Talcahuano of the highest naval authority, already covered, apparently 
calmed the situation but soon it worsened again because the engineering officers in that 
base became aware that the concessions made by Admiral Valdés were not approved in 
Valparaiso. Furthermore, the political situation was daily becoming more uncertain and 
there were some rumours about a military movement that would overthrow the Government 
Junta. All this became known because junior officers’ commissions travelled around the 
country visiting the local garrisons, defending their ideas and because engineering, supply 
corps and pilots officers from Talcahuano visited Santiago to contact members of the Naval 
and Military Junta. Commander Barros-Merino, one of the delegates to that organization, 
visited Talcahuano with news that showed that the majority of the Navy in Valparaiso 
disagreed with the main positions of the Talcahuano’s officers. In this base, Captain Huerta 
says
. 
128
‘We were very few wanting the Government Junta to be absolutely 
independent from the Naval and Military Junta. The majority had the 
opinion that this last committee could not disappear’. 
:  
 
                                                 
126  Proceedings of the Naval Board, 3 Oct, 22 OCT, 25 NOV, 3 DEC, 4 DEC, 22 
DEC 1924. Chilean Naval Archives. 
 
127  Navarrete, p. 84-85. 
 
128  Huerta, p. 5. 
 
 67 
The conflicts and frictions between both Juntas led to a final crisis in December 
1924. Lieutenant Colonel Blanche, the Naval and Military Junta’s president requested the 
mediation in this dispute of Ismael Tocornal, a prominent politician, and the Cabinet 
offered its resignation in the best parliamentary style. 
The Navy Board adopted two resolutions on 12 December regarding the conflict 
between both juntas. In the afternoon of that day it decided to support unconditionally the 
Government Junta and after listening to Commander Jouanne, a member of the Naval and 
Military Junta, who travelled especially to Valparaiso, it decided to reaffirm its 
endorsement. Vice Admiral Valdés, the Director General of the Navy read the following 
public statement:  
‘1st. Having the country an organized Government, the Navy does not 
consider as necessary the existence of a Naval and Military Junta; 2nd. The 
Navy reiterates its support of the Government Junta; 3rd.  For the same 
reasons, it has decided to cancel the existence of a Naval Information 
Committee and to call back its representatives in the Naval and Military 
Junta. This resolution would be communicated to that body as an act of 
courtesy; 4th. The Navy will deal directly with the Government Junta 
following the valid laws129
 
’. 
It is clear from the above that the Navy’s high command supported the moderate or 
conservative policies of the Government Junta and had also a favourable opinion from the 
naval members of the Naval and Military Junta [Jouanne and others] who had less extreme 
positions than the majority of the Army’s membership.  
General Bennett writes that when the Government requested the dissolution of the 
Naval and Military Junta it counted on: ‘The Navy’s discipline and the unconditional 
support of its admirals because in this occasion, as in other in the past, they decidedly 
backed their superiors in the Government130
The same day [12 December] the Naval and Military Junta stated it had agreed:  
’. But this support was not absolute, as we 
know, due to the rupture between the executive and the engineering officers. 
‘1st. To request the Cabinet’s resignation; 2nd. To leave free Lieutenant 
Colonel Ewing to pursue his candidacy; 3rd. To request that General Ortiz-
Vega becomes Minister of War; 4th. To request Mr. Emilio Bello-Codesido 
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to organize a new Cabinet: 5th. To dismiss itself if the Government Junta 
accepts the above131
 
’.   
It must be noted that Emilio Bello-Codesido was a liberal politician and that the 
above statement shows political hostility to Rear Admiral Gómez-Carreño, the Minister of 
War, from the Naval and Military Junta or at least from its most radical members. 
On the next day, 13 December, a great number of Santiago’s Military Garrison 
officers gathered in the Army Club seeking the resignation of the Naval and Military Junta. 
They were discussing the subject when an officer arrived with the news that this 
organization had agreed to dissolve. Carlos Sáez gives details of the process leading to this 
decision. He says that when requested to do so by the president of this board, Lieutenant 
Colonel Blanche, he drafted a statement adding that he also talked to General Altamirano to 
make him aware that the moderate officers accepted the dissolution but warning that now 
the most radical members would be free to overthrow the Government. 
The statement mentioned by Sáez said that the Naval and Military Junta did not 
favour a military candidacy for President and that it decided its self dissolution due to the 
incidents resulting from Colonel Ewing’s candidacy. It expressed also its confidence that 
the Government Junta would carry to a happy end the movement initiated by the Armed 
Forces. The tone used shows an important participation of the moderates, Sáez being one of 
those. As a sample of the way of thinking in that period, it must be added that there was an 
interchange of telegrams published by La Unión132
Grove and Ibáñez proposed to General Bennett to change the composition of the 
Government Junta in December 1924 where he was one of members. In return, they would 
dissolve the Naval and Military Junta. Bennett predicted that this step would lead to a Civil 
War due to the possible reaction of the Navy. The conspirators answered that by 
imprisoning Admirals Nef and Gómez-Carreño, the Navy would accomplish nothing 
because of the differences between the Navy Board and the executive officers, over the 
issue of the engineering officers. It is true that in that time this service was divided and, 
moreover, it was riddled with undisciplined officers, something especially notorious in 
. In the first one, a group of Army 
officers expressed to the Secretary of the Naval Club its joy at the disappearance of the 
Naval and Military Junta. Valparaiso answered with satisfaction at this message. 
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Talcahuano. In this atmosphere, Ibáñez and Grove started to prepare for a coup that would 
change the membership of the Government Junta.  
 The coup started in the morning of 23 January when all the commanding officers of 
the Regiments in Santiago who were loyal to the Government Junta were imprisoned by the 
followers of Ibañez and Grove. In the afternoon, the mutinous units went to La Moneda and 
captured everyone who was inside, including Admirals Nef and Gómez-Carreño but not 
Soffia who was able to flee and leave for Valparaiso. General Bennett was that day in 
another town for unknown reasons and when he came back he requested to suffer the same 
fate as that of the other members of the Government Junta. When this did not happen, he 
resigned from the Army. 
 Those who organized the coup wished the return of Alessandri no matter the 
mistrust of some military officers. A demonstration of this orientation was the visit that the 
Military Attaché in Paris, General Luis Cabrera, made to the former president.  
 The plotters had no hesitation in using all the possible means to achieve their 
objectives, including those that could jeopardize the internal peace such as the treatment of 
the Admirals in La Moneda. They were not stopped by the peril of a deep internal conflict 
among the Armed Forces. 
The coup found the Navy extremely divided just as it would be during the 1931 
mutiny. By 1925, the Navy consisted of two very different generations of officers: those in 
the high command, consisting of members tied to the social sector that imposed a pseudo 
parliamentary regime in 1891, with its virtues and defects. In the other side were the junior 
officers, who supported the goals arising in the Chilean middle class that came to the 
government with President Alessandri in 1920, expecting a better future. The clash between 
the generations in these months of unrest in 1924 and 1925, turned into an open dispute 
which Ibáñez shrewdly manipulated, shaking this service deeply for a long time. 
 One of the causes for conflict was that once the imprisonment of the Admirals in 
Santiago and the overthrow of the Government Junta became known in Valparaiso, a 
meeting was called for in the Navy’s headquarters late on 23 January 1925. The following 
statement expressing disagreement with the military coup was issued. 
‘1st. The navy does not accept this procedure, the way it was achieved and 
the idea that it does not have a political objective; 2nd It has decided to wait 
until it can listen to its representatives in the Government to adopt a 
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resolution; 3rd. It states solemnly that it has decided to keep internal order 
by all means133
 
’.  
 This statement was followed by the imprisonment of the Army officers arriving at 
Valparaiso to take control of the Police. A Navy Commander was named to assume this 
task.  
 The situation became so serious that troop movements from the Army and Navy 
took place during the whole day. The following morning [24 January 1925], Vice Admiral 
Salustio Valdés went to Santiago trying to obtain the liberation of the Admirals imprisoned 
in La Moneda. Nef and Gómez-Carreño claimed that there must be no special consideration 
for them in seeking a political agreement. They also expressed their willingness to stay out 
of the new situation. Their attitude enabled Admiral Valdés to negotiate from a better 
position with the rebel Army officers. The Revolutionary Committee [see Appendix E] 
refused to accept the liberation of the Admirals before arriving at the organization of a new 
Government Junta. Admiral Valdés decided to return to his headquarters because he did not 
believe he was empowered to settle such matters without the agreement of the Navy Board. 
This episode reflects eloquently one of the problems of this service at that period: the 
limited power of the Director General of the Navy to solve an urgent issue. 
 The Navy issued a long manifesto on 25 January 1925134
 In an effort to reconcile positions, it was decided by the military that no 
nominations of candidates for presidential elections would be accepted. Then negotiations 
started with the aim of nominating a new Government Junta with a civilian, a military and a 
naval member; but the tension between both services did not diminish. Worse, the internal 
naval difficulties became more acute within the fleet when the destroyer Williams was 
ordered to support the Coraceros Regiment, a military unit in favour of the Navy’s 
positions in the clash with the rebel Army officers of Santiago, and the destroyer’s 
 stating its purpose of 
avoiding the use of force and opposing the recall of Alessandri and this opened the way to a 
solution of the conflict. 
                                                 
133   Merino-Saavedra, p.8. 
  Donoso 1952, p.399. 
  Monreal, p. 184. 
 
134  Monreal, Appendix. 
 
 71 
engineering officers refused to carry out their duties135
 In the same sense, but even more serious are the events in Talcahuano. As a 
summary, we may add that the Naval Base and the town became involved in a spiral of 
political and social agitation culminating in the invasion of the naval base by an 
unrestrained mob convinced that it could stop the peril of civil war which to its way of 
thinking was being created by the intransigent attitude of the Navy. This episode has not 
being covered thoroughly by the historians due to the lack of sources
. They asked instead to be sent 
ashore. The situation did not worsen but it demonstrated the extent of the divisions and the 
poor state of discipline within the naval officer corps. 
136. But in the 
preparation of this Thesis an extensive narrative by Captain Huerta-Lira, a direct witness of 
those days, was found. These events are additional evidence that the Navy was a broken 
service since within the mob or supporting it, there were engineering, supply corps and 
pilot officers in civilian clothes137
 The news about the Santiago coup reached Talcahuano on 23 January and on the 
following day, the statement in which the Navy reacted rejecting it also reached the 
southern base. Captain Huerta, the acting Commander in Chief of the Naval District and 
Base decided to call for a meeting on board the cruiser O’Higgins where he read the Navy’s 
statement. From the beginning, the engineering, supply corps and pilot officers expressed 
their support for the coup adding that they would not participate in a civil war. They had 
already sent a first telegram supporting the coup
. 
138
                                                 
135  Monreal, p.204-205 writes about a similar attitude in the engineering department 
of Latorre. Unfortunately, he does not quote or identify his source except saying 
that it was an engineer of the battleship who informed him. 
. Moreover, when the most senior 
engineering officer, who was present in Talcahuano because he was performing an 
inspection, expressed his support to the high command of the Navy, the lower ranking 
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engineers remained silent139. The meeting was terminated by Captain Huerta due to the lack 
of compromise among those attending. Still he decided to send a telegram to the 
headquarters in Valparaiso saying that: 'Unanimously all the actions taken were approved, 
that is, to protest for not having informed the Navy of this new revolution…..140
 This action initiated a telegraphic war. The engineering, supply corps and pilot 
officers and even the crews sent wires to General Pedro Pablo Dartnell-Encina, identified as 
one of the leaders of the coup, undermining the opinion of their Commander in Chief stated 
in the above telegram. This attitude might be considered a surprise but we also know from 
Captain Huerta that: ‘Many engineers participated in those meetings’…[taking place in 
Talcahuano] …‘deliberating and keeping the contact between the rest of the officers and 
the civilian elements
 '. 
141
 To deepen the breakage of the naval consensus, this situation was not only 
instigated but also used by Army officers in favour of the coup as follows. Major Carlos 
Millán-Iriarte who had been denied access to the Naval Base by Huerta, met downtown a 
gathering of disaffected engineering, supply corps and pilot officers
’. 
142 in hopes of 
convincing them that the Navy wanted to precipitate a civil war and that these officers 
should not participate in that type of adventure143
On Sunday, 25 January, the Navy issued a new critical manifesto about the coup, 
accusing the rebel Santiago Army officers of trying to reinstate the same corrupt regime 
. 
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that was deposed in September144
After those meetings, the Commander in Chief of the Naval District and Base 
wanted to test [using his own words] the: ‘crew’s pulse’… [in order]... ‘to report 
consciously to the headquarters and to let it know the exact situation of Talcahuano’s 
Base
. Captain Huerta gathered the officers again repeating the 
above statement. The executive officers demonstrated agreement but the engineering, 
supply corps and pilot officers were not present since they were still in a meeting outside 
the base with civilians for Alessandri. When that afternoon they learned of what happened, 
they again showed their disagreement with the rest of the Navy. 
145
‘The answer to this polling was that the personnel almost  unanimously 
said that they supported the new movement, and that they already sent a 
telegram in this sense to general Dartnell. Only the crews of destroyers 
Blanco, Uribe and Lynch had the same thoughts as the headquarters in 
Valparaiso…
’. He ordered a meeting of the lower deck personnel where he read them the 
statement of the Navy and then he checked their opinions:  
146
 
’. 
The situation could not be more delicate. Huerta faced the possibility of a civil war. 
He had to resist the pressure and threats from those who favoured the Santiago coup, 
managing at the same time a complex internal situation among his officers. Another 
problem arose: it was difficult to defend the base from a land attack because the guns of its 
forts were installed to defend it from an attack from the sea and its commander did not have 
the total support of his men. 
Confronted by this critical situation, Huerta chose to react prudently:  
‘There was no other choice than conciliation, to try to calm down the 
moods, destroying the campaign being made by civilians, of speaking to 
the crews and doing what was possible to avoid an armed conflict that 
would spark immediately an outburst. Things were in such state that only a 
mere spark could start a fire147
 
’.  
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On Monday 26 January, amid a sensation of vulnerability and internal rupture, the 
Navy’s high command decided to negotiate and requested the intervention of Agustín 
Edwards-McClure. Although he was a follower of Alessandri, he enjoyed a great prestige 
in this service. 
Meanwhile, rumours circulated everywhere [either created or not by some interested 
groups] and caused concern in the population. In Talcahuano they did great damage. The 
dockyard workers had a meeting the night before in the main square outside the base. The 
agitators lectured them that the Navy wanted a civil war and that they should not support it. 
The following day the men seemed restless and not working in order to avoid helping 
prepare the ships’ readiness. 
It had been ordered by the Naval Headquarters that the submarines and the surface 
units of the fleet anchored there should steam to Valparaiso and these preparations were 
impossible to hide. Observing the dockyard workers’ unrest, Huerta148
As a result, the headquarters in Valparaiso cancelled the order already given 
regarding the submarines. This decision had to be made known in and outside the base, but 
rumours and lack of trust prompted nocturnal meetings, where it was asserted that news of 
the measures adopted by the high command of the Navy was untrue. At the same time, 
alarming news about a breakdown in the negotiations had arrived. There were rumours that 
the Director General of the Navy, the Navy Board and highly ranked officers would go on 
board, making some remember the events of 1891
 ordered the Coastal 
Gunners [see Glossary] to be placed on the alert. That afternoon, at the end of the working 
day, the dockyard workers instead of going home, went to the Submarine Base trying to 
prevent those units from getting underway. The Commander in Chief of the Naval District 
and Base assisted by some officers, tried to calm an excited mass of about five hundred 
workers. He authorized the submarines’ machinists to go ashore on leave and also he tried 
to go with the workers to the town. At the same time, Captain Huerta tried to convince the 
Director General of the Navy to cancel the orders given to the submarines to sail to 
Valparaiso and also reported that with activists urging the mob against the Navy, there was 
an atmosphere of unrest inside and outside of his base. 
149
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there is no other evidence than Captain Huerta’s Memoirs where he wrote that some of 
these rumours became known through intercepting radio communications150
The news arriving at midnight of the success in the negotiations conducted by 
Agustín Edwards in Santiago brought some relief in the strained situation. At noon next 
day, the boards placed in front the newspapers offices said reports of success were not true 
yet and that the negotiations had failed due to the Navy’s attitude, and once again false 
information about the submarines sailing off that evening spread. When the workers ended 
their activity and arrived in town, they learned this news and they gathered immediately in 
the main square. Captain Huerta, informed of this situation, sent two representatives to 
categorically deny the rumours. But his attempt to quell the demonstration failed. The mob 
demanded to enter the base, to ascertain if the warships had not been made ready to sail or 
had not sailed already. In principle, this action would be accomplished by a commission of 
workers, but at that moment the demonstrators saw an empty train going back to the base 
and boarded it. When this shouting crowd got into the base, Captain Huerta confronted it 
asking what were they trying to achieve. He behaved prudently and by acting in a 
conciliatory fashion managed to convince them that they were wrongly concerned. After 
some tense moments
. 
151 because: ‘Any moment a shot from everywhere could be fired…152’ 
the situation was solved when part of the crew of the cruiser Blanco Encalada was sent 
ashore on leave. At this moment, the mob dispersed and went out of the Base requesting the 
Commander in Chief of the Naval District and Base to stay with them until they reached the 
base entrance. He agreed and he used the occasion to read them a telegram just arrived 
reporting that the negotiations were finished and the Navy would participate in a new 
Government Junta naming Rear Admiral Carlos Ward-Rodríguez for this purpose153
                                                 
150 Huerta, p. 10. 
. 
 
151  Accordingly to Monreal, p.204 the only officers staying at Huerta´s side all the 
time in this period were commanders Ubilla [engineer] and Mendoza [supply 
corps]. No executive officer did the same. 
 
152  Huerta, p. 14. 
 
153  Monreal, p.202-204 describes the situation in Talcahuano slightly differently from 
Captain Huerta. He was not present and, unfortunately, does not quote his sources. 
 
 76 
 It is worthwhile to cover two opinions regarding the attitude of the Communist 
Party in those days because later it will be claimed that one of the origins of the Naval 
Mutiny of 1931 is the support given to the mutineers by this group. 
 Ricardo Donoso says that the Executive Committee of this political party accused 
the Government Junta headed by general Altamirano of supporting the candidacy of 
Ladislao Errázuriz who, according to them: ‘Symbolizes tyranny, despotism and 
arrogance154
‘The officers conspiring against General Altamirano´s government, who 
were no more that twenty, negotiated and obtained the support of the 
Communist Party, in exchange for the approval of laws favourable to the 
proletarians’ interests. To arrive to this result….they used Major Millán, an 
officer who had gained a considerable influence over the communist 
associations having being sent to those organizations by the September 
Revolution…For this reason, the leftist elements had an excuse for 
approaching the non-commissioned officers and slipping into their ears 
attractive and easy to attain offers if they organized soviet styled workers 
and soldiers committees at the first trace of anarchy
’. General Navarrete the Army Chief of Staff in those days writes:  
155
 
’. 
 In the research of this Thesis no evidence of such approaches to naval petty officers 
had been found.  
Although there was no blood shed, the Talcahuano events were particularly serious 
because a naval base was invaded by a mob and the use of force against it could have 
produced a tragedy. This did not happen due to Captain Huerta’s and the rest of the 
officers’ good judgment. Nevertheless, the unauthorized invasion of civilians and the 
wrong conduct of some officers and men created a bad precedent. 
Six years later, in the 1931 Naval Mutiny, these same attitudes would be repeated 
and the bad example of the 1925 events was quoted as an excuse for the offences or crimes 
committed. 
This section was devoted to a period when a real danger of civil war started due to 
diverging visions between the Navy senior officers and the Army younger officers led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Ibáñez who was supported by naval engineers. In addition, the weak 
support of the ChCP to this latter group of Army officers was evident. The outcome of this 
period period of political instability is covered in next section. 
                                                 
154 Donoso, p. 399. 
 
155 Navarrete, p.150. 
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4. THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE 1925 CRISIS AND ITS FAILURE TO 
LAST. 
 
4.1 The meddling of Ibáñez in the Navy. 
 
 It is necessary to go back to Santiago and Valparaiso on the 26 and 27 January 1925 
to explain the end of the period when the differences between the services was more 
evident156
 Meanwhile, Arturo Alessandri was in Italy at this time. On 23 January he was in 
Venice and he became aware of the events taking place in Santiago next day through a 
telephone call from the Chilean ambassador in Rome. On 26 January, Alessandri arrived at 
the Italian capital, where he met the Chilean diplomatic representatives in Italy and 
Germany and two other of his supporters. He analyzed the situation with them as well as 
the telegrams sent by Generals Ortiz-Vega and Dartnell plus several political organizations 
requesting his return to Chile to assume again the Presidency. As the astute politician he 
was, he answered to the two Generals holding the power at that time with a communication 
that would be known as the ‘Telegrama de Roma’ [the Rome Telegram
. In these two days Agustín Edwards’ mediation took place. It was unsuccessful 
initially because the Navy insisted that it opposed the return of Alessandri. Finally, a 
telephone conversation between Edwards and General Dartnell with Vice Admiral Valdés 
and a survey of the opinion of the naval officers by the latter made possible the acceptance 
of the President’s return.  
157
                                                 
156  The evidence of the differences among the high ranked officers of both services is 
in the telegrams issued by General Dartnell and Admiral Valdés on 26 January 
1925. It is in Monreal, p. 218-219. Meanwhile, the lower deck personnel from 
Talcahuano expressed its support to the new ‘Junta de Gobierno’ in a telegram 
sent to General Dartnell dated 27 January while La Unión wrote the same day that 
the military garrisons in northern Chile supported the high command of the Navy. 
Monreal, p. 222. 
]. 
 
157  Arturo Alessandri-Palma, Recuerdos de Gobierno (Santiago. Editorial 
Nascimento, 1967),  v.2 p.41. 
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 This long document was full of adjectives and expressions trying to explain the 
events and the author’s motivations, as well as his wishes and aspirations. It can be 
summarized as follows, trying to stress those aspects implying a political agenda to be 
complied with by those inviting him to return to power: 
1. He explains the reasons for leaving the presidency in September 1924 [avoid 
riots and enable political reforms]. 
2. He says that he appreciates the attitude of those high ranked officers 
recognizing him as President in their communications. 
3. He hopes that the movement of 23 January would comply with the purposes 
of the September movement which were forgotten by the previous Junta. 
4. He congratulates those who wrote him for their attitude of reinstating the 
Constitution and Law. 
5. Regarding his return to office, he sets the following conditions: 
 a. The immediate organization of a civilian Government. 
b. A constitutional reform made by means of a Constituent Assembly, 
empowered also to set the rules for electing a new President and 
Congress. He will hand over the presidency at the end of his 
constitutional period [23 December 1925] without accepting any 
extension of it. 
d. The Armed Forces shall go back to their own duties. 
6. Finally he says that he will return to office only if all the above conditions 
are accepted. 
 At the end of Edwards’ mediation, the Navy named Rear Admiral Carlos Ward-
Rodríguez to become a member of the Government Junta, whose president would be Emilio 
Bello-Codesido. The third member would be General Pedro Pablo Dartnell-Encina. When 
this Junta took office, Ibáñez asked Admiral Ward to solve the engineers’ problems and the 
answer was that he must not meddle in naval internal affairs158
'After considering the serious present danger for the country and as 
suggested by the mediator Agustín Edwards, the arrangement proposal is 
. The final arrangement 
between both services was recorded in a document quoted by General Navarrete. The Navy 
explained its acceptance in the following statement: 
                                                 
158  Vial-Correa, v.III, 1988, p.507 and pp. 508-509. 
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accepted for the sole purpose of avoiding a civil war, as it has been always 
the objective of our service159
 
’. 
 In the same context, Agustín Edwards sent a telegram to Alessandri stating that: 
‘After great difficulties, an arrangement between the Navy and the Army 
has been reached avoiding a civil war. With the acceptance of this 
arrangement the honorific role assigned to me by the Navy and Army has 
ended. I return to my retirement... trusting that the patriotism of those who 
have the country’s destiny will lead to a policy of appeasement and 
concord160
 
’.  
 It must be recalled that Edwards, the author of this document was strongly in favour 
of the absent President, and this explains why he wanted to report his role to him. 
 On the same day, 27 January, Admirals Nef and Gómez-Carreño were liberated 
from La Moneda and both went to their homes ending for ever their role in naval and 
political life. The new Junta took office the following day, being installed by the 
Revolutionary Committee that had overthrown the previous Government four days before. 
The new Government named its first Cabinet. Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ibáñez del Campo 
became the Minister of War. There is no debate that he was the author of the sudden 
political change taking place in those days and that his ever rising political career had 
started. Rear Admiral Braulio Bahamondez-Montaña became Minister of the Navy. 
 No matter what already quoted telegrams stated, the lack of confidence between the 
different groups and political actors was evident. Indeed, the enmity between civilian 
elements and the Armed Forces continued influencing the following months and even up to 
the 1931 Naval Mutiny. 
 Arturo Alessandri wrote in a telegram sent to Agustín Edwards in those days that a 
Constituent Assembly was mandatory and that: ‘It was very dangerous that the national 
interests were being taken care of by arrangements between the Armed Forces without 
considering the popular sovereignty whose will cannot be disregarded161
                                                 
159  Navarrete, p.181. 
’. He insisted that 
he had already mentioned this in his ‘Telegrama de Roma’. 
 
160 Navarrete, p.63. 
 
161 Navarrete, p. 188. 
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 What was really the President’s message from Europe? What did he fear? No doubt 
he was afraid of a new Naval and Military Junta, such as the one acting very notoriously 
between September and December 1924, or any other form of ‘de facto’ organization. 
Marmaduque Grove rushed to say in a letter published by El Mercurio that: ‘It is not true 
that the Revolutionary Committee would keep acting until the arrival of President 
Alessandri nor that its members were those named by Los Tiempos162’. This last newspaper 
belonged to the same owner as La Nación a strong partisan of Alessandri and a foe of the 
military’s participation in politics. General Navarrete, a valuable witness because of his 
high position in the Army, writes that the lack of military intervention was not true and that 
there was an exclusive group of Army officers permanently in session in an office close to 
Ibanez’s, acting as an illegal advisory organization. The General says that he mentioned 
this problem to the Minister of War and he responded that he could not abandon those who: 
‘Backed him risking their lives and tranquillity for the country163
 Immediately after the new Government Junta took office, the political coalition 
headed by the Conservative Party and its press, El Diario Ilustrado of Santiago and La 
Unión of Valparaiso, adopted a bellicose attitude towards the government and the Navy. 
There was an attempt to censor that newspaper published in Valparaiso by Colonel Enrique 
Bravo-Ortiz, a strong supporter of Alessandri but this matter was solved by the direct 
intervention of Vice Admiral Valdés who was the Governor. There were also rumours that 
the coalition Union Nacional [see Glossary] was conspiring and this was the cause of the 
imprisonment of several of its members who were deported later. 
’. 
 Within the military, there were still some tremors resulting from the big earthquake 
represented by the movement of the 23 January [if it is acceptable to make an analogy 
between politics and seismology]. Ibáñez ordered Colonel Arturo Ahumada, a former 
member of the Naval and Military Junta, to be retired for issuing a statement that the Navy 
had been insincere in its approach to the Army in the days after 23 January. The naval 
officers said that the reality was that Ahumada had been on board the battleship Latorre to 
seek cooperation to reorganize the Army and to change Ibáñez for a general. To solve this 
matter, a report from Captain Merino, the commanding officer of the battleship was 
requested and he delivered it to the Navy Board on 10 February. After that, Vice Admiral 
                                                 
162    Navarrete, p.203. 
 
163 Navarrete, p. 204. 
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Valdés, as well as Merino, went to Santiago to report the whole affair to the Cabinet and 
the Government Junta. As a summary, Merino164
 One of them is given by General Navarrete. He concludes that no matter Agustín 
Edwards’ mediation:  
 reported that the actions of Colonel 
Ahumada: ‘Had no links within the Navy and this service had no interest in a problem of 
purely military nature as was the stability of the Minister of War’. This is more evidence of 
the problems between the Armed Forces in that period. 
‘There was an unpleasant feeling in the Navy regarding the coup on 23 
January and this did not change with the arrangements on 27 January. This 
service signed the agreement only to avoid the shock of a civil war as it 
stated publicly. The Navy accepted the arrangement without being 
convinced that the coup of January 1925 was necessary. It left inside both 
services the germ of a deep revolt due to the attitude of the Coraceros 
Regiment of being closer to the Navy and that of the naval engineers 
attaching themselves to the junior military officers165
 
’.  
Navarrete also covers the influence that different groups had started upon the non-
commissioned officers. He writes:  
‘This undercover effort, also intended by the communists, was a cause of 
deep concern for the Government and the military. This originated several 
rumours, credible in same cases but false in other. According to these, the 
troops of certain units were contaminated by the subversive propaganda 
making possible the creation of committees of soldiers and workers166
 
’.  
Just such an incident occurred when the Valdivia Regiment rebelled on 28 February 
in Santiago167
                                                 
164 Merino-Saavedra, p.11. 
. Meanwhile in Talcahuano, the engineers, supply and pilots presented a 
 
165 Navarrete, p.186. General Navarrete visited Valparaiso where he met senior and 
junior naval officers, reporting later his conclusions to the cabinet. The Navy 
issued a statement explaining the reasons for the agreement with the Army 
[Monreal 1929, p.262-263]. 
 
166  Navarrete, pp. 186 & 289. 
 
167  This mutiny took place when a conservative group incited non commissioned 
officers of this unit to commit an offence severely punished by law. The bad 
example set by the officers was another ingredient of the men disobeying orders. 
While the above events were taking place, an officer shot a soldier thereby 
precipitating the mutiny. The troop gained access to the weapons, some even 
leaving the barracks. The commander and the rest of the officers, seeing that the 
situation was out of control, left the premises. The turmoil ended when Lieutenant 
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document to the new ‘Junta de Gobierno’ complaining about their situation and offering 
support to the new government168
These events moved the Government to declare the country under State of Siege, a 
condition where some constitutional rights were restrained. Also, the Valdivia Regiment 
was dissolved. The imprisonment of members or adherents of the Unión Nacional also took 
place in the following days. 
. 
As the crisis faded, a change took place in the Navy’s leadership due to the new 
laws setting a limit for staying on active duty. Vice Admiral Valdés delivered his position 
as Director General to Rear Admiral Luis Langlois-Vidal on 2 March 1925 and as a retired 
officer, stayed as Governor of Valparaiso. The new director took office only as a substitute 
until the arrival of Vice Admiral Juan Schroeder-Peña from London where he was serving 
as head of the Chilean Naval Mission.  
Vice Admiral Valdés told the last session of the Navy Board that he chaired how, 
under the political situation of his time, he was invited to overthrow the Government in 
1919 by retired Rear Admiral Arturo Cuevas-Briones while he was the Commander in 
Chief of the Fleet. Valdes’ statement disclosed the only episode between 1891 and 1924 of 
such type of unprofessional activity. 
The change in command of the Fleet took place on 6 March. Rear Admiral Arturo 
Swett-Otaegui took this position while Rear Admiral Soffia retired, being clear by then that 
his foe, Arturo Alessandri, would be back to the Presidency. 
General Navarrete169
As a conclusion for this brief but turbulent period, it can be said that there was a 
rising group in Chilean politics whose role was becoming significant and the followers of 
Ibañez’s leadership were members of it. This was the middle class seeking better political 
 says that even in mid March the Revolutionary Committee 
was still active and as a proof, he publish in his book a statement that was printed by the 
newspapers. It was signed by Lieutenant Colonel Marmaduque Grove, Captains Amaro 
Pérez and Alejandro Lazo and Lieutenant Luis Alarcón setting the conditions under which 
Arturo Alessandri must perform his Government duties. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Colonel Blanche, then Under Secretary of War, arrived at the barracks with two 
aides and convinced the seditious personnel to surrender. 
 
168 Monreal, p.206-209. 
 
169 Navarrete, p. 206. 
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and social conditions for itself. The Navy was clearly losing political prominence enjoyed 
since Admiral Montt´s days [see section 2.2]. It had to accept the return of Arturo 
Alessandri urged by the forementioned group of Army officers, while the issue of the 
internal disagreements; due mainly to the engineers’ problems was only delayed by the 
arrangement leading to the new Government Junta Bello-Ward-Dartnell. 
As has been already discussed, Alessandri set conditions for his return to Chile in 
the ‘Telegrama de Roma’. The Navy accepted his stipulations only to ‘avoid a civil war’ as 
it was stated in several documents already quoted. Rather than being a step widely 
accepted, it was something done to avoid a bigger harm. 
 Alessandri returned by ship and while he stopped in Rio de Janeiro he received the 
visit of one of his followers belonging to the ‘execrable camarilla’, the abominable clique 
as it was called by the military [see Glossary]. This was a group that the officers wanted to 
keep far from the President as he regained his political power. In the next port of call, 
Montevideo, he was welcomed by an official committee consisting of Rear Admiral 
Langlois, the acting Director General and General Navarrete now the Inspector General of 
the Army170. After protocol events, there was a meeting in the hotel where Alessandri was 
staying. The two Armed Forces representatives already mentioned, a couple of ministers 
and two sons of the president attended. Unfortunately, there are only two versions of this 
meeting, Alessandri’s171
 The President recorded that he received two letters in Montevideo. The first one was 
from Ibáñez which was written: ‘in the right tone, respectful and without asking anything or 
making specific proposals’. On the other hand, the one sent by the Navy had
 written a long time after the events and General Navarrete’s which 
will be analyzed later.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
172
                                                 
170  The highest position in the Army was the Inspector General but it lacked the wider 
power of the Director General of the Navy 
 had clear 
conditions about the orientation the President would need to follow and about the 
membership of a new Cabinet. Alessandri writes:  
 
171 Alessandri, v.2 pp.122-124. 
 
172  The letter has not been found. La Nación on 11 March 1925 publishes a naval 
statement dated on 7 March setting the aspirations of this service in the political 
phase to be initiated at the arrival of Alessandri to Chile. The newspaper adds that 
Admiral Langlois ‘..will report and deliver this statement…’ to the President. 
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‘Reading such strange document really upset me. I threw it away in anger 
and energetically I told the Admiral that …I rejected the Navy’s demands 
…and would not even consider them. They were against the explicit 
‘Telegrama de Roma’…I added that if the Navy did not withdraw its 
absurd suggestions, I would board the same ship and return back to 
Europe173
 
’.  
 Unfortunately he does not include in his book the Navy’s original document and we 
do not know the reason for this omission but we may suppose that, as a memoir writer, he is 
more interested in emphasizing his performance than setting the record straight. 
 Alessandri continues that he pressed general Navarrete to decide whom he would 
support. And the answer was that the Army had determined to follow the orders of the 
President. The Admiral said in this moment that he was only bringing a draft and that he 
had no doubts that his service would support the presidential decisions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 The Navy Board is the organization where this subject should have been discussed 
and it did hold sessions in February and also on 2 and 9 March. Although several 
contingent subjects were discussed, this one was not covered and if it was, there is no 
evidence in the minutes of the meetings. 
 Navarrete´s version174
‘I do not accept that the Navy meddles in Government matters that I should 
decide by myself. This is against what I said in the ‘Telegrama de Roma’. 
If the Navy insists, I have no other choice than returning to Europe, sending 
my resignation to Chile and then, it would have to assume the 
responsibility of this event
 says that after he delivered Ibanez’s letter he did not receive 
any hint about the President’s reaction and he had no opportunity to ask. Moreover, he 
suspected that the Army’s letter did not please him due to his character and feelings. The 
General also assured Alessandri that his service respected him and that he could resume his 
duties confidently sticking to the ‘Telegrama de Roma’. At this moment, a minister with 
Admiral Langlois entered the room and the naval officer asked him if he had already read 
the letter from his service. Navarrete says that President’s mood changed violently saying:  
175
 
’.  
 The Admiral tried to explain himself but the President gave him no opportunity and 
kept issuing severe comments about a letter which Navarrete had no knowledge of, even 
                                                 
173  Alessandri, v.2 pp.134-135. 
174 Navarrete, pp. 224-227. 
 
175  Navarrete, p. 226. 
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though Santiago’s newspapers had reported that this document would be sent through 
Langlois. The General used the opportunity to say that it was surely not the Navy’s 
intention to meddle and probably the whole misunderstanding was due to the way the 
document had been drafted, as that service had publicly expressed its wish to avoid 
interfering in Government’s matters. He added that it would be a good idea to listen to 
Admiral Langlois, but the acting Director General of the Navy limited himself to saying 
that his service wished to support the Government’s actions and to stay out of politics, as it 
has always done. 
 It is very likely that this was the Navy’s real position, since La Unión reported on 7 
March, that is eight days before the meeting, that:  
‘The Navy would tell the President that it will retire from all governmental 
duties, once he is in charge of the nation again. This will be Admiral’s 
Langlois mission in Montevideo176
 
’.  
To sustain this statement Valparaiso’s conservative newspaper quoted Admiral 
Ward who said:  
‘Not being a classified mission’… [that of the acting Director General]. ‘I 
can tell you he has no other mission than to tell …[to Alessandri]…‘that 
the Navy’s sole aspiration is that the country soon gets back to its 
constitutional life and the civilians will take care of ruling. Also, according 
to the supreme aspiration of all its senior and junior officers plus its crews, 
once the President assume the supreme command of the nation, the service 
will concentrate only in performing its routine professional duties177
 
’. 
 Finally, the writer and attorney, Carlos Vicuña Fuentes gives a third version 
although he did not attend the Montevideo meetings. He writes that the very same day that 
Alessandri arrived at the Uruguayan capital the Army and Navy officers present told him 
that:  
‘The President was only called back to finish the revolutionary program 
and only by a special consideration of the legitimate authorities and to 
avoid a return to ‘the old politicking’. If the President did not accept this 
program, he could not return to Chile178
                                                 
176  ‘La Armada manifestará al Presidente de la República que se retirará de toda labor 
gubernativa’, La Unión, 7 March 1925. 
’.  
 
177 ‘La Armada manifestará al Presidente de la República que se retirará de toda labor 
gubernativa’, La Unión, 7 March 1925. 
 
178 Carlos Vicuña-Fuentes, La Tiranía en Chile, (Santiago: LOM Editores. 2nd. 
Edition, 2002) pp. 302-303. 
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 This author is not credible enough, as he wrote long after the events and he was not 
present in Montevideo. Furthermore, he does not give any sources and he is not very 
objective in his conclusions. The only merit of his work is that he knew personally many 
protagonists of that period and this enables him to provide a good description of those times 
and characters. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that he has an ideological bias and he is 
clearly against the Armed Forces of his generation.   
 It must be stressed again, that in this investigation no other evidence on this subject 
has been found, except for what is summarized above, and that the only witnesses were 
General Navarrete and Arturo Alessandri and both wrote years after the event. In spite of 
this, it can be said that it is very likely that even in March 1925 the Navy was still reluctant 
for Alessandri to return to the presidency and to his old political style.  It is also possible 
that the President was also trying to divide the Armed Forces before taking back his post 
and that he did not trust the Navy due to this service opposition to his return.  
 Finally, Alessandri was back in office on 20 March 1925. Santiago gave him an 
unforgettable massive popular reception. He retained Ibáñez as Minister of War and 
Admiral Bahamondez as Minister of the Navy. 
 The Navy decided to pay tribute to him perhaps because of the events in 
Montevideo, and organized a Naval Review. This type of formal act is reserved for 
important occasions and in this case, it took place on 8 April. That day Alessandri and part 
of his Cabinet reviewed the fleet anchored in Valparaiso. Ibañez stayed in Santiago and the 
rest of the Army officers were stationed on an auxiliary vessel without being invited to the 
flagship due to the events on 23 January. Captain Merino assisted by some officers made a 
presentation to the President reporting the Navy’s participation in the events since 
September 1924179
 The Navy also decided to host two additional social events, both at the Navy Club at 
Valparaiso. The first one, which occurred on 11 March, was in honour of President 
Alessandri. General Navarrete was one of those who attended and he stated that the 
intention was that ‘The revolutionaries became convinced that Alessandri was not a 
. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
179  Merino-Saavedra, p. 11, Navarrete, p.266 and Von Schroeders, p. 111. 
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‘persona non-grata’ to the Navy180
In May, Vice Admiral Juan Schroeder-Peña, who was the senior member on the 
officers’ roster, arrived in Chile from Europe, after a slow and long trip, to replace the 
acting Director General Rear Admiral Langlois. He enjoyed a high prestige and his first act 
in office, was to give the Navy Board a more active role in solving certain matters since 
from Admiral Montt’s times it was only a consulting body, although it had a good deal of 
influence. 
’, a somewhat strange opinion since this act was 
celebrating his return to the Presidency after the Naval Review made for the same purpose. 
The second event, which occurred the following day, was in honour of the officers of the 
Coraceros Regiment, a unit that was in favour of the Navy during the coup of 23 January. 
They were in the process of being punished for their attitude by the Minister of War Ibáñez 
in spite of what had been agreed upon in the document signed at end the period of 
confrontation between both services. 
 One of the most remarkable political actions during Alessandri’s renewed first term 
in office was the approval of a new Constitution replacing that of 1833 which had been 
partially modified several times in order to give a quasi parliamentary characteristic to the 
political system. There are opinions that the old constitution was one of causes of the 1920s 
crisis. The President and his followers, including some Army officers, thought that the 
fundamental law must be replaced by a text drafted and approved by a Constituent 
Assembly, but the turn of events starting on 23 January, was the cause of Alessandri’s 
choice of a broad commission to write a new constitution. Finally, the actual work was 
done by a smaller group with a strong personal participation of Alessandri. The President’s 
decisions were influenced by the fact that the Congress was inactive since September 1924. 
Since the political parties were not enthusiastic about this reform, the President realized that 
if he did not intervene, the new Constitution would not be approved within his Presidential 
term. 
 The constitutional commission was nominated on 7 April 1925 and new members 
were added in three stages, arriving at a total of one hundred twenty two. Initially, two 
Army officers [General Navarrete and Major Fenner] were members. The vicissitudes of 
the process of drawing up the new law will not be covered in this thesis because it is out of 
its scope, but it is necessary to mention that during this process some political 
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representatives abandoned the task while the discussions became stormy. This led the 
President to nominate other people to become part of the Commission. One of them was 
Vice Admiral Schroeder, a firm supporter of Alessandri’s initiatives in this matter, as was 
General Navarrete181
 The new Constitution was approved in a plebiscite on 30 August 1925. Only half of 
the 302,304 registered electors actually voted. 123,382 votes
. The discussions came to a dead end in the session on 23 July 1925. 
The standstill was broken by the active participation of General Navarrete who pressed for 
a solution in a strong speech and this enabled Alessandri’s constitutional ideas to prevail. 
182
 In the previous months, Major Carlos Millán-Iriarte continued making speeches to 
communist unions and writing articles on newspapers about social issues. When he was 
reprimanded by the Inspector General of the Army because he violated the order to avoid 
the publication of non-professional subjects, he answered that he had the Government’s 
support adding that his activity was well known by the President and the Minister of the 
Interior. The General threatened to resign if Major Millán was not transferred to another 
garrison where he could not dedicate himself to those activities
 were in favour of approval 
and the new fundamental law became effective on 30 September. As the political meddling 
of the Armed Forces had been criticized in this thesis, the constitutional reform supported 
by the services may be considered a positive action in the direction of the acceptance of the 
middle class aspirations which, until then, the oligarchy had stymied.   
183
While the important constitutional debate was taking place, another period of labour 
unrest occurred in the northern mines, particularly in the nitrate fields. The Navy was 
ordered to send warships to different ports to support the land forces in preventing possible 
riots. One of these was the destroyer Williams, sailing to Tocopilla under the command of 
captain Andonaegui who reported that:  
. In the end, he was sent 
to Europe but he would be back acting in matters related to the Navy and in a very decisive 
fashion, as it will be seen later. 
‘In this northern port ‘Despertar’ a communist newspaper was edited. Its 
articles were very subversive keeping the workers very excited. For this 
reason, its closure and the imprisonment of the leaders were ordered. They 
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were brought to my ship remaining on board several days under strict 
surveillance184
 
’.  
 At the same time, Police and Army forces had a serious confrontation with the 
miners in Iquique’s hinterland at La Coruña and Pontevedra nitrate fields. Several workers 
died on 4 July 1925 and the detainees were taken to the cruiser Zenteno anchored at 
Iquique, where they were charged in Court Martial, as the country was in State of Siege at 
the time. They were sentenced to be exiled to the southernmost part of the country, but later 
these punishments were commuted to other less rigorous terms by the Cabinet. While 
discussing this subject, there was a verbal incident between Alessandri and Ibáñez because 
this minister opposed this last decision. 
 What influence could these contacts between the lower deck personnel and the 
labour leaders imprisoned on board naval units have had in the Naval Mutiny of 1931? 
There is no strong evidence about this subject, but it can at least be stated that using Navy 
ships as detention sites for civilians was an anomalous situation. 
 At the end of August, an event demonstrates the influence that Ibáñez was having in 
naval matters and that the disciplinary problems were still present, in spite of the efforts of 
the Navy’s high command to the contrary. Commander Julio Allard-Pinto, a witness of that 
period, gives the following description:  
‘Naming officers for important positions of high responsibility was 
something that the new Director General did employing exclusively 
members of his immediate personal circle. Such was the case of the 
Captain nominated to become Commander in Chief of the Naval District at 
Talcahuano…and this originated in that base a very active campaign to 
reorganize the Navy, following the wishes of the military. This is the birth 
of the so often called ‘Luises’Affair’ because it was coincident with the 
names of the four officers usually mentioned as being the ringleaders of the 
idea of removing from their positions Rear Admiral Bahamonde, the 
Minister of Navy, the Director General, Vice Admiral Schroeder, the 
Commander in Chief of the Naval District and Base, Captain Luis Díaz-
Palacios and others who, according to their criteria, were not fit to remain 
in service. These four officers were commander Luis Escobar, the 
commanding officer of the reserve cruiser Esmeralda, Luis Caballero-
Canobbio, the commander officer of the transport ship Angamos, Luis A. 
Concha, the director of the Torpedo and Mine School and Luis Lavín, the 
commander of the Coastal Artillery in that port185
                                                 
184 Andonaegui, p. 92. 
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185 Julio Allard-Pinto, Memorias (Typewritten mss in possession of Captain Carlos 
Martin Fritz), n.d. p.20. 
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 The same source reports that the objectives of the conspirators were to have a Navy 
Captain as Minister, to make Rear Admiral Arturo Swett-Otaegui the new Director General, 
and to have Captain Merino-Saavedra as Commander in Chief of the Fleet. This last officer 
writes in his book that another objective was to remove Captain Olegario Reyes del Río 
whom they considered: ‘Had become the owner of the Navy, developing a personal activity 
of gossiping and intrigues with the goal of giving good positions to personal friends and 
informers186
 The naval high command became aware of this movement on the arrival of the 
cruiser Blanco Encalada and the submarine flotilla from Talcahuano, as its officers 
commenting on what they had heard in the southern base. The news about the ‘Luises 
Affair’ also became public in September when the Government became involved and the 
newspaper front pages reported new evidence of naval indiscipline, such as the statement 
supporting the ‘Luises’, signed by a group of Talcahuano´s officers, refuted by those of the 
Naval Academy, who opposed that movement. Commander Luis Concha, one of the 
‘Luises’, sent an open letter to the Director of the Naval Academy through a newspaper 
making different comments. Other ‘Luises’ supported this letter
’. This last quotation is a demonstration of an unusual language, an excessive 
passion and a deep breach in of discipline. 
187
 The Navy high command reacted, naming Captain Merino-Saavedra as special 
prosecutor to investigate. He went to Talcahuano, launched an inquiry and then, in 
accordance with his criteria, recommended punishments to the Naval Board and later to the 
President. 
. These events are a 
demonstration that the lack of discipline among the officers was much extended. 
 The four officers who were the main protagonists were forced into retirement. Other 
participants received lesser punishments and some would become the commanding officers 
of naval units in the Naval Mutiny of 1931. One of the ‘Luises’, commander Luis Escobar 
would be recalled to service when Ibáñez completely dominated the political scene, and he 
reached the rank of Rear Admiral. The rest of the ‘Luises’ returned to the Navy as well, 
except commander Concha who died in 1926. This action of punishing and then undoing, 
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accordingly to the vagaries of politics, is very typical of that period. Captain Merino adds 
another comment to his performance as prosecutor writing:  
‘It was later demonstrated that this movement was directed by the Minister 
of War Colonel Ibáñez and Colonel Marmaduque Grove, who were slowly 
undermining the Navy’s discipline with their ambitions of seizing the 
Government of the Republic188
  
’. 
 He writes later that when Ibáñez became President in 1927 and named Commander 
Carlos Frödden-Lorenzen as Minister of the Navy, this last official considered: 
‘These subversive actions …’[the ‘Luises Affair] …‘as acts of political 
character and he ordered all the participant officers to be recalled to active 
duty, giving them all kind of promotions, good positions and rewards. 
Some of them were commanding officers of destroyers when the 1931 
mutiny of lower deck personnel took place. Then they demonstrated being 
better fitted as conspirators than men of action189
 
’. 
 These were very harsh words written by prosecutor Merino-Saavedra. They explain 
what happened later to the participants in ‘Luises Affair’, confirming Ibañez’s influence in 
naval matters and the consequences of the period 1924-1925 in the 1931 Naval Mutiny 
which is the main subject of this thesis. 
At the beginning of spring in the southern hemisphere, the issue of the presidential 
succession agitated the political atmosphere, particularly because Alessandri’s term would 
finish in December 1925 and he had stated that he would not accept any extension of it. 
Then, a group of civilian raised Ibañez’s candidacy. In this context, a meeting of the Navy 
Board took place. Admiral Swett presided since the Director General Admiral Schroeder 
was that day in Santiago. Ibáñez suggested that, in order to avoid an intense political 
struggle he would accept this post only if he would be the sole candidate. He also informed 
the Navy of this fact too. At the Navy Board meeting there were opinions in favour of a 
unanimous civilian candidacy but finally that of Ibanez’s prevailed. ‘The Navy Board 
agreed to state that in accordance to the Navy’s general way of thinking, Colonel Ibanez’s 
candidacy had its support’190
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 In this same month, the Prince of Wales visited Chile and he was honoured by 
Alessandri who was still angry at the naval service and who received a suggestion from the 
military to ask the Prince for a British Naval Mission to supervise the Chilean Navy. In the 
end, a mission with only an advisory role arrived. Captain Merino had a poor opinion of 
this mission but Commander von Schroeders saw it from a favourable perspective, showing 
the navy’s diverging way of thinking. 
 Eight British naval officers with the rank of Commanders or Lieutenant 
Commanders performed their duties in Chile between 1926 and 1928. They gained 
importance as Ibáñez progressed politically because he thought that this mission would 
reform the conservative Navy as he wished. These advisors were replaced by another group 
of the same origin, a subject to be treated in a later chapter, due to its importance in the 
analysis of the 1931 Naval Mutiny191
 When Alessandri left his post, there were several points of the ‘Telegrama de 
Roma’ left unfulfilled. He did not change the Constitution and the political institutionalism 
. The subject of Ibañez’s candidacy created a great 
political nuisance and it has been already covered that the way the Navy took part in this 
subject was clearly beyond its professional duties. The Cabinet, pressed by the President, 
stated that no minister could stay in office while being a candidate at the same time. Ibáñez 
himself had stated the same some time previously, when a civilian minister tried to 
campaign for the Presidency. Then, the whole Cabinet resigned expecting that the Minister 
of War would follow suit but this did not happen. Finally, Ibáñez wrote a letter to 
Alessandri, stating that he would not resign from the Cabinet to become a candidate since 
this was not a legal or a constitutional requirement. He added that he did not accept being 
morally disqualified as a member the Cabinet from being a candidate. He wrote as well 
that, as the head of the revolution, the position of Minister of War was assigned to him so 
he would not jeopardize the Army’s discipline by resigning. He added a comment saying 
that since he was the only active minister, each presidential document should bear his 
signature as well as that of the President or otherwise it would have no value. Confronted 
with this situation, Alessandri named Luis Barros-Borgoño as vice president and left the 
presidency definitively on 1 October 1925. 
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by means of a Constituent Assembly192
 Admiral Schroeder went to Santiago to meet General Navarrete on the day after 
Alessandri left the Presidency. He told the General that the Navy did not accept Armed 
Forces officers becoming candidates because this violated the ‘Manifesto of 11 September’. 
It must be stressed that the Director General’s position was different to that which was 
approved by the Navy Board under the presidency of Admiral Arturo Swett already 
mentioned, and this is a demonstration of the degree of confusion in the services at that 
period. 
, as it was his explicit wish, but nevertheless, he 
achieved the goal of imposing a new constitutional text by other means. He didn’t 
implement a civilian rule either due to Ibanez’s and his military group’s high influence nor 
did he finish his presidential period. Worse, he did not bring the Armed Forces back to their 
own duties. 
 Schroeder said that the Navy did not only disapprove Ibañez’s candidacy but also 
considered that the frequent mood changes of the Colonel were caused by the clique 
surrounding him. General Navarrete had the same opinion, as he had stated to El Mercurio 
on 29 September that the candidate should be a civilian. He gave this same opinion to the 
Minister of War before the announcement of his candidacy. Furthermore, he gave the 
newspaper article to Ibáñez before its publication and the Minister agreed. After the above 
dialogue, the General proposed a visit to Ibañez to tell him the way of thinking of both 
services. Schroeder asked to wait until he could invite also the Minister of the Navy. 
 The meeting took place in Ibañez’s office and it was attended by General Navarrete, 
Admirals Schroeder and Bahamondez, Major Fenner and others. The Director General of 
the Navy told the Minister of War that the candidate needed to be a civilian because of the 
promises made by the Armed Forces to the country. He said that ignoring this provision 
would discredit the Minister. He also charged him with being under the influence of a large 
and irresponsible clique. Ibáñez requested the opinion of Navarrete as Inspector General of 
the Army and he answered that he already knew it and stressed that he was for a civilian 
                                                 
192  The three Chilean Constitutions that lasted long periods were designed and 
approved by means of methods different from the Constituent Assembly. There are 
political groups keen for a Constituent Assembly but they did not succeed in Chile 
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candidate. Following this, an incident between Ibáñez and Navarrete took place. Both 
quoted their positions to each other and at the end, Ibáñez told Schroeder:   
‘You may tell the Navy…that I have no interest in being a candidate…I 
had been obliged to accept a candidacy because the political parties did not 
arrive at an agreement to name a civilian for this purpose, in spite of the 
efforts made by the Government193
 
’.  
 After this statement, Schroeder told him that he was grateful for his patriotism, a 
somehow candid statement in the light of the following events.  
 While the above happened in Santiago, in Valparaiso Admiral Swett received a 
telegram from the Minister of War, requesting him to assume the position of Minister of the 
Navy. Swett was at this moment presiding over a meeting of the Navy Board, and he asked 
for time to give an answer, because of the previous agreement of this board to keep 
Admiral Bahamondez as Minister of the Navy, and since Schroeder was in Santiago.  Swett 
says that he talked with Schroeder over the telephone and the Director General of the Navy 
informed him that no one in Santiago had consulted him about this change. Furthermore, he 
had agreed with Vice President Barros-Borgoño to keep Bahamondez as Minister, in 
accordance with the agreement of the Navy Board. Due to the above, Swett sent telegrams 
to the Vice President and to Ibáñez, asking to avoid a change in the Ministry of the 
Navy194
 All the above is evidence of Ibañez’s methods, because without having 
constitutional authority to designate ministers, he manoeuvred without the knowledge of 
the Minister and the Director General of the Navy, to press for the nomination of an 
Admiral to a governmental position, thinking that he was nearer to his own political goals. 
It is also evidence of how this Army officer and his group had been gaining, slowly but 
consistently, influence in the Navy. This fact would undermine the hierarchical structure in 
this service and this would have an impact on the events of 1931. Unfortunately, those who 
. In those days Captain Alejandro García-Castelblanco became Minister of Industry 
and Railroads. Up to then he was the Under Secretary of the Navy and he was accepted by 
the military officers surrounding Ibáñez. This group did not have a favourable opinion of 
Admiral Bahamondez and preferred Swett as Minister of the Navy but in the end, they 
accepted because this last officer had to finish his term as Commander in Chief of the Fleet.  
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commanded the Navy did not become aware of this military influence, probably due to the 
contradictory attitudes of colonel Ibáñez. 
 El Mercurio, in its edition on 3 October 1925, points out that from the day before 
Ibáñez had resigned to be a candidate, the political parties started negotiations to reach a 
consensus for a single nominee. The Colonel did not mention that his resignation, in order 
to be a candidate, was something that was requested of him by the highest authorities of the 
Army and Navy days before. Moreover, he said that he had the support of his service195
 The reaction within the Navy to Ibañez’s subsequent withdrawal of his candidacy 
and to the designation of a sole civilian candidate can be seen in a telegram to the Minister 
of the Navy:  
. 
‘The Navy Board expresses its satisfaction regarding the agreement 
between the Armed Forces and the political parties, accepting one of the 
desires of the services. It also expresses that it is pleased by the nomination 
of the eminent citizen Emiliano Figueroa Larraín …’ [as a candidate]…‘for 
the Presidency196
 
’. 
 This telegram was signed by Admiral Schroeder as Director General. General 
Navarrete ascribes a fundamental role to the Navy and its senior admiral, in Ibanez’s 
resignation of his political ambitions to become a presidential candidate. This naval 
conduct would have upset Ibanez’s staunch admirers [the ‘clique’], because they thought 
this enabled the politicians’ ideas to prevail and this would make the political reforms, 
contemplated by the revolutionaries of September 1924, unachievable. Another attempt at 
stopping the presidential election would be tried by Ibañez’s supporters. This happened 
when the Colonel stated openly that the election should be adjourned. The Navy Board’s 
reaction was stated in a letter to the Minister of the Navy:  
‘I beg that you tell the Vice-president that the Navy Board considers 
inconvenient the idea of postponing the Presidential election, because this 
measure would by against agreements that must be complied with to 
preserve the Government prestige inside the country and outside of it, 
while the important subject in the northern region197
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extending the present revolutionary state is dangerous for the internal order 
and would make it even more difficult the return to a normal government. 
It is not prudent to violate the country’s wishes, already stated in the 
unanimous and patriotic agreement reached, favouring the nomination of a 
sole candidate. Lastly, postponing the date set in the Constitution would be 
a violation, erasing the fact that it had been approved recently by a very 
eloquent popular vote198
 
’. 
 Again this communication was signed by Admiral Schroeder.  
 In the following month, an event revealing the character of Colonel Ibáñez took place 
when he kept manoeuvring to hold on to and even to increase his political and military 
power. On 2 November, he ordered as Minister of War, the replacement of General 
Navarrete as Commander of Santiago’s Military Garrison. The General answered that, 
together with relinquishing this post, he would resign as Inspector General of the Army and 
retire from service. He attributes his conflict with Ibáñez to his opposition to the existence 
of the Government Junta nominated in September 1924 and his later rejection to the 
presidential candidacy of an Armed Force officer, coinciding in this position with that of 
the Navy. This same month, a protocol event meant to consolidate the civilian candidacy 
took place in the fleet. Vice President Barros-Borgoño and General Véliz, the Minister of 
the Interior, together with Emiliano Figueroa-Larraín, who had been elected as President, 
went on board the flagship where they were entertained by the naval authorities. The 
Minister of War Ibáñez once more excused himself from attending a Navy ship or shore 
establishment as he had been doing since the coup of 23 January. Captain Merino-Saavedra 
the commanding officer of the flagship described the fleet’s mood as: ‘Of confidence and 
calm, reflecting the country’s mood …’ [and that Figueroa] …‘would rule without the 
political parties’ exasperating struggles199
 Meanwhile, within the Navy, the pressure for reforms intended to improve the 
situation of the engineers, supply corps and pilot officers continued. Most of the engineers 
favoured Colonel Ibáñez because he was the first to become aware of their deplorable 
situation in spite of the efforts made by the Navy to give this group an excellent 
’. 
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professional education. On 23 December, Emiliano Figueroa-Larraín became 
President and this political event caused some changes in the higher levels of Government. 
Rear Admiral Swett became Minister of the Navy, while Ibáñez remained as Minister of 
War. A possible speculation is that he somehow participated in the nomination of the 
former, due to Swett’s sympathy with Ibáñez’s political views as discussed above 
concerning the October crisis. Admiral Bahamondez replaced Swett in the command of the 
fleet. Later in May 1926, Captain Merino, now promoted to higher rank became the Navy 
Chief of Staff, moved to Santiago where he observed more closely the continuous political 
progression of Colonel Ibáñez.  
  
4.2 Summary: the development of active participation by the Navy in Chilean 
politics and its significance for the 1931 Mutiny. 
  
Before covering the subsequent presidential period of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo it is 
necessary to summarize the 1924-1925 period [covered in chapters 3 & 4], when the 
discipline of the Chilean Armed Forces collapsed and when certain events similar to those 
which would occur later in the 1931 Naval Mutiny, took place. This similarity is 
particularly the case of Talcahuano. Not only were the events are alike. What is even more 
striking is the similarity of the attitudes, of the way in which the situation was handled. In 
short, there is a parallel in mentality. 
 In both instances, the commands gathered their personnel, requested their opinions 
and later rejected or approved political attitudes by means of telegrams. The officers gave 
conferences and speeches, published press articles, expressing ideas of clear political sense 
and turned down the government on three different opportunities and in one of them, with a 
direct threat of force. And all this was done while the Constitution of 1833, and later that of 
1925, stated that the Armed Forces were obedient and not deliberating institutions.  
 In part, this way of acting was the heritage of the liberal and quasi parliamentary 
period succeeding the presidential and conservative period, which ended with the Civil War 
of 1891. Between 1891 and 1925 politics were characterized by numerous alliances, 
lobbying, never ending discussions and cabinet changes but control was always maintained 
by the highly placed sector of the Chilean society. All political discussions occurred within 
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that almost closed group, while the Armed Forces disregarded any political activity, except 
a frustrated minor seditious movement taking place in 1919. This period ended in the 1920s 
when the armed forces officers became important political actors. 
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5. THE FAILED SOLUTIONS OF 1925-1931. 
 
5.1. The brief presidential period of Emiliano Figueroa-Larraín. 
 
 The 1920s were a decade of big change for Chile. The middle class did not enjoy 
political expression until the military started dismantling the existing political order in the 
way that has been described.   
 A transformation of this nature does not transpire in a short period. The new 
Constitution enacted in 1925 and the laws approved between September 1924 and the 
following year, plus the election of a new President, who became a candidate with the 
support of all political parties, gave the prospect that the country would return to a normal 
political life. The sudden changes in Chile’s political life between 1924 and 1925 caused a 
succession of modifications in the higher levels in the Navy bringing a set of young officers 
to assume top responsibilities in the following years and this was an important factor in the 
coming events. It is possible that the events in Talcahuano in January 1925 did not leave 
any lessons or plans in order to handle the similar problems which became evident in 1931, 
due to the frequent changes in the high command of the Navy as a consequence of the 
political unrest of the period 1924-1925. 
 In spite of the feverish reformation plans, the task of changing the political 
institutions was not achieved at the end of 1925 and the desires of the emerging middle 
class were not entirely fulfilled, as the events that will be analyzed later will demonstrate. 
The 1931 Naval Mutiny took place precisely in this atmosphere. 
In the previous pages Ibáñez’s rise to power from anonymity to Director of the 
Cavalry School, and, ultimately, to Minister of War was discussed. His ascent through the 
ranks was the result of his participation in the coups of 5 September 1924 and 23 January 
1925. 
The following pages are devoted to this Army officer who became a destabilising 
force and who influenced the Navy deeply, becoming an important factor in the Naval 
Mutiny of 1931. But before analyzing his presidency the renewed intention to maintain 
civilian rule will be discussed. The participation of Emiliano Figueroa has been introduced 
in the previous pages. The subject of his election will be covered now. 
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 It is necessary to recall that in the military coup of 1925, President Alessandri was 
reinstated only to finish the political reforms sought by Ibáñez and his group. As a new 
presidential election approached, Ibáñez influenced by his supporters, entered the race as a 
candidate. However, he encountered opposition from certain political groups and the Navy, 
as has been seen. As a result, Alessandri encouraged him to leave his Cabinet, arguing that 
it was inconvenient to be both a minister and a candidate at the same time. Ibáñez resisted 
because his post as Minister of War was the source of his influence. The President, not 
willing to share power with his powerful minister, resigned definitively just a few months 
before the end of his term. Upon his resignation, he named Luis Barros-Borgoño as Vice-
president to rule until the president-elect could take power following the upcoming 
elections. Barros named two naval officers to his Cabinet: Rear Admiral Braulio 
Bahamondez-Montaño became Minister of the Navy and Captain Alejandro García-
Castelblanco, Minister of Public Works, Commerce and Transport. 
The political parties agreed to back Emiliano Figueroa-Larraín as the sole candidate 
in the elections because he lacked a strong political personality, and would therefore not 
adversely affect their interests. Facing a consolidated political environment and lacking 
support from the Navy and particular sectors of the Army, Ibáñez withdrew his 
candidacy200
Figueroa won a large majority on 24 October 1925 elections. Without a functional 
Congress since the Military Coup of September 1924, Deputies and Senators were also 
selected in November. Once Emiliano Figueroa assumed the presidency, he abstained from 
changing his Cabinet, particularly the Minister of War, Ibáñez.  The decision would impact 
on the fate of his presidency, because Ibáñez would increase his influence during his term. 
As Minister of the Navy, Rear Admiral Arturo Swett-Otaegui replaced Rear Admiral 
Bahamonde. There is evidence, as noted previously, that this replacement of the flag officer 
was favoured by Ibáñez and his followers. The inference is that President Figueroa made 
the change with the advice of his Minister of War. For Ibáñez, it was clear that within the 
high levels of command in the Navy, there was resistance to his methods. A similar feeling 
existed in part of the naval officers who had also a somehow optimistic view of the period, 
. 
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as the result of the new presidency. They saw Figueroa as a conventional politician, from 
the old oligarchic Chile, which was being displaced by an emerging middle class. This 
mentality was captured by author Captain José Toribio Merino Saavedra: 
‘By influence of Don Emiliano Figueroa as President and a Congress 
elected by popular vote, militarism with its ambitions and activities seemed 
to be quieted, although Colonel Ibañez retained the position of Minister of 
War; it seemed that the Republic was slowly being orientated to normality 
and that we would enjoy better times and well-being…201
 
’.  
The first months of Figueroa’s term passed in harmony. The group of Army officers 
led by Ibáñez, however, was not satisfied and wished to accelerate the political, social and 
economical reforms emerging from within the middle class. By November 1926, alarm and 
rumours spread that Ibáñez was preparing another coup. 
 The British Minister in Chile, Sir Thomas Hohler, wrote in a report sent to the 
Foreign Office: 
‘Wednesday the 17th November, Thursday the 18th and Friday the 19th were 
days of considerable anxiety as it was widely thought that this country was 
on the verge of a coup d’etat and, it might even be, a civil war. The latter 
fear arose from reports of antagonism between the Army and the Navy202
 
’. 
The Navy, although agreeing with Colonel Ibanez’s diagnosis of Chilean problems, 
disagreed strongly with his methods, particularly those that might lead to a military 
dictatorship. The fleet, conducting exercises in the southern region at the time, received 
orders to sail back to Valparaiso203
The peril of another military coup was attenuated by a purely parliamentary 
procedure, the cabinet change, which occurred only after much lobbying and several 
unsuccessful negotiations detailed in Hohler’s report previously quoted. This is evidence 
that even after ratification of the presidentially orientated Constitution of 1925, the 
mentality and political custom of the 1891-1925 era still survived. While Ibáñez and Swett 
remained in the new cabinet, Captain García-Castelblanco did not. Sir Thomas Holler 
. 
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commented that the new cabinet: ‘has not liquidated the crisis but has merely brought a 
respite which may be brief204
The auspicious beginning of Figueroa’s administration changed over the course of 
1926. An unfavourable milieu within the Navy would foment the conditions that triggered 
the Naval Mutiny of 1931.  
’. 
On New Year’s Eve, 1927, the Director General of the Navy, Vice Admiral Juan 
Schroeder Peña, organized a lunch for all officers and wives in the Naval Country Club in 
Las Salinas, Valparaiso. José Toribio Merino-Saavedra, one of the attending officers, wrote 
the following narrative: 
‘Despite the prevailing joy and harmony, abnormal symptoms were evident 
and there were veiled conversations about the proximity of better days for 
the Navy—for a period of freedom and liberty…..It was something morbid, 
undefined, floated in the environment and only those aware of the record 
could understand it205
 
’. 
Five days later, the Government requested that the Chamber of Deputies reduce the 
Army’s budged by $15,500,000 and the Navy’s by $10,000,000206
A few days later, the Navy Board met to analyze the budget reduction. La Unión 
polled officers regarding a possible reduction in salaries. They stated anonymously that: 
. Given that a budget had 
already been discussed and approved only a few months prior, the reduction was evidence 
that, to some degree, the Government had lost control over its finances. 
‘The Navy is, in essence, an obedient institution that does not deliberate on 
decisions adopted by the Government…..If the Government believe a 
salary reduction as necessary, such decision is acceptable if done 
proportionately. Neither the officers nor the enlisted would resist salary 
reductions like those being suggested by certain Public Workers’ 
associations. There is negative talk of the hate towards the Armed Forces in 
light of the salary reduction proposals that target Army and Navy personnel 
exclusively. These proposals are dangerous and must not be adopted 207
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Within this context, the General Secretary of the Navy made a public statement208
This environment of concern probably forced Rear Admiral Swett, the Minister of 
the Navy, to meet the officers of the Latorre and the cruiser Chacabuco, the most 
significant units of the fleet, for lunch. Merino-Saavedra criticised the Minister: 
 
announcing that the battleship Latorre would not go to Europe to be refitted. This decision 
meant the cancellation of an important professional goal for this service. 
‘The commanding and executive officers said to him that they noted among 
the officers symptoms of rapprochement and sympathy toward the Army, 
which if strengthened would bring unrest. Thus, they advised the Minister 
that it would be prudent to neutralize such an outcome by anticipating the 
events and adopting a policy of advancement and harmony with the Army. 
Unfortunately, the Minister did not heed their warning; rather, he became 
angry upon hearing such words. He considered the opinions traitorous to 
the naval mission. Thus, he showed his ineptitude at confronting the 
situation by demonstrating a lack of flexibility and foresight. In Santiago, 
the Minister fell in the same quagmire that devoured the old Admirals of 
the first Government Junta…’  ‘…the incense burnt by Santiago’s 
politicians and oligarchy at his ostentatious personal appearance enervated 
him.  Fooled by a mirage of political strength, he did not prove his intellect. 
He did not react nor progress to a policy of rapprochement toward the 
militarism represented by Colonel Ibáñez, whom he scorned and 
repudiated209
 
’. 
Merino Saavedra continued his criticism of Swett by noting that his failure to 
resolve the outstanding issues with the army officers caused the members of this service to 
directly contact the naval officers and, as a result: 
‘commanders …. headed a movement of rapprochement with the 
Army…displacing high positioned officers and precipitated their future 
fall. The commanders, upon assuming higher ranks and positions, were 
unable to keep discipline and traditions.  They pushed the Navy towards 
mutiny210
 
’. 
Merino’s criticism is slightly biased. First, Swett was appointed pursuant to Ibáñez’s 
recommendation, precisely because, as noted earlier, the Colonel thought that he shared an 
affinity for reform. Subsequently, however, his performance in the Ministry of the Navy 
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would prove that he did not cherish the same ideas. Second, it is not possible to assign 
responsibility to a single person or to the Navy commanders assuming high-level positions 
in the service for the crisis that would affect the service in 1931. Nevertheless, Merino 
validly observed that, in general, all the Admirals of that period failed to understand the 
political changes occurring in Chile in the 1920s, and to adjust the naval organization and 
rules to reflect this new reality [see section 2.2]. From the junior officers’ perspective, their 
seniors seemed tied to the more conservative politicians, who happened to be the most 
fervent opponents to the reforms favoured by the Army officers close to Ibáñez. 
By January 1927, rumours of a conspiracy by naval officers who were unhappy with 
the direction of the service had surfaced. Ibáñez ordered that military exercises be carried 
out in Concón, near Valparaiso and Viña del Mar, homeport of the fleet and site of several 
naval establishments. The Navy publicly stated that it would not participate. The Army 
massed units from several cities for the exercises, constituting a powerful concentration of 
forces, perhaps as a demonstration of strength. Some dissatisfied naval officers, among 
them Commander Joaquín Herrera-Aguirre and Lieutenant Commander Carlos Cortés, 
went to Concón. They met Colonel Anibal Parada, Lieutenant Colonel Luis Cabrera and 
Lieutenant Alejandro Lazo, all active members of the closest Ibáñez supporting group.   
The Minister of War inspected the participating troops on 30 January 1927. The 
inspection was followed by a luncheon. Some naval and Coastal Artillery officers also 
attended. Merino writes: 
‘One of the naval officers, acting on a preset plan, talked about aspirations 
within the Navy orientated at changing the service and at transitioning 
toward granting officers of intermediate ranks more power. They seek the 
collaboration of the Minister of War to take these ideas to the 
Government211
 
’. 
This was not the only outcome of the exercises in Concón. On 4 February, in a hotel 
in Viña del Mar, compromising documents were discovered in a room where Colonel 
Parada had been lodged. The papers revealed the existence of a plot organized in the Army 
to counteract a coup in the Navy. President Figueroa sent the documents to Manuel Rivas-
Vicuña, the Minister of the Interior, for discussion with Ibáñez. According to Merino, the 
documents were abandoned with a purpose and, once discovered, were given to the 
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Director General of the Navy, who took them to the President. In his opinion, not delivering 
a copy to the press was a naval mistake 
The meeting between Rivas and Ibáñez took place on 7 February. The Colonel 
grabbed the compromising documents from the Minister and did not return them. He 
refrained from commenting on them. Rather, he told Rivas that a group of junior naval 
officers wanted to oust the high command of the service.  The group sought to replace the 
Minister of the Navy with a junior officer and to name an Admiral in whom they had 
confidence, namely Rear Admiral Merino, to the post of Director General of the Navy. 
Swett sent a telegram to the Director General of the Navy on 9 February, saying: 
‘The Minister of War has told the President that when in Valparaiso he 
received a petition signed by several junior officers, demanding that the 
President reorganize the Navy by removing superior officers, which in fact 
the Minister did so demand. The President of the Republic declared he 
would resign before adhering to the petition. The Minister of the 
Interior….[Rivas] ….adhered to this declaration212
 
’ . 
The press also published213
Sir Thomas Hohler summarized the facts:  
 the quoted telegram. 
‘There appears to be no doubts as to the connivance of Ibañez and his 
emissaries in the Mutiny- I think it can be described by no other word- in 
the Navy. He had found the Navy an invincible obstacle to his paths in 
November last and he- or his advisers- were resolved on removing it214
 
’. 
In turn, Ibáñez made a strong public statement against politicians who: 
`incited hatred against the Army, hereby serving the interests of the 
anarchist, who were striving to bring about a social revolution and had 
organized to distribute propaganda against the Army and the Navy215
 
’.  
The acts of the Minister of War and his followers led to a Cabinet crisis. In the 
Navy, the recent acts of indiscipline came to light because the Undersecretary of the Navy 
travelled from Santiago to visit Vice Admiral Schroeder, the Director General, who was 
                                                 
212  Annual Report 1927 of the British Embassy to Foreign Office NA. FO 371/12752 
No. A1630/1630/9, 25 JAN 1928, p.21. 
 
213           La Unión, 11 FEB 1927. 
 
214 Sir Thomas Hohler to Foreign Office, 19 FEB 1926. NA.FO 371/11976 No. 50. 
 
215 Sir Thomas Hohler to Foreign Office, 25 JAN 1925, p.6. NA. FO 371/12752 No. 
A1630/1630/9. 
 
 106 
accompanied in his home by Rear Admiral Merino. The Undersecretary confirmed on 
behalf of the Minister of the Navy that junior naval officers petitioned Colonel Ibáñez to 
intervene in favour of reorganizing the Navy.  
Merino writes that the following measure was adopted: ‘as in other occasions, the 
fleet and shore establishment officers would sign a document rejecting and discrediting the 
petition216
The measure reveals the period’s mentality. While, under the Military Code of 
Justice, these events constituted criminal conduct, the measure adopted is typical of those 
that might be adopted by a political party or a trade union, namely collective expressions of 
support, rather than those proper to the Armed Forces.  Merino wrote in the next paragraph 
of his book that a trustworthy officer visited him. The officer told him that he had travelled 
to Santiago the night before in a locomotive dispatched for him by Ibáñez to meet with the 
Colonel and his group. According to the Annual Report of the British Legation in 
Santiago
’.  
217
Merino relayed the Commander’s report to the Director General of the Navy, who, 
in turn, summoned the Navy Board. However, no resolution was adopted. On the other 
hand, the British Report stated that Vice Admiral Schroeder tendered his resignation as 
Director General; Rear Admiral Alfredo Searle-Lorca, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet 
temporarily assumed the post. According to Merino, Schroeder handed his resignation to 
the Undersecretary of the Navy while he was in Valparaiso telling him that he should go to 
Santiago and make it effective only if the situation worsened. Meanwhile, the Navy’s plan 
to procure the signatures of the officers in the statement denouncing the plot set forth by 
Ibáñez and his followers was not particularly successful. Merino recalls that while all the 
officers in the Naval Staff signed the statement, Commander Alejandro Yánquez-Cerda 
indicated that the document had no value because the Government had already received a 
petition from the junior executive officers, as well as the engineering and supply corp 
officers.  
, the officer was Commander Joaquín Herrera, who upon returning, reported that 
the Army denied any intervention in the internal affairs of the Navy. 
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In other words, the course of events had quickly rendered the measure adopted by 
the high command of the Navy moot. The Admiralty appeared reactive, that is, only 
capable of confronting accomplished facts. 
Under the above circumstances, and duly authorized by the Director General of the 
Navy and by Swett, who had already resigned from the Cabinet, Merino decided to travel to 
Santiago. He reported to the President on: ‘the situation in the Navy and the consequences 
that the appointment of a junior officer as Minister would have on the service218’. He adds 
that he went to Santiago: ‘to defend the organization of the Navy, and under no 
circumstances, as an advocate for the interests of his colleagues in rank, or any other 
fanciful notion recently published by the Diario Ilustrado219
The Navy thought, undoubtedly, that the President, vested with the powers granted 
by the recently approved presidentialist Constitution, would maintain the traditional naval 
organization. However, Emiliano Figueroa hailed from the Parliamentary era. He lacked a 
strong personality needed to oppose Ibáñez’s intentions. Moreover, he had already 
entrusted the Colonel with the task of organizing a new cabinet. 
’. 
The events illustrate that a new step in the disintegration of naval discipline had 
been achieved, culminating with the nomination of a new Minister of the Navy and a new 
Director General. According to Merino, the junior naval officers elected Commander 
Joaquín Herrera as Minister at a gathering at the Navy Club in Valparaiso by sending a 
collection of signatures by telegram to Colonel Ibáñez. Photographs of the meeting 
appeared in newspapers the following day. 
‘Simultaneously, in the alley between the Club and the Holy Ghost Church, 
Colonel Parada, chief of the cavalry units gathered in Concón, met 
Commander Carlos Frödden and pressed him to accept the position of 
Minister of the Navy, offered through him by Colonel Ibáñez. Frödden 
resisted, but accepted. If this officer, perhaps with a higher sprit de corps 
and patriotism, would have rejected this offer, the destiny of the country 
and the Navy would have followed another course, and this doomed service 
would not have collapsed four years later220
 
’.  
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Later in his book, Merino blames the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Rear 
Admiral Searle for not having implemented measures to suppress the lack of discipline. He 
notes that this flag officer ceased attending to his flagship, limiting himself to taking care of 
everyday matters at the headquarters in replacement of Vice Admiral Schroeder, who had 
previously resigned. Then: 
‘Nothing stopped the lack of discipline and its overflow. The ships’ 
commanding officers, without guidance, ended up in a meeting in the 
battleship Latorre and, upon calling the rest of the officers, dispatched a 
radio message, via the Commandant of the Military Garrison of Valparaiso, 
to Colonel Ibáñez, which communicated their assent to Commander 
Frödden as Minister of the Navy’…….[and added]…. ‘That in order to 
curb the incidence of indiscipline, Rear Admiral Merino should become 
Director General of the Navy221
 
’.  
The British Legation 1927 Annual Report confirms these events. 
Merino met Ibáñez on 9 February. By then, the Colonel wielded real power. Merino 
says that Ibáñez praised him for garnering the support of the quarrelling naval factions. The 
Colonel also told him that the rampant political and parliamentarian anarchy required a 
strong and apolitical government. Ibáñez added that the Navy must: 
‘not fear for its organization because a junior officer has been named as 
Minister, merely because of the precedent…..of an Army Captain, mister 
Mora, who had been Minister of War. He shared that, while he had a 
commitment to appoint Captain Frödden, he had not yet responded222
 
’. 
Merino then argued to Ibáñez: ‘our Naval culture forbids us from accepting the 
appointment of a junior officer to Minister. This would provoke the retirement of Admirals 
and the most senior Captains, unhinging the service. I proposed an alternative plan to name 
Rear Admiral Ward as Minister’ …a member of the Government Junta after 23 January 
1925. But Ibáñez: ‘rejected this idea because he considered that Ward opposed his ideas, 
and because of disagreements they had had while he was a member of the Junta223
Ibáñez shared that he had also offered the position of Minister of the Navy to 
Captains Hipólito Marchant-Morales and Francisco Nieto-Gallegos, but his true candidate 
was Frödden. 
’. 
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Merino adds that Ibáñez:  
‘Asked him, with great warmth and interest, that he should assume the 
position of Director General of the Navy…’ ‘I thanked him for his 
thoughts, and told him that I would leave the service, together with my 
colleagues of the same rank, given the situation we face with the 
appointment of a Minister that destroyed the concept of hierarchy…224
 
’. 
On the same day Ibáñez and Merino met, Ibáñez delivered a public statement, which 
precipitated the cabinet crisis that had been looming. Swett, still a Minister, also delivered a 
statement that was too late to reveal: ‘certain intrigue oriented at breaking naval discipline 
has been taking place for some time225’. The statement was untimely, because, on the same 
day, President Figueroa had entrusted Ibáñez with the task of forming a new cabinet. The 
Navy limited itself to recognizing the President’s power to form a cabinet without 
parliamentary approval226
According to Merino
. The statement, however, avoided expressing concern for the 
political importance Ibáñez had achieved by appointing a new cabinet. Naming 
Commander Carlos Frödden-Lorenzen as Minister of the Navy was a particularly sensitive 
problem for the service. 
227, on 10 February 1927, La Moneda received the message 
from the fleet officers accepting Frödden as Minister. The President, having already 
determined the new cabinet assembled by Ibáñez, summoned Merino to La Moneda to tell 
him that he intended to resign due to health problems, but the new cabinet rejected the idea 
given the negative internal and external consequences. In this context, Figueroa asked 
Merino to accept the position of Director General of the Navy. Merino cautioned the 
President: ‘about the infringement of the hierarchy inherent to the appointment of a junior 
officer as Minister228
                                                 
224  Merino-Saavedra, p.23. 
’…of the Navy, and of his intention to retire from active duty. The 
President argued that retirement was a useless sacrifice. He added, considering Merino’s 
position as a link between the Government, the Army officers, and the junior naval officers, 
 
225  Vial-Correa, v. IV, 1996, p. 113. 
 
226  ‘El momento histórico por el que atraviesa la Marina de Guerra’, La Unión, 12 
FEB 1927. 
 
227   Merino-Saavedra, pp. 23-25. 
 
228  Merino-Saavedra, pp. 24. 
 
 110 
that patriotism should lead him to accept the position and sacrifice his qualms, since no 
other Admiral had the same characteristics. Merino writes: 
‘I accepted the position of Director General….under dark circumstances, 
convinced that it would be temporary, because I was familiar with Colonel 
Ibáñez scheme to do away with the post and the Navy Board—constant 
institutional impediments to his plans. I accepted due to the requests of 
President Figueroa and the Navy personnel and, from my side, due to the 
affection I had for my profession. Also, I had an interest in saving the 
service and delaying the chaos and indiscipline slowly progressing and 
reflecting the country’s ambient229
 
’. 
It must be noted that we only have account of the designation of the Director 
General of the Navy from one source, Merino—precisely the appointed officer. 
Accordingly, his narrative may be biased. 
 The appointment of the new Director General of the Navy and, especially, the new 
Minister of the Navy prompted the immediate resignation of Rear Admirals Carlos Ward 
and Braulio Bahamondez230 and a couple of Navy Captains. Note that Vice Admiral 
Schroeder had left the Navy a few days earlier. In the following days, the Government 
ordered the retirement of Rear Admiral Olegario Reyes del Río, who, although junior to 
Merino, could have remained on active duty. Thus, the Navy lost an important group of 
senior and experienced officers. Moreover, Ibáñez achieved his goal of ridding himself of 
those who most strongly opposed his ideas in the Navy, knowing that the majority of junior 
officers supported him231
The appointment of captains to the higher posts of the Navy in a meeting in 
Valparaiso on 13 February 1927 between the Minister and the Director General of the Navy 
concluded the period of changes. Two of these officers, Abel Campos-Carvajal and Roberto 
. This same source stresses that Captain José Manuel Montalva-
Barrientos temporarily became Commander in Chief of the Fleet, while also commanding 
officer of battleship Latorre, site of the aforementioned deliberations. His polemical actions 
in 1924 and 1925 have been covered before [sections 3.1 and 3.2]. 
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Chappuzzeau-Cienfuegos, promoted to Rear Admiral the following years, would face the 
Naval Mutiny of 1931, which involved units under their command. 
Rear Admiral Merino’s first order of business in his new position was to re-establish 
discipline, an objective shared by a Government that was practically headed by Colonel 
Ibáñez. He distributed a communication that attempted to mirror the ideals of the junior 
officers and engineers: 
‘A new mentality is ruling the destiny of our service, in harmony with the 
progress experienced by our country. Public opinion enthusiastically 
accepts a military regime that would end the destructive politicking, 
organize an energetic government to reconstruct our nation, and to solve 
the international and internal problems….The Navy …must have this new 
mentality, orientated to the future and not the past232
 
’. 
He added later that some recently retired Admirals criticized the above document 
because they felt that it condemned their performance when they were in the Navy. The 
note ended with a warning: ‘All activities of naval personnel…..involving deliberation, 
assembly, or subversive or anti-disciplinary acts shall be punished with expulsion from the 
service233
In addition to the appointment, two other important events took place on 13 
February that indicated the course Colonel Ibáñez’s de facto government would take. First, 
the deportation of leftist union leaders started. The Minister of the Interior stated: ‘From 
today there will be no communism or anarchism in Chile. Those with the audacity to 
change the national flag with a red rag shall not control the country
’.  
234’. Second, the Navy 
Board, chaired by the Minister of the Navy, met. The Minister subsequently addressed the 
press235
[a]  New and clear rules. 
 with the following points—all related to the spirit of renewal pushed by Ibáñez: 
[b]  Representation of the engineers, surgeons and supply corps officers on the 
Navy Board. 
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[c] Unified academy for officers [fusion of Naval Academy and   
 Engineers School]. 
[d] Rank promotions strictly by the rules. Use of star on cuffs as distinctive 
emblem among all officers. 
Some of these measures are also referenced in the 1927 Annual Report of the British 
Embassy236
Despite the new rules and warning issued by the Director General of the Navy, there 
were new acts of indiscipline among engineers in the Naval Base in Talcahuano in the 
following month. The authorities summarily punished the perpetrators
. 
237
‘the enormous responsibility that his revolutionary movement contributed 
to unravelling the discipline within the Armed Forces rested upon 
him…’[Ibáñez]…. ‘The Services have become the preferred target of 
tendentious demands. Re-establishing discipline obliged him to impose 
harsh punishment on his comrades, who considered themselves entitled to 
some say over the future course of the Government, and on civilians who 
sought to incite the spirit of insubordination
. While the 
offenders proffered their adherence to Ibáñez’s ideals as an excuse for their wrongdoing, 
their punishment was strict given that the Colonel also wanted to restore discipline. 
Concerning Ibáñez, Carlos Sáez writes:  
238
 
’. 
5.2. Carlos Ibáñez finally becomes President of Chile. 
 
Because of health problems, President Figueroa left his post on 8 April 1927. As 
Vice-president, Ibáñez exercised the powers of the Presidency. Frederick Nunn, an 
American historian, writes that something unbelievable ensued: 
‘Four hundred officers from the Armed Forces and Carabineros visited the 
candidate and Vice-president’…[Ibáñez]…‘in his residence. Military bands 
played marches and the people’s favourite melodies. The Minister of the 
Navy Frödden and General Juan Emilio Ortiz-Vega, the newly appointed 
Minister of War, toasted to the good health of the Vice-president. The 
event demonstrated, once again, that Ibáñez enjoyed considerable support 
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among members of the Armed Forces and Carabineros. Despite the 
restrictions imposed by the new fundamental law [as it happened with the 
old one] the Chilean Armed Forces had transformed into a collective body 
[but not a monolithic one], openly deliberative over three years239
 
…’. 
Unfortunately, Frederick Nunn provides the only source that documents this very 
serious political participation of a large congregation of officers of the Armed Forces. 
There are, however, signs that this influence was more widespread, as evidenced by news 
of subsequent social gatherings of naval officers in the Navy Club and at Las Salinas Naval 
Gardens amid a presidential campaign240
Emiliano Figueroa definitively resigned on 4 May, in accordance with what he had 
told Merino in February. Eighteen days later, Ibáñez was elected President of the Republic. 
He defeated communist leader Elías Lafertte-Gaviño, who, while exiled to Easter Island, 
could not mount a campaign. With respect to the Mutiny of 1931, Lafertte is an important 
character. He was one of his party’s founders, a contributor to the turmoil of 1926, and an 
important factor in triggering significant political events that will be discussed infra. The 
new President was sworn in on 2 July 1927.  He would continue to push for important 
reforms in the Navy that he promoted from his previous posts as Minister and Vice-
president, the consequences of which will be the subject of our attention. 
. 
The Annual Report of the British Chargé d’Affairs in Santiago states that:  
‘1927 will be regarded as a milestone in Chile’s history, for it has marked 
an important stage of its political development, that is, the emergence of 
the middle class241
 
’. 
The new government would frenetically devote itself to transforming the institutions 
and to consolidating the reforms initiated by the several Governments of the 1920´s. The 
middle class desired these reforms, but the process was carried out in a disorderly manner 
due to the political turbulence described in this chapter. 
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As President of Chile and a newly promoted General, Ibáñez fervently devoted 
himself to realizing the reforms he initiated as Minister of War, Head of the Cabinet and 
Vice President. As Vice President and with the signature of the Minister of the Navy, 
Frödden, Ibáñez issued the ‘Decreto Supremo’ [equivalent to an Order of Council] to 
reorganize the High Command of the Navy242
That ‘Decreto Supremo’ ordered the Minister of the Navy to act as: 
. As will be discussed below, the hastily 
implemented reorganization would disrupt naval discipline anew.   
‘Director General of the Navy and Navy Council, exercising, consequently, 
the high command of the Navy. Naval forces at sea, ashore, or by air, as 
well as those commissioned abroad, shall be under his direct authority. In 
other words, all superior resolutions and executive orders came from the 
Minister of the Navy, whom, as a secretary of state, consolidated command 
of the service243
 
’.   
According to a contemporary publication244
The reforms of 1927 were not popular among naval circles. Rear Admiral Merino-
Saavedra, who became the last Director General of the Navy because of the reorganisation, 
heavily criticized the changes in his book, which has been previously cited. The 
, during the second year of Ibanez’s 
presidency, the Minister of the Navy was in charge of: ‘reorganizing, creating, purging and 
renewing the Navy’. Organic changes in May of 1927, created the position of ‘Inspector 
General of the Navy’, whose duties included: ‘investigate, under the authority of the 
Government, all services within the Navy, and during times of peace, act as General 
Director of naval exercises in which a significant number of units participate’. Reformation 
included moving the offices of the ‘Inspector General of the Navy’, the Naval Staff, and 
other high-level bodies to Santiago. The reforms implemented in 1927 undoubtedly gave 
the President tight control of the Navy through a young Minister who, within headquarters 
in Santiago, wielded consolidated control over all service bodies. The most significant 
change was the abrogation of the Naval Council and the position of Director General of the 
Navy - institutions founded by the reforms implemented by Admiral Montt in 1898 [see 
section 2.1]. 
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Government sought to arrest all failures of discipline like those of September 1924 and 
January 1925, among others. In addition, the Government completed other projects, like 
those previously announced by Frödden, including fusing both officers’ schools [‘Escuela 
Naval’ and ‘Escuela de Ingenieros’] in Valparaiso245
Changes to the law on retirement improved the situation facing engineers, supply 
and medical corps officers. Promotions were hard to attain, causing them to reach older 
ages still in very low ranks. Also, rank denominations were modified among these officers 
to homogenize them with the ranks of executive officers. 
. The Naval Academy [‘Escuela 
Naval’] began operating in 1928 with engineering students arriving from Talcahuano. 
In addition to procurement contracts signed by the previous administration, and 
even as new ships arrived, General Ibañez’s government also pursued an aggressive policy 
of ship acquisition. Many of these ships would serve as a stage for the Naval Mutiny of 
1931.  
Six Serrano class destroyers were the first arrivals to be commissioned. The ships 
were named Serrano, Orella, Riquelme, Hyatt, Videla and Aldea. The Ibáñez administration 
also commissioned the construction of three O class submarines, subsequently named 
Thomson, Simpson and O’Brien, a tender ship, the Araucano, and two oil tankers, Maipo 
and Rancagua, as well as some auxiliary ships. A significant number of aircraft were also 
purchased for naval purposes. 
The Ibáñez government’s vast acquisition policy, which was principally achieved in 
Great Britain, exposed Chilean crews to the political turmoil within British ports. The 
battleship Latorre went for repairs and extensive refitting at the Devonport Naval Dockyard 
between June 1929 and March 1931. During this long period of twenty one months the 
crew of the ship lived together most of the time with the Royal Navy personnel at the 
base—an encounter that will be detailed further below. The acquisition policy required a 
very large financial investment. The modernization of the Latorre alone, consumed two 
thirds of the total allotment for Armed Forces purchases246
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New ships plus the Navy’s overall growth underscored the dearth of officers needed 
to cover all available positions, as noted by the British Legation Annual Report247
The reasons for this expensive program was the still pending subjects with Perú and 
the South American version of navalism [see section 2.2] affecting mainly Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile. The final settlement with Perú will be explained later. Another reason for 
the acquisition of ships was the orientation that Ibáñez wanted to give to his term as 
President. He wanted to modernize the country as a whole. The Navy, with its Conservative 
organization and mentality was one of his main targets. Up dating a fleet until then having 
only ships built before Word War One would make his organizational transformations more 
acceptable for the naval officers. 
. Given 
the extensive time required to train additional officers at the schools, this problem had no 
quick short-term solution. The effects of this would be felt in next year’s mutiny, 
particularly, on those ships moored in Talcahuano Naval Base. Moreover, foreign loans, 
which funded the acquisition program, would exacerbate the economic crisis in the closing 
years of the 1920s.  
In addition to the fundamental organizational changes discussed, several unpopular 
measures (from a disciplinary point of view) followed. For example, Rear Admiral Ward, 
who had experienced some frictions with Ibáñez in 1925 retired. Also, officers punished in 
the ‘Luises´Affair’, returned to active duty. According to Merino, who by then held only 
the position of Inspector General of the Navy, he cautioned President Ibáñez of the 
problems occasioned by the return to service of those officers and their political intrigues. 
Merino also suggested that Ibáñez appoint a more senior officer as Minister of the Navy. 
Merino would have caused Ibáñez to recognize the negative consequences of a young 
Under Secretary of the Navy, and that abrogating the position of Director General of the 
Navy was a mistake. In the end however, he dispatched Merino to Europe—a measure the 
President used when he wanted to rid himself of Navy or Army officers that, in his opinion, 
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were obstructing his will. At his farewell, Frödden hinted that Merino’s departure from 
Chile was because he was suspected of heading an opposition movement against the 
President. In contrast to Merino’s exit, Frödden would remain as one of Ibañez’s most 
dependable supporters through the end of his government. Amid latent disciplinary 
problems, the foregoing illustrates the methods Ibáñez employed to avoid them. . 
Among the successes of Ibanez’s presidency, Chile signed a treaty with Perú in 
Lima on 3 June 1929 that sealed matters pending since the end of the war between both 
countries, which broke out in 1879. The final destiny of the departments of Tacna and 
Arica was the most pressing issue pending. The countries agreed that the former would 
return to Peru, while the latter would remain under Chilean sovereignty. This treaty, and an 
additional protocol, established the definitive border between both countries. The Navy had 
contributed with its presence in northern harbours for decades preventing Peruvian attempts 
to recover territories that were under its sovereignty before the war. 
The following year, the diplomatic missions of Chile in London and of Great Britain 
in Chile matured into embassies, reflecting the growing relationship between the countries. 
The treaty with Peru and the new embassy in London represent important 
achievements of the Ibañez government. The agreement with Peru was especially important 
because it concluded a matter pending for decades. It had been left open by the treaty 
ending the war in 1883, which had ordered the determination of the final sovereignty of 
Tacna and Arica by means of a plebiscite to be held within one decade. The improvement 
in the diplomatic relationship between Chile and Great Britain was the fruit of the positive 
opinion that British diplomats held of Carlos Ibanez’s government in their reports. One of 
these248
                                                 
248  British Embassy report to Foreign Office, 16 AUG 1930, p.2. NA, FO 371/14216 
No. A5574/2155/9.  
 described the success of the government restoring order and stopping communism, 
which was beneficial for the British investments in Chile. The decision of the Chilean 
Government favouring British shipyards to build six destroyers, three submarines, a 
submarine tender, two oilers plus reffitng battleship Latorre perhaps was also a reason for 
turning the diplomatic missions into embassies Despite its achievements, however, the 
Ibáñez presidency would end before its constitutional term, as will be explained below, 
because this event set the stage for the Naval Mutiny of 1931. 
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There is a consensus among historians that economic crisis was a principal factor 
leading to Ibañez’s fall.  The government financed a vast array of reforms, the creation of 
new institutions and regulatory bodies, public works projects, and new acquisitions for the 
Armed Forces with loans that the executive branch expected to pay off with revenue 
derived from the resulting economic improvement. Tax reforms implemented and 
developed over the course of a decade were also expected to bolster revenue and ease the 
strain of loan repayment. While the economic crisis leading to the collapse of the Ibáñez 
government is not within the analytical purview of this thesis, it is important to note that 
Chile had considerable debts when the New York Stock Exchange crashed on 29 October 
1929. The ensuing worldwide economic crisis did not immediately affect Chile. Rather, 
problems arose the following year.  International banks declined to issue new loans and the 
prices for Chilean exports consistently declined. Creditors would eventually demand 
payment of debts and create an unmanageable problem in Chile. Gonzalo Vial writes: 
‘A later study by the League of Nations…stated that, of all countries of the 
world, Chile was the most affected by the Great Crisis249
 
’. 
Furthermore, the Ibañez Government claimed that Arturo Alessandri exacerbated 
the situation by frustrating the government’s attempts to secure new loans which might 
alleviate the financial crisis.  
As early as 1930, the government began reducing salaries for civil servants and 
members of the Armed Forces. After the ‘Red Aircraft Complot’ [discussed below], 
rumours of further reductions spread. While the Navy and Carabineros did not bemoan 
another salary reduction, complaints were voiced from the Army indicating the widespread 
dissatisfaction with Government250
Economic problems were not the sole cause for the sudden end of Carlos Ibañez’s 
presidency. Political problems also marred the presidency. Carlos Sáez, an Army officer 
who played a key role in events in 1924 and 1925, returned to Chile after a long 
commission in Europe. He was a limited supporter of the president. For this reason, his 
comments are particularly interesting: 
. 
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‘When I left Chile, I left a country in anarchy, without government, 
compromised by capricious and unscrupulous statesmanship. Upon 
returning in early 1931, at the very least, I had to recognize that there was 
order, respect for authority, and labour discipline….but….where one 
sensed order, one feels manifest signs of rebellious ferment confined to 
particular sectors of public opinion. Great material progress:  respect for 
authority, but a deaf malaise251
 
’. 
A recessive economy, coupled with the social consequences of such, revived the 
Communist Party in Chile, which the government had strictly controlled in the past. 
Subversives, for example, attempted to detonate a bridge over the river Maipo while the 
President’s convoy crossed. The police frustrated the plot and arrested several participants. 
The British Embassy252
The political problems in 1931 were faced by means of manoeuvres typical of a 
parliamentary regime, although this did not exist anymore in Chile since the new 
Constitution. The President changed his ministers several times. One of these changes took 
place in April 1931. Ibáñez appointed Rear Admiral Marchant as Minister of the Navy and 
General Pedro Charpin-Rival as Minister of War. A year after adopting a salary reduction, 
the cabinet proposed another. A political report from the British Embassy observes that 
while the Navy and the Army would accept the measure, the opposition of several generals 
precipitated the removal of three of them. The naval reaction consisted of an officers’ 
meeting on board the Latorre, which had just returned to Chile
 bought the Government’s argument that communists had 
influenced the attack, adding that there was an: ‘elevated communist activity in most South 
American countries; for instance, the recent labour demonstrations in Talara and elsewhere 
in Peru’. Notwithstanding, the Embassy concluded that Ibáñez had reduced the communist 
problem in Chile since the Alessandri presidency. Ibáñez improved labour laws enacted by 
Alessandri, and adequately controlled communist activity through the recently created 
corps of Carabineros. According to the British Embassy, the depression had spawned the 
contemporary problems of that period. 
253
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meeting were not known by the Embassy254
Faced with one final crisis in the middle of 1931, Ibáñez attempted to mollify 
adversaries by appointing new ministers among prominent members of the opposition. By 
adopting drastic and unpopular measures to curb expenditures, the new cabinet compelled 
the President to revert to appointing ministers aligned with his ideology. 
. Signs of indiscipline, like those experienced in 
1924-1925, resurfaced. 
Amid these cabinet changes, the Navy, having strongly opposed Ibáñez’s initiatives 
prior to 1927, now filled several important posts under his administration. Captain Carlos 
Frödden-Lorenzen255
One of the measures considered to reduce expenditures included diminishing the 
size of the British Naval Mission serving since 1926, which consisted of approximately ten 
officers ranging in rank from Captain to Lieutenant Commander
, who initially served as Minister of the Navy, was subsequently twice 
appointed Minister of the Interior, serving in the most critical stage of Ibáñez’s presidency. 
Rear Admirals Hipólito Marchant-Morales and Edgardo von Schroeders-Sarratea served as 
Ministers of the Navy, while Rear Admiral Alejandro García-Castelblanco served as 
Minister of Economic Promotion. Additionally, several other naval officers, both in active 
duty and retired, served in variety of government positions. When Ibáñez fell from power, 
public opinion blamed the Navy for supporting him.  
256
Facing another possible round of salary reduction and the abrogation of government 
posts to palliate the economic crisis, Ventura Maturana expressed to the Minister of the 
Interior, Carlos Frödden, that: 
. The presence of these 
officers enabled the British Embassy, among other things, to be very well apprised of 
Chilean Naval affairs, as evidenced by the reports sent to the Foreign Office. 
‘Being the case, they must constitute a cabinet composed exclusively by 
Military and Naval servicemen and declare a state of siege to face the 
tumult that has nearly come to fruition after the two previous reductions. If 
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not, the Government’s enemies would surely take advantage of the 
opportunity to subvert the order257
 
’. 
On 15 July 1931, several police chiefs greeted Juan Esteban Montero-Rodríguez, 
the new Minister of the Interior. He asked Ventura Maturana for his opinion on the 
situation. Maturana reflected and stated: 
‘In April of this year, when the Government attempted its first salary 
reduction, one could feel the first inklings of revolution. The second round 
of salary reductions the following May coincided with a second attempt at 
insurrection in Iquique; one can clearly deduce it from the summary I have 
laid on the table258
 
’. 
The gravity of another salary reduction was clear. The stability of the government 
and the armed services were at stake. Yet, six weeks after the meeting between Montero 
and Maturana, a salary reduction would trigger the naval mutiny.  
An intensifying economic crisis and social upheaval across the political spectrum 
sullied the final days of the Ibáñez Government. The Communist Party, which the 
Government had strongly repressed, recovered its vigour in 1931. Organized strikes 
especially targeted the transportation sectors in Santiago and Valparaiso. A very active 
group of university students further exacerbated the disorder. Their clashes with police 
brought casualties and deaths to both sides, as well as among innocent people. Moreover, 
funerals occasioned new clashes, which led to more death and property destruction259
On 26 July 1931, Ibáñez resigned the presidency, tendering the post to Pedro Opazo 
Letelier who was the President of the Senate. In the morning of the following day, Ibáñez 
travelled to Argentina
. A 
strike among doctors, lawyers and bank employees even further aggravated the situation, 
especially since these professionals constituted the middle class—traditionally a bastion of 
support for Ibáñez. 
260
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became Minister of War. A few days later however, Opazo resigned, leaving Montero as 
the new Vice President. Arturo Alessandri subsequently returned to Chile from the exile 
that Ibáñez had imposed on him. 
The new government informed the British Embassy about the financial measures it 
was adopting to avoid a massive withdrawal of bank funds. Among these measures, the 
following were mentioned: ‘Mr. Pedro Blanquier has accepted to head the Ministry of 
Finance, while the Government has implemented a strict economic policy, a reduction of 
the Armed Forces, and a balanced budget261
The government also adopted another important measure, calling a presidential 
election. Vice President Montero accepted being a candidate, thus he resigned his position 
temporarily on 18 August 1931
’. It must be stressed again that the announced 
reduction of salaries triggered the Naval Mutiny.  
262
Before ending this section a summary of the fallen caudillo’s activities must be 
introduced. 
. Having been Minister of the Interior since 8 August, 
Manuel Trucco Franzani replaced Montero. This marked the third Head of State since 
Ibañez fell showing the political instability preceding the Mutiny of 1931. The situation 
worsened when a disagreement with the Government prompted General Sáez to resign as 
Minister of War. 
The action Ibáñez took and the influence he exerted upon the Chilean Navy before 
and during his government appear contradictory. 
 His opinion was that the High Command of the Navy, over the period covered in 
these chapters, was essentially conservative. He considered that the High Command 
opposed his revolutionary ideology and the reforms sought by the junior officers, so he 
worked to force the most senior admirals into retirement. He exploited internal conflicts in 
the Navy, especially through the engineer’s corps, to promote indiscipline and controvert 
measures adopted by the High Command. 
Once Ibáñez achieved full political power, and even before becoming president, he 
changed his disposition toward the Armed Forces, particularly the Navy. He tried to restore 
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discipline and reformed the naval organization. By then, Ibáñez had practically eliminated 
its High Command by forcing several senior admirals into retirement and by naming a 
Commander on active duty to serve as Minister of the Navy. Soon thereafter, he eliminated 
the Navy Board and the position of Director General of the Navy. In conjunction, and 
contrary to Ibáñez’s efforts, these changes deteriorated the state of discipline even further.  
The indiscipline would culminate in the Naval Mutiny of 1931. 
Ibáñez also attempted to modernize the Navy. He implemented a vast package of 
reforms, and acquired new ships and aircraft while refitting older vessels. Ibáñez’s vastly 
expansive initiatives where not limited to the Navy. Indeed, he financed several 
government projects through external loans. 
 The worldwide economic crisis strained Chile and the government’s immense 
initiatives.  The government had to adopt drastic measures to save financial resources and 
mobilise the Armed Forces and Carabineros to confront the contemporary social upheaval 
unleashed by the crisis. 
 In particular, the Navy collaborated by holding and transporting detainees on its 
ships. As in other antecedent periods of history however, this put the crews in contact with 
leftist groups and ideology. 
 The sudden end of Ibañez’s presidency on 26 July 1931, greatly affected political 
stability until 1 September the initial day of the Naval Mutiny. Three transient Heads of 
State briefly took power after Ibáñez, provoking instability and uncertainty in key 
Ministries.  All the meanwhile, the government desperately battled the financial crisis amid 
public discontent with the Armed Forces stemming from its support of the deposed 
government. Within this context, another reduction in salaries was announced, sparking the 
Naval Mutiny. 
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6. THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OF THE MUTINY 
 
6.1. Alessandri’s plots against Ibáñez. 
 
As previously noted [see section 2.2], Ibáñez did not enjoy universal support within 
the Armed Forces. The following narrative will disclose that it was not that solid within the 
Navy. Surprisingly however, sympathy for Ibáñez from the Navy grew despite an initial 
resistance to his methods. Nevertheless, as discussed below, an attempt at destabilization 
would have a peculiar influence on the Naval Mutiny of 1931. 
Fearing social turmoil and upheaval, the politicians reluctantly accepted the Ibáñez 
government. Nevertheless, he faced strong opponents, the most important of whom was, 
undoubtedly, Arturo Alessandri Palma. As previously shown in this thesis, Ibáñez’s direct 
intervention concluded Alessandri’s presidency at the end of 1925.  
General Ibáñez’s government worked vigorously to keep its political enemies in 
check. The government relegated adversaries to distant corners of Chile or expelled them; 
among the latter was the former President Alessandri and his family. This, in turn, 
immediately triggered efforts to depose Ibáñez. These efforts became a ticking time bomb.  
To the chagrin of its creators, the bomb exploded at exactly the wrong moment after 
Ibáñez’s fall, that is, during the Mutiny of 1931. As with politics, if Ibáñez sensed that an 
officer from the Armed Forces failed to support him or presented a danger to his regime, he 
would reassign the officer to a distant garrison, like Tacna, or, if the officer was particularly 
important, dispatch him to a foreign country, as with Rear Admiral Merino. 
Conspiratorial activity started six months after Ibáñez became President. The 
Military Attaché in the Chilean Legation in London 1928, Colonel Marmaduque Grove-
Vallejos, had been Ibáñez’s conspiratorial partner between 1924 and 1927. Grove, 
however, had become disaffected from the General. Major Carlos Millán-Iriarte was 
another conspirator who had also been commissioned to Europe. According to General 
Enrique Bravo-Ortiz, who was a close follower of former President Alessandri, Millán 
visited Grove, and: 
‘…detailed what is happening in Chile….and… invited him as our 
representative, to travel to France for talks….This is how we met in Calais 
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on 16 January 1928, Arturo Alessandri, Marmaduque Grove, Carlos Millán 
and I. After signing the minutes of the meeting in Calais, we returned the 
same day; Grove to London and the three of us to Paris. I wrote to Grove 
days later, asking him to meet me alone to settle some matters still pending 
from the previous meeting. He responded that we should meet in Dover on 
29 February because it was difficult for him to leave England. Thus, we 
booked two rooms at the Lord Warden Hotel, and met. I wanted to consult 
with Grove about the names of friends and companions-in-arms of 
confidence, who we could recruit for our conspiracy….The next 
day…Grove, accompanied me to the port from which I would return to 
France. Nearing the pier, Grove and I happened upon Arturo Alessandri 
and Agustín Edwards. I approached to greet them. Grove greeted only Don 
Arturo, and left immediately to take his train back to London263
 
’. 
Ventura Maturana-Barahona, an attorney and police officer, closely observed these 
meetings and reported them to the Chilean Government since he had been commissioned to 
study criminal investigation techniques in Europe264
‘a person whom had infiltrated the revolutionary committee acting in 
Paris’….reported that...‘Colonel Grove met with Alessandri and other 
enemies of General Ibáñez’ Government. The meeting had set forth a 
conspiracy
. Major Carlos Sáez, also 
commissioned to Europe, wrote that: 
265
 
’. 
Consequently, upon returning from Europe, Major Millán and a non-commissioned 
army officer were detained after disembarking in Valparaiso on 7 March 1928. They had 
with them messages written by the conspirators. The press reported that ‘a communist 
conspiracy had been discovered’; this was the typical classification given to all conspiracies 
of that era. The discovery unleashed a harsh reaction from the government. The two 
detainees were dismissed from the Army. Alessandri’s sons and sons-in-law, among others, 
and other persons were arrested and scattered between Juan Fernandez Island and Easter 
Island on the transport Angamos266
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The Chilean Government seemed to be well informed of the covert activities of its 
Military Attaché in London. In November 1928, the Chilean Minister in London asked the 
British Government to authenticate a telegram sent by Colonel Grove from his home on 17 
or 18 March of that year. To obtain the certification from the Foreign Office, the Chilean 
representative argued that: ‘evidence had been discovered showing that Colonel Grove had 
been engaged in subversive propaganda against his own government in concert with other 
disaffected subjects’267
On 8 September, another of Marmaduque Grove’s brothers, Surgeon Lieutenant 
Commander Eduardo Grove-Vallejos, was appointed to the Chilean Naval Commission in 
London
. In May of 1929, Marmaduque Grove having been dismissed from 
his position in London, moved to Buenos Aires — a site from which a committee acted in 
opposition to Ibáñez. The committee was comprised of exiles, among them, Jorge Grove-
Vallejos, a dentist and Marmaduke’s brother. 
268. As was common in those years, Eduardo Grove travelled through Buenos Aires, 
a necessary stop on the way to Europe. On 27 October 1930, he set off as crewmember for 
the battleship Latorre — being refitted in Devonport at the time. While there is no 
conclusive evidence that he participated in the conspiracy organized by his brothers, 
Marmaduque and Jorge, his subsequent conduct, however, suggests that he harboured an 
affinity for his brothers’ ideology. First, when the Mutiny of 1931 broke out on the 
battleship Latorre, it spread to other ships and he was on board the armoured cruiser 
O’Higgins from the day before as part of the ship company. His role in this will be 
discussed later. Second, on 25 August 1932, the Ministry of the Interior requested that the 
Navy reassign this medical corps officer to the distant city of Punta Arenas because he was 
caught engaging in unspecified subversive activities269
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Aguirre-Cerda appointed him to serve as Mayor in Viña del Mar270. The Popular Front was 
comprised of Communist, Socialist and Radical parties. Lastly, another Popular Front 
coalition government named him Ambassador to Canada, which prompted his retirement 
from the Navy in 1942. All these facts evince an ideological affinity between the three 
Grove brothers271
Returning to the narrative at hand, that is, chronicling attempts to destabilise the 
Ibáñez regime, on 22 October 1929, a young miner attempted to assassinate the President. 
While he managed to fire his revolver, his gun misfired. Upon his arrest, authorities found 
communist literature in his home. The 1929 Annual Report of the British Embassy deemed 
the incident the isolated act of a temporarily insane person
. Nevertheless, there is no conclusive proof that Eduardo participated in 
real acts of naval subversion, such as receiving instruction from the Committee for 
Alessandri in Europe to incite the crews of Latorre or O’Higgins to act against Ibañez’s 
Government in 1930. 
272
In 1930, two instances of subversion against the Ibáñez Government involved the 
Navy. First anti-governmental pamphlets were discovered to have been printed at the 
Navy’s Printing Works, located in Santiago at the time. As a result, criminal proceedings 
ensued. Jorge Grove-Vallejos, the dentist who was a brother of Marmaduque and Eduardo, 
had participated in the affair.  Along with civilians and naval service members, a Naval 
Court condemned him to sixty days in prison. A higher court, however, absolved Jorge 
Grove on appeal.  Later on, his fate would see him exiled to the distant Chilean town of 
Calbuco
. 
273. The fact that the Navy was not directly nor institutionally involved in the 
incident had propagandistic consequences: One of the pillars of governmental power, the 
Navy, harboured subversive activities without the knowledge of its command274
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The second incident might have had even greater consequences. On 21 September 
1930, Alessandri’s supporters attempted to stir an uprising among the men of the garrison 
in Concepción. Expecting to be greeted by a mixed group of military and naval personnel 
who had previously agreed to participate in the plan, General Bravo and Colonel Grove 
arrived on a special flight from Argentina to join them. The episode is known as the 
‘Complot del Avión Rojo’ (‘The Red Aircraft Conspiracy’). Nothing went according to 
plan.  General Bravo and Colonel Grove were detained and held at Talcahuano Naval Base. 
In a demonstration of confidence in the Navy, the government ordered that the two 
prisoners be carried into exile on Easter Island on a naval transport. According to Ventura 
Maturana275 the ‘Red Aircraft Complot’ was the product of the Dover meeting. The British 
Embassy estimated that the coup against Ibanez’s government failed because of the attitude 
of the most senior officer at the Talcahuano Naval Base. His name was not reported by the 
informant credited by the Embassy. That senior officer would have opposed the use of arms 
in any plot of this sort276. Who was then in charge of the Talcahuano Naval Base when the 
red Aircraft landed in nearby Concepción? Rear Admiral von Schroeders took this position 
in March 1930 but in August he became Minister of the Navy277, so he moved to Santiago 
and the senior officer at the base took this duty until the nomination of the next Commander 
in Chief. He was Rear Admiral Chappuzeau who took this position the day after the arrival 
of the Red Aircraft on 22 September 1931278. Researching the Navy List for 1930 the 
senior officer in Talcahuano Naval Base between August and 22 September 1930 probably 
was Captain José A. Goñi279
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In this context, Maturana also insinuates280
‘a report from a reliable source indicated that since the conspirators in Paris 
had undermined the crew’s discipline, the crew would riot upon arriving in 
Chilean waters under the pretext that the ship’s refitting and repairs had not 
been paid. The situation was resolved in time; however, the seeds of 
demoralization had nevertheless been sown on the decks. They would bear 
their poisonous fruit on 1 September 1931
 that the conspirators made contact with 
the officers and sailors of the Latorre while this ship was in Devonport. Although he does 
not offer direct evidence, he firmly avers that: 
281
 
’. 
The lack of payment for the repairs does not seem like a plausible basis for the 
rebellion282
‘…the Revolutionary Committee in Paris sent aboard a special delegate 
who resolutely presented their cause while the battleship was undergoing 
repairs. Discontent precipitated by a reduction in allowance for those in 
foreign duty facilitated the delegate’s task. Given that I was the Minister of 
the Navy in 1930, I received 30 reports concerning the special delegate’s 
campaign at year’s end, which I put at the President’s disposition
. The popularity that Alessandri’s supporters enjoyed among petty officers, and 
perhaps even among a few officers is a more plausible cause. The influence that Surgeon 
Lieutenant Commander Eduardo Grove Vallejos might have exerted after becoming part of 
the crew of the Latorre in October 1930, when the ship was moored in Devonport, cannot 
be discounted. Indeed, Rear Admiral Edgardo von Schroeders-Sarratea provides harder 
evidence regarding the conspirators influence.  When the Latorre was in Devonport: 
283
 
’. 
Immediately after the Mutiny of 1931 the British Ambassador sent an encrypted 
cable to his superiors: 
‘Each day that passes seems to confirm that the mutiny was caused by 
small revolutionary committee assisted by communists. They probably 
received funding from the Chilean revolutionaries in Paris while the 
Latorre was in Plymouth and were aided by communists284
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 This opinion regarding a particular factor that originated the mutiny can be found in 
other sources also, and will be discussed further below in this thesis. 
6.2. Communist plots against political stability. 
 
 Thanks to Professor Olga Ulianova, a Russian historian now living in Chile, who 
has researched in the archives of the Russian Federation, we know something about the 
activity of the Chilean Communist Party [ChCP] in the 1920s and 1930s [her main 
publications in this context were mentioned in section 1.2]. To analyze what happened in 
the ChCP before and after the mutiny, it is necessary to understand this political 
organization’s creation and evolution. 
Labouring in the nitrate field was a taxing occupation leading the workers in the late 
nineteenth century to form organizations to defend their interests. In 1912, Luis Emilio 
Recabarren-Serrano, a typographer born in Valparaíso, was attracted to their cause. 
Although he started his political activities initially in Valparaíso, and then in Santiago, it 
was in northern Chile where he won widespread popular support leading to the creation of 
‘Partido Socialista Obrero’ or Worker’s Socialist Party [WSP] in Iquique, a port located in 
the nitrate producing zone. This political organization grew in particular during the crisis 
affecting the nitrate industry as a consequence of the steep fall in prices due to the 
introduction of artificial fertilizers and other factors after World War One.  
Political activity in Chile often paid special attention to what was happening in 
Europe. The ideas and changes that originated in that continent ended up influencing Chile. 
Olga Ulianova writes: ‘It is not a coincidence that all the national press belonging to 
different trends attach a strong importance and space to the Russian Revolution but almost 
nothing to the Mexican Revolution285
The Bolshevik Revolution caused huge interest and admiration in the WSP, 
enjoying the support of the nitrate and industrial workers. Luis Emilio Recabarren-Serrano 
became a candidate for President in 1920. Largely because Arturo Alessandri-Palma 
enjoyed great popularity among the workers, Recabarren did not fare well. Alessandri, then 
’. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
285  Ulianova, 2008, p. 102. 
 
 131 
a leftist and populist politician did vanquish the traditional rightist parties, while 
Recabarren became a deputy a year later. 
Since its inception in 1889, the Second International remained united, but the 
international socialist movement was split in 1919. The most revolutionary elements, which 
formed the Third International, broke away from those belonging to a reformist wing 
[social democrats and labour]. The Third International started having world congresses. 
These gatherings formulated different goals for the local parties belonging to this 
international communist movement. The first convention, which was held in Moscow in 
1919, formed the Third International. The Second Congress took place in Petrograd and 
Moscow in 1920 where the creation of Soviets was stressed. The conditions for local 
parties close to the communist ideas to become affiliated to the international movement 
were established in this meeting. The following year, the Third Congress, which was held 
in Moscow as well, approved the policy of ‘United Fronts’. This tactic was stressed in the 
Fourth Congress held in the Soviet capital in 1922. It called for local communist parties to 
seek an alliance with workers only, avoiding agreements with the leadership of other 
parties. In the Fifth Congress [Moscow 1924] the bolshevization of the Communist 
International called for the various communist parties to adopt the methods and 
organization of the Soviet Communist Party. The Sixth Congress of 1928, emphasized the 
adoption of the class struggle. Between this congress and the next one, held in Moscow in 
1935, political changes forced the Communist International to abandon the policy of 
‘United Front’ for that of the ‘Popular Front’. This last tactic called for the communists to 
form alliances with socialist, social democratic and labour parties in order to face the 
menace of fascism which had come to power in Italy and Germany. The consequences in 
Chile of the policies adopted in those congresses will be seen in the following pages. 
In 1922 the members of the WSP held a congress and decided to affiliate to the 
international communist movement. Recabarren travelled to Moscow to participate in the 
congress of the Communist International while the WSP became the Chilean Communist 
Party. Its publications started calling the ChCP as the Chilean Section of the Communist 
International. Recabarren committed suicide on 19 December 1924, probably due to 
depression and dissatisfaction about the party’s evolution. 
The ChCP continued under the conduction of other leaders coming from the old 
tradition originated in the WSP and this produced some peculiar characteristics during the 
1920s. First, the organization did not adopt immediately a cellular structure, violating the 
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‘bolshevization’ process. Also, there was a certain independence or autonomy in the way of 
thinking because: ‘The ChCP was created differently from the European or American 
communist parties in the sense that it was founded without the participation or presence of 
emissaries of the International286
Initially, the Communist International did not closely follow the events in South 
America thinking that a revolution would spread more easily to Asia or Africa than in this 
distant part of the world. As the 1920s progressed, this attitude changed due to the creation 
of the South American Bureau [or Secretariat] of the Communist International [SAIB] in 
Buenos Aires. It was initially led by Europeans agents using Latin American communists as 
instructors or delegates in the local parties. Olga Ulianova saw this way of acting as 
follows: 
’. Furthermore, the WSP's leaders, operating in a distant 
and peripheral country such as Chile, lacked a solid education about the Marxist doctrine. 
Coming from the old WSP they possessed a culture of alliances with groups sharing similar 
views to achieve the objectives desired by the people they represented and this violated the 
tactic of ‘United Fronts’ approved by Moscow.   
‘within the Cominterian culture, Eurocentric and messianic, sending 
delegates to different countries was considered essential to assure an 
adequate path towards a worldwide revolution. Without knowing many 
times the different national realities, but convinced of having a new 
revelation that would save the world, the delegates of the International 
thought that they were the protagonist of history with capital letters, a sort 
of new prophets287
 
’. 
Another purpose of supervising closely what was happening in the different 
countries was bringing the local communist parties to a cellular organization with an 
obedient conduct respecting the resolutions adopted in Moscow. In other words, the 
bolshevization process decided in Moscow on 1924. One of the delegates reported to his 
superiors that the ChCP in the mid 1920s was:  
‘the strongest party in the region, controlling the biggest assembly of 
unions in those days [FOCH]’.... [Federación Obrera de Chile]...‘and 
having a strong parliamentarian representation [eight deputies and two 
senators] obtained while participating in a wide coalition of the centre and 
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left parties in the 1925 elections. At the same time, it lacked a strong 
leadership after Recabarren’s death288
 
’. 
This optimistic vision about the situation of the ChCP changed as Colonel Ibáñéz 
began his rise to power in the Government, culminating with his election as President in 
May 1927. His vigorous repression of communism forced the party to operate 
clandestinely. Ibáñez’s Government wooed the unions away from the ChCP influence, in 
part by adopting attractive measures for the workers, some of whom were later expelled 
from the ChCP due to their support for Ibáñez. The most prominent example was Senator 
Manuel Hidalgo-Plaza and some other members of parliament. Hidalgo was expelled 
because he was not strongly against Ibáñez and in the late 1920s he followed a Trotskyist 
trend.  
The Ibañez Government also exiled the leaders of the ChCP either to distant 
locations within the country, or in some cases, out of Chile. The repression shattered the 
ChCP's good organization. 
In the period of Ibáñez’s fall [July 1931] and the Naval Mutiny, the SAIB sent 
Paulino González-Alberdi, an Argentinean instructor, to Chile. He and fifteen party leaders 
were arrested in the last days of the General’s Presidency. Rufino Rosas, who will be 
mentioned several times later, was also among the apprehended. After Ibañez’s fall, the 
newly freed communists devoted their efforts to the imminent presidential election 
campaign and the reconstruction of the party. Once Paulino González recovered his 
freedom, he complained about the SAIB’s lack of diligence in handling the ChCP and that 
he and the local party leaders were abandoned. He also pointed to a lack of security in the 
internal communications between Montevideo and Chile.  
When the Comintern organized SAIB, one of the tasks of this regional organism 
was to achieve the already described bolshevization of the local communist parties, ending 
their alliances with bourgeois parties or groups. Ulianova wrote about the concern of 
Paulino Gonzalez regarding the opposite trend of communist Chilean leaders accepting: 
‘joint actions with the Alessandrists’...coming....‘apparently from the autonomous past, 
before cominterianism289
                                                 
288    Ulianova, 2008, p. 108. 
’. Speculating about this subject, it is possible to think that 
Alessandrist elements could have been conspiring together with certain communist Chilean 
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leaders against Ibáñez while they were in exile, before the ChCP was under SAIB’s control. 
During this period, contacts with the crewmembers of Latorre may have occurred. 
Nevertheless the research for this thesis did not find clues of this activity, except that these 
leaders associated with Alessandrist and civilists collaborated in Ibañez’ fall in July 1931. 
The subject of the ChCP and SAIB’s analysis after the mutiny will be covered later. 
In the period when Latorre was in Devonport dockyard there were propaganda 
actions organized by the Communist Party. The archives of the British intelligence and 
counterintelligence organizations MI5 and MI6 indicate that there were probably other 
types of actions as well290. Once the Mutiny of 1931 took place in Chile, the Admiralty 
asked the Commander in Chief of the Naval Base at Devonport if in the barracks the crew 
of Latorre came in touch with communist elements291. It was said in Chile, during the same 
period, that such influence had existed, but without any proof. Vice Admiral Hubert Brandt, 
answered that: ‘The result, as far as the R.N. Barracks is concerned, is that there is no 
evidence to show that such propaganda was spread whilst the men were accommodated in 
that establishment292
‘there are several men in the Dockyard who are well known to hold 
communist views and the possibility of their having been in 
communication with the men of Almirante Latorre undoubtedly exists. No 
knowledge, of any other such activity in the dockyard is available, and it is 
thought unlikely that the dockyard would have been used for this purpose 
when much better facilities were obtainable outside. The following known 
communists were employed for varying periods on board Almirante 
Latorre: H.A.W. Lovejoy, J. Salisbury, C. Hill and their activities are now 
being investigated in connection to further communist agitation
’. The report adds that respecting the dockyard in Devonport: 
293
 
’.  
                                                 
290   The main research done for this thesis on this subject was in the National 
Archives (NA, Kew, UK) under the sections KV2/595, KV2/2497 and KV3/311 as 
it will referenced later. 
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The police services continued investigating the subject because, in addition to the 
Chilean mutiny, a few days later a great mutiny took place at Invergordon, Scotland, while 
the Atlantic Fleet was engaged in exercises in the area. The uprising affected ships that had 
Plymouth [Devonport] as a homeport as well as others from Portsmouth and Chatham. The 
result of those investigations shows several interesting aspects. The Police Chief in 
Plymouth wrote to the Head of the Counterintelligence Service sending several documents 
regarding communist workers belonging to H.M. Dockyard, Devonport, who were engaged 
in activism294. One of the documents is a report narrating the cause of the delay in the 
Chilean battleship Almirante Latorre leaving Devonport after refitting. It says that one of 
the crew members had sabotaged the ship while it was in the dockyard295. This document 
was inside the dossier of John Harold Salisbury whom an intelligence report indicates: ‘was 
employed on the Chilean battleship Almirante Latorre when she was undergoing refit....and 
came under suspicion in connection with the mutiny occurred in this ship on her return to 
Chile296’. Was it is really possible that communists were acting to subvert discipline in 
naval forces in the UK and perhaps in other countries? An author studying the Invergordon 
Mutiny says297
‘Make it a practice of inviting young workers not to refuse military service, 
but to join the Army and the Navy in order to learn, in the interest of the 
proletariat, the art of war, and to carry on disintegrating work there in the 
interest of Communism
 that in March 1928 the Executive Board of the Young Communist 
International met in Moscow and decided that it was plausible and necessary to form 
revolutionary soldiers and sailors unions on a local scale. Later that same year the Sixth 
World Congress of the Communist International agreed to:  
298
 
’.  
In the same Congress a prominent Communist said:  
                                                 
294  Police Chief in Plymouth to the Head of the Counterintelligence Service, 24 APR 
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‘We must intensify our work in the Navy and do everything in our power to 
build Communist groups there, carrying our systematic agitation amongst 
the sailors to develop real ferment299
 
’.  
This same author writes that when the Royal Navy ships visited foreign ports, they 
were subjected to propaganda actions from the local Communist Party. Such was the case 
of HMS Caradoc, a cruiser visiting Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Montevideo. In this 
last port: ‘a large number of propaganda leaflets were left on board by visitors to the ship, 
and communist slogans were chalked on gun-shields and other parts of the ship300
Other evidence of communist participation is given by Edwards when he writes that 
Able Seaman Wincott, infamous for his participation in the Naval Mutiny of Invergordon 
and with a later activity in the British Communist Party: 
’. The 
organisation in charge of coordinating the actions of the Communist Parties in South 
America had its headquarters in Montevideo at that time. The events already discussed are 
evidence of the existence of a policy of subversion of naval forces in all countries. 
‘was serving in HMS Norfolk……HMS Norfolk was manned from 
Devonport , which was the home port to which she returned after every 
cruise. In 1931 the dockyard port of Devonport was the link between a 
number of events. It was in Devonport where the mutiny in HMS Lucia 
occurred. The later mutiny in the Chilean Navy has been proven to have 
been due to subversive and mutinous influences picked up by the crew of 
the Chilean battleship Almirante Latorre when, in 1931, she was being 
completed after an extensive refit in Devonport dockyard301
 
’. 
During the investigation made in Chile about the local mutiny, no irrefutable proofs 
as those suggested by Edwards were found, but there is enough evidence that such 
influence occurred while the Chilean ship was in Devonport, as said previously and it will 
be discussed later. Regarding the specific situation of the Chilean Communist Party, it must 
be said that the Ibáñez government’s vigorous police actions had wrecked this organization. 
On top of that, the party was split into two antagonistic fractions, one headed by Manuel 
Hidalgo-Plaza and the other by Elías Lafertte-Gaviño. In addition, during the time of the 
mutiny of 1931, the party was more concerned about the next presidential election and 
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Hidalgo’s impending participation in it. He apparently opposed the political orientation that 
the South American Bureau of the Comintern [see Glossary] advocated. Olga Ulianova, 
writes extensively about this subject and her conclusion is that Jan Valtin’s hypothesis has 
no basis in fact when he says that: ‘the uprising of the sailors would have been the result of 
an action of the Communist International, in particular of its maritime unions302
To demonstrate her point of view, she writes:  
’.  
‘The documents analyzed before, as well as all Comintern documentation 
referring to the subsequent analysis, do not confirm such a hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, it is not possible to disregard that during the trip of the 
battleship Almirante Latorre to Great Britain [1929-1931] members of the 
crew had become close with members of the English maritime unions who 
were tied to the International and that some ideas might have penetrated, 
but this does not mean that there was a political conduction from a 
Comintern level303
 
’. 
In opposition to what Valtin says, Olga Ulianova characterizes in this way the role 
of the Chilean Communist Party in the gestation of the Chilean Naval Mutiny of 1931:  
‘in general terms it is possible to conclude that the communists became 
aware at a certain distance that there was social unrest in the Navy perhaps 
by means of a former militant, sympathiser, friend or relative within the 
service. But as a party, they had no participation in the gestation of it. 
Moreover, the start of it surprised them because while the delegate of the 
International was thinking about how to interpret the signals arrived from 
Coquimbo, the insurrection had already started304
 
’. 
The communist leader Elías Lafertte writes in the following terms about the 
gestation of the mutiny:  
‘On 1 September, arrived to Santiago, sent by Rufino Rozas, who was in 
Coquimbo, a comrade whose name was Lobos, who asked to talk to me. He 
said, certainly in a very agitated way, that he had news that the sailors 
would rise up, imprison their officers and issue a manifesto to the country 
and a petition of an economic character to the Government. Some of this 
petition, in the way explained by this comrade, was not only oriented to the 
                                                 
302   Jan Valtin was a German communist whose real name was Richard Krebs. He 
was a maritime and stevedore workers' union leader and a clandestine Comintern 
agent. At the end of the 1930s, he became disappointed with communism and he 
set up himself in the United States where he wrote his memoirs ‘Out of the Night’ 
which mentions the Chilean Mutiny among other subjects.  
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alleviation of the sailors’ lot but also would be beneficial for the whole 
country. I thought that the movement was extremely interesting and 
popular in its nature and that it deserved our support305
 
’. 
Lafertte says that he took Lobos to the Party’s Secretariat where he widened his 
explanations saying that: ‘The Warrant Officers and seamen of all the fleet were secretly in 
agreement to rise up at an order that would come from battleship Latorre and that they 
would sustain the movement until achieving its points of view306
The Communist party decided that Lobos should avoid publicity in order to keep the 
rebellion a secret, while they studied a way of supporting the mutiny. Lafertte adds: ‘For 
unknown reasons to me, the mutineers anticipated their movement, and it broke out on 1 
September…’. Regarding his personal participation or that of the Communist Party, he 
writes: ‘I have no reason to ascribe to myself things that I have not done. Neither may I 
credit them to the party….We really helped after, as it will be seen, with the forces we had 
then…
’. 
307’ He says that other support during the days of the mutiny was the general strike 
stimulated by the Communist Party. It was obeyed mainly by the tramway workers. The 
communists in Coquimbo, Santiago and Valparaiso rallied the crowds in those cities 
expressing that the conditions were ripe for establishing a communist regime308
Manuel Hidalgo also said that his party had no participation in the origin of the 
mutiny but he adds that it would have helped in establishing a communist regime
. This 
shows that rather than organizing a mutiny, what the communists really did was to use it in 
an effort to achieve their own goals, once it started by its own dynamics.  
309
A US Intelligence Reports says that the Ministry of the Navy stated on September 
that:  
.  
                                                 
305   Elías Lafertte-Gaviño, La Vida de un Comunista [Páginas Autobiográficas] 
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Secretary of State William Castle, 5 September de 1931. NAUSA.  
 
 139 
‘The mutiny was the outcome of a proposed combined mutiny in all armed 
forces, planned and promoted by communists. This combined mutiny was 
to have taken place on 5 September. The reasons for the Navy mutiny 
beginning on September 1 are as follows: The communist leaders were 
finding difficulties in organizing the mutiny in the other services and for 
this reason decided to spring the naval mutiny ahead of the scheduled 
date....and encourage the other services top join in310
 
’. 
Lieutenant Donald Mc Intyre Griffiths was a student in the School of 
Telecommunications in 1931. He testified when the events were investigated that a recently 
retired Lieutenant, Arturo Frederick-Huerta, told him that he wrote a letter to Lieutenant 
Commander Arturo Young-Ward twenty four hours before the mutiny, reporting to him 
what was being organized. Frederick was aware of this because he was the owner of a print 
shop in Valparaíso where a communist newspaper was printed and because of this, he had a 
good relationship with members of that party without sharing their ideals311
The Chief Harbourmaster of Coquimbo reported
. This is an 
indirect witness and it is very vague. But it could indicate that in this port there was also 
some previous knowledge about the mutiny within the local Communists because they were 
probably contacted by naval personnel as it happened in Coquimbo, a subject covered 
before in this section.   
312 after the mutiny that during it, 
some mutineers were seen in civilian clothes entering a place where communists lived. 
Admiral von Schroeders writes in his book that after his first meeting on board Latorre 
with the mutineers he had a meeting with prominent civilians who offered going to the 
battleship to talk to the rebels. Von Schroeders writes as well that after this group went on 
board a delegation of communists did the same and at their return ashore they reported to 
their followers: ‘There is nothing for us on board, there are only “pancistas” [opportunists] 
on board313
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’ meaning that among the mutineers there were no communists but only people 
 
311   Statement: Lt Cdr Arturo Frederick, n.d., CM, v. 1 (V) (456M), pp. 85-99. 
BUPERS.  
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313   Von Schroeders, p.28.  
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with no strong revolutionary convictions. Although the von Schroeders’ report is not very 
clear about the source of this information, it is an element to consider in the evaluation of 
the involvement of the ChCP in the origin of the mutiny. It seems that the communists went 
on board and found no one willing to follow their orientation on 2 September. 
The conclusion from the writings of Olga Ulianova, Elías Lafertte, Manuel Hidalgo, 
the Chief Harbourmaster and the Ministry of the Navy about the communist participation in 
the origin of the mutiny is that it is very likely that there was a relationship between some 
members of that party in Coquimbo and the crewmembers of the fleet but it is not fully 
clear what was the influence of this relationship in the origin of the subversion. The mutiny 
started earlier than the scheduled date, probably because the salary reduction and the 
Latorre’s Commanding Officer’s reaction was the detonator needed by the leaders, as will 
be covered later [in section 7.2]. In those circumstances, the Communist party tried to gain 
control of the subversive movement only after it had started. Lafertte and Hidalgo, the 
communist national leaders, denied any personal or corporate involvement in the origin of 
the mutiny.  On the other hand, the Ministry of the Navy maintains categorically that there 
was a clear communist participation, without giving any evidence and without orienting the 
investigations, as far as we know, to elucidate this crucial aspect. Nevertheless, there is no 
doubt that the communists tried to take advantage of the mutiny to create a favourable 
climate for setting up a regime according to their ideas. It is also possible to admit that 
during the stay in Devonport the communist dockyard personnel working on board Latorre 
would have taken actions on board to attract Chilean crewmembers to their ideas. 
Was it possible that there was certain collaboration between members of the CHCP 
and Alessandrists agents trying to subvert Latorre’s crewmembers against Ibáñez? To 
answer this question the orientation given by the Sixth Congress of the Communist 
International must be taken into account. It decided to set into action the policy of ‘class 
against class’. As a consequence, the communist believed that the reformism of the Social 
Democrats would make capitalism more palatable and it would divert the working class 
from its revolutionary mission. The socialists, following this reasoning, were excoriated as 
‘social fascists’314
                                                                                                                                                     
 
. The Alessandrists would be considered in this last category by the 
314  Paul Preston, ‘The Great Civil War, European Politics 1914-1945’ in ‘Oxford 
History of Modern Europe’, ed. By T.C.W Blanning, (Oxford: University Press) , 
p.65. 
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communists although they never used the label of socialists for themselves. It is not 
plausible then that there was a plot organized jointly by Alessandrists and Communists due 
to the last group’s policy established in 1928. Joint actions between Communists and 
Alesssandri’s followers in 1928 are not credible under the policy of ‘class against class’. 
 
6.3. The battleship Latorre in Devonport, UK. 
 
  In previous sections, the political context of 1931 and the terminal crisis of General 
Ibáñez government have been covered [see sections 6.1 and 6.2]. It was mentioned as well 
that the battleship Latorre was in Devonport Naval Base [Plymouth] being extensively 
transformed. In that period the ship was visited by agents belonging to a committee, 
organized by former President Arturo Alessandri in Paris, in charge of organizing a 
rebellion against the government. 
 Among the possible contacts of the Alessandrists exiles might have been Surgeon 
Lieutenant Commander Eduardo Grove-Vallejos, who in Court Martial stated that while in 
Europe, he visited Arturo Alessandri-Palma, Enrique Matta-Figueroa and other unidentified 
exiled Chileans who were his friends. He defended himself by saying that he discussed with 
them only personal subjects and that he never became aware of their activities against the 
government. He added that he was not approached for this purpose. He mentions that Matta 
visited Captain Abel Campos-Carvajal, the commanding officer of Latorre, while the ship 
was in Devonport315
An indirect witness is Raúl Rossi-Contreras who lived through the mutiny on board 
destroyer Hyatt. He later reached the rank of Rear Admiral and in his retirement years he 
gave conferences and was interviewed on this subject. In his opinion, Warrant Officer 
Ernesto González-Brión, who will appear later as one of the leaders of the mutiny, was less 
innocent about his contacts with Alessandri’s committee than those described in his 
. Eduardo Grove stated as well that from his arrival in Great Britain to 
serve on board Latorre until this ship returned to Chile, he was always considered suspect 
by Captain Campos.  
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book316. In one interview he said that Rafael Santibáñez-Escobar, who was Lieutenant 
Commander on board during the period from the refit in Devonport until the mutiny on 
board Latorre, told him years later that while the battleship was in the dockyard, several 
officers met with Alessandri’s committee. Santibáñez also told him personally that: ‘He 
attended two lunches with Alessandri and with Mr. Mathieu adding that due to his naval 
political naivety, he did not realize that those meetings had a certain purpose’. Santibáñez 
added as well that: ‘some engineering officers also attended and made political contacts 
against Ibáñez…’ and that ...‘the enlisted personnel did the same and González was one 
who went most frequently’.  Rossi added rather imprecisely that: ‘There was an accusation 
against an engineering officer named Morales. It was said that he was a leftist317
The above evidence seen as a whole, shows that while Latorre was in Great Britain, 
there were meetings between Alessandri’s followers and officers and enlisted personnel and 
the objectives were not merely social. More evidence about this subject became known 
during the trials [see section 10.2]. 
’.   
Once the work in Devonport was finished, the battleship underwent extensive sea 
trials under the control of dockyard working parties, ending on 10 December 1930. The 
Chilean crew again was disembarked and lodged in the barracks. Petty officers and ratings 
stayed in Exmouth Block, Warrant Officers and Officers in the respective messes, while the 
dockyard personnel finished the work on board. This ship did not sail again until 11 
February 1931318
The events on board that submarine support ship were as follows. HMS Lucia was 
scheduled to leave its berthing on 31 December to prepare to sail to Gibraltar but bad 
weather prevented the ship from departing until the next day, Thursday 1 January 1931. 
Consequently, the crew could not go ashore for the week end to say farewell to their 
. This shows that the Chilean crew was in the right place to become aware 
of the events taking place on board HMS Lucia that were widely described in Plymouth 
press.  
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families but instead they had to make the ship ready. When this occurred, a group of about 
thirty seamen locked themselves in an interior department and did not obey when called to 
fall in and receive orders on Monday 4 January 1931. This group was isolated and taken to 
the barracks ashore as prisoners. They had to appear in a Court of Inquiry sitting in the 
Officer’s Mess on 7 January 1931319. An official statement issued by the Admiralty and 
published in The Naval and Military Record described the events as a ‘breakage of 
discipline’ without using the word mutiny. Probably the fears of using this term, as 
observed by Elihu Rose320 and by Bell and Elleman321
The investigation concluded that one of the crewmembers should be dismissed from 
the service and four others should appear in a Court Martial, where they were sentenced to 
six months of hard labour. Later, there were public complaints on how this case was 
handled and as a result, some officers were punished and at the same time the sentences 
imposed by the Court Martial were commuted, although the decision to dismiss one of the 
sailors stood
 were present [see section 1.3]. 
322
It is not known what influence, if any, the HMS Lucia mutiny had on the Chilean 
crewmembers. It is possible that the leniency extended to the Lucia mutineers may have 
been an encouragement for insubordination of the Chilean sailors nine months later.  
Although in the later statements of the Chilean mutineers there are no references to those 
events, we know about the friendship between the Chilean and British crews in Devonport. 
The depth of this relationship is a mystery, but it was solid enough as the news of the 
Chilean mutiny had an impact on some sailors in the Royal Navy
. There is something very similar about this case with what happened in 
Chile, as will be mentioned later [see section 10.2].  
323
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At that time the ports of England’s southwest suffered a deep economic depression 
and this may be the origin of the following press comment: ‘At times nearly 2,000 men 
have been employed in the ship....Latorre....and the work of this character is specially 
welcome as so large a proportion of the total outlay is devoted to labour324
In January 1931 all Ship’s Company positions were filled with personnel arrived 
from Chile to end the sea trials and to sail to Valparaíso. Until then, only a part of the crew 
stayed in Devonport while the battleship was under dockyard control. 
’. We also know 
from general research done for this thesis that there were communist agitators at that time 
in the British naval bases and dockyards, as was discussed [see sections 5.2 and 6.2]. 
The final weeks of the battleship’s stay in Devonport was divided among sea trials 
and final preparations for the trip, including social acts of farewell with the local 
authorities. All this was covered by the press. The Lord Mayor of Plymouth presented a 
silver tray to the battleship stressing: ‘the employment for two years given to 2,000 British 
workers and for the splendid behaviour observed by the ship’s crew325’. This last quotation 
was closely related to the fact that unemployment had suddenly risen from one million 
workers in the 1920`s to two and a half million at the end of 1930, representing 20% of the 
total national work force326
Latorre sailed to Chile via the Panama Canal under the command of Captain Abel 
Campos-Carvajal, arriving to Valparaíso on 12 April 1931. A few days later Captain 
Campos was promoted to Rear Admiral and replaced by Captain Alberto Hozven-Azola. 
On 8 May 1931 Admiral Campos took the position of Commander in Chief of the Active 
Fleet. His Flagship was the armoured cruiser O’Higgins. The recently arrived battleship 
was not part of this naval force but was the flagship of the ‘Escuadra de Instrucción’ 
[Training Squadron]. This remained the current organization of naval forces until the 
mutiny. 
. The Commander in Chief of the Naval Base also presented in 
the same ceremony a gift purchased by the workers of the dockyard for the crew of the 
battleship. 
                                                 
324   The Naval and Military Record, 28 January 1931, p. 30. 
 
325   Latorre’s Logbook, p. 205. Chilean Naval Archives. 
 
326   Stephen Constantine, Unemployment in Britain between Wars, (London: 
Longman, 1980).  
 
 145 
The battleship arrived with the following innovation in its organization which would 
have a consequence in the mutiny of 1931. The Royal Navy had adopted a new system of 
spare parts management called Central Stores.  The people in charge of the system would 
be the supply specialists [store keepers] but in the Chilean Navy this type of personnel was 
only in charge of pantries and payment of salaries. Because of this change, the Bureau of 
Personnel selected civilians who had basic knowledge of accounting to become leading 
ratings. This new personnel was sent to Latorre for a training period on this subject327
Another prominent group of the future mutineers was the schoolmasters. These 
people were elementary school teachers who were in charge of instructing in reading and 
writing to illiterate crewmen. The schoolmasters were part of the crew in many ships and 
shore establishments and although some of them were very young, they were admitted in 
the Navy with the rank of chief petty officer. 
. 
Manuel Astica-Fuentes was one of these leading ratings. He was twenty five years old in 
1931 and before he had been editor in chief of El Día de Talca, a local newspaper in a town 
in central Chile. He also collaborated in two newspapers in Valparaíso and was an active 
participant in social movements organised by the Catholic Church [see section 3.2]. 
Carlos Aguirre Vío lived that period on board the ships of the fleet as an officer. He 
says that the Bureau of Personnel was negligent in selecting these personnel and because of 
this, some of them: ‘were admitted without any military training and without checking their 
personal records328
 
’. A record verification would have revealed Astica’s extensive political 
activity before entering the Navy.     
6.4. Before the mutiny in Chile: salary reductions. 
 
The Government that followed that of General Ibáñez had to face an acute economic 
crisis. One of the measures adopted in the belief that it would attenuate the most acute 
problem of that period was a reduction of expenditures. One way to achieve this goal was 
to reduce salaries. The Ibáñez Government had used this tool in 1930 and tried to do the 
                                                 
327   Mayorga, pp. 350-351. 
 
328   Carlos Aguirre-Vío ‘Mis recuerdos de la Escuadra en 1931’, Revista de Marina. 
N° 120/877; 6/2003, p.592. 
  
 146 
same again in 1931, but it had no time to apply this measure before falling from power. The 
next Government tried to make a new salary reduction in July 1931 and the newspapers 
even announced it, reporting the percentages of reductions to be applied. Finally, the 
measure was postponed until the following month. 
The Minister of Finance, Pedro Blanquier-Teyletche, checked in those days with the 
Minister of War, General Carlos Sáez, and with the Minister of the Navy, Rear Admiral 
Calixto Rogers-Cea, about the measures of closing the officers’ schools and reducing the 
salaries in both services. Sáez says that he visited all Army units in Santiago trying to 
explain these ideas in hopes of making them acceptable329. The writings of this Army 
officer, plus a telegram sent by the Government to all the Embassies in Santiago on 15 
August 1931, show that the Government was conscious that the reduction of the 
administrative expenditures could not be excessive if it was to avoid widespread public 
unrest330
 The newspapers in Santiago and La Serena published the statements of the Minister 
of Finance about the reductions that would be applied to the salaries in order to attenuate 
the deficit in the governmental accounts. Blanquier’s statements had a confusing language 
and perhaps this exaggerated the fears of the affected personnel, since the La Serena 
newspaper was read on board the fleet anchored in nearby Coquimbo. He said initially that 
a reduction of 12% would be applied to the annual salaries below $ 3,000 and 30% to the 
higher salaries. This first statement caused deep concern on board the ships since it affected 
even the lower ranks. The crews remembered very well the reduction of 10% already 
applied, as well as a reduction in the bonuses for specialists and for the different 
geographical areas where they performed their duties. Latorre’s crew in particular, 
remembered that the government halved the 150% bonus given to crews serving abroad 
when they were still returning the monies received in advance before the trip to Devonport. 
. 
 At the end of August, Blanquier finally cleared up this subject. El Mercurio de 
Valparaíso on 28 August 1931 published the instructions issued by the minister two days 
earlier. The salaries of this month would be paid with reductions: those below $250 
[equivalent to $3,000 annual] would suffer a discount of 12%. The salaries higher than that 
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amount would also have a 12% discount up to $250 and over that amount the reduction 
would be of 30%. Also, the amounts discounted might be used to pay up to 50% of housing 
loans. 
The amounts discounted would be recorded in order to be returned later, without 
specifying a date.  From the introduction of the idea of salary reductions in July there 
was concern in the naval personnel. One reaction to this is reported by Arturo Niño de 
Zepeda331
 Midshipman Carlos Aguirre a witness of that period on board a destroyer writes 
about Blanquiers’s plans:  
, an officer in the Arsenal of Valparaíso, who stated in Court Martial that a 
boatswain in the Communications Shop told him, regarding the 30% reduction, that if the 
officers would not defend the crews’ interests they would defend the officers’ interests. He 
reported all this to his commanding officer who recommended him to advise the men that 
they would have to endure this situation with patriotism. 
‘This public news naturally arrived to Coquimbo and the unrest of the 
crews became evident; commanding officers and executive officers talked 
frankly to the crews and this was done in Hyatt while discipline was 
maintained normally332
 
’.  
In O’Higgins, Lieutenant Roberto Nieto von Seitz overheard Torpedo Leading 
Rating Pedro Salas-Robles talking to other crewmembers about the idea of refusing the 
reception of the reduced salary, and he reported this to the Executive Officer. This 
conversation took place during August gunnery exercises. The Lieutenant said that he was 
with another officer and he had the impression that the ratings wanted the officers to 
become aware of their conversation333
Warrant Officer González writes in his book that the officers of Latorre asked the 
Commanding Officer, Captain Hozven, around mid August, to request that the Government 
avoid the salary reductions but he did nothing. He also writes that the officers 
of O’Higgins met on 24 and 25 August to analyse the situation and: ‘they agreed to advise 
the crew that they should present a request in writing…to be submitted to the 
. 
                                                 
331   Statement. Lt Cdr Arturo Niño de Zepeda, 11 SEP 1931, CM, v.1(V) (456M), 
pp.121-124. BUPERS. 
 
332   Aguirre-Vío, p.254. 
 
333  Statement: Lt Roberto Nieto, 2 NOV 1931,CM, v. 4(V) (456I), p.437. BUPERS. 
 
 148 
Government334’. Further, he writes that on board Latorre, on 26 August, the officers: 
‘talked to the ratings advising them to submit by means of regular channels a written 
petition asking to suppress the reduction in salaries335
Accordingly to von Schroeders the last Government’s statement about the 
reductions: ‘recognized that that these had been exaggerated by the public. Unfortunately 
this…’[statement]...‘was dated 1 September….and did not arrive on time….’ because the 
mutiny had already started. He considered that due to this last reason, this statement was 
‘late and the evil had been done already
’, which was a legitimate way to 
present complaints in the Chilean Navy. In this way, this author insinuates that it was the 
officers who incited the crewmembers to complain when the reductions in salaries were 
announced, but his affirmations are not supported by his own statements or the statements 
of other witnesses in Court Martial. When he wrote his book he was already condemned 
because of his role in the mutiny and he needed a justification for his actions. For this 
reason, readers should view with suspicion these claims.  
336
In the investigation made after the mutiny, it became clear that the Commander in 
Chief of the Active Fleet, Rear Admiral Abel Campos-Carvajal became aware about the 
reductions only after reading them in the press. He then asked the Undersecretary of the 
Navy on 29 August, to clarify the subject due to the confusion about the percentages and 
reach of the measures. He did not get an answer on time. This is an indication of the lack of 
organization and a careless attitude in the Government. There is clear evidence in the Court 
Martial proceedings that the officer in charge of paying the salaries in the Active Fleet sent 
several documents asking Valparaíso about this subject and he had no answer
’. There is no doubt that the Government had 
been careless in the treatment of such a sensitive subject. It did not notify the affected 
group in a clear and precise way about the measures decided and when it tried to do so, it 
used press statements that were confusing and too late.  
337
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memorandum about the salaries but he was not going to accept it. Even with all this 
previous knowledge, very little was done to prevent such a serious event as a mutiny. 
How the idea of submitting a complaint about the salary reductions by regular 
channels turned into a mutiny is the subject of next part of this thesis. 
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PART II: THE MUTINY 
 
7. COQUIMBO. 
 
7.1. Organizing a mutiny in Coquimbo, Chile. 
 
As has been mentioned before, at the end of August 1931, two independent naval 
forces were anchored in Coquimbo. One was the Active Fleet with its flagship the 
armoured cruiser O’ Higgins. The other was the Instruction Squadron with its flagship the 
battleship Latorre. The units of both forces at that time are set out in Appendix B below. 
The Active Squadron had recently arrived from exercise under the Command of Rear 
Admiral Abel Campos-Carvajal. The other force was under the command of Captain 
Alberto Hozven-Azola who was also the commanding officer of Latorre and it went to sea 
seldom due to the economic crisis of the period. 
Three possible organizers of the mutiny will be analysed in this section: A former 
minister, the local Communist Party and the naval personnel on board the ships. 
 After the fall of General Ibáñez regime, his former Minister of Interior, Captain 
Carlos Frödden settled in Coquimbo. Because he had been an important minister in that 
Government, he was visited by two commanding officers of ships belonging to the Active 
Squadron.  This action gave rise to the suspicion that he was organizing a coup to bring 
back Ibáñez to the Government. Consequently, Frödden sent a letter to Admiral Campos 
requesting him to order fleet officers to avoid making such visits and at the same time, he 
met the Governor of that province to dismiss these suspicions. The governor recommended 
him to leave Coquimbo and the same advice was repeated later by some of his naval 
visitors. This suggestion was reinforced when some popular anti- Frödden demonstrations 
erupted. Frödden finally decided to move away to another place in the countryside.  
The investigation done after the mutiny demonstrated that Frödden’s presence in 
Coquimbo had no influence on the events. Part of the suspicion arose from the fact that 
after leaving the Cabinet for the first time years ago he stated that he wanted to return to the 
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fleet. Such wishes were twisted by other people, who said that he really wanted to obtain 
the command of the fleet to place again General Ibáñez in the Government.  
One of the investigative lines followed by the prosecutor after the mutiny was to 
research everyone who had visited Carlos Frödden and to discover what exactly they had 
discussed during such visits. This investigation concluded that there was no link between 
the former Minister and the mutiny338
Lieutenant Commander Niño de Zepeda also stated
.  
339
‘the evidence about the communist feature of the mutiny is the distribution 
of pamphlets in Coquimbo some of them found on board Latorre and 
Orella. I reported this to the Commodore
 that the officers of the cruiser 
O’Higgins told him while the ship was in this port, that communist pamphlets were 
distributed on board when the fleet had been in Coquimbo. Commander Samuel Ward-
Rodríguez would state later in Court Martial:  
340
 
’ [Captain Hozven]. 
In section 6.2., the activities of the Chilean Communist Party during Ibáñez’s 
regime were covered. The conclusion was that this political party was not in position to 
organize a mutiny in the Armed Forces in August 1931. Placing pamphlets on board the 
ships in Coquimbo was probably an action initiated by local communists with contacts with 
crew members. Further analysis about communist participation is included in sections 11.1 
and 12.4. 
Now the actions of the crew members will be covered. Warrant Officer Class One 
Ordnance Mechanic Victoriano Zapata-Salinas, who would later play a prominent part in 
the mutiny, stated in Court Martial that the movement had been under way days before it 
erupted; he could not be precise in giving dates but in accordance to what he heard, the 
gunner and supply ratings assembled secretly and they had the support of all ships in the 
fleet. They also wrote letters to the ships in the southern region and to the Army regiment in 
La Serena, close to Coquimbo341
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only on the afternoon of 31 August as some writers have stated. There is enough evidence 
presented in the last section that there were some ideas about opposing another salary 
reduction but when the press confirmed, on 28 August, the rumours started two weeks 
earlier, those ideas were transformed into plans. 
Manuel Astica, the Supply Leading Rating recently contracted by the Navy, gave a 
somewhat different version about the immediate origin of the mutiny, decades after the 
events. He says that the warrant and petty officers of Latorre decided on the presentation of 
a written document asking that the salary reduction should not become effective and that 
Electrical Leading Rating Manuel Labra asked him that the recently contracted supply 
ratings help the warrant and petty officers in drafting it. Astica says: 
‘we drafted a short text. It was very respectful, stressing that the salaries of 
the crews in those days were barely enough to sustain a very modest living. 
The petition started circulating simultaneously through Latorre and the rest 
of the units anchored in Coquimbo342
 
’.  
It is very likely that the warrant and chief petty officers had chosen to present a 
petition, while the ratings were in favour of a more radical action. 
There is some evidence that on the last weekend of August 1931 [Saturday 29 and 
Sunday 30] crewmembers held secret meetings on board and ashore.  
The Active Squadron had anchored in Coquimbo on Saturday 29 August after being 
at sea during the previous weeks. In those meetings, the ratings were the majority and of 
these the gunners were the most active. Boatswain rating Thomas Moore-Hodges says343
Some other crewmembers knew about the meetings but almost nobody reported 
them to their superiors. Steward Ordinary Rating Ramón León-Concha stated in Court 
Martial that:  
 
that the night before the mutiny there was a meeting of the O’Higgins crewmembers where 
they learned that on the next night, at 04:00, Latorre was going to give a signal to imprison 
its officers. The idea was to treat the prisoners well unless they resisted their imprisonment. 
It was decided to adopt different actions than petitioning to put pressure for the abolition of 
the reductions. 
‘I listened on the wharf to some sailors and they were saying that the crews 
were unhappy about the reductions and that they would protest. The next 
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day was a Sunday and I did not see the Commanding Officer, but I told him 
this on Monday344
 
’ [31 August 1931].  
 In the investigation conducted after the mutiny there is enough evidence that on 
Monday 31 August and even before, some officers of both squadrons received some vague 
hints of demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction. 
One of these officers was Lieutenant Arturo Fernandois-Sánchez of Riquelme who 
informed his Commanding Officer and Executive Officer of the plot. Something similar 
happened with Lieutenant Víctor Flores-Cammas of Lynch who also talked about this 
subject with Lieutenant Commander Arturo Valle-Fierro of Latorre. On the night of 
Sunday 30 August several officers met on the O’Higgins to have dinner.  According to the 
statement of Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Martínez-Valdés, they commented on the 
rumours and about the lack of discipline demonstrated by the crews. Also attending that 
dinner was the Chief of Staff of the Active Squadron, Commander Emilio Daroch-Soto and 
the Commanding Officer of destroyer Aldea, Commander Luis Bahamondez-Torrejón.  
Martínez suggested that Daroch should report this situation to Admiral Campos345. Daroch 
stated346
Lieutenant Luis Morales-Reyes was an engineer on board Latorre. He stated as well 
in court that on Sunday 30 August he heard rumours that the crews of the destroyers would 
protest about the salary reductions and the next day he assembled his personnel to ask them 
directly if they knew what was going on. When he arrived to the conclusion that the 
 that the day before one of his informants on board one of the ships of the 
Instruction Squadron stated that the crewmembers were planning ‘to make a regular 
representation about the situation which they will be in after the reduction in their salaries’ 
and he reported this information to Admiral Campos on the same day, on 29 August.  
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rumours were credible, he reported to his superior officer and this is how the news arrived 
that morning to the Executive Officer and the Commanding officer of the battleship347
Commander Julio Pinto-Farías and Lieutenant Commander Víctor Espejo-López of 
the Engineering Department of Latorre, also heard rumours which they relayed to 
Commander Alberto Obrecht-Herrera, the Executive Officer before 11:30 on 31 August, 
with the request that Captain Hozven should be informed. The defence attorneys of this 
Commanding Officer stated
.  
348
Warrant Officer Gonzalez adds in his book that the officers suggested that the 
enlisted personnel should name committees that would meet in Latorre and who would 
present their petitions at the same time, on 31 August at 14:00, but the committees of 
O’Higgins and Videla brought forward this action to 29 August. This procedure of acting 
collectively clearly contravened the naval discipline codes in Chile. It must be stressed that 
González’s writings about the officers’ support of the mutineers are not confirmed by the 
prosecutors reporting to the Court Martial.   
 that Obrecht did not comply with this essential duty.  
When he was questioned about this specific point González's Court Martial 
testimony did not report any participation of officers. Not even when he presented his 
discharge through his attorney349
                                                 
347  Statement: Lt Luis Morales-Reyes, 21 DEC 1931, CM, v. 4 (V) (456D), p.462. 
BUPERS. 
. On the other hand, he said in Court Martial that the 
process, meaning the mutiny, was generated in the Ratings’ Mess and that the most 
prominent participants were the gunner leading ratings Víctor Villalobos-Martínez, Juan 
Bravo-Quiñones, Eleodoro Labra-Salinas; the supply leading ratings Manuel Astica-
Fuentes, Augusto Zagal-Anabalón and René Jara-Sandoval; the Electrical Ordinary Rating 
Luis Pérez-Barrientos and the Electrical Leading Rating Manuel Bastías. To this group it 
must be added Supply Petty Officer Lautaro Silva-Silva. González made these charges 
because these were the first ratings who went to talk to Ordnance Mechanic Warrant 
Officer Class One Victoriano Zapata-Salinas and Electrician Warrant Officer Class Two 
 
348  Statement: Defence Attorney of Capt. Hozven, n.d., CM, v. 6(V) (456D), p.83. 
BUPERS. 
 
349  Statement: Warrant Officer Ernesto González, 12 SEP 1931, CM, v.7(V) (456A), 
pp. 357-362. BUPERS. 
 
 155 
Juan Méndez-Urdero about submitting a written petition. Their objective was to gather the 
crew’s opinions first, before starting the mutiny350
Warrant Officer González stated
.   
351 that Captain Hozven talked to him about the 
rumours of unrest on the morning 31 August and that he reported to him that ‘it seemed that 
it was a matter of a representation that the crewmembers [including Latorre’s ship 
company] were going to submit’. He adds352
‘this man was no less than my most trusted Warrant Officer who had in his 
hands the official documents. He was recommended by former officers; he 
was held in high esteem…he reported to me in a very loyal fashion and 
very confidentially the dissatisfaction of the crew about the salary 
reductions and the protest that would take place
 that Captain Hozven told him that the 
Executive Officer had reported to him that the crews of Riquelme and Videla would refuse 
to be paid. These two ships did not belong to the force commanded by Hozven. González is 
telling the truth about this specific topic since Hozven's report about the mutiny, dated 9 
September 1931, expresses his disillusionment about Gonzalez’s loyalty writing that:  
353
 
’.  
Another paragraph of Hozven’s document confirmed that González informed him of 
the above on the morning of 31 August. That same morning an informant told Commander 
Daroch and Admiral Campos: ‘that the demands of the crews were extending to other 
ships354
After receiving that information given by González, Hozven decided to summon the 
crew to fall in on the after deck of Latorre in the afternoon. He summoned as well a 
delegation of twenty men with the Commanding Officers and the Executive Officers from 
each destroyer of his force. 
’. 
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Meanwhile, Commander Obrecht told Lieutenant Commander Rafael Santibáñez 
that there were certain rumours that the crews intended to make a representation in which 
they would request, among other things, the resignation of the Minister of Finance. 
Santibáñez proposed that the Divisional Officers gather their personnel to discuss the 
subject in order to know their opinion about this matter. Obrecht agreed but said that due to 
the timing and to the instruction schedule these meetings could not be held, which is not 
credible. Obrecht also did not report this conversation to Hozven and worse, when the 
Commanding Officer called him to comment about what González had told him, the 
Executive Officer declared355
These events show that there was a considerable failure to communicate among the 
officers and Commanding Officers of both squadrons and also between the Commanders in 
Chief.  Although anchored in the same bay they did not share the reports nor the rumours 
which revealed that discipline was breaking down and that trouble was brewing.  
 that he was ignorant about this subject. 
Certain mutineers, and later the press, stated that they were encouraged by the 
officers to complain. There is no clear evidence to substantiate these statements. Instead it 
seems that they were mere excuses to get less rigorous sentences. Those who made this 
type of statement point to the three engineering officers, Pinto, Espejo and Morales on 
board Latorre already mentioned. Warrant Officer González mentions also Lieutenants 
Commanders Valle and Aurelio Labbé, Lieutenant Aníbal Rojas and Midshipman Víctor 
Normandín without offering any proof and without stating his allegation in the Court 
Martial. Lieutenant Commander Espejo stated356 that after midday on 31 August stoker 
Erasmo Jofré Olivares met him, warning that there was a petition about the reduction in 
salaries which would be presented and he answered: ‘you should only do that if it is going 
to be presented according to the rules’. This information was transmitted by Jofré to the 
members of the Ratings’ Mess357
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who were planning a mutiny, in a sense that there was a certain benevolence to the 
complaints. The officers’ behaviour should be considered in the climate of economic 
problems affecting everybody. The prosecutors did not investigate this subject rigorously 
and every time they questioned the officers on this subject they received strong denials.  
The assembly ordered by the Commander in Chief of the Instruction Squadron, 
Captain Hozven after the conversation with González described above, took place on the 
afterdeck of Latorre starting at 13:45. He writes: ‘I made it as solemn as the occasion 
required. The officers attending wore swords and the crew was dressed in blue 
uniforms358
At the assembly, Captain Hozven read a speech he drafted earlier, stating that it had 
come to his knowledge that a group of crewmembers of the battleship were seeking 
adherents to request the dismissal of the Minister of Finance and to refuse to accept the 
reduced payments ordered by the Government. He criticized those who initiated these 
actions, characterizing them as anti patriotic characters and promising to punish them 
harshly. He did not consider it worthwhile to explain that the reductions were really a loan 
to the Government affecting mainly the higher paid ranks, that part of the amount reduced 
could be applied to pay home loans and that the government would repay the loan. Neither 
did he mention the possibility that those affected could present complaints according to the 
Navy’s regulations and that these would be sent to the Ministry of the Navy in the quickest 
possible way. He limited himself to chastising his subordinates without indicating that he 
understood their situation.  
’. The formality shows the importance given to this act and what it meant to 
face this situation. He adds that after the ceremony he drafted a note for the Ministry of the 
Navy that he had no time to post before the mutiny started. Not sending his information by 
radio of what was going on board shows that Hozven did not consider the situation as being 
very serious, because he knew that a note sent by mail took at least a couple of days to 
arrive to Santiago. 
In the final paragraphs of his speech he said:  
‘Finally I will state that patriotism does not mean to sing the national 
anthem or to honour the flag everyday. No! Patriotism has a much wider 
and higher meaning and it has other significance that you seem to be 
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unaware of. The fatherland needs its sons not only in war but also now, in 
peace, to be saved from this crisis oppressing it359
 
’. 
In the speech final line he called to dismiss the ceremony with the cry of: Viva 
Chile! [Long Live Chile!]: the usual way to end fall in at this time.  This expression was 
answered very reluctantly by a majority of the attendance, but enthusiastically by some 
cadets who were in a training period on board the battleship. 
Hozven’s speech shows a rigid concept of discipline without trying to dissuade the 
crewmen from joining a mutiny. He did not try to explain that the High Command of the 
Navy and the Government were trying to attenuate the problems affecting the 
crewmembers. Also, his passivity in failing to adopt effective preventive measures when 
the uprising was imminent is noticeable. In his later acts he would prove himself to be a 
rigid officer, distrustful of his subordinates, in particular of his officers whom he would 
indirectly blame for the ensuing uprising. 
A weekly magazine published an article a couple of weeks after the events reporting 
that after Hozven´s speech some ratings went ashore and met members of leftist groups and 
received advice about future actions. The first manifesto [Appendix A.2] would have been 
drafted in that meeting. There is no other evidence about this meeting ashore360
Upon observing the situation after his speech, Captain Hozven ordered Commander 
Obrecht, his second in command in Latorre, who was also the Chief of Staff in the 
Instruction Squadron, to go to report in person the situation to Rear Admiral Campos, the 
Commander in Chief of the Active Squadron. On this same occasion, he ordered that all 
officers should carry pistols. These two measures were deficiently complied with. Hozven 
had to repeat the order to Obrecht to have it obeyed. When this Commander finally arrived 
at the flagship of the other squadron, he did not meet the Admiral and decided to report to 
Commander Daroch, the Chief of Staff of that force, who reported later to Admiral 
Campos, as soon as he could and a few hours before the mutiny.  
. 
The arming of the officers of Latorre was not completed because there were not 
enough pistols or revolvers for everybody. Worse, the duty officer did not receive a 
handgun. Nothing was done in respect to the main weapon systems, nor with the rifles 
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stored in the gun racks located outside the officers’ cabins. The watch officer received 
orders to patrol the decks frequently and he complied by means of the midshipmen instead 
of doing it by himself. The midshipmen did not discover two clandestine meetings that 
occurred in the afternoon and the evening of 31 August.   
According to Warrant Officer González, the first meeting took place at 16:00 on 31 
August in the Hydraulics Machinery Department of Latorre. The fact that this meeting took 
place shows the critical failure of the Commanding Officer and the rest of the officers to 
react when they discovered the crew’s hostility. In that meeting, the rebels decided to take 
control of the ship by agreeing to the following steps361
a. Send delegates to all ships to convince the crews to imprison all officers and 
take control of the unit. 
: 
b. Draft a manifesto explaining the objectives of the movement and obtain the 
signatures of all crewmembers. Also obtain the officers’ signatures, but on a 
different page. 
d. Request a statement about the decision adopted by the crews from the 
warrant and petty officers immediately. 
e. Name a Staff and an Executive Committee to assume control of the fleet as 
soon as the movement acted. (The books of that period called Crew’s Staff 
[Estado Mayor de las Tripulaciones] this de facto, informal collective sort of 
organism. It had delegates from all ships and it made the political decisions. 
They used for themselves the word Staff probably because it was a 
prestigious word and they wanted to avoid unionism or political 
connotations and to avoid personal responsibilities. Due to this reason they 
never recognized single leadership of one individual.) 
f. Set a signals plan to communicate with all ships. 
g. Seize hand weapons, rifles, and ammunition and be ready to seize control at 
04:00. 
The above plan seems to be authentic since what happened later followed it 
precisely. Not only is it remarkable for its simplicity, but it indicates that the rebels must 
have decided their actions days before the mutiny because organizing such a plan demands 
time. 
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As stated by Warrant Officer Victorino Zapata362
Another indication of the above is a letter sent from the cruiser O’Higgins by 
somebody named Mellado [who has not been fully identified in the research for this thesis] 
to Rating Manuel Neira-Neira who was on board Condell being repaired in Talcahuano 
Dockyard. The letter is dated on 31 August and postmarked in Talcahuano 3 September. It 
says: 
 of the Latorre and discussed 
earlier in this thesis [in this section and in 6.4], some crew members had been plotting and 
trying to extend their ideas more widely for days before the mutiny began. 
‘Neira, tell me your situation in Talcahuano due to the infamous reduction 
of 30% in the salaries because, I tell you, tomorrow 1 September, we will 
present our first complaint and if we are not listened to, we will let you 
know, as you deserve to know. We all agreed in the Active and Instruction 
Squadrons that at 23:30 a signal will be raised in Latorre and in the rest of 
the ships: we will send a letter as well to those of Talcahuano and of the 
submarines, to strike with strength. I pray to God that we all prevail363
 
’. 
Zapata’s statements and Mellado’s letter are indications that the idea of extending 
the mutiny to Talcahuano and perhaps to other places, was present among the mutineers but 
sending letters was perhaps a last minute idea. 
It will also be discussed later that the mutiny in Talcahuano started precisely on a 
ship belonging to the Active Fleet that was being repaired in that port’s dockyard. Also, the 
official investigations made later revealed an active participation of gunner and storekeeper 
ratings and this gives credibility to Zapata’s statement quoted above. 
The personnel attending a boxing competition taking place in the afterdeck of 
O’Higgins disseminated the plan for the mutiny to the rest of the ships. Petty Officer José 
Basáez-Jiménez stated that at supper time on 31 August, a document arrived at O’Higgins 
from Latorre saying that it had decided to start the uprising. Ordinary Rating Mariano 
Vargas González, also a crewmember of the armoured cruiser, gives364
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of information that they heard about the start of the mutiny during the boxing competition 
that took place on O’Higgins which was watched by sportsmen from all of the other ships. 
He also says that in a meeting of petty officers and ratings held between 19:00 and 20:00 
they decided to participate in the mutiny. Other statements claimed that this meeting took 
place actually in the musicians' room of the armoured cruiser. Meanwhile, the ships' 
officers were attending a social gathering in their ward room with civilians ending at 21:00. 
The Latorre was showing a movie which permitted the movements of small craft carrying 
the crewmembers of the destroyers to the battleship and this contributed to spreading the 
mutineers' plan. 
When he heard the news about what happened on board Latorre, Admiral Campos 
summoned his officers for a meeting to take place the following day.  Both he and his Chief 
of Staff concluded that the situation did not merit another action than that meeting. It must 
be considered that his sources were the press, the reports sent by the Commander in Chief 
of the Instruction Squadron and a meeting requested by O’Higgins’ petty officers to the 
Executive Officer of that ship, Lieutenant Commander Eleodoro Muñoz-Toro365
The idea of the rebellion seems to have been adopted by the ratings of Latorre 
named previously. Warrant Officer González
. They 
called the meeting to discuss the subject of the reductions, but it was postponed until the 
arrival of the official information requested by Admiral Campos. The extremely 
conservative reaction of this Admiral did not help prevent the mutiny. 
366
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 stated that the movement was born in the 
Ratings’ Mess and the main participant names have been already given. He says that this 
group was the first to meet Warrant Officers Victorino Zapata and Juan Méndez with a list 
of collective grievances with the purpose of collecting the crew’s opinions and setting the 
time of the mutiny's outbreak. González adds that he received an invitation from those two 
Warrant Officers at 23:00 on 31 August to attend a meeting in a compartment of the 
battleship located near the bow. He says that he did not report this meeting to the 
Commanding Officer because his intention was to find out what subjects would be covered 
in the gathering and report it later. This is a somewhat disingenuous excuse. 
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About one hundred and fifty crewmembers attended the meeting. There was a group 
deliberating and another dedicated to the opening of ammunition boxes to supply the 
mutineers. The most active of the plotters were ratings Bravo, Pérez, Villalobos and Zagal. 
They decided to seize the ship that night. González stated that he was sure that Rating 
Bravo had adopted all measures to achieve that end and when he left the meeting, he saw 
crewmembers with rifles. The mutiny, accordingly to this important participant was totally 
organized and agreed on the evening of 31 August by the ratings. The Warrant officers and 
petty officers invited did not strongly oppose it, as would have been expected due to their 
greater experience. 
Storekeeper Rating Astica would state nearly forty years later: 
‘I remember that I was lying in my berth and González approached 
proposing the rebellion’s delay. He was confident that by talking with the 
Commanding Officer the objective that the Government listen to the 
requests of the crewmembers would be achieved. I looked at my watch. It 
was 11:45. I said it was too late to call another meeting and this was the 
only way to implement what was agreed367
 
’. 
Astica appears to be the only one who claimed that there was an attempt to delay the 
sedition, because González’s book as well as his court martial testimony does not confirm 
this. Furthermore, the mutiny did not start at midnight but at 04:00 which González stated 
the ratings had agreed upon. Neither González nor Astica are very credible witnesses since 
their memoirs were written after some time had elapsed and they might have wished to 
make their acts more important than they were in reality.  Other evidence calling into 
question Astica's credibility is his charge that the only officer on board Latorre the night of 
the mutiny was the duty officer. This is not true since there are a number of statements in 
the proceedings of the Court Martial confirming that a large majority of the officers were 
sleeping in their cabins when the mutiny surprised them at 04:00 on 1 September 1931. The 
reason for this will be explained in the following paragraphs.   
In the afternoon of 31 August there was liberty for officers, non-commissioned 
officers and ratings. Those who had their wives in the area could stay ashore until next 
morning. Some commanding officers, executive officers and senior officers serving on the 
destroyers and a few lieutenant commanders and warrant officers from the flagships used 
this authorization. This explains the presence of a few officers and warrant officers ashore 
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at the time the beginning of the mutiny. The Commanders in Chief and the Commanding 
Officers of the two flagships and almost all the rest of the officers were surprised by the 
rebellion while they were sleeping on board. Some crewmembers went ashore in the 
afternoon and came back before midnight. At Coquimbo’s wharf, before embarking in the 
launches taking them back to their ships, they listened to rumours that a mutiny was under 
way but nobody reported this information upon their arrival. 
The duty officer in O’Higgins was Lieutenant Horacio Vío-Valdivieso. He patrolled 
the ship at 19:30 as established in the Navy Rules but he did not see anything that called his 
attention. At 22:00 he patrolled the crew berthing again without noticing anything 
abnormal. Two hours later he was replaced by midshipman Eduardo Rawlins-Allan and 
four hours later, at 04:00, midshipman Guillermo Leighton-Leighton assumed this post. On 
the Latorre, Lieutenant Víctor Carrasco-Délano was the officer of the watch. This officer 
stayed usually on the afterdeck of the battleship because this was the best position to have 
better control of activities on board such a big ship. He trusted the duty of patrolling the 
lower decks and crew berthing to the adjunct midshipmen. Significantly, he did not carry 
out the 19:00 patrol because he was organizing the cinema session. He said that he put all 
his effort into this task because he was concerned about the mood of the ship company after 
the Commanding Officer speech. At midnight he was replaced by midshipman Ramón 
Barros-González. 
The scenario was set for the mutiny. 
 
7.2. The outbreak of mutiny in the flagships. 
  
As mentioned above, the mutiny started early on the morning of 1 September 1931. 
Midshipman Barros, who was on duty in Latorre from 00:00 to 04:00, made three patrols 
through the lower decks on his watch, without noticing anything in particular and he lighted 
a searchlight as had been ordered. He turned his watch over to a petty officer diver because 
there were not enough midshipmen to cover all the night watches. A few moments later, 
when he was on his way to his cabin, he noticed some crewmembers carrying rifles with 
bayonets and he was surrounded by four men. He escaped and went to Lieutenant Juan 
Moraga-Ramos’s cabin to get a weapon, but he did not find one. When he tried to go to 
 164 
Lieutenant Teodoro Varas-Polanco’s cabin, one of the mutineers ordered him to return to 
Moraga’s cabin. He stayed there with the door open until a search party came looking for 
small weapons. Moraga denied having one. Barros agreed with his host to use a hidden 
weapon at the first opportunity but they were kept confined and closely watched368
Awakened by the noise, Captain Hozven was captured by the mutineers as he tried 
to leave his cabin. He attempted to dissuade the rebels and when he was not obeyed, he 
tried to use his pistol but it did not fire. Astica narrates the events in this way: ‘Captain 
Hozven would have resisted but he was subdued by Gunner Rating Eleodoro Labra. From 
then on, he was kept in his cabin
. At dusk 
on 1 September Barros, was moved to his cabin in the midshipmens’ quarters. 
369’. Rating Labra was questioned by the prosecutors and 
he admitted having shot close to where Captain Hozven was and he said370 the he did this 
to scare those who were attacking the Commanding Officer, which is a somewhat childlike 
excuse. In subsequent investigations, Hozven would try to demonstrate unsuccessfully, that 
his pistol had been sabotaged, suggesting that the officer in charge of small weapons, 
Lieutenant Commander RobertoValle-Fierro, was an ally of the rebels. This allegation was 
not proven in the trial371 372. Valle stated that Captain Hozven did not know how to use 
firearms properly because he had suffered an accident that limited the movement of one of 
his arms373
‘The attitude assumed by Captain Hozven, when apprehended in his cabin, 
was energetically courageous and determined and if the weapon had not 
failed, as he states, several mutineers would have died with him. Such 
attitude, in extreme circumstances as this, reveals his real character and 
temperament
. Prosecutor Allard’s conclusion regarding this subject is as follows: 
374
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On the other hand, it may be argued that Hozven could have killed and wounded 
some of his captors initially and that attitude could have deterred them, stopping the 
mutiny. But it is also possible that, given the attackers superior numbers, Hozven's use of 
force would have caused his death and a radicalization of the conflict as well. 
In any case, Hozven complied with his duties although rather late when he tried to 
defend himself. If not, he would have been prosecuted under articles 270 and 299 of the 
Chilean Code of Military Justice which punish those who do not actively oppose to a 
mutiny [see section 1.4]. 
The majority of the officers were detained in their cabins where they had been 
sleeping; some had small arms because Captain Hozven had ordered the issue of pistols the 
day before, an order that was only partially implemented. They could not use the weapons 
for different reasons: Some because they did not have the arms ready for use and because 
they were too sleepy to react when they were suddenly attacked. A small number of officers 
stated that the circumstances did not merit killings. The next morning the rebels completed 
their control apprehending those few officers staying ashore that night when they returned 
already knowing that there was a mutiny on board.   
While these events happened in Latorre, Midshipman Leighton who was on duty in 
O’Higgins from 00:00 to 04:00 limited himself to remaining on deck, leaving the duty of 
patrolling to a petty officer who later was accused of being a leader of the mutiny. When 
another midshipman, who was ready to take the watch from Leighton saw that the 
crewmembers were breaking into the weapons cabinets, he ran to advise the Commander in 
Chief of the Active Squadron, Admiral Campos. Leighton went to his cabin and put on his 
sword. Using this largely ceremonial weapon, he tried to deter the mutineers but they fired 
at him, wounding him slightly in one of his legs. The Admiral, who did not have a weapon 
to defend himself, unsuccessfully tried to use his moral authority and presence of mind to 
make the men return to normality. The Commanding Officer of O’Higgins, Captain Héctor 
Díaz-Aburto, was sleeping in his cabin after returning from shore leave. He could not 
defend himself with his pistol because it was not loaded and because at the first moment he 
left his cabin quickly and without it to find out what was happening. Then he went back and 
once he had his firearm ready, he decided not to use it because nobody attacked him and 
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due the lack of other armed officers nearby. At that moment, he had already heard shots in 
the upper deck near the stern and in the after deck375
The Executive Officer of O’Higgins, Lieutenant Commander Eleodoro Muñoz-Toro 
arrived on the main deck armed with his personal weapon but he did not use it. Later, he 
stated that the mutineers told him that they wanted to avoid bloodshed, and they sent him to 
his cabin. Meanwhile, the majority of the officers were apprehended inside their cabins by 
armed personnel while they were sleeping or when they were leaving their cabins to 
investigate what was happening. They did not have weapons and they were pressed to 
return to the cabins by rifle shots
.   
376
Having won control of the flagships, the mutineers acted to spread their seditious 
message to the rest of the units anchored in Coquimbo. 
.  
 
7.3. The mutiny unleashing on board the destroyers. 
 
While some of the destroyers were taken by their crews [Orella, Lynch, Videla], 
others [Serrano, Aldea, Riquelme, Hyatt] required the support of the Latorre and O’Higgins 
to start the sedition.  
In the first group, there was a majority of ships belonging to the Instruction 
Squadron [Orella and Lynch] while in the second subset, there was a majority of destroyers 
belonging to the Active Squadron [Aldea, Riquelme and Hyatt]. It seems that the rebellious 
attitude was stronger in the former squadron having Latorre as flagship. 
On those ships of the first group [Orella, Lynch, Videla] the mutiny started at the 
same time as the two flagships when armed personnel surprised all of their sleeping 
officers, except for the commanding and executive officers of the Lynch and Videla, who 
had gone ashore for the night. 
Although some officers had personal weapons, they could not use them because 
they were caught sleeping377
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the commanding officer. He found Commander Samuel Ward Rodríguez in a hotel in 
Coquimbo. Ward passed the word to the commanding officer of another destroyer and 
requested his wife to do the same to a third commander who was ashore that night378
One of the crewmembers of Lynch was Chief Petty Officer Alejandro Caldera-Holm 
who, according to witnesses demonstrated an extremely seditious attitude. Later he moved 
to Latorre where he became a member of the so called ‘Crew’s Staff’. In this organization 
he stands out for his radical ideas and for the impassioned speeches he made. Boatswain 
Able Rating Thomas Moore Hodges stated
.  Their 
idea was to return to their ships and oppose the mutiny. 
379 later that Caldera wanted to raise a 
communist red flag but he deterred him with a pistol. He also stated that the petty officer 
wanted to segregate the entire northern region to establish a workers government in that 
area north of Coquimbo. Caldera, who was from the Chilean northern region, denied these 
accusations in his statements in Court Martial380
In Orella, the officers were totally unarmed and they did not have a chance to grab 
their pistols since they were not allowed to rise from their beds. In Videla none of the 
officers who were sleeping became aware of the events until too late. 
 . 
The case of destroyers Serrano, Aldea, Riquelme and Hyatt was different in that 
they were only taken by mutineers with the support of the flag ships. 
In Serrano there was a boatswain petty officer second class on duty on the deck. He 
called the executive officer, Lieutenant Commander Luis Correa-Ball, reporting that the 
rest of the ships had red lights on and that something unusual was taking place. Correa 
ordered the rest of the ship’s company to general quarters. He asked the enlisted personnel 
and officers on the deck the meaning of what was happening but he did not get answers. 
Soon he discovered that a mutiny was taking place because he saw small craft from 
O’Higgins and Latorre carrying armed personnel to the destroyers.  He informed the ship's 
company that he would not turn the ship over to anybody except the Commanding Officer, 
who was ashore. He ordered the crew to close the condensers and to raise pressure in the 
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boilers to get ready to sail. The men managed to obey the first order but not the second, 
because they said that they feared that the Latorre, seeing the smoke coming out of the 
stacks, might fire on them. Next, Correa sent a boat to request that the Commanding 
Officer, Pedro Gallardo-Lataste, should return to the ship. When the crew did not dare to 
raise pressure, he became aware that the ship's company was colluding with the other ships’ 
crews but that they did not want to act openly against their officers. The Lieutenant 
Commander did not order any officer to bear weapons, but he and Lieutenant Raúl Searle-
Bunster already had their own pistols hidden with them. Correa ordered Searle to take his 
weapon back to his cabin but this lieutenant initially disobeyed the order arguing that 
nobody knew that he was armed. Finally he complied. Afterwards, he was the only officer 
of this ship who refused to sign the list of complaints presented by the Crew’s Staff. The 
rest of the officers, including the Commanding Officer, signed it later, stating that their 
signature had no legal value and that if they refused to sign, they would have been sent to 
Latorre. They added that they preferred to stay on board their ship, in hopes that they 
would convince the mutineers and recover control of the situation381
In Aldea, the Commanding Officer, Luis Bahamondez-Torrejón and the rest of the 
officers were advised by the Master Chief Petty Officer that he heard shots on board 
Latorre and O’Higgins and that it seemed that the fleet’s crews had rebelled. The officers 
appeared on deck, most of them armed
. 
382
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. The Commanding Officer then ordered locking 
the rest of the personal weapons and rifles in the officers’ cabins and that the engines be 
readied to sail because red lights were observed being switched on at the top of the masts of 
the rest of the fleet without any clear reason. The Commanding Officer observed that 
launches from O’Higgins and Latorre were boarding Riquelme, so he ordered the crew to 
man combat stations to resist a similar action. Before the order could be implemented, the 
ship was assaulted in a quick action by about one hundred armed mutineers arriving in 
launches equipped with machine guns. The attackers took control of the bridge and the 
engine room and surrounded the officers who were scattered in different places. It was 
noticeable that at the beginning, the Aldea’s ship’s company was not involved in the mutiny 
since the men had readily locked up the weapons in the officers’ cabins. The Latorre 
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crewmembers ordered the rest of the destroyer's ship’s company to appear on deck where a 
Rating from the battleship, asking them if they agreed with the mutiny, received no answer. 
Due to this poor reaction, he talked to them saying that the movement consisted of a 
respectful note to be sent to the government but the guns of Latorre and O’Higgins were 
ready to be used. Part of the crewmembers declared themselves in favour of the mutiny but 
not the chief petty officer and the petty officers. Those who did not state their support of the 
mutiny after being questioned were sent to Latorre as prisoners. The mutineers wanted to 
take Commander Bahamondez to Latorre but the strong verbal opposition of the officers 
deterred them, and finally the mutineers took with them only the hand weapons. The 
officers of this destroyer were ordered to remain in their cabins and were free to talk to 
each other until lunch time that day383
In Riquelme, the Commanding Officer, Commander Alejandro Yánquez-Cerda, and 
the rest of the officers were awakened by the personnel on duty who reported that they 
heard shots on board O’Higgins. The Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Gustavo 
Carvallo-Gundelach, ordered Lieutenant Jorge Barruel-Scheppeler to have the officers’ 
pistols ready in case of an emergency. Before these weapons could be distributed, the ship 
was boarded by armed personnel from O’Higgins. There was no opposition to this action 
since nobody knew what was happening and because of this, the Commanding Officer 
decided to keep the ship’s company asleep. Resistance would have been pointless because 
the guns of Latorre and O’Higgins were aiming directly at this ship
. 
384
The duty officer on the destroyer Hyatt, Lieutenant Raúl Arancibia-Aranciabia, 
heard shooting at 03:45 approximately while in his cabin and he went immediately to the 
main deck, calling the rest of the personnel on duty to fall in. After that the situation was 
calm, so he remained gathered and chatting with the rest of the officers present on board. 
He ordered the boatswain to take the personnel back to their living quarters, ordering them 
to remain in their hammocks.  He was surprised, therefore, when several of the men 
returned to the stern deck without being called. One rating advanced and said that the 
battleship Latorre had signalled ‘follow the movements of the flagship’. He said that all the 
ship’s company wanted to follow what was being done there. Arancibia promised to present 
. 
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their complaints according to the regulations. At the beginning, they seemed to agree but, 
as they went to their quarters, they grumbled that they wanted weapons to organize a 
boarding party. The duty officer rejected this request and went with another officer carrying 
pistols to keep the crewmembers away from the hand weapons lockers. He also ordered that 
the rest of the officers wake up and attend the main deck with their hand weapons. At that 
time, a launch from Latorre arrived with a chief petty officer in charge requesting the 
presence of a chief petty officers’ delegation to go with him to a meeting with Rear 
Admiral Campos on board O’Higgins. Arancibia asked who wanted to participate in this 
meeting and an instructor chief petty officer answered positively. At the moment when the 
launch was leaving Hyatt the Chief Petty Officer in charge of it ordered Lieutenant 
Arancibia to turn over the ship to the senior non-commissioned officer and to hand the 
weapons to the enlisted personnel. He refused, ordering him to leave. Next, he ordered the 
engines prepare for departure and sent a launch to bring back the Commanding Officer, 
Commander Manfredo Becerra-Saavedra, and the Executive Officer, Lieutenant 
Commander Hugo Julio-Aguirre, who were still ashore. The crew refused his order. A 
small boat left Hyatt without his authorization and a little while later another launch from 
Latorre arrived without position lights, carrying armed personnel and a machine gun 
pointing at the officers who were astern.  When this boarding party surrounded the officers 
without opposition from the ship’s company the officers realized that they did not enjoy the 
support of their own personnel. A chief petty officer then told that Latorre was aiming its 
guns at the Hyatt. The officers agreed to turn this ship over to the senior chief petty officer 
but only if the personnel from Latorre returned to their ship. Then the officers were forced 
to stay in their cabins385
An important fact is that in each destroyer there was a Commanding Officer, an 
Executive Officer and six or seven other officers. In some of these ships this number was 
diminished by those who were on commission elsewhere or were ashore on leave. Each 
destroyer carried approximately one hundred and forty non-commissioned officers, most of 
whom remained on board that night. The actions on board the auxiliary ships present in 
Coquimbo or nearby will not be described because it is not relevant. 
. 
By noon on 1 September 1931 the sequence of events in the mutiny had thus been as 
follows:  
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Between 04:00 and 05:00 seditious personnel captured all ships present at 
Coquimbo, starting this action in the two flagships and following with seven 
destroyers and other auxiliary ships. 
 
The majority of the officers, including the two flag officers, were surprised while 
sleeping. They were locked in their cabins as 1 September went by. 
 
A few officers were on the main deck or were able to reach it but were unable to 
control the situation. 
 
Another minority group of senior officers, including three commanding officers and 
executive officers of destroyers, were ashore with their families and when they 
returned voluntarily to their ships, they were captured and locked in their cabins as 
was done with the rest of the officers. 
 
7.4. First days of the mutiny in Coquimbo. 
  
Once the mutineers gained control of the ships, they started organizing themselves. 
Generally, they named or elected a committee of six men of different ranks. In several 
ships, the most senior non-commissioned crewmember was part of this group and he took 
control of the ship in some cases. In Latorre this committee was widened and became what 
the seditious personnel called the ‘Estado Mayor de la Tripulaciones’ [or the ‘Crew’s 
General Staff’]. This group became dominant instantly and started issuing orders to the rest 
of the ships belonging to both squadrons and those who would subsequently arrive from 
Talcahuano. The name adopted by the mutineers for this ‘de facto’ organization is very odd 
but there is no doubt that nobody wanted to show himself as heading an unlawful 
organization. The debates within this group were chaired by Warrant Officer González, but 
actually ratings Zagal and Astica were the ones that dominated the situation386
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the real leaders who took over a movement initiated among the gunner ratings in the days 
previous to the mutiny. 
 When the ships needed to be moved from one berth to another or to sail and no one 
in the committee was able to take control, some petty officers and even some ratings took 
charge of the manoeuvring. On the Latorre, Boatswain Chief Petty Officer Moreno387
 The 1st September was used by the mutineers to get organized, as seen, and also to 
raise the first list of complaints in the form of a draft. They sent a committee to the different 
ships trying to obtain the signatures of the officers. The autographs enscribed very unwisely 
by some of them is the origin of some authors such as González and the press claiming later 
that the naval officers agreed with the mutineers. Afterwards, the officers would explain 
that they had been misunderstood, adding that that they were forced to sign the draft. This 
claim has a certain veracity since their signatures were requested by armed personnel, often 
belonging to Latorre or O’Higgins who had promised that they would regain liberty once 
they signed, a promise not honoured. 
 
assumed this role. 
 Commander Samuel Ward-Rodríguez, the Commanding officer of Lynch, a 
destroyer belonging to the Instruction Squadron, was summoned by the ‘Estado Mayor de 
las Tripulaciones’. He agreed to attend because this gave him the opportunity to talk to 
Warrant Officer González. He had a high opinion of this man since he had had him under 
his orders in the past. Once in Latorre, Ward was imprisoned and taken to the Executive 
Officer’s cabin where he was pressed for a signature on the statement. He accepted after 
they promised him that he would be sent back to his ship and this they did but without 
placing him in command of Lynch again.  
The commissions sent out to other ships obtained mixed results. The two 
commanders in chief and the chiefs of staff refused to sign. The same happened with the 
majority of the commanding officers. But on other ships, all officers signed after seeing the 
signature of the commanding officer. There were also ships where some officers signed and 
the rest refused.  The officers who signed would argue later that that they did so knowing 
that their signature has no legal value since it was obtained when they were imprisoned and 
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pressed by armed personnel. In the destroyer Videla the document was not signed by a 
majority of the officers but the Commanding Officer, Commander Humberto Aylwin-
Tasso, appended his signature adding the following statement: ‘although the ideas are good, 
the procedure used negated their value388’. Engineer Lieutenant Roberto Campos-Durán 
also signed, adding the following note: ‘good ideas but the procedure followed is 
shameful389’. The Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Athos Valenzuela-Bastías, 
signed as well stating: ‘With the remarks of the two previous pages; A shameful and 
unacceptable procedure390’. In those pages he refutes every subject raised by the mutineers 
except the petition about food allowances and about bringing back to the Navy a Captain 
who had been forced into retirement by the Government391
Destroyer Aldea is an extreme case. No officer signed. González writes that 
convincing what he calls: ‘the supportive officers’ to sign the first manifesto, was an action 
ending only at 16:00 ‘because many of them wanted to sign adding remarks oriented to 
modify or to widen some points, in accordance to their own ideas
.  
392’ and this delayed this 
process. A message from the mutineers to all ships states: ‘Those officers who did not sign 
the manifesto will be kept in their cabins under strict surveillance393
An officer in Aldea, while imprisoned wrote that at the attempt of forcing them to 
sign the manifesto, they:  
’. 
‘recorded in writing that their rank had been taken away and that they have 
lost all moral influence with respect to the personnel formerly under their 
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orders. After the humiliation they had suffered, they could not give any 
opinion394
 
’.  
Meanwhile, the Chief Harbourmaster in Coquimbo, who was a retired naval officer, 
observed strange actions on that morning of 1 September. He did nothing regarding the 
transmittal of news to his superiors or to the other local authorities. In a later report, he 
states that he sent a ciphered message to the Ministry of the Navy saying: ‘I have 
knowledge that serious acts are taking place in the fleet. It has been impossible to contact 
any officer. The launches are carrying only petty officers. They do not give any 
information395
That day, at 16:55, Rear Admiral Calixto Rogers-Cea, the Minister of the Navy, 
received the first manifesto with several demands by a radio message from the mutineers. 
This was the first concrete information about the mutiny that reached the Government and 
this is a demonstration that the local authorities in Coquimbo were negligent of their duty. 
The document, in synthesis, demanded that: 
’, but no evidence had been found that this message arrived. 
a. Salaries should not be reduced 
b. The people responsible for the financial situation should be extradited in 
order to hand them to the justice system396
c. Hostility directed against the Armed Forces should cease. 
. 
d. The two fleets should remain in Coquimbo. 
They requested a response to these demands within forty eight hours. In addition, 
the mutineers stated that they would not use their weapons against any of the people and 
that they were not influenced by anarchist ideas [see this document in Appendix A.2]. 
Facing this new reality, the Minister of the Navy convened the Consultive Board of 
the Navy [a euphemistic name given to the Navy Board suppressed by Ibáñez] composed of 
the flag officers residing in Santiago. This deliberative body, at the beginning, had the idea 
of applying harsh punishments but later the debate was concentrated in the following items: 
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a. Avoid a hasty use of force without knowing the loyalty of the naval and 
other forces, because an initial failure would have irremediable 
consequences. 
b. Advise that the ships affected by subversion should by sunk only as a last 
resource due to their importance for Chilean defence. 
In conclusion, diplomacy should be used before employing force397
The analysis above is a summary of the situation appraisal made by Rear Admiral 
Edgardo von Schroeders-Sarratea in his book
. 
398
Between 17:30 and 18:30 the authorities of the Ministry of the Navy started their 
first of several communications with the Base Commanders making them aware of the 
mutiny. They used the telephone to contact Valparaíso and Talcahuano. No evidence was 
found about Punta Arenas, in the Strait of Magellan but nothing happened in that far distant 
base related to the main subject of this thesis. 
. He was one of the participants of that 
meeting [see Appendix A].  
That night's deliberations between the national and the naval authorities urged the 
Government to adopt a moderate course of action. Rear Admiral von Schroeders was 
selected as the Government’s delegate to travel to Coquimbo to meet the leaders of the 
mutiny and to seek a solution. It seems that the mutineers were also deliberating that same 
night on 1 September, because at midnight the Government received a second manifesto 
with more political demands such as: 
a. Suspending the payment of the external debt. 
b. Agrarian reform. 
c. Measures to create employment. 
d. Lowering the interest rate on deposits over $10,000 in money lent to the 
Government. 
It also stated other demands [see Appendix A] having a more self interested nature 
such as: 
a. Closure of naval schools to save financial resources. 
b. Free uniforms. 
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c. Improvements in the naval ration [the food allowance for each man in the 
Navy]. 
d.  Retirement payment after twenty years in service. 
e. Improvement in the system of promotions to higher ranks. 
f. Salary taxation to be set at the level existing on 31 July. 
g. Return of Captain del Solar to service in the Navy. 
 
 Neither González nor Astica publicly stated the reasons for the rebels' radicalizing 
the demands between the first and second manifestoes. This may be seen also in later 
mutineers’ statements. Astica recognizes399
 Rear Admiral von Schroeders
 only his participation in the first manifesto. 
González supports him saying that it was this rating who drafted and typed it directly on a 
machine, without consulting any further draft. This fact demonstrates that Astica was 
familiar with this activity, probably from his past as union agitator and this led some people 
to raise the hypothesis that he was a communist. The Christian Socialist ideas of Astica in 
the years before the mutiny have already been explained in another chapter [see chapter 3]. 
400 was a highly regarded officer who had held many 
commands at sea and ashore, and who had served as Minister of the Navy at the end of the 
Ibáñez Government. To comply with the new mission given by the Government, he chose 
as his aides Captain Luis Muñoz-Artigas and Lieutenant Rogelio Huidobro-Santander. 
They flew to Coquimbo arriving at noon on 2 September401
                                                 
399  Mayorga, p. 352. 
. The Government had 
instructed the Admiral to meet the mutineers only ashore, so he summoned them to be at 
Coquimbo`s Chief Harbourmaster’s Office at 14:00. The mutineers' delegates responded 
that the meeting should take place on board Latorre and promised that they would facilitate 
Admiral. Von Schroeders' access and render him all the honours due him as a flag officer. 
Realizing that he would not achieve anything unless the government permitted him to go on 
board, he sent numerous telegrams and called Santiago in order to obtain the authorization.  
These manoeuvres consumed almost an entire day.  
400  Von Schroeders wrote important sources for the research of the mutiny. The first 
one is a secret report addressed to the Minister of the Navy on 10 de September de 
1931 [CM. t. 23, pp. 61-68]. He extended this report in a book already quoted.  
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The following day, 3 September, the news that the Vice-President Manuel Trucco-
Franzani had accepted the resignation of the Cabinet became known and that he named 
retired Captain Enrique Spoerer-Jardel as Minister of the Navy and General Carlos 
Vergara-Montero as Minister of War, who received the power of Commander in Chief of 
the Armed forces. Arturo Prat-Carvajal was named Minister of Finance. He was the son of 
Arturo Prat-Chacón the most prominent Chilean naval hero. 
The Government then authorized von Schroeders to meet the rebels on board 
Latorre and ordered the Minister of Finance to pay August's salaries without the reductions. 
The first meeting of the Government’s delegate and his aides with the ‘Estado 
Mayor de las Tripulaciones’ took place in the midshipmen’s mess on board Latorre on 3 
September. The rebels’ de facto organization was chaired by Warrant Petty Officer 
González. Around him there were the other members of this committee as well as fifty to 
sixty other naval personnel. To his right, was seated Leading Rating Zagal who would 
subsequently emerge as the rebels' most intriguing leader. At a nearby small table sat 
Leading Rating Astica who would serve as the mutineers' secretary. Later he would appear 
as one of the most intransigent and vehement of the leaders. After four hours of 
conversation, the participants seemed to have reached a resolution of the mutiny when radio 
messages reported that the Talcahuano Naval Base and in Valparaíso, the School of 
Communications and the Quintero Air Base had rebelled that day. Nevertheless, the 
mutineers gave an additional period of twenty four hours to the Government to respond to 
their demands402. Once he was back ashore, von Schroeders received a telegram from the 
Government expressing support to all the agreements achieved until then403
In the second meeting on board the Latorre, the mutineers widened their demands, 
seeking immunity and that the government would not take reprisals. They also added a 
clause which made an agreement extremely difficult. They demanded that the act of 
agreement should be signed only after the arrival of Talcahuano’s seditious ships that had 
already set out for Coquimbo
.   
404
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negotiations, but he warned the Government that the demand of the mutineers for awaiting 
the arrival of the ships from Talcahuano was a postponing manoeuvre405
Meanwhile the situation of the officers on board the ships anchored in Coquimbo 
was unchanged. The Commanding Officers were imprisoned in their cabins, and the rest in 
their living quarters. Sentries guarded them but they were treated correctly with a few 
exceptions. Those officers who evinced strong or vehement opposition against the 
mutineers were taken to Latorre and placed in detention cells. Another similar example of 
that is the attitude of the O’Higgins` midshipmen acting with the vigour of youth. They 
wanted to recapture the ship. On one occasion Admiral Campos had to recommend that 
they remain calm since the ‘Crews Staff’ reported to him about the verbal aggressiveness of 
the midshipmen against the guards. The Admiral was concerned that these events would 
frustrate the previously described negotiations. 
.   
At that time in Santiago, there was concern about the officers’ fate and this was the 
reason for adopting initially a conciliatory attitude, avoiding the use of force. Von 
Schroeders’ negotiations allowed for the hope that nothing harsh would take place, but this 
government mood was hardening in the face of the mutineers' demands.  
Von Schroeders’ negotiations arrived at a decisive point on 4 September. That day 
was spent discussing with the ‘Crew’s Staff’ a project to end the conflict. The Admiral had 
hoped that the government would accept it. By the time the project was returned from 
Santiago, its content was fundamentally changed, perhaps in part because the Government 
had now decided to use force. When von Schroeders read the Moneda's document, he 
thought that the rebels would reject it. He then made an unsuccessful effort to persuade his 
superiors in Santiago to accept the text agreed before with the mutineers. He proved 
prescient because the ‘Estado Mayor de las Tripulaciones’ did in fact reject the 
Government’s proposal. They knew that the ships sailing from Talcahuano would arrive in 
Coquimbo the next day. The document drafted in Santiago only committed the Government 
to study the measures requested by the mutineers, regardless of the delegate’s warning that 
a document worded that way would be rejected. Given the impasse the meetings on board 
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Latorre ended at midnight 4 September406
Von Schroeders returned to Santiago on 5 September reporting his negotiations and 
that he had observed symptoms of a conflict among the mutineers. His opinion was based 
on the contacts he had with some warrant and petty officers acting outside the ‘Crews Staff’ 
and the reports delivered to him by Latorre’s Chaplain and a Paraguayan officer who was 
initially on board a destroyer. Those two were the only officers allowed to come ashore. 
Later a medical officer was allowed to go to Coquimbo`s hospital to perform surgery on 
one of the crewmembers. 
. The main reason for the rejection was that the 
Government did not commit itself to solving any of the rebel’s complaints. 
Admiral von Schroeders’ performance was positive in the sense that he was close to 
achieving an agreement but it was frustrated by the lack of an accommodating attitude by 
both parties. His presence on board Latorre and ashore in Coquimbo enabled the 
Government to have a better assessment of the situation by means of telegrams and 
telephone calls from the port where the mutiny started and through the final report handed 
in upon at his arrival to Santiago. 
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8. TALCAHUANO 
 
8.1. Organizing a mutiny in Talcahuano. 
 
The Talcahuano Naval Base was the most important of the Chilean Navy. It had 
several shore logistic establishments, schools, and directly dependent ships to perform 
duties in the southern area. In addition, it had reserve naval units and ships undergoing 
repairs belonging to other commands. It acted as the base for submarines, and these ships 
were relatively independent from the Naval Area Command because like all active naval 
forces, the Submarine Squadron received orders directly from the Ministry of the Navy 
[see: Appendix C. Ships and Shore Establishments of Talcahuano]. 
 The Commander in Chief of the Naval Base in Talcahuano was Rear Admiral 
Roberto Chappuzeau-Cienfuegos. He received the information of the mutiny by a telephone 
call from the Ministry of the Navy. On 1 September, he summoned a meeting of all 
Commanding Officers of ships and Shore Establishments to disseminate the news and 
adopt the first measures. It was agreed that each Commanding Officer would talk to the 
crew the next day explaining what happened and to exhort them to maintain discipline. 
Chappuzeau suggested initially that the Commander of the Submarine Flotilla, 
Captain Luis Muñoz-Valdez, should put to sea with the submarines and submarine tender 
but this officer did not consider it convenient to do so at that moment. He wanted to avoid 
raising adverse attitudes in the submarine crews since he considered that they were very 
loyal. He reasoned that the crews would consider that they were not trusted if the 
submarines went to sea at that moment. Muñoz also believed that those submarines at sea at 
that time should first return to Talcahuano to load ammunition and torpedoes in case they 
had to engage the rebel squadrons407
The subordinate officers informed their crews about the Coquimbo mutiny but in the 
Condell, a destroyer belonging to the Active Squadron, a singular event occurred. The 
Executive Officer, Lieutenant Adolfo Novoa-Carabantes, would state later that:  
. 
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‘in the presentation made by the Commanding Officer, it called to our 
attention and to the rest of the officers, the manner in which he talked to the 
crew, with no military manners and in a inappropriate way for his rank408
 
’.  
It must be noted again that Condell belonged to one of the two squadrons anchored 
in Coquimbo but it was being repaired in the dockyard and that one of his crew members, 
Rating Manuel Neira-Neira, received the letter409
The author of the letter also wrote that similar communications were sent to surface 
ships and submarines whose home port was Talcahuano, demonstrating that there were 
attempts to coordinate actions between the organizers in Coquimbo and the rest of the ships 
in that southern base. 
 signed by Mellado [see it in section 7.1] 
communicating the starting date of the mutiny if their petition regarding the salary 
reduction was not accepted. Mellado added that there was an agreement between the crews 
of both squadrons to act by striking with energy.   
The letter was dated 31 August 1931 on board cruiser O’Higgins anchored at 
Coquimbo and had a post seal dated in Talcahuano 3 September, when the mutiny had been 
occurring for three days, showing that it was late in communicating the news.  
Mid morning on 2 September the Commanding Officers attended Rear Admiral 
Chappuzeau’s office and reported the results of the call to quarters. On that occasion they 
told their crews about the events in Coquimbo and afterwards they observed that the men 
stayed calm and disciplined. Because of this, it was agreed that the following text for a 
message to the Minister of the Navy should be sent: ‘The Admiral, senior officers, officers 
and enlisted personnel of the Naval Base Talcahuano condemn the Squadrons' crews 
attitudes410
‘Senior officers, officers and enlisted personnel of the Naval Base 
Talcahuano invite the Squadrons’ crews to think that due to the lack of 
patriotism and discipline it has placed the National Navy in a sad situation 
before the country’s and world’s public opinion. This attitude has caused a 
’. In addition the Admiral requested the Commanding Officers to check with 
their crews the following telegram to be sent to the mutineers:  
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difficult period for the nation in a testing moment when a major collective 
sacrifice is needed from all Chileans. Our Navy from its birth, has shown to 
the country and the world its heroism and discipline and it is not possible to 
accept that a century of glorious traditions will be erased by a moment of 
obfuscation411
 
’. 
The initiative to send this telegram unleashed an outbreak of indiscipline in this 
naval base and in its naval units and Coastal Defence forces. Admiral Chappuzeau says412 
that he decided on this controversial measure because in this way: ‘one could know more 
deeply if there was any connection between the squadron and the people of the Naval Base’ 
and this idea received the support of all Commanding Officers, as stated during the later 
investigations by Captain Luis Muñoz-Valdes413 and Captain José Goñi-Germain414
As an example of the consequences of the above measure, the events in one ship and 
one Shore Establishment will be narrated. The opinion of the Condell’s Executive Officer 
has been recorded already. In this ship, the Commanding Officer, Commander Víctor 
Ramm-Siebt requested the crew’s opinion about the text of the proposed telegram. The 
ship’s company showed itself divided and asked authorization to go to the living quarters to 
deliberate, a request which Ramm accepted. The Executive Officer argued then that: ‘he 
could not be held responsible for discipline since the right to deliberation had been awarded 
to the crew
 who 
attended this meeting. 
415
In Fort Borgoño, the Commanding Officer of the Coastal Artillery Group, 
Commander Fidel Alviña-Vergara, gathered all the personnel to analyze the text of the 
telegram. One gunner told him: ‘that they would not fire on their workmates of the 
squadrons
’. This is a strong criticism of Ramm`s behaviour. 
416
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agree with the way in which the events of Coquimbo happened but that they agreed with its 
deeper content. Alviña subsequently reported to the Admiral that: ‘he estimated that there 
was a discipline problem from the moment when the personnel deliberated about the 
telegram’s convenience417
The Commanding Officers started arriving at the Admiral’s office around 16:00 and 
reporting that, in general, the crews did not agree with the methods employed by the 
Coquimbo mutineers, but at the same time, they expressed their hostility toward the 
economic measures adopted by the Government and with this it became evident that there 
was a beginning of a rebellious mood. 
’. 
On that same afternoon the Admiral ordered that the enlisted personnel receive 
liberty while their officers remain on board and in the Shore Establishments. This was done 
to disperse the enlisted personnel because it was appreciated that the men were unsettled 
and to allow the officers to secure the rifles’ mechanisms and ammunition. Also the duty 
officers would be reinforced.   
Two examples of how these orders were complied with are the following. In the 
cruiser Blanco the rifle mechanisms were taken out by the officers only after the first 
shooting was heard on 3 September418. In the ‘Escuela de Máquinas’ [School of 
Machinists] the authorities locked the rifle ammunition in the accountant’s safe. The 
Executive Officer of this school, Engineer Lieutenant Commander René Cortez-Magnan, 
would explain later that this happened because: ‘the dominant idea was that they expected 
the authorities would resolve the squadrons' problem, so we believed that adopting 
measures of that nature…[reinforcing the officers on duty]….would indicate a lack of 
confidence in the crew419
Meanwhile, Admiral Chappuzeau, lacking a real staff, decided to keep the 
Commanding Officers of ships and shore establishments in an almost permanent meeting 
on 2 and 3 September. Close to sunset on 2 September, the Araucano’s Executive 
’. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
417  Statement: Cdr. Fidel Alviña. 13 SEP 1931. CM, v.1 (T), p.95. BUPERS.  
 
418  Prosecutor Report, n.d. CM, v.1 (T), pp 314-315. BUPERS.  
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Officer420, Commander Alberto Consiglo-Rébora, told the assembled officers that the 
Araucano's officers, and those of the submarine fleet, unanimously suggested that they 
should sail at once to demonstrate their loyalty to the Government, a request that the 
meeting endorsed. The same meeting also ordered that those midshipmen studying in 
‘Escuela de Torpedos’ [Torpedo School] and those who served on board Blanco Encalada, 
would be transferred to the naval units to reinforce the duty officers. This order started to 
be complied with immediately. The Chief of Staff of the Naval Base, Captain Silvestre 
Calderón-Navarro informed421
At 21:30 the Commander of a Company of Coastal Artillery, Sub-lieutenant 
Humberto Berndt-Vivanco, who remained in the Gunnery School, became aware that 
Admiral Chappuzeau doubted the personnel’s loyalty and that the Government had 
suggested requesting support from the Army but Chappuzeau was also doubtful about the 
loyalty of those troops. The Sub-lieutenant had previously questioned his company’s 
personnel who stated that they would remain loyal no matter the attitude of the rest of the 
troop at Fort Borgoño. Upon hearing a fire alarm out of the base, he sent personnel from his 
unit to collaborate in extinguishing it and when the company returned to the base it was 
sent to sleep
 the Base Duty Officer, Lieutenant Commander Danilo 
Bassi-Galleguillos, that in ‘Batería Rodríguez’ [Rodríguez Battery] and in ‘Escuela de 
Artillería’ [Gunnery School] barracks there were naval and Coastal Artillery land forces 
available and that he must keep close surveillance on the situation.  
422
Coastal Artillery Gunner Valentín Marín-Marín was on duty at the entrance of the 
Arsenal. Close to his post and in a basin, there were several ships and submarines moored. 
He later averred that at 21:00 several petty officers came by his post saying that Araucano 
and the submarines would that night join the mutiny and sail to Coquimbo. When he said 
that he would go to report to the Duty Officer he was arrested by four or five sailors, but 
released later. At 23:00 Signals Corps Chief Petty Officer Orlando Robles-Osses came by 
saying that a searchlight would illuminate from the horizon to the sky signalling that the 
.   
                                                 
420  Araucano was a submarine tender. Its Commanding Officer was the Commander 
in Chief of the Submarine Squadron as well and the Executive Officer acted as 
Chief of Staff.  
 
421  Statement: Lt Cdr. Danilo Bassi, 17 SEP 1931CM, v.1 (T), p.196. BUPERS. 
  
422  Report by Sub-Lieutenant Berndt, n.d. CM, v.1 (T), pp. 174-180. BUPERS.  
 
 185 
crews of the Condell, Uribe and Chacabuco should seize the Araucano. Marin finished 
duty at 24:00 and reported423
Petty Officer Robles was one of the main mutiny organizers in Talcahuano. Later 
investigations demonstrated that he organized at least one meeting in the home of Miss 
Eloísa Maldonado-Leighton in 71 Caupolicán Street, Talcahuano
 to the Duty Officer, Lieutenant Commander Danilo Bassi-
Galleguillos who decided to order the Coastal Defence Company, then at the Gunnery 
School, to come to the Arsenal. 
424 on 2 September425. She 
said that the Petty Officer asked her to permit a meeting at her home with some friends and 
that about twenty Navy men attended arriving in groups of four or five. Eloísa Maldonado 
was not present in the meeting taking place inside a room426. Robles identified later 
gunnery Rating Benito Ampuero-Ruiz and supply Rating Leandro Farías-Bueno as 
attending that meeting which hoped to coordinate the support for the mutiny427. The 
resolution adopted in this meeting was drafted into a document that was subsequently read 
on board Araucano and later destroyed. Apparently another person present at the meeting 
was Seaman Apprentice José de la Cerda Gatica from the School of Machinists. He later 
became the secretary of a committee created in this tender ship in which he embarked 
voluntarily428
‘I would like to say for the record…that from my personal investigation 
and from the administrative proceedings that some Coastal Defence 
Gunners participated in a meeting taking place in Colón Street between 
. He is the author of a book narrating the mutiny. Commander Fidel Alviña 
would state during the investigations that:  
                                                 
423  Statement: Gunner V. Marín, n.d. CM, v.7 (T), p.165. BUPERS. 
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crew members and civilians. In this meeting, the presence of communist 
elements, such as E. Sepúlveda429 and others should be noted430
 
’. 
Commander Fidel Alviña is probably referring to two typographers who made 
announcements in the Gunnery School Press with the objective that the Army soldiers 
avoid using force to clear the Naval Base of mutineers.  Their family name was Sepúlveda 
and one of them, Eliseo, who was a civilian naval worker, was regarded as communist by 
some witnesses. The man in charge of the Gunnery School Press wrote in a letter after the 
mutiny charging that the Sepúlveda brothers were ‘well known communists having a print 
shop in Balmaceda Street431
In his statement Alviña does not relate this meeting with the other taking place in 
Caupolicán Street described earlier neither to another reported by one of his officers
’. 
432
Another mentionable encounter oriented to organizing the mutiny is the statement of 
Rating Eusebio Morales who belonged to the Arsenal. He said that on 29 August at 17:30. 
‘I met with five other…’ [people] ...‘in Pedro Letelier´s home to prepare the assault
 
although he stated that he made a personal investigation about the behaviour of the 
personnel under his command.  
433
The subject of these preparatory meetings of the mutiny was not well researched by 
the prosecutor of the Court Martial. Most probably, the purpose of these encounters was 
organizing the beginning and the implementation of the mutiny, and this explains the 
’. 
                                                 
429  Commander Fidel Alviña is probably referring to two typographers who made 
announcements in the Gunnery School Press with the objective that the Army 
soldiers avoid using force to clear the Naval Base of mutineers.   
430  Report by Cdr. Fidel Alviña, 22 APR 1932. CM, v.19 (T), p.192. BUPERS. 
 
431  Letter from Benítez to Cdr Gastón Nef Videau, 9 Septembre 1931. CM, v.4 (T), 
pp.8-10. BUPERS. 
 
432  A coastal artillery officer, Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Córdova-Lizardi, 
also testified in court that one of his men reported after the mutiny that during 
August a gunner rating who was drunk in a Concepción’s bar had asked if the 
coastal artillery would shoot on the ships in case of rebellion. The man reporting 
this and Córdova himself assigned no importance to this information due to the 
gunner’s drunkenness [Statement: Lt Cdr Guillermo Córdova, CM v.14 (T); 456G, 
file 7, p.259]. This statement has only a relative significance because this officer is 
not a direct witness. 
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decision to light up a search light as a signal.  The investigation shortcoming shows that it 
was oriented to a quick end and punishment of the naval mutineers but not the civilian 
instigators. The evidence gathered during the sessions of the Court Martial is the only 
available material about this subject and is presented for the first time in this thesis. 
 
8.2. The mutiny erupts in Talcahuano. 
 
 The Araucano’s Commanding Officer, Captain Luis Muñoz-Valdés, who was also 
the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Squadron, returned to his ship from the 2 
September meeting of all Commanding Officers with Rear Admiral Chappuzeau.  He was 
met by Commander Consiglio and all officers who were preparing the ship to sail. They 
were armed with their pistols. Until then the crew complied with orders and had been 
awakened to prepare the ship to weigh anchor. It was 3 September 00:30 a few hours after 
Petty Officer Robles had the meeting to coordinate the mutiny in Miss Maldonado’s home. 
Fifteen minutes later, a Midshipman on board the destroyer Condell warned 
Commander Ramm that the crew was arming themselves. Due to this fact the officers 
appeared on the deck carrying their hand guns. Three Midshipmen tried to use their pistols 
but Commander Ramm stopped them because: ‘he considered that this was a useless action 
against the large number of mutineers, about one hundred men434’. The Commanding 
Officer tried dissuading the mutineers but they went ashore, going towards Araucano. 
Before that a Lieutenant and two Midshipmen tried to go to the bow sector intending to 
persuade the rebels but they were stopped by a sentry who dissuaded them with a shot. The 
Commanding Officer would state later that they had followed the order of extracting the 
rifle mechanisms and collecting the ammunition which they stored in a magazine room 
because the hand weapons room was being painted435
                                                 
434  Statement: Cdr. Víctor Ramm, 12 SEP 1931. CM, v.1 (T), pp.73-74. BUPERS. 
. This temporary storage facility, 
however, was accessible through the crew’s living spaces and the padlock securing the 
access to it was broken, indicating that the Commanding Officer was careless in complying 
with the Base Commander instructions. In must be mentioned that in other ships and shore 
 
435  Report of Prosecutor Julio Allard Pinto. CM, v.3 (456I), p.73. BUPERS.  
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establishments, the officers stored the weapons in a safe or in the Commanding Officer’s 
cabin. 
A few moments later the Duty Officer in the School of Machinists, Lieutenant 
Tomás Marsh-Órdenes was awakened by a rating reporting to him that the students had 
risen from their berths without being ordered. When he left his bedroom unarmed he was 
imprisoned by four armed men. Something similar happened with another officer who was 
sleeping in this shore establishment436
The mutinous personnel belonging to Condell arrived on the Araucano’s deck 
demanding the ship’s surrender. On the deck, the submarine tender's Commanding Officer, 
Captain Muñoz Valdés, was in company with some officers. He faced the mutineers and, 
after convincing them not to act, he took away their arms and sent them ashore. The leader 
of this group was Gunnery Rating Salvador Martínez-Guerra
. 
437
Once ashore, the personnel who tried to seize Araucano were returning to the 
Condell but when passing by School of Machinists, an anonymous individual persuaded 
them to rejoin the rebellion, handing them weapons and ammunition. This group, together 
with those from that school numbered around two hundred men. They started shooting at 
Araucano in hopes of preventing it from sailing. The Commanding Officer of the 
Submarine Tender directed to return the fire with two Lewis machine guns which he had 
ordered removed from the submarines. These weapons did not work because they had been 
sabotaged
. One of Condell’s 
Midshipmen, upon passing by Araucano observed personnel from his ship on the after deck 
of the Submarine Tender Ship and he also went on board to take the weapons from them. 
He observed that they carried ammunition in their cartridge belts and also in bags showing 
that they were ready for action. 
438
Captain Muñoz-Valdés went to the stern living quarters where the ship’s company 
stood to warn them to remain loyal. He asked if the ship’s company would support him and 
. Then the ship officers started answering the fire with their pistols. Meanwhile 
Araucano’s crew tried to reach the deck using the gangway but were contained by an 
officer. 
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nobody answered. Then Petty Officer Orlando Robles stepped forward and pressed the 
ship’s company for a negative answer to the question asked by the Commanding Officer. 
Soon after, this Petty Officer would become the leader of the ship sailing off from 
Talcahuano. At this moment, Muñoz-Valdés was told that Admiral Chappuzeau had arrived 
on the ship. The shooting had ceased for a while and many rebel personnel went on board 
following the Admiral. The Coastal Artillery Company commanded by Sub-lieutenant 
Berndt had gathered next to Araucano´s berth and the School of Machinists and was 
already deployed. This officer saw and heard what Rear Admiral Chappuzeau was saying to 
the men on the after deck of Araucano. He decided to send his second in command to tell 
him that he was awaiting orders and remained in that attitude for ten minutes. The officer 
sent by Berndt arrived to the shore side of the tender ship gangway where he found Captain 
Calderón, the Base Chief of Staff. He reported to him Berndt’s message and was ordered to 
tell the Coastal Artillery Company to abandon the dock since the brawl had ended and the 
Admiral was talking on board with the mutineers. 
The men who were on the deck, responded to the Admiral's speech with insolence 
and jeers. One of the mutineers said something more rational:  
‘The officers made the revolution before without asking the crews about 
their ideals; now we, the crews, are the ones that are doing this for 
ourselves and we have to follow our mates in the squadrons starting 04:00’.  
 
Another said: ‘the officers in no way took care of us, they do not know the 
suffering of the crews and they care less about our complaints…439
 
’.  
One of the most active in this verbal interchange was Supply Rating Rogelio 
Valdivia-Ochoa of the submarine Thomson, a man distinguished by several witnesses as 
having extremist ideas440
                                                 
439  Statement: Radm. Roberto Chappuzeau, 10 SEP 1931. CM, v.1 (T), pp. 19-31. 
BUPERS. 
. Other speakers blamed the officers’ indifference and lack of 
concern about the enlisted men’s situation. The mutineers said that they were only 
interested in having the Araucano sail to Coquimbo in order to join the rebel squadrons. 
One of them said that the officers should accompany the crews. The Admiral decided that 
this would be shameful, responding that if the officers gave the crew the right to go to 
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northern Chile the officers should be given the right to remain in Talcahuano441. Probably 
he was afraid that the officers would be taken as prisoners as happened in Coquimbo. The 
above conversation is confirmed in a general report by the British Embassy in Santiago442 
and in a US intelligence report443. The School of Gunnery Executive Officer, Lieutenant 
Commander Raimundo Fajardo Rodríguez, who was present all the time, would state444
Rear Admiral Chappuzeau retired from the scene considering that subversives had 
taken over the situation. He left Araucano to talk to the Commanding Officers and to report 
to the Ministry of the Navy
 
later that the general tone of the Admiral’s words while he was on board Araucano:‘ was 
inconvenient’...and the mutineers showed themselves....‘exited and insolent’. 
445 from his office ashore446
‘I have the absolute conviction that if the Admiral had ordered an attack on 
the rebels, we would have been successful, because I had them surrounded, 
they were in disorder, gathered without any leadership; my troop was 
awaiting only the order to act decisively
. After coming ashore he ordered the 
Commanding Officer of the Coastal Artillery Company to take away his troop back to the 
barracks. Sub-lieutenant Berndt would state later to the Administrative Inquiry prosecutor:  
447
 
’.   
The officers started abandoning all ships, sometime pressed by the mutineers and in 
some other cases following their superiors. An amazing case is the following. In that 
morning on 3 September, in destroyer Riveros, staying inside a dry dock, there was no 
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abnormal situation, no matter that it was known that a rebellion had started in other ships. 
Riveros’s Commanding Officer, Commander Guillermo Troncoso Palacios, who was at the 
same time the Director of the School of Seaman Apprentices, located in Quiriquina 
Island448 went to the office of the Commander in Chief. There, Rear Admiral Chappuzeau 
instructed him to avoid using violence and to keep his position while he retained the crew’s 
loyalty. When he returned to his ship, he decided with his officers that the situation could 
be interpreted as that they were supporting the mutineers, while there were symptoms that 
the destroyer would be attacked by mutineers from other ships. He called the crew to fall in 
to explain the above, saying that he would exit with his officers. The crew gave him the 
name of a petty officer to take care of the ship449
The case of one of the Shore Establishments is illustrative as well. In the Arsenal 
Fourth Section its head, Commander Antonio Alviña-Vergara, observed that the personnel 
started abandoning their workplaces and embarking in different ships. He reported this to 
his superior who instructed him, that in accord with the Admiral's instructions, to let them 
do what they wanted because they had no means to make the crews obedient
. The destroyer was taken out from the 
dock by the mutineers and a few days later would take action against Army troops. 
450
In the Coastal Artillery barracks the situation was no better. When Fort Borgoño´s 
Lieutenant Solón Aranda-Blummer addressed his troop about the situation he received a 
hostile reaction. His Commanding Officer, Commander Fidel Alviña-Vergara stated
. 
451 later 
that Aranda had not followed his orders when he addressed his troop. The Lieutenant would 
state452
                                                 
448  This island is inside Concepción Bay where the Talcahuano Naval Base is also 
located. The School of Seaman Apprentices is about five nautical miles away from 
the Naval Base. 
 later that he decided to talk to his battery troop and in fact nobody expressed 
support for the officers when he requested their support. In that moment he abandoned the 
barracks in civilian clothes feeling dishonoured. He then returned to Fort Borgoño but he 
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left it again after seeing that Commander Alviña turned his command over to a petty 
officer. Alviña had the opinion that he would be able to control this petty officer and 
another who was called by him from another fort under his command. At the end this was 
not true since this last petty officer acted as a leader although somewhat deviously. 
An illustrative case is what happened in the School of Seaman Apprentices, one of 
the educational establishments attached to the Talcahuano Naval Base. The Executive 
Officer was Lieutenant Commander René Berisso-Monsalve who decided to check the 
opinion of the crew [excluding the students] because these people showed themselves very 
nervous due to the events and because of the fact that Commander Troncoso was on board 
Riveros where he had the position of Commanding Office as a collateral duty. The warrant 
and petty officers told him that they agreed with the mutiny. Berisso asked that they name a 
commission to whom to turn over the command of the school and recommended them to 
avoid involving the students. There were the Seaman Apprentices and the Cadets on board 
frigate Lautaro, a pontoon anchored close to the school where Merchant Marine officers 
were educated by the Navy. At that moment Commander Troncoso arrived and Berisso 
reported to him. The Director or Commanding Officer decided then that the officers should 
go to their homes on the island. Later he ordered them to abandon the island taking their 
families with them. This was achieved at 21:30 on 3 September 1931453
In summary, all ships in Talcahuano as well as the shore establishments were in the 
hands of the rebels on 3 September and in this way the mutiny was carried out in this base. 
.  
 On that same day, the initial committee taking charge of the Base was organized 
with the following members: A radio operator petty officer from the Radio Station, a 
machinist warrant officer from the destroyer Williams, a boiler fitter worker from the 
Arsenal, a torpedo machinist petty officer from the Weapons Depot, a torpedo machinist 
petty officer from the Submarine Depot, a worker from the Arsenal, a machinist petty 
officer from the Arsenal and a schoolmaster from School of Torpedoes. This shows that the 
rebels wanted a board representing most of the ranks, ships and shore establishments. 
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9. VALPARAÍSO AND THE END OF THE REBELLION. 
 
9.1. The mutiny in Valparaíso. 
 
Valparaíso lived though shocking days when President Ibáñez fell. This port was 
more important politically, demographically, and in commercial and industrial development 
than Talcahuano. It was also the seat of some shore establishments and Navy schools 
scattered through the city and the neighbouring Viña del Mar454
The Valparaíso Naval Base was under the command of Rear Admiral Francisco 
Nieto Gallegos, who was advised by a complete staff, which was not true of Talcahuano. 
 [see Appendix D. Ships 
and shore establishments in Valparaíso]. 
The Rancagua, an oiler belonging to this base, had left Coquimbo sailing for 
Valparaíso on 31 August. While at sea a delegation of crew members asked for a meeting 
with the Executive Officer who agreed. In that meeting the sailors requested respectfully 
that their August salaries should be paid without the 30% discount. This petition was 
submitted in writing to the Base Commander in Chief upon the Rancagua's arrival to 
Valparaíso on Tuesday 1 September. On the afternoon of the same day, Admiral Nieto 
received the information about the mutiny from the Ministry of the Navy at almost the 
same time as the Admiral in Talcahuano. He ordered immediately that officers and men 
stay in the barracks or on board accordingly to the Base's defence plans455
In the ‘Escuela Naval’ [Naval Academy] once the news about the mutiny in the 
squadrons and the order to stay in the barracks arrived, it was ordered to remove the 
mechanisms of the weapons and to place the ammunition in a safe place, leaving ready only 
enough arms for the officers and the cadets who were students in the advanced class. As the 
situation worsened, weapons were readied to equip two infantry companies made up of 
. 
                                                 
454  Viña del Mar is twenty kilometres away from Valparaíso in the same bay and from 
those years is considered as almost a neighbourhood of it. Quintero, where the Air 
Force Base is located, is forty kilometres north from Viña del Mar and sixty from 
Valparaíso. 
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cadets. They stayed ready to act at all times456
Until 2 September, nothing indicated that a behaviour against discipline would 
happen in ships or shore establishments of the Navy or in the barracks and bases of the 
Army and Air Force in the area of Valparaíso, regardless of the fact that the news about the 
mutiny was already known and several unions were on strike. But this initial calm changed 
dramatically on the next day. 
.  The next day the ship and shore 
establishment Commanding Officers reported to headquarters that the crews remained loyal 
and condemned the attitude of the Coquimbo mutineers. 
At noon on 3 September, Admiral Nieto ordered the filling of Rancagua’s oil tanks 
with water in order to render useless the three hundred tons of fuel the ship carried on board 
as well as to prevent the ship leaving the harbour. The Admiral acted this way because 
Rancagua’s Commanding Officer, Commander Miguel Bahamondez-Torrejón, had told the 
Flag Officer that he doubted the loyalty of the crew as well as the ability of the ship going 
to sea in that condition of discipline. The Admiral also ordered the removal of the 
Galvarino's457 main steam valve458. The Rancagua’s Commanding Officer ordered his men 
to disconnect the radio antennas and to take the hand weapons of his ship to the officers’ 
living spaces459
On 3 September the first symptoms of insubordination were perceived in the 
‘Escuela de Telecomunicaciones’ [School of Telecommunications] when the enlisted 
personnel, without the authorisation of the Commanding Officer, Commander Emilio 
Merino-Lemus, sent a radio message of support to Latorre 
. 
460
                                                 
456  Statement: Cdr Guillermo del Campo, n.d., CM, v.7(V) (456A), pp.291-298. 
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maintain discipline, gathering the warrant and petty officers as well as the seaman 
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apprentices [students] exhorting them to fulfil their duties and remain loyal. By that 
afternoon the crew showed itself openly rebellious461
Nearby the School of Telecommunications were Las Salinas Radio Station and a 
Telecommunications Equipment Depot. Both shore establishments joined the mutiny, in 
particular the Radio Station which was manned by school personnel. As a precaution, the 
Naval Base Command ordered two lieutenants, who were students at the School of 
Telecommunications, to take control of the Playa Ancha Radio Station
. 
462 because it had no 
officers and its Commanding Officer was a member of the staff of the base. The 
Commanding Officer spent most of the time at the headquarters and not performing this 
collateral duty. The two junior officers managed to impose discipline on that shore 
establishment except when a message of moral support was transmitted to Latorre463
When the School of Telecommunications joined the mutiny at 14:00 on 3 
September Admiral Nieto immediately informed Santiago, as well as requesting that it send 
an Army Regiment from the capital's garrison to occupy the school since he did not trust 
the loyalty of the Valparaiso troops. After some consideration and debate the Government 
decided to avoid the use of force in order not to interfere with the conciliatory commission 
being held at that time by Rear Admiral von Schroeders in Coquimbo. This order was 
communicated to the Commanding Officer of that school and he was recommended to 
maintain the situation in a pacific way, acting tactfully
. The 
rebels managed to send the message by claiming that the Base Chief of Staff and the Radio 
Station Commanding Officer had authorized this act. 
464
The mutiny in that establishment of naval education started when the Commanding 
Officer of a Students’ Company, who was a Lieutenant belonging to the Chilean Air Force, 
ordered the disarming of the personnel who had just arrive from an exercise held outside 
the barracks. Instead of complying, a group of seaman apprentices went to a gathering of 
petty officers who had organized the sedition. Once this mutiny took place, the Executive 
Officer, Lieutenant Commander Armando Parker-Lara, asked permission of the 
. 
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Commanding Officer to abandon the school with the rest of the officers. Commander 
Merino decided that the officers would exit the premises on a pass with instructions to 
attend next day at the Base headquarters in Valparaíso465
When the squadrons and the School of Telecommunications mutinies became 
known, the garrison of the ‘Cuartel Nº 1 Silva Palma’ [Silva Palma Barracks Nº 1]
. He remained on the premises 
with two Air Force lieutenants who were students at the school until the establishment was 
recovered two days later. 
466 began 
acting in a frankly rebellious way on 3 and 4 September. Due to the fact that the same 
instructions given to the School of Telecommunications had been given by Admiral Nieto 
to the Commanding Officer of the Barracks, Lieutenant Commander Fernando Aranda-
Osorio, the initial attitude of Aranda was tolerant, trying to contain the mutineers with 
reasons and calls to keep order. Nevertheless, discipline in this place remained deficient 
even though a loyal Coastal Artillery Company was lodged there as well. This troop 
contributed to contain a first mutiny intent but Lieutenant Commander Aranda’s orders 
were not fully complied with and some men were seen carrying guns even though Aranda 
had assured the Commanding Officer of the Coastal Artillery Company that all hand 
weapons had been put into storage and that he had the key467.  Finally Aranda maintained 
this unstable control until Carabineros troops occupied the barracks468
Rancagua’s crew joined the squadrons’ mutiny sending a message by means of 
Radio Station Las Salinas on the night on 3 September. A few hours earlier Air Force Base 
Quintero
.  
469 had also joined the mutiny470
                                                 
465  Statement: Lt Cdr Armando Parker, 10 SEP 1931, CM, v.7(V) (456A), p.65. 
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466  Silva Palma Barracks Nº 1 was an establishment located in the Playa Ancha 
neighbourhood of Valparaíso. Its mission was serving as a lodging place for in-
transit personnel. Also, there was a Naval Prison on the premises. 
 
467  Statement: Lt Cdr Fernando Aranda, 12 SEP 1931, CM, v.7(V) (456A), pp. 134-
141. BUPERS. 
 
468  Report of Prosecutor Julio Allard Pinto. CM, v.3 (V) (456I), p.32. BUPERS.  
469  This was formerly Quintero Naval Air Station a shore establishment handled over 
by the Navy to the Chilean Air Force when this service was created on 21 March 
1930. 
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gained full control on the morning of the next day471. Admiral Nieto requested again a 
Santiago regiment to seize the Air Force Base urging that this measure must be adopted at 
once since the situation was worsening472. Meanwhile, the Commanding Officer of the 
Valparaiso Arsenal, Captain Juan Gerken Mahn, thwarted the School of 
Telecommunications mutineers in their efforts to send by hand a message to the oil tanker 
Rancagua. This ship was moored close to the Arsenal and the message ordered this ship to 
weigh anchor and sail to Coquimbo at the request of the mutinous crews there. To achieve 
this, Gerken took the weapons away from two enlisted men who arrived at his shore 
establishment and took them as prisoners to the Base headquarters473
The Coquimbo mutineers had sent the destroyer Aldea to sail to Valparaíso to meet 
the ships coming from Talcahuano. At a request from the mutineers of Air Base Quintero, 
this ship was ordered to make noticeable its presence near the base without engaging in any 
action to avoid spoiling the advancement of the talks with Admiral von Schroeders
. 
474. The 
mutineers of the School of Telecommunications also475 sent a message476
Oil tanker Rancagua’s crew manifested their hostility by disobeying orders. When 
the Commander in Chief of the Valparaiso Naval Base learned of this, he requested troops 
to seize the ship but the Government refused to authorize the use of force. On 4 September 
 but the rebels in 
Coquimbo decided against sending a ship in order to: ‘avoid dispersing our force’.  
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the Rancagua's commanding officer assembled his crew and authorized it to go ashore on 
leave.  The sailors, however, refused477
The officers belonging to School of Telecommunications who left that educational 
establishment the day before met their Commanding Officer in Valparaiso’s Naval Club 
and agreed to resign their commissions. They asked then for permission to do so to the 
Commander in Chief of the Naval Base. The Admiral requested them not to take this step 
because it would place an additional burden on the Government, adding that they must wait 
until the situation calmed down. The officers then requested the creation of an infantry 
company composed of themselves and other naval officers but the Admiral answered that 
they must place themselves under the orders of the Naval Base Chief of Staff because there 
was considerable work to do in the headquarters
. 
478
In the afternoon of 4 September, Radio Station Playa Ancha received a message 
signed by several Sergeants belonging to ‘Regimiento Maipo’ [Maipo Regiment] stating 
that they joined the mutiny. The Commander in Chief of the Valparaíso Naval Base ordered 
that the message must not be transmitted and that instead it should be turned over to the 
Commanding Officer of that Regiment showing good judgement in this action. With the 
evidence that military personnel were supporting the mutiny, the Army decided to occupy 
the barracks using the troops of the ‘Escuela de Infantería’ [Infantry School] brought from 
the town of San Bernardo, forty kilometres south from Santiago. It also decided to move 
the troops of Maipo Regiment out of Playa Ancha, Valparaíso, to another garrison.  This 
transfer, which required the use of buses and trucks, took place on 6 September. During this 
last event, shooting between the cadets of the nearby Naval Academy and the guards on 
board the trucks and buses took place, probably due to lack of coordination. Fortunately 
nobody was hurt
. 
479
As explained [in section 7.4] a new cabinet assumed in Santiago and initiated 
negotiations with the mutineers in Coquimbo through Admiral von Schroeders on 3 
. 
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September. At the same time, General Carlos Vergara-Montero was named as Minister of 
War and empowered as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He took some measures 
to be explained in following sections to face the possibility that the dealings in Coquimbo 
failed. This outcome became more evident the afternoon of 4 September so the proof that 
the mutiny might be extended into the Army, offered by the Sergeants’ message, was 
another factor to adopt the decision of using force. 
By midnight September 4, when the mutiny was still unfolding in Talcahuano’s 
ships and shore establishments, it became known that the negotiations in Coquimbo had 
failed. The breakdown and the possible extension of the rebellion to the rest of the Armed 
Forces moved moved the Government to embrace the possibility of using force. This 
decision would cause the mutineers’ defeat, after a few days. 
 
9.2. The final events in Valparaíso, Talcahuano and Coquimbo. 
 
As noted earlier [see section 7.4], Rear Admiral von Schroeders realized that 
divisions had occurred among the mutineers and that various rebels began to indicate that 
the mutiny was not going anywhere. When the rebels at Coquimbo learned that there were 
troop movements near Talcahuano they sent a radio message480 to the Government to desist 
from these actions. This communication was sent before the conversations with the 
governmental delegate had broken down.  Von Schroeders, upon his arrival in the capital 
the next day reported the results of his mission and observed that the Government had 
already decided to use force everywhere against the mutineers481
 At 04:00 on 5 September Carabineros seized Silva Palma Barracks Nº 1 in 
Valparaíso. Four hours later a mountain infantry regiment captured the School of 
Telecommunications in Viña del Mar and forty minutes later a cavalry regiment did the 
same in Quintero Air Base. 
. 
The Commanding Officer of the oil tanker Rancagua, who had observed hostile 
attitudes in his crew on 4 September ordered his officers to carry their hand weapons and 
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called again for his crew to assemble on the deck. He asked again if the crew backed him 
only to learn that the enlisted men agreed with their comrades in the squadrons. Then the 
Commanding Officer, together with his officers, all holding their hand guns ordered the 
crew to disembark, an order which was obeyed. News of this event was reported to the 
Valparaiso Naval Base Commander in Chief and Garrison Commander482
At the same time, Admiral Nieto inspected Fort Valdivia and Fort Vergara
. 
483
Meanwhile, very important events of the rebellions happened in the Concepción and 
Talcahuano areas on 5 September. The day before, the rebels from Talcahuano 
communicated to their comrades at Coquimbo that they counted on: ‘the whole support of 
Concepción and Talcahuano civilists
 and 
talked with warrant officers and petty officers urging them to fulfil their duties and asking 
for a statement in favour of the Government and they accepted. 
484 elements’485
 The mutineers, knowing that an Army attack would take place at any time, and 
having full control of the Naval Base had designated a Gunnery Warrant Officer as Chief of 
the Land Forces. Probably he had reassuring news because he ordered by phone at 02:30 
that everybody should leave their weapons and go to sleep. This new man in charge was 
against what had been decided earlier by the committee headed by a Radio Operator 
Warrant Officer and this is an indication of the disunity within the mutineers at that time. 
This order was not obeyed in general and again, a new ‘Junta’ was created in the School of 
Gunnery and it called itself the Action Committee, being the third body in charge of the 
rebellion in Talcahuano. 
. 
Meantime, in the School of Torpedoes a split took place when the news of an Army 
attack arrived: the crew members, who did not want to leave their weapons in order to be 
                                                 
482  Report by Cdr Miguel Bahamonde, n.d., CM, v.7(V) (456A), p. 159. BUPERS. 
 
483  The Coastal Artillery, a branch of the Navy, had several forts in Valparaíso bay in 
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military regimen of general Ibáñez. They were mainly the Alessandristas. 
Paradoxically the Ibañez Government did not exist anymore. 
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ready to fight the Army, were headed by a schoolmaster and a torpedo machinist rating. 
This group insulted those who wanted to leave their arms and surrender to the military 
troops. Perhaps this also happened in other shore establishments because the order to leave 
their weapons was issued to everybody. The new Committee directing the rebellion in the 
Naval Base was headed by a machinist petty officer and delegates of School of Torpedoes. 
One of these said that this last establishment was not under arms against the Army but to 
combat the communists, which is not very credible. He was then arrested and sent to the 
cells for prisoners on board Prat. The same happened the day before when a diver petty 
officer of that school stated his opposition to the mutiny. These events clearly show the 
internal divisions within the mutineers486
In the communications sent from Talcahuano to Coquimbo on 5 September at dawn 
it is possible to recognize that the mutineers in this Naval Base knew that they would be 
attacked and for this reason they were adopting last minute defence measures without being 
very organized
.  
487. Ten minutes later the ‘Crew’s Staff’ instructed Talcahuano’s rebels: ‘you 
cannot keep negotiating while the Government does not accept the reforms as a whole and 
positively. In case of violence in the Naval Base, we would decide adopting measures for 
reciprocity488’. A few moments later the ‘Crews Staff’ attempted to calm down the 
Talcahuano’s mutineers by telling them489
A Commander who was not aware that he must go to join the Army at Concepción 
and who stayed the whole night at home in the Naval Base was awakened at 06:30 on 5 
September by the dry-dock siren. He could see then the arrival of a train: ‘full of civilians; 
among them I noticed that there were many that had nothing to do with the dock workers. 
 that they should not fear an attack due to the 
current negotiations, which was not really true since they ceased on the midnight of 4 
September after von Schroeders had told them a few hours earlier that he was returning to 
Santiago due to the failure to reach an agreement.   
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They ran in all directions and returned armed with rifles and carbines490
At 09:30 Coastal Artillery Warrant Officer Juan Zapata-Pinto, who was in charge of 
Fort Borgoño informed Commander Alviña that the Army would attack the Naval Base 
through the Tumbes Peninsula and he sought advice about the attitude that they should 
adopt. We must remember that Alviña was the Commanding Officer before the mutiny. He 
answered him that they should let those forces enter the base without resisting. Alviña 
stayed the rest of the time at home trusting that his former subordinates would return him to 
his command since they were asking for advice. Nevertheless, this did not happen and this 
Commander would be put back in his post only when the Army succeeded in taking the 
weapons away from the mutineers
’. At the same time 
about fifty men in the charge of a petty officer belonging to the School of Torpedoes who 
were really decided to fight went to the committee and they were sent to the tennis court 
located near the base entrance.  
491
At the same time, several civilian employees’ families, who lived in Navy houses, 
sought refuge in the School of Torpedoes, far away from the Naval Base entrance, while 
several officers remaining inside it for different reasons, were imprisoned and sent to one of 
the rebel ships. 
. 
Immediately after midnight on 4 September, the majority of the Naval Base's 
officers appeared at the Army’s regiments in Concepción asking to be admitted in the units 
that would assault the rebels. General Guillermo Novoa-Sepúlveda, the Commander in 
Chief of those forces integrated them, forming an infantry company under the command of 
Commander Luis Muñoz-Valdés, Araucano’s Commanding Officer. All these naval 
officers carried weapons like infantry soldiers. Another group was sent to the staff and to 
the military units to serve as advisors, guides, and soldiers. The General had concentrated 
the following forces in Concepción: the Chacabuco and O´Higgins Infantry Regiments, 
Artillery Regiment Silva Renard and Cavalry Regiments Guías and Húsares492
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was to seize first Fort El Morro to enable the Artillery Regiment, with some naval officers, 
to direct their field guns against the Naval Base. Meanwhile the infantry company 
composed of naval officers together with the Regiment Chacabuco would attack the naval 
base from the back through the hills of the Tumbes Peninsula. Also, the base would be 
assaulted through the main entrance with the rest of the military units. 
General Novoa notified493
The Government’s intention of using force, plus the announcement made by the 
Quintero Air Base that it was being attacked by Army troops at 08:40 on 5 September
 the mutineers of his intentions early on 5 September. ‘I 
have orders to seize Talcahuano. In order to avoid blood shed, the rebels are invited to 
leave their arms and to yield unconditionally within a one hour period’. He also told them 
that if they do not obey, they would have to accept the consequences.  
494, 
and Talcahuano’s report that the military forces did not accept any other attitude than that 
of unconditional surrender495 were a clear demonstration that the situation was changing 
dramatically. But these facts did no prevent the ‘Crew’s Staff’ on board Latorre from still 
believing that it was in a strong position since it unwisely insisted to the mutineers in the 
southern base that they should resist496. Next, the mutiny leaders invited the Government to 
halt the troop movements and at the same time issued a veiled threat of using force against 
La Serena497
 There were several conciliation attempts when the troops were already deployed 
and several successive postponements were granted until the Chacabuco Regiment seized 
Fort El Morro without resistance at 14:30. A gun battery belonging to Regiment Silva 
Renard and some machine guns were installed there and fifteen minutes later all these 
. 
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weapons manned by the naval officers attached to the Army started firing on land and naval 
targets.  The destroyer Riveros, the most active rebel ship, was damaged by the action of 
weapons placed in Fort El Morro. Afterwards, this ship withdrew to Quiriquina Island. 
There it embarked some fugitives. Then it went to Mocha Island, under the command of a 
torpedo operator petty officer, arriving the next day with four men dead and eighteen 
wounded498
 Meanwhile the mutineers ashore became more disorganized. At 14:10 on 5 
September, in the face of an imminent attack, Schoolmaster Pedro Pacheco-Pérez asked the 
Coquimbo mutineers if they had sent any ship in support to Talcahuano. More than one 
hour later he reported that since no one was commanding the rebels he had decided to 
assume this role, naming Petty Officer José Ravest-Ravest to direct the defensive 
actions
. 
499. According to the Naval Base Radio Station, the most violent events in 
Talcahuano took place between 16:00 and 18:00. While under control of the mutineers, it 
kept reporting to the ships at Coquimbo by means of several radio messages about the 
actions until the station was captured500
After taking Fort El Morro, the Chacabuco Regiment continued to advance towards 
Talcahuano. The Naval Officers Infantry Company climbed along the road to Tumbes 
Peninsula and supported by that Army unit, took positions at the rear of the Naval Base 
Headquarters. When it tried an attack it came under machine gun and rifle fire from the 
woods. This regiment and the naval officers were also attacked from Battery Rodríguez and 
a train mounted battery placed inside the Base
. 
501
 Despite this opposition, the company advanced toward the Base Headquarters. 
There, the Commanding Officer of this unit [and of Araucano] Commander Muñoz Valdés, 
.   
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yelled to the leaders of the Committee ordering that they should vacate the nearby School 
of Gunnery and the Gunnery Depot. The rebel personnel complied, assembling, as ordered, 
on the tennis court. Eventually the firing from the roofs of the shore establishments and 
from the Officers’ Mess stopped. Then the Araucano’s Commanding Officer ordered that 
the mutineers open the Base’s main entrance [The Lion’s Gate] 502 to allow the loyal forces 
to enter the compound and to clear that school and depot of resistance. Schoolmaster 
Pacheco, the mutineers’ leader at that moment was apprehended and he was pressed to call 
the rest of the ship and shore establishments ordering the end of any resistance and that all 
the personnel should go to the tennis court503
 The assaulting troops advanced to the interior of the Naval Base headed by naval 
officers carrying the Schoolmaster as a hostage. Because they came under fire from the 
Movie Theatre and the Bakery it was necessary to check every house for rebel activity. A 
similar procedure was followed in the Arsenal and the ships. 
.  
The Commanding Officer of the Torpedoes School reported504 about the mutineers’ 
gunnery skills. He stated that in addition to the two 120 mm guns train mounted, the 
following naval units also shot: armoured cruiser Prat, with its 120 mm cannons; protected 
cruiser Chacabuco, with one 120 mm gun and one 200 mm gun; destroyers Condell, 
Williams and Uribe with all their guns505. He also said that the shooting of all the above 
weapons was very bad since the aiming sight was used in disagreement with the projectile 
load and as a result, all the shots fell outside of the targets. In addition to the naval artillery 
the mutineers set demolition charges close to the Base Main Entrance which were 
deactivated by a lieutenant belonging to the School of Torpedoes. The report506
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that the rebel ships were hit by shots from government guns placed in the Harbourmaster 
Headquarters507
After the situation was mostly dominated by the Army troops, intermittent shooting 
continued in the hills close to School of Torpedoes and Fort Borgoño until the Cavalry 
Regiment Húsares captured the rebels and their weapons. The army unit stayed in that 
educational establishment sending out patrols for several days searching for the last 
mutineers. 
. Some shots from these guns aimed against the rebel’s train mounted 
battery fell on the roof of the Naval Hospital.   
During the operations at Talcahuano, the Government’s forces had the support of 
aircraft belonging to the Temuco Air Base. These Air Force elements patrolled the area 
particularly after the recovery of the Naval Base, due to the flight of several ships under 
rebel control.  Recovering these units was a slow process but finally all returned to 
Talcahuano under the control of Government forces.  
The casualties were not high: six dead and two wounded among the Army troops 
and seventeen dead and thirty wounded in the Navy according to a report508
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 of General 
Novoa [these numbers include the dead and wounded on board Riveros]. It is possible that 
these figures changed in the following days because some of the wounded died. Novoa also 
noted that the loyalist forces had captured 1,010 rebels on 5 September and 620 in the 
following two days. To these numbers should be added those who were imprisoned at the 
arrival of Araucano, Blanco Encalada and submarines at Valparaíso from Coquimbo 
making a total of 3,200 prisoners. This figure gives an idea of the magnitude of the 
insurrection in the Talcahuano Naval Base and its ships. Those one thousand men captured 
on 5 September were undoubtedly the most active mutineers remaining ashore, since they 
fired artillery and small arms against the Government forces for several hours. The rest of 
Talcahuano’s personnel went on board the ships and sailed to Coquimbo. The magnitude of 
the rebellion becomes clear when you realize that 8,600 enlisted personnel [including men 
in uniform and those in civilian clothing] served in the Navy at that time.  
507  Located closer to the Naval Base than Fuerte El Morro. 
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The ‘Crews Staff’ reaction on board Latorre is in a radio message addressed to the 
Government after becoming aware of the Talcahuano attack: ‘where many victims 
occurred’. With little political realism the message’s author adds:  
‘we give you a time until today at 24:00 to cease all  hostilities as well as 
the aircraft movements and to cancel the order prohibiting the delivery of 
provisions…in case of not agreeing, we will act the same way with the 
officers we have under our control509
 
’. 
A few hours later the Government answered with this message signed by Vice-
president Trucco510
‘Having exhausted all conciliatory methods and started use of force 
operations, the Government demands now unconditional surrender. The 
crews must disembark unarmed at once and submit themselves to the 
orders of the Garrison’s Commanders. If this is done, the Government 
would not impose the most rigorous punishments ….on the other hand it 
will apply all the strength of Martial Law. The Government gives you one 
hour…or it will act following the indicated measures
 and all his cabinet:  
511
 
’. 
The ships sailing from Talcahuano to Coquimbo were north of Valparaiso’s latitude 
on the same day that the Government recovered that southern base (5 September). The 
Government tried to prevent their advance northwards, arguing that their home Naval Base 
was practically under the control of its forces. This was denied by the Talcahuano 
mutineers. The Executive also argued that it had recovered the Quintero Air Base, which 
was true. As a reaction, Araucano issued the following statement:  
‘To the people of Chile and our comrades of the Army, Air Force and 
Carabineros: This is the moment of sealing in a fraternal embrace the union 
of the workers of the sword and the gun with their brothers of the muscle 
and the brain, marching closely united to win progress, justice and 
liberty512
 
’. 
                                                 
509  Message from ‘Estado Mayor de las Tripulaciones’ to Vice President, 5 SEP 1931, 
21:30. CM, v.22 (T), p.62. BUPERS.  
 
510  He was the acting President as explained in a previous chapter. 
 
511  Message from Vice President to ‘Estado Mayor de las Tripulaciones’, 6 SEP 1931, 
01:00. CM, v.22 (T), p.63. BUPERS. 
 
512  Message from Araucano to all units, 5 NOV 1931, no further data. CM, 
t.22(T),p.56. BUPERS. 
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In the following message Araucano notified the Government that it would keep 
travelling to Coquimbo, it would not use force unless challenged and that it would defend 
itself if it were attacked. For the first time a communication was signed by a real person. 
This one was signed by Petty Officer Orlando Robles Osses513
The news about the events that occurred in Talcahuano and Valparaíso on 5 
September lowered the morale of the crews in Coquimbo. The lack of fuel and provisions 
also affected them, although these logistics deficiencies were attenuated by means of an act 
of piracy, seizing the steamship Flora and taking the food cargo from this vessel dedicated 
to the coastal trade with northern ports. Also they transferred fuel between the different 
units demonstrating that the mutineers could implement some complex operations. 
.  
The government's harsh use of force provoked anger among some of the crewmen 
as evidenced by the menace of shooting against La Serena and Coquimbo and acting 
against the imprisoned officers stated in radio messages addressed to the Government514
The most evident participation of Coquimbo’s communists happened once the 
negotiations between the Government’s Delegate, Admiral von Schroeders and the rebels 
ceased. The Port Master said that in the night on 5 September some mutineers in civilian 
clothes entered the home of prominent local communists in Virgilio’s Alley
. 
515. Also the 
mutineers ordered a company of sixty armed men to go ashore and a commission went to 
talk with the Port Master menacing that they would no stay responsible for the officers’ and 
La Serena’s fate516. He answered with the Government’s ultimatum and told them that all 
measures against them had been already adopted517
                                                 
513  Message from Araucano to Commander in Chief Armed Forces, 5 SEP 1931, 
12:17. CG, v.22 (T), p. 56. BUPERS. 
. 
 
514  Statement: Petty Officer Manuel Ceura, n.d., CM, v.8 (V), p. 156. BUPERS and 
message from Estado Mayor de las Tripulaciones to Vice President (and other 
national authorities), 5 SEP 1931, 21:30.CM, v.22 (T), p. 62.  BUPERS. 
 
515  Report by Chief Harbour Master to Director of Maritime Affairs, n.d., (September 
1931). CM, v.22(T), p.110. BUPERS. 
 
516  Message from Government Palace to Ministry of the Navy, 6 SEP 1931, 05:25. 
CM, v.22 (T), p.64. BUPERS. 
 
517  Message from Port Master Coquimbo to Commander of Armed Forces, 6 SEP 
1931, 07:30. CM, v.22(T) p. 66. BUPERS. 
 
 209 
One man eagerly pressing for the bombardment of La Serena was Radio Operator 
Petty Officer Alejandro Caldera-Holm, who belonged to the destroyer Lynch but who 
stayed always on board the armoured cruiser O’Higgins518. Some crew members even said 
that Caldera was a communist who tried to raise a red flag an act which a majority of 
mutineers opposed519. Those naming Caldera as a communist, even giving details about his 
acts are: Torpedo Operator Rating Pedro Salas520, Storekeeper Petty Officer Héctor 
Gaete521, Electrician Warrant Officer Manuel López Segura522, and Musician Warrant 
Officer Luis Cerda-Leighton523
‘We state in front of the country’s conscience ….that the crews, observing 
the Government’s anti patriotic intransigence and considering that the only 
remedy to the situation is changing the social regime have decided to 
support the people’s aspirations. We sail with a commission of workers 
representing the feelings of the nation’s proletariat, from the Worker’s 
Federation and the Communist Party. The civil struggle induced by the 
Government turns into a civil revolution from this moment
. Also, the Blanco Encalada mutineers headed by 
Storekeeper Petty Officer Carlos Cuevas Gallardo, wanted to do the same thing, although 
this man denied being the author of the idea. Another reaction by the mutineers to the 
Government’s ultimatum was to order the rebel fleet to sail south from Coquimbo to meet 
the units arriving from Talcahuano. They also sent the following message:  
524
 
’. 
This is the mutineers’ clearest mention of communism and its aspirations to initiate 
revolutionary changes, as in other mutinies that occurred in other countries. This sometime 
happened in a few mutinies as covered by Bell and Elleman525
                                                 
518  Statement: Rating Juan Lagos, n.d., CG, v.2 (V), p. 198. BUPERS. 
 and this was summarized in 
 
519  Statement: Rating Thomas Moore, n.d., CG, v.2 (V), p. 406. BUPERS. 
 
520  Statement: Rating Pedro Salas, n.d., CM, v.2 (V), pp.187-188. BUPERS. 
 
521  Statement: Rating Héctor Gaete, n.d., CM, v.2 (V), pp. 209-210. BUPERS.  
 
522  Statement: Warrant Officer Manuel López, n.d., CM, v.2 (V), pp. 324-328. 
BUPERS. 
 
523  Statement: Warrant Officer Luis Cerda, n.d., CM, v.2 (V), pp. 328-331. BUPERS. 
 
524  Messages from Latorre (Estado Mayor) to Government, 6 SEP 1931, CM, t.2 (V), 
pp. 36-41. BUPERS and from Estado Mayor de las Tripulaciones to the 
Governemnt, 6 SEP 1931, 07:20. CM, v.22(T), p.66.BUPERS. 
 
525  Bell&Elleman, p.266. 
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another chapter [see section 1.3].  But in the Chilean case, this went no further than a 
menace because in that period the Chilean Communist Party did not have the strength and 
organization to attempt such a process, as will be discussed later [in section 11.1]. On 6 
September the naval bases in Valparaíso and Talcahuano were under Government’s control. 
The Government’s reaction would be experienced soon by the ships in Coquimbo. 
The revolutionary message quoted above carried the names of various 
representatives from the different ships as well as that of: ‘Domingo Solar, Luis Jofré 
Barraza and Tobías Solar representing the Worker’s Federation and the Communist 
Party526’. Domingo Solar was the author of articles in the newspaper ‘La Semana 
Comunista’ [Communist Weekly] that was published by Chilean Worker’s Federation in 
Coquimbo. One of these essays, entitled the ‘Social Revolution’, appeared in the March 
1925 issue and referred to the indiscipline and other events that happened in Talcahuano 
that year and covered in another chapter of this thesis [see section 3.2]. This is an indication 
that the communist interest about naval subjects came from the period of unrest between 
1924 and 1925 and the opportunity of influencing naval affairs came with the mutiny. One 
of La Serena`s newspapers published a few days after the mutiny that: ‘On board of one of 
the surrendered ships in Valparaíso were found two Coquimbo communists named Rojas 
and Del Solar. They contributed with their lectures to the submissiveness of the crew 
members to the leaders of the revolt527
And yet, in the research done for this thesis using the courts martial and 
administrative court proceedings no evidence about these members of the Communist Party 
arriving at Valparaíso was found.  This shows lack of diligence from the prosecutors. 
’. This is one of the few hints of the communist 
activity on board.  
 As they made a sortie to sea on 6 September, the mutineers addressed the following 
menacing message to the Government: ‘if by 14:00 on this Sunday the hidden military 
forces at La Serena do not surrender unconditionally, I will destroy this city528
                                                                                                                                                     
 
’. 
526  Message from Estado Mayor de las Tripulaciones to the Governemnt, 6 SEP 1931, 
07:20. CM, v.22(T), p.66. BUPERS. 
 
527  ‘Dos Comunistas’, El Diario, La Serena, 10 September de 1931, p.2. 
 
528  Message from Commander in Chief Fleet to Minister of  Defense, 6 SEP 1931, 
11:50. CM, v.22 (T), p.70. BUPERS. 
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The most judicious crew members, who were a majority, refused to obey the orders 
to fire on two undefended cities or hurt the imprisoned officers. Nevertheless, they 
performed a few acts more symbolic than effective; when the ships went to sea at 07:00 on 
6 September they shelled the airfield where they believed the Government’s aircraft landed. 
But this base was located at Ovalle, too far for the range of the squadron’s guns. This action 
took place at 10:00 and the ships shooting were Latorre, O’Higgins and Blanco 
Encalada529
The final failure of the mutiny affecting the two squadrons in Coquimbo was due to 
the disagreements among the mutineers resulting from the threat of bombarding the 
harmless cities of Coquimbo and La Serena, the logistics problems and the communists’ 
presence
. 
530. Perhaps for this reason they sent a slightly more conciliatory message: ‘At a 
request of the ladies of Coquimbo, the bombardment of La Serena has been postponed. We 
reserve for ourselves to retaliate for the bloody Talcahuano events531
The mutineers knew that the Government would use air power against them. It had 
shown its determination when it ordered the aircraft to locate the ships sailing from 
Talcahuano to Coquimbo in a slow voyage between 3 and 5 September and when it ordered 
the attack at Talcahuano.  
’. 
Before enduring an aerial assault, the seditious personnel asked the Latorre’s 
Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Commander Luis Roberto Valle-Ferro, how they should 
oppose the aerial threat. This officer used the occasion to contact personnel he knew 
supported him noting the crew's inability to use the anti aircraft fire control system532
                                                 
529  Report by Chief Harbour Master to Director of Maritime Affairs, n.d., (September 
1931). CM, v.22 (T), p.59. BUPERS. 
 and 
hence, the inability to combat more than three aircraft at the same time. He made them 
aware that since the Government would send thirty aircraft, they would all die. He used the 
opportunity to tell them that they should rebel themselves against the ten or twelve people 
who were manipulating them. Lieutenant Commander Valle stated later that a Gunnery 
 
530  Statement: Rating Pedro Salas, n.d., CM, v.2 (V),p. 187. BUPERS. 
 
531  Message from Commander in Chief Fleet to Minister of Defence, 6 SEP 1931, 
15:00. CM, v.22(T), p.70. BUPERS. 
 
532  Installed on board in Devonport Dockyard while the battleship was being refitted 
there. 
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Chief Petty Officer stayed always loyal to him and was effective in provoking the fall of the 
mutineers’ committee after the aerial attack, instructing the gunners placed throughout the 
ship to convince the rest of the crew to rebel against that organism. The activities of this 
officer to oppose the ‘Crews Staff’ were supported by the statements made in court by this 
petty officer and four gunners533
At 17:25 on 6 September
.  
534 and following reconnaissance flights made at noon, the 
Chilean Air Force attacked the fleet in Coquimbo. A heterogeneous formation of twenty 
one aircraft flew at a relatively low altitude and followed a course that diminished the 
ships’ ability to aim their anti aircraft guns against the sunlight535
The ships’ defences utilized anti aircraft artillery manually operated. Those units not 
possessing this type of weapon used hand guns [that is the cruiser Blanco Encalada and 
auxiliary vessels]. Some submarines shot with machine guns and then dived to avoid the 
bombs. Then they emerged to shoot again. The defence was at least enthusiastic and 
damaged several aircraft, one of which had to make an emergency landing
.   
536. None of the 
bombs hit the target. The Chief Harbourmaster, who was observing the action, says that the 
destroyer Videla shot with its bow gun against an aircraft flying close the hills surrounding 
the bay and the shell fortunately did not hit the houses but fell near Tortuga Lighthouse. 
The aircraft went out of sight at 18:00537
                                                 
533  Statement: Petty Officer Manuel Soto, n.d, CG, v. 4 (V), p.454. BUPERS. 
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534  Report by Chief Harbour Master to Director of Maritime Affairs, n.d., (September 
1931). CM, v.22(T), pp.104-114. BUPERS. 
 
535  Ramón Vergara Montero, Por Rutas Extraviadas, (Santiago: Imprenta 
Universitaria, 2 nd. Edition, 1933), pp. 56-65 and Military Intelligence Division 
(M.I.D), Intelligence Summary, 9 October 1931, Latin America, p. 13520. 
NAUSA. 
 
536  Vergara, p.26. 
 
537  Report by Chief Harbour Master to Director of Maritime Affairs, n.d., (September 
1931). CM, v.22(T), pp.104-114. BUPERS and report by Guillermo Valenzuela, 
Coquimbo’s Chief Harbourmaster to Director of Maritime Affairs, Chilean Navy, 
13 APR 1932. CM, v.22 (T), p. 57-58]  
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Next day Surgeon Lieutenant Commander Eduardo Grove-Vallejos, who remained 
in Coquimbo, informed538
 The mutineers’ first reaction after the previous day combat was by: 
 the Government about the casualties inflicted by the Air Force. 
One of the crew members of submarine Quidora was dead and another was wounded. 
Three crew members of other ships were interned in the port hospital due to different 
illnesses not related to the combat. 
‘menacing bombarding La Serena and stating the adoption of an openly 
revolutionary attitude; the purpose would be causing a change in the social 
regime with the personal help of a Communist Party delegation if the 
Government does not give way to reach an agreement with us539
 
’.  
González says that the Government’s radio response was quite simple: ‘To end the 
conflict there is no other way than surrendering unconditionally540
The complete and true Government ultimatum is:  
’.    
‘The Government does not accept any other attitude than a complete 
surrender. The crewmembers shall go ashore without weapons and remain 
under the orders of La Serena´s Garrison Commanding Officer who has 
instructions. If not, the Government would keep proceeding with even 
more energy541
 
’.   
As a consequence of the aerial bombardment and the Government’s reply, the 
enthusiasm for maintaining the mutiny declined considerably. Another reason was the 
undesired growing influence of the communists542
                                                 
538  Message from Doctor Grove to Minister of the Navy, 7 SEP 1931, 16:10. CM, 
v.22(T), p.94. BUPERS. 
.  The first specific result of this 
demoralization was a meeting convened by the ‘Crews Staff’ on board Latorre to which 
Rear Admiral Campos, the Commander in Chief of the Active Squadron and several 
destroyers’ Commanding Officers were invited. The Admiral became aware that the 
mutineers’ idea was to ask him to intercede with the Government on their behalf. He only 
attended the meeting after receiving the positive written opinion of the officers of the 
 
539  González, p.60. 
 
540  González, p.60. 
 
541  Message from Minister of Defence to Latorre, 6 SEP 1931, 22:50. CM, v.22(T), 
p.76. BUPERS. 
 
542  Statement: Rating Pedro Salas, n.d., CG, v.2 (V). p. 188. BUPERS. 
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O’Higgins, his flagship.  The meeting with the mutineers was attended as well by the 
Commanding Officers of destroyers Orella, Serrano and Lynch plus the battleship’s 
Executive Officer. In this meeting, Admiral Campos agreed to mediate and sent a 
telegram543 to the government to report the situation on board at that moment. He also 
accepted the idea of travelling to Santiago with the Serrano’s Commanding Officer. He 
stated on board that his idea was to report the seriousness of the situation in hopes of 
influencing the Government to end the hostilities and arrive at an arrangement with the 
mutineers. His real purpose, though, was to recommend measures to subdue the mutineers 
and save the ships, because he feared that the government would launch a new and more 
accurate aerial attack544
While imprisoned, Commander Yánquez and the rest of Riquelme’s officers 
convinced the crew members to return to normality on Sunday 6 September at 18:00. This 
ship escaped at 20:00, in the darkness, to submit to the Government control
. At Admiral Campos’ arrival in the capital city, he found the 
Government supporting the Minister of War General Carlos Vergara in its use of force and 
his offer of mediating was not accepted. 
545. The 
authorities in Santiago learned of this from a radio message from this unit announcing its 
return to Valparaíso546
The Serrano’s Commanding Officer, Commander Pedro Gallardo-Lataste, returned 
to his ship after the Latorre meeting to learn from his Executive Officer that the ship’s 
company was ready to capitulate. Nevertheless, Gallardo decided to leave his command 
since he would go ashore to comply with the mission requested by the ‘Crews Staff’ joining 
Admiral Campos to mediate the end of the mutiny with the Government
. 
547
Also at 22:00 on Sunday 6 September, the Hyatt’s officers convinced the crew to 
abandon the mutiny and return to Valparaíso to place themselves under the Government’s 
.  
                                                 
543  Message from Admiral Campos to President, 7 SEP 1931, 02:50. CM, v.22 (T), 
p.80. BUPERS. 
 
544  Report of Prosecutor Julio Allard Pinto. CM, v.3 (456I), p.3. BUPERS. 
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control548. Two hours later the Orella’s Commanding Officer and the rest of the officers 
also convinced that crew to abandon the mutiny549. Meanwhile, Commander Samuel Ward-
Rodríguez, the Lynch’s Commanding Officer, returning from the meeting on board Latorre 
recovered the control of his ship but the crew did not release the rest of the officers until ten 
hours later550. The Aldea’s Commanding Officer did not attend the meeting on the night of 
6 September, because he had already obtained the crew’s support and was awaiting the 
opportunity to escape, which he did at 03:45 Monday 7 September551
Latorre ordered to weigh anchor on 7 September at 04:00 to face the expected new 
aerial attack. Orella used the opportunity to run away later. The same happened afterwards 
with Lynch and Hyatt.   
. 
The battleship sailed still rebellious with three destroyers plus the cruiser O´Higgins 
and the ships that had arrived from Talcahuano. At 07:00 on Monday 7 September 
Latorre’s crew liberated the Executive Officer and gave him command of the ship. 
Commander Obrecht reported552 to the Ministry of the Navy that the rebels had freed him 
after intercepting a Government’s message suspending a new aerial attack. He ordered the 
release of the communications and navigation officers so they could attend to their duties 
and at 13:00, having the situation under better control553, he called for the freeing of all the 
remaining officers who collected those weapons still in the crew’s hands. Also, a guard was 
stationed in front of the ship's magazines. Obrecht subsequently ordered the flooding of the 
ammunition because he was informed that some rebels intended to blow up the ship554
                                                 
548  Message from Cdr Becerra to Ministry of the Navy, 7 September 1931, 02:00. 
CM, v.22 (T), p.78. BUPERS. 
. The 
 
549  Report of Prosecutor Julio Allard Pinto. CM, v.3 (456I), p.25. BUPERS. 
  
550  Report by Cdr Samuel Ward to Minister of the Navy, n.d., CG, v.4 (V), p.122. 
BUPERS. 
 
551  Report of Prosecutor Julio Allard Pinto. CM, v.3 (456I), p.12. BUPERS. 
 
552  Message from Cdr Obrecht to Ministry of the Navy, 7 SEP 1931, 09:50. CM, v.22 
(T), p.86. BUPERS. 
 
553  Message from Cdr Obrecht to Ministry of the Navy, 7 SEP 1931, 13:57. CM, v.22 
(T), p.88. BUPERS. 
 
554  In the Court Martial proceedings there are several testimonies of this subject as in 
statements.  Some witnesses point to Leading Rating Astica, Petty Officer Caldera 
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most forceful statement about this sabotage attempt was that of Midshipman José Duarte- 
Villaroel who says555: ‘There were at least fifteen charges ready to explode. They were 
found by the torpedist petty officer. I saw them personally556
Obrecht, fearing for Hozven's safety, did not liberate him, until the ship arrived to 
Quintero on the next day because he felt that the situation on board was still uncertain
’. 
557
Lynch, sailing with its Commanding Officer at the bridge, but with a still rebellious 
crew, intercepted a message from Latorre at noon on 7 September reporting the crew’s 
surrender. The knowledge of this fact by the destroyer’s crew enabled the return of that ship 
to the control of the officers.  But the former mutineers, before turning the ship back, 
stipulated that that the officers must sign a document testifying that they were well treated 
and that the crew acted under Latorre’s pressure. This they hoped would mitigate any 
future punishments. The Commanding Officer, aware of the delicate situation and knowing 
that statements had no legal value, accepted their demands. His agreement calmed the crew 
and enabled the recovery of this ship. Then he set course to Valparaíso, while ordering that 
the crew surrender their weapons.  He would reach that port on 8 September at 08:00
.  
558
At the same date, Latorre called at Quintero where its Commanding Officer, 
Captain Hozven, was finally liberated. The rebellion in this capital ship definitively ended 
after thirty hours of this hazardous trip. The suicide of Schoolmaster Juan Bautista Riveros 
Araya, who played a prominent role in the mutiny, became known on arrival.  
. 
On board the cruiser O’Higgins the Commanding Officer and the rest of the officers 
assumed control of the ship after departing the port at dawn on 7 September. This ship went 
back and anchored in Coquimbo again due to lack of fuel to sail to Valparaíso. Blanco, one 
of Talcahuano’s ships arriving two days before at Coquimbo, weighed anchor very early on 
                                                                                                                                                     
Holm, Petty Officer Lautaro Silva, Leading Rating Bastías and Schoolmaster 
Riveros as authors of this idea. See: CM, v.1 (V), p, 9, 92, 93 and 95. 
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7 September communicating559 its surrender at 15:00 and asking instructions to return to 
Valparaíso or its home port. Araucano did the same at 21:30, reporting560
Blanco, Araucano and the submarines finally arrived on 8 September at Valparaíso 
and adjacent ports under the command of mutineers since the officers were left in 
Talcahuano. Finally, these units returned in the following days to their home base and 
under Government control.  
 as well its 
concern about the submarines Thomson and Simpson which dived when located by aircraft. 
These two submarines finally surfaced and surrendered. 
Meanwhile in Talcahuano and since 5 September, the first task was isolating the 
mutineers and restoring the base’s most essential functions. The most prominent rebels 
were imprisoned in regional public jails and submitted to war time military courts. 
The security inside the base in Talcahuano was kept by the same military units that 
participated in the assault. Later the Army was replaced gradually by Carabineros. After a 
few months the security of the premises returned to the Coastal Artillery. This last force 
had concentrated itself in a few forts not participating in the mutiny with the purpose of 
keeping some guns in a high level of readiness. The rest of the forts were closed 
temporarily.  
As a consequence of the mutiny, a new Commander in Chief of the Naval Base and 
Commanding Officers for ships and shore establishments were named. They were chosen 
from among naval officers who were serving in places where there was no rebellion. At the 
same time, the trials in Courts Martial and administrative investigations were started.  
The Talcahuano base returned to normality twelve months after the mutiny in the 
sense that the investigations ended, the penalties were notified and the administrative 
separation of involved personnel [including corresponding appeals] was finished. 
In Valparaíso the mutiny affected only one Shore Establishment [Escuela de 
Telecomunicaciones] and one ship [Rancagua] so it returned to normality sooner than 
Talcahuano. 
                                                 
559  Commanding Officer Blanco to Ministry of the Navy, 7 SEP 1931, 15:30. CM, 
v.22 (T), p.90. BUPERS. 
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Nevertheless, the city was shaken because it was the home port of the squadrons 
where the mutiny started, the area where the surrendered ships arrived and the region where 
the most important trials took place.   
First of all, troops loyal to the Government not only occupied Shore Establishments 
but also the Maipo Regiment’s barracks and Quintero Air Base because both had sided with 
the rebels. The military forces also took control of ships as they called at ports except the 
cruiser O’Higgins remaining in Coquimbo where it was occupied by La Serena’s regiment 
without any resistance. 
The presence of military forces on board was adopted for several reasons. First to 
assure that the rebels were effectively disarmed and taken to prison until their trials. Then it 
was necessary to enable the new Commanding Officers to take up their positions while the 
old ones were sent ashore to be tried. And lastly, security had to be maintained while the 
ships were operated in port by a reduced naval crew.  
After a brief period the naval authorities decided on a reduction in the active forces, 
concentrating in a small number of destroyers and submarines the crews not contaminated 
with the mutiny. The rest of the units were sent with a minimum crew to Talcahuano.  
The investigations conducted by the prosecutors made it possible to convene a 
Martial Court in La Serena to try the crew members of O’Higgins, in San Felipe for the 
men of the Latorre and in Valparaíso for the rest of the ships and Shore Establishments of 
this base.  
Another separate Court Martial was convened in Valparaíso for Quintero Air 
Station mutineers and in San Bernardo for the Maipo Regiment’s troops. Talcahuano ships’ 
and Shore Establishment personnel were tried in that base. Due to public opinion pressures 
the officers underwent trial by a Court Martial convened in the School of 
Telecommunications in Viña del Mar [Las Salinas] and in Talcahuano. 
After hearing the prosecution’s charges and the statements of the witnesses, 
defendants and the defence attorneys, the Court Martial condemned in the first instance one 
hundred and twenty six enlisted men and this is 1.6% of a total of 8,326 men belonging to 
the Navy at that time561
                                                 
561  Memoria del Ministerio de Marina 1930 (Ministry of the Navy Annual Report). 
Imprenta de la Armada. 1931. p. 1138. 
. The trials took no longer than a week and this rush explains the 
omissions and defects evident on reading the proceedings.  
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The harsh penalties applied by these wartime naval courts, including death penalties 
for some, and long periods of imprisonment for the rest and the unstable institutional and 
political situation in Chile at that moment determined that the interim Government started 
delaying the executions programmed for 18 September 1931562
‘These crewmembers ruining the impeccable naval tradition with an 
unforgivable disgrace were pardoned by Vice President Trucco 
Government’s; that of President Montero released them from jail; the 
socialist regime of Mr Carlos Dávila let them use La Moneda’s balcony to 
make speeches to the people; Mr Oyanedel’s gave a retirement pension to 
those who had been dismissed from the service and the Constitutional 
government starting in December 1932 ruled this also for those penally  
convicted, even given an important governmental post to the mutineers’ 
leader Schoolmaster González
. The delay evolved in a 
very peculiar way. Admiral von Schroeders would write in 1932: 
563
 
’. 
The initial investigations within the administrative and legal processes showed that 
the participation of crewmembers in the mutiny was massive both in ships and in Shore 
Establishments. On top of this, a strong impression was made by these events on the society 
of that period and in particular on the Government. There was a perception that not all the 
participants in the mutiny would be punished due to the formalities of the processes and the 
short period allowed to complete them. As a reaction, the Executive Branch dictated the 
Ministry Order Number 64 on 22 September 1931564
                                                 
562  18 September is the Independence Day in Chile and a Cabinet member argued 
than nobody should be executed in such occasion. 
 using temporarily power given to 
General Vergara as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Commanding Officers 
empowered by this order created Administrative Commissions in every unit in the three 
services. The task to be achieved by these commissions was to classify all the enlisted 
personnel in four categories. In the first one would be placed all personnel to be expelled 
either because they were condemned by Courts Martial or due to a decision of these 
 
563  Von Schroeders, p. 26. Here this author is mentioning the successive governments 
ruling Chile from the mutiny until the end of 1932. He made a mistake in writing 
that González was a Schoolmaster and unfortunately this error was propagated in 
other writings. He was a Writer Warrant Officer Class 2. 
 
 
564  Ministry Order Nr. 64, 22 September 1931.Boletín Oficial de la Armada N° 2, 24 
September 1931, pp. 12-14. 
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Administrative Commissions. The second group would include personnel who would be 
temporarily discharged for two years. The third list consists of personnel being discharged 
with a retirement pension and the fourth by those not being charged administratively. These 
commissions were integrated by the Executive Officer and a couple of other officers of 
each ship or shore establishment. They made quick investigations hearing witnesses and 
defendants to get those lists ready and have them endorsed by the Commanding Officer 
before sending them to the Bureau of Personnel with the rest of the files to apply the 
administrative punishments. There were appeals to that Bureau but very few were accepted 
so the overall following numbers could be taken as final.  
 
EXPELLED 
WITHOUT 
RETIREMENT  
PAYMENT 
EXPELLED 
TEMPORARILY 
FOR TWO 
YEARS 
RETIRED  
WITH  
PENSION 
NOT AFFECTED 
BY 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
CHARGES 
TOTAL  
1,202 592 175 173 2,142 
 
The Navy at that time had 8,326 non-commissioned personnel. Then the nearly two 
thousand men affected by penalties imposed by courts and administrative commissions 
(those in the first three rows of the above table) are equivalent to 23 % of the all the 
enlisted personnel in service in 1931. 
As a result of the above procedures and the final decision made by the Bureau of 
Personnel, a considerable number of naval personnel left the service. This created a social 
problem since there was a considerable unemployment and misery at that time as a 
consequence of the world crisis. In subsequent months new appeals and bitter complains 
against the Navy occurred. 
The press representing various political trends began publishing the Court Martial 
proceedings which were open to the public. Also, they published statements of the 
prosecuted who were interviewed between the sessions or in the jails. This started turning 
the public opinion against the Navy hierarchy and particularly the officers. The prosecuted 
convinced the public that the officers agreed with the initial demand for eliminating the 
salary reduction. Several political parties in the political instability of 1931-1932 pressed 
for the government to study the offices’ behaviour, leading to the convening of a Court 
Martial.  The prosecutor charged twenty six officers in this court sitting in Las Salinas, 
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Viña del Mar, to judge those belonging to both squadrons and the Valparaiso Naval Base. 
Two of them were condemned and many others were punished with various administrative 
sanctions including expulsion and retirement. 
In Talcahuano, almost all the three hundred officers belonging to the Naval Base or 
the Submarine Command appeared before a Court Martial or an Administrative Court, or 
both. The prosecutors charged four with committing crimes penalized by the Military 
Justice Code and in the case of another thirty, requested an administrative sanction. This 
affected in practice all officers who were Commanding Officers on ships and shore 
establishments during the mutiny. In addition, other officers were punished for breaking 
discipline. 
As a summary, the Navy had at that time six hundred thirty seven officers. Only six 
[1%] were condemned in first instance to short prison terms and about two hundred [30%] 
receive administrative punishments such as expulsion, early retirement, remaining without 
post for several months and other minor sanctions. All ship and shore establishment 
Commanding Officers lost their commands. The same happened with the Commanders in 
Chief of both squadrons and of the Talcahuano Naval Base, all of whom retired a few 
months after the mutiny. 
The penalties applied to enlisted personnel were for crimes punished by the Military 
Justice Code565 to those promoting, organizing and committing mutinies. The penalties 
applied were harsh due to the State of Siege566  declared a couple of days after the initiation 
of mutiny567
                                                 
565  This was analyzed in another chapter [Section 1.4]. 
. Some officers were charged under article number 247 of the above code 
because it was assumed that they did not employ all means at their disposal to contain the 
crime of sedition and due to evident negligence to combat it, specially in Talcahuano. 
Those on board the ships at Coquimbo who signed some of the seditious documents, adding 
their own comments or who did not comply with their duties as Commanding Officers in 
the face of these events were also charged. 
 
566  The State of Siege permitted the trials to be handled in wartime courts and the 
applications of more severe penalties. 
 
567  ‘Estado de Sitio’, El Diario, La Serena, 5 de September 1931, p.1. 
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As a result of all the above and due to the precipitation in the processes followed in 
Court Martial [started on 10 September and ended five days later in the case of Latorre’s 
crewmembers] the successive Governments took actions to attenuate or even eliminate the 
punishment of enlisted personnel.  
Regarding officers punished in first instance, their appeals were later accepted by 
higher courts and some of them stayed in the Navy, but only briefly. The administrative 
punishments have already been described. In addition, the Navy Board ordered the 
retirement during the normal annual process of some of the officers not punished 
administratively. The officers who were involved in the events but who were not punished 
in any way were not awarded commands during 1932.  
 
9.3. Final comments. 
 
This chapter was oriented mainly to the description of the events but it is possible to 
sum up its course, outline the reasons for its failure, and anticipate some conclusions. 
The Mutiny of 1931 is without doubt the most serious and transcendental event 
related to discipline in Chilean Navy history. During one week, most of the naval ships and 
its main logistical base were under control of mutinied enlisted personnel. In ships at 
Coquimbo, the officers remained imprisoned in their cabins. In Talcahuano, they were 
allowed to go ashore and join the base’s officers. Most of them were able to go to the Army 
barracks in Concepción to collaborate in the recovery of the naval base. 
During this period, the mutineers made different demands to the Government but 
only one was accepted and that was cancelling the measures ordered at the end of August 
regarding salaries that was the event which triggered the mutiny. Other demands made in 
the mutineers’ manifestos had clear political meanings and this unleashed suspicion about 
Communist Party participation.  
It was demonstrated that there were previous contacts with communist elements and 
a delegation of this party was seen on board Latorre during the mutiny. They enscribed 
their signatures in one of the most radical manifestos issued by the mutineers and perhaps 
were the authors of the draft due to the expressions used. It seems that this participation 
was limited to local members of the party at Coquimbo because the central directory was 
surprised by the events. Nevertheless, the communist party tried to take control of the 
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situation by ordering a general strike that had a limited success.  We should note that 
British communist workers, duly identified in official documents, agitated on board Latorre 
while it was undergoing extensive transformations in Devonport’s naval dockyard. The 
crew was also the target of subversive activity of Alessandrist exiles in Europe against 
Ibañez’s government.  Despite this contact, no direct causal effect relationship has been 
found indicating that the communists or Alessandrists originated the mutiny.   
The thorough account in Section I.2.4 and in Part II, allows including some 
conclusions about the beginning and rapid ending of the mutiny. 
The sedition was initiated on board the battleship Latorre due to the following 
reasons:  
- The nearly two-year- stay of the battleship in Great Britain brought her crew into 
contact with new ways to protest that had recently appeared in the British naval 
service (the HMS Lucia case) or were being concocted in an atmosphere that was 
about to give rise to a greater mutiny (the Invergordon case occurred during the 
second week of September, 1931). 
- The unsettling influence of Alessandrist groups over Latorre’s crew that stayed in 
Great Britain with the aim that, once back to Chile, they could begin a destabilizing 
action against Ibañez’s Government.  
- The reduction of the personal allowance of the battleship’s crew while in foreign 
waters. This was in addition to the general reductions in salaries affecting all armed 
forces personnel between 1930 and 1931. 
- Contacts between enlisted personnel and some communist representatives in 
Coquimbo. 
- The particular way of exerting command by the Latorre’s Commanding Officer and 
his misguidedly reaction to press news at the end of August about a new and 
misunderstood salary reduction.  
- The above immediate causes must be added to the more distant ones depicted in 
Part I. In those chapters, it was concluded that the changes causing the middle class 
gaining political dominance were not properly perceived by the senior naval officers 
and this led them to ignore what was happening in some sectors within this service 
while they became involved in politicking with a conservative orientation. The 
empowerment of mesocratic elements, with Arturo Alessandri and later with Carlos 
Ibáñez as leaders, ultimately led to major changes within the Navy destabilizing its 
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officer corps and leading to acts of indiscipline. This happened as well because 
these two caudillos improperly influenced some members of Navy, facilitating 
disciplinary breakdowns by dissatisfied middle class junior officers, all of which 
provided both an example and an opportunity for independent action by the lower 
ranks. 
The mutiny was then initiated in Latorre, the most powerful warship of its age in 
the Chilean Navy and having the most numerous crew. The importance of being part of the 
ship’s company of this dreadnaught allowed those who prepared the mutiny to convey it to 
other ships and shore facilities in Valparaiso and Talcahuano, employing previous contacts 
and the excellent communications systems recently installed in the battleship. Additionally, 
some destroyers’ crew members, who had been in Great Britain during the construction of 
these ships during 1926-1928, had lived the social turmoil climate of previous years in 
which the general strike in 1926 was the paramount expression.  
Even though the Chilean Government decided to modify temporarily the salaries of 
the whole public sector (civil and military) again in August 1931, the mutiny did not extend 
considerably to the other branches of the armed forces and Carabineros mostly due to the 
following reasons: 
- Dispersal (or lack of concentration) of the Army, Air Force and Police units across 
the country with no adequate communications systems. The best and fastest national 
communication network to convey news and orders was the radio links of the Navy.  
- Delays, lack of coordination and faint attempts to contact external adherents in the 
Army, Air Force and Carabineros by the mutineers. 
- Quick and effective reaction from the Army’s and Air Force’s authorities to 
suppress the only real attempt of adhesion coming from sergeants and corporals of 
the Maipo Regiment and Quintero Air Base. 
- Lack of support to, and in some cases direct disapproval towards the mutiny in the 
mass media as a whole, while the danger of a social outbreak was present.    
- Inaction of the public sector employees in facing the salary reduction. The strike 
that the Communist party tried to organize had a limited echo. Most of the 
participants were trade unionists not affected by the economic measures but 
obedient to the Party instructions.   
The reasons for the quick ending of the mutiny are varied and can be summarized as 
follow: 
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- The withdrawal of the governmental measures of reducing August salaries was 
adopted two days after the beginning of the mutiny and while negotiations were 
been carried out on board Latorre. Some of the other vindications (that might be 
called ‘unionists’) were accepted by the Government as well. The same did not 
happen with ‘political’ petitions. These were introduced by the more radicalized 
mutineers under external influence. 
-  The less radicalized mutineers – who were the majority – reacted against those 
more radicalized because of the actions taken or planned by these (shooting against 
civilian populations, for example). 
- The growing logistic problems shown by the act of piracy against steamship Flora 
in order to obtain supplies. Another example is the cruiser O’Higgins running out of 
fuel on 7 September.  
- The lack of effective political or social support after the governmental resolution to 
use the force once the negotiations failed (4 September). 
- The arrival of ships to Coquimbo coming from Talcahuano (5 September) 
reinforced the posture of mutineers in this port, but weakened those left in 
Talcahuano, leading to the recovery of this port by the Army. 
- The reasonable use of force by the Government to recover the shore establishments 
in Valparaíso and later in Talcahuano was a decisive strike at the mutineers on 
board the ships stationed in Coquimbo because they lost any possibility of logistic 
support. 
- The air attack against the ships stationed in Coquimbo on 6 September, made 
evident to mutineers the governmental willingness to use force, generating a 
massive desertion and subsequently the handing over of the ships to their officers 
that night.  
The mutiny’s short term consequences have already been discussed. It must be 
added that in the following years, there was a loss of combat readiness; a loss of credibility 
of the Navy in the eyes of the civil society; living conditions inside the service became 
harder and public recriminations between former naval officers occurred. These were the 
long term consequences of the mutiny. And all this happened in addition to the great 
austerity needed during Alessandri’s second term as President [1932-1938] to solve the 
economy crisis of the 1929-1931 period. All this could explain the extreme weakness of the 
Chilean Navy at the beginning of World War Two. 
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 PART III: THE AFTERMATH 
 
10. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE NAVY. 
 
10.1. Introduction to this part. 
 
This chapter is devoted to the events after the mutiny and also to the immediate 
consequences of this historical event. The influence over the way of thinking of the Chilean 
left and the rise of this political trend will be analyzed together with the idea of imposing a 
closer State control of the economy as a reaction to the crisis started in 1929. Also, the 
Navy’s weakening process, as a defence institution and its abandonment of any 
involvement in politics will be covered. 
 
10.2. Consequences of the mutiny. 
 
As has been shown above, the mutiny took place in a climate of instability 
following the fall of the authoritarian presidency of General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. This 
abrupt political change happened while an acute economic crisis mainly of external origin 
was taking place and was propelled by a movement called ‘civilism’ at that time. The latter 
was a movement opposed to the militarism represented by Ibáñez and was hostile to the 
existing political parties because many of their members had supported the General. 
Independent professionals, such as doctors, attorneys and engineers, plus university 
students constituted the backbone of the civilist movement and was hostile to the existing 
political parties. In addition to these individuals, some politicians belonging to different 
parties that did not participate in the Ibáñez government also favoured the civilists. By 
means of strikes and demonstrations these forces precipitated a crisis overturning the 
Ibáñez presidency while leaving a political vacuum which the civilists, due to lack of a 
coherent organization, could not fill. Due to this factor, it is not surprising that they flocked 
to the candidacy of Juan Esteban Montero-Rodríguez, a lawyer and professor who, 
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although a member of the Radical Party568, was not a seasoned politician, but a serious 
professional without political ambition. Montero represented an antithesis with respect to 
populist caudillos such as Alessandri. He was named as head of the Cabinet by Ibáñez in 
the last weeks of his presidency precisely because he was not one of his followers. When 
Montero tried to rectify the course of the fading presidency, Ibáñez did not support him and 
in this way Montero became a leader of those who provoked the General’s fall569
The presidential election occurred on 4 October 1931, a few weeks after the mutiny 
and at the same time that the government was trying the mutineers. The main opponent to 
Montero was Arturo Alessandri Palma. The communists, beset by factionalism, presented 
two candidates, Elías Lafertte and Manuel Hidalgo. The election outcome as follows: 
.  
 
 
 
 
     
Source: Vial-Correa, v. V, p. 81. 
 
 The election turnout showed that civilism had attracted two thirds of the vote, even 
though the movement was not very well articulated and supported a candidate who only 
reluctantly participated in the elections. The electoral results indicated that the electors 
wanted an alternative to the two caudillos of that time, Ibáñez and Alessandri. It also shows 
that the public strongly opposed the intervention of the Armed Forces in politics that had 
occurred since 1924. 
 
10.3. The presidency of Juan Esteban Montero-Rodríguez: the civilist reaction. 
 
                                                 
568  Despite its name, the Radical Party was the most important social democrat 
political organization in Chile during that period. 
 
569  The last days of Ibáñez as President and the participation of the civilistas and 
Montero on that period is covered by Collier and Sater, pp. 222-223 and by Vial-
Correa, v. V, Chapter 1, pp.13-51.  
 
CANDIDATE VOTES  
Montero 182,177 63.96% 
Alessandri 99,075 34.78% 
Hidalgo 2,344 0.82% 
Lafertte 1,226 0.43% 
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Montero took office on 4 December 1931570
Resolving the economic crisis and undoing the most negative effects of Ibáñez’s 
administration constituted the new government's major task.  The first steps were removing 
those Ibáñez supporters who still held positions in Government and to avoid destabilizing 
military movements. But Montero did not call for elections to purge the Senate and 
Chamber of Deputies whose submissive members had been nominated by Ibáñez without a 
competitive election
 although he had been ruling the 
country as Vice-President since Ibáñez’s fall in July. He had to turn over power to another 
temporary vice president, Manuel Trucco, for the duration of the campaign. The mutiny 
took place precisely during this period. Nevertheless, every important decision dealing with 
the rebellion was taken with his approval.  
571
The civilists tried to blame the Armed Forces for the mistakes made in Ibáñez’s 
administration once they controlled the country. This started a period of unrest in these 
services. It must be remembered that one of the points included by the mutineers in their 
first statement was: 
. Nor did he did deal with COSACH, an organization with a 
wretched reputation, created by Ibáñez to regulate the production and sale all nitrate 
produced in Chile. Both the composition of the congress and COSACH’s existence were 
very important questions. Unfortunately, Montero's inability to resolve these two issues, 
plus his lack of decision to solve the other pressing problem, undermined his government's 
reputation. 
‘The Government, in compliance with its duties of watching over the 
sacred rights of all citizens [civilian, military and naval] and defending 
liberty, must avoid by all means the creation in the conscience of masses of 
a hostile attitude towards the Armed Forces’ [see Appendix A]. 
 
One of the new Government's first steps was to reorganize the Navy or more 
precisely, return this service to its pre Ibáñez table of organization, including reviving the 
position of Director General of the Navy and also the Navy Board, and moving the 
                                                 
570  The Presidency of Juan Esteban Montro is the subject of one chapter in: Vial-
Correa, v. V, Chapter 1, pp.13-51.  
 
571  This Congress was nominated by Ibáñez after he convinced the political parties to 
avoid an election. He selected the names of the Senators and Deputies in Chillán 
Thermal Springs located 500 kilometers south from Santiago. For this reason this 
parliament is known in Chilean History as the Thermal Congress. 
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headquarters from Santiago to Valparaíso. Montero's first cabinet after his election as 
President kept Captain Enrique Spoerer as his Minister of the Navy. Spoerer was originally 
named in this post by Trucco in the second day of the mutiny. He was selected through 
being a retired officer, due to the civilists’ distrust of those high rank officers serving under 
Ibáñez. 
The civilists' anti military feelings572
In this period, reproachful statements were issued between several officers attending 
as witnesses and defendants, showing the atmosphere of discord and demoralization inside 
the Navy. An example of this is a statement of Rear Admiral Abel Campos Carvajal 
blaming the mutiny on: 
 and public pressure pushed the Government to 
prosecute in Courts Martial the officers of both squadrons and naval bases where the 
mutiny took place. This decision was also influenced by the idea that mutinies happened 
due to failures in the chain of command, as mentioned by Elihu Rose and analyzed in a past 
chapter [see section 1.3]. The trial took place in ‘Escuela de Telecomunicaciones’ between 
14 December 1931 and 17 February 1932. A similar trial against the officers took place in 
Talcahuano. 
‘the undisciplined actions of some officers showing that while’…[Latorre 
was in]…‘England a propaganda campaign against the previous 
Government took place573 by means of secret visits made on board574
 
’ . 
Unfortunately Campos does not confirm who were the visitors and who were the 
officers being visited but in a former chapter the efforts made by Alessandrist elements in 
Europe to topple Ibáñez’s government were covered [see section 6.1], including possible 
meetings with Latorre crewmembers.   
Admiral Campos, was commanding the Latorre during the period it was finishing 
its refit in Devonport dockyard and he probably knew more than he stated to La Unión 
above. An indirect testimony of this period is that of Midshipman Miguel Álvarez-Torres 
who was on board Latorre in the first weeks of its stay at Devonport. Years later he told his 
son, Miguel Álvarez-Ebner that political exiles visited the crewmembers and the officers 
                                                 
572  This subject is covered in: Vial-Correa, v. V, pp.24-27. 
 
573  He refers to Ibáñez’ Government. 
 
574  ‘Declaración del contralmirante Campos ante el Consejo de Guerra’ La Unión, 14 
DIC 1931, p.3. 
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did nothing against this illegal activity. Álvarez-Ebner communicated this piece of 
information to the author of this thesis575
 Another example of the blaming statements made in the same period is that of 
Commander Samuel Ward Rodríguez, the Commanding Officer of the destroyer Lynch. He 
said that:  
. 
‘he had the intimate conviction that the movement was of communist 
character’...because...‘days before the outbreak, subversive pamphlets were 
handed out at Coquimbo and some reached Latorre and other ships’...[and 
he]... ‘reported this  at the time to the Navy’s higher levels576
  
’. 
The Commanding Officer of Latorre and the rest of the officers of this ship did not 
report the same before or after the mutiny as was their duty in such a serious situation and 
Ward’s statements were not investigated deeply. 
The trials against the mutineers had only just begun when petitions for clemency 
started. Arturo Alessandri used this idea as his own, in a speech made on 19 September 
1931 during his campaign as a presidential candidate. In this instance he said:   
‘The crimes committed by the sailors had been very serious and the 
country’s conscience had already judged them. This is enough punishment 
for avoiding the recurrence of similar acts in the future. But to be fair, it is 
necessary to study the origin of this process577
  
’. 
Then he went on, trying to explain what is a dictatorship, meaning no doubt, 
Ibáñez’s: 
‘This country lived for five years under a regime of tyranny, outside of 
legal and constitutional rule; the man governing the country did not respect 
the authorities’...‘and there is nothing more serious than the bad example 
given by the higher authorities’ ...‘The venom of insubordination and 
anarchy had been fed to the lower decks. Those in high positions also 
committed serious crimes. We have seen that in a critical period the old 
admirals ruling the fleet were expelled from their positions to put the Navy 
at the service of mean ambitions to expel Mr Figueroa from government 
and in this way to have access to power578
                                                 
575  Interview of Miguel Álvarez Ebner by author in Viña del Mar and Valparaíso, 29-
30 OCT 2009. 
’.  
 
576  ‘Declaración Reveladoras sobre el Origen del Movimiento’, El Mercurio de 
Valparaíso, 20 DIC 1931.p.3. 
 
577  Donoso, v.II, p.68. 
 
578  Donoso, v.II, p.68. 
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We must recall that this process of removing senior naval officers was initiated by 
Ibáñez, as covered in other chapters [see 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2]. Alessandri continued his speech 
stating:  
‘If all had sinned, if all had given a bad example, there is no reason to 
assign all the penalties exclusively to the lower deck members, especially 
when those most guilty of committing of moral and material indiscipline 
affecting the country remain unpunished579
  
’. 
Later in his speech, Alessandri requested a pardon for the mutineers. 
Regardless of the imprecision of a speech made amidst a political campaign, 
Alessandri argued that the authorities should excuse the mutineers because of the bad 
example set by the higher levels during Ibáñez’s dictatorship. Nor did he mention his 
attempts while in exile in Europe, to use his contacts with Latorre’s crewmembers in 
Devonport to destabilize that Government [see section 6.1]. The idea that the bad example 
came from the officers is accepted as his own by Warrant Officer Class 2 Ernesto González 
in his book. Beginning in December 1931, the anti-Montero and leftist Crónica serialized 
Gonzalez’s book580
During this same time when the officers’ trials were taking place, those 
crewmembers being tried or already sentenced and imprisoned began a hunger strike in 
December 1931 issuing also a manifesto signed by the main participants in the mutiny, 
among others, Ernesto González, Carlos Cuevas and Augusto Zagal. They stated: 
. This newspaper was financed partially by Alessandri through Waldo 
Palma-Miranda, who was one of his close followers and who was the director of this 
publication. This fact might indicate that González, far from being a communist, was 
probably an Alessandrist and might have been one of the crewmembers whom the past 
president had contacted in Devonport in order to agitate against Ibáñez. Further details 
about his probable link to Alessandrism will be covered later. 
‘the burden of punishment fell but was not consistent with the clear rule of 
law and the naval officers, the sole responsible group of the September 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
579  Donoso, v.II, p.69. 
 
580  Donoso, v. II, p.76. 
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events, have evaded and circumvented the military codes and Constitution 
right  in front of the eyes of the people581
 
’. 
This attitude adopted by the prisoners was stimulated by a campaign to bring 
disrepute on the officers. It received a wide support from the press and the Communist 
Party.  
The Chilean Attorney’s Bar announced a few days later that it would request a 
pardon for the condemned crewmembers thereby unleashing a movement to pardon the 
main participants in the sedition. The campaign favouring the mutineers happened amidst a 
climate of social unrest culminating in a general strike on January 1932. The strike did not 
have the successful outcome expected by the organizers, mainly the Communist Party.   
Among the various changes in the Navy’s organization instituted as part of the 
efforts to eliminate Ibáñez’s influence and mitigate the economic problems faced by 
Montero’s Government were included a twenty percent reduction of officers and the 
retirement of several admirals, some of whom served as ministers in Ibáñez’s regime. 
Among the latter were Rear Admirals Hipólito Marchant-Morales and Alejandro García-
Castelblanco582
By this time, the trials of the officers mentioned above had finished. The 
conservative newspaper ‘La Unión de Valparaíso’ 
. 
583
At the beginning of March, two other admirals promoted by Ibáñez’s Government 
retired from the Navy and it was announced that Rear Admiral Carlos Jouanne de la Motte 
du Portail would be nominated as Director General of the Navy, the newly revived position 
that the former Government had eliminated. Jouanne was an officer placed on the 
retirement list by Ibáñez’s Government
 stated in its editorial page its 
satisfaction because the trials of the naval officers did not prove their complicity either in 
starting the mutiny or in aiding the mutineers. The article noted that the court convicted 
only two officers for dereliction of duty, penalties that were overturned on appeal.   
584
                                                 
581  ‘Declaraciones de Carlos Cuevas, Ernesto González y Augusto Zagal’,La Unión, 
14 DIC 1931, p.5. 
, who was called back again to active duty by 
 
582  Office of Naval Intelligence, 23 FEB 1932. NAUSA, serial 17 File 901-105.  
 
583  ‘Editorial’, La Unión, 18 FEB 1933.p.3. 
 
584  Probably because he tried to end the participation in politics of a group of young 
Army officers led by Ibáñez in 1924-1925 [see section 2.2] 
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President Montero. It is clear that the civilist movement, fearing that Ibanez wanted to 
return to power, initiated these changes in the high command of the Navy in order to erase 
any chance of success of the former dictator’s supporters wanting to regain control of the 
political leadership.  
On 6 April 1932 the recently reinstalled Navy Board met to analyze a document 
prepared by the Naval General Staff containing a political situation appraisal585. This 
document was transcribed in a book written by Carlos Charlín586
The document blamed the overthrow of Ibáñez’s government on the civilists’ action 
as well as the mismanagement of the public treasury. It also stated that although the civilists 
consolidated their control of Government by means of an election, after a few months of 
administration the stability was threatened by: 
. Although it seems to be 
incomplete, still it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that once again the Navy was 
facing an institutional crisis and a period of further instability. 
‘The professional politicians, the bad elements and those who fell from 
power with the old regime….’ [Ibáñez]. ‘In this way, resistance groups 
against the present Government inside public opinion had been forming 
slowly’… ‘and they may have found sympathy among Armed Forces 
personnel. This attitude of sympathy is possible within our Armed Forces 
as a consequence of their disgraceful participation in Government changes 
or in the Government itself pressed by circumstances and by the pressure 
exerted by dissatisfied civilians587
 
’. 
The document concluded with the admission of the possibility that a political 
movement against Montero’s government might take place and in this event the situation of 
indiscipline existing in the Armed Forces during the last eight months must be taken into 
account, the September mutiny being the clearest evidence of this. The disciplinary 
situation and the mutiny were: 
‘a demonstration of the revolutionary and restless spirit in the lower ranks. 
This way of thinking cannot be eliminated by force at once, because it is 
caused by the country’s general situation and it is not exclusive to the 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
585  Proceedings of the Naval Board, 6 April 1932. Chilean Naval Archives. 
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service personnel. For this reason, it should not astonish us while it is 
present. We should count on it as a disgraceful but inevitable fact588
 
’. 
The Naval General Staff did not think that the Armed Forces would try to overthrow 
the Government due to their spirit of discipline or because such action, without public 
acceptance, would not have any chance of success. This organism considered that the 
danger for the Government lay with:  
‘the dissatisfied civilians’… from the left or mainly the Ibáñez 
supporters….They might try to overthrow the Government, taking 
advantage of the moral situation of the Armed Forces personnel previously 
expressed589
 
’. 
The document stated that such a destabilizing event might gain support from only 
one part of the Armed Forces, for example from Santiago’s military garrison, while the rest 
of the services remain in a passive mood awaiting the outcome. Then the document focuses 
on the Navy, writing that this service: 
‘cannot adopt a [political] position with the same certainty as the other 
branches because it is far from the political centres and due to the character 
of its personnel who, instinctively repudiate any participation in struggles 
or political movements590
 
’. 
 In short, the authors of the report seem to accept the idea that the rebellion which 
had happened seven months before in the Navy was only a mutiny of promotion of interests 
and not a political mutiny. These two types of rebellions were explained in a previous 
chapter [see section 1.3] 
The document analyzed then the state of weakness of the service, with its naval 
forces reduced to a destroyer and a submarine flotilla, its coastal defence forts only partially 
manned and its shore establishments without sufficient men to act in the self-defence role. 
Due to this: 
‘The Navy isolated and without the support of land forces, does not 
represent a material force capable of presenting a serious resistance against 
a determined movement of opinion [such as the left]. This ability is even 
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lessened if forces belonging to the Army, the Air Force and Carabineros 
supported such a movement591
 
’. 
The conclusion of the Naval General Staff after that pessimistic view was: 
‘The Navy’s attitude in principle must be of loyalty towards the 
Government. But in case the Government is overthrown by other forces, 
the Navy should consider its material weakness relative to the other forces 
already mentioned and proceed in any case in accordance with them with 
the objective of avoiding greater damage to the country. Also and with the 
aim of avoiding lack of unity in the way of thinking within the service and 
the influence of political or social agents on naval personnel during the 
beginning of any actions, it is advisable to keep the naval units away from 
the centres of propaganda and to prevent communications between 
crewmembers and people ashore592
 
’. 
This analysis indicates that the Navy feared at the beginning of 1932 the action from 
leftist parties and movements, the Communist Party and various socialist groups. There was 
fear that they would subvert the crewmembers, using them to overthrow the government 
and implement the programs articulated in the last manifestoes during the mutiny of 
September 1931.   
Two days after the Navy Board analyzed the document, the Government requested 
the Congress to authorize a declaration of state of siege to face the menace of a rebellion.  
The opposition to Montero consisted of three groups: the leftist parties supporting 
Alessandri who had failed to win the last presidential election. Included among them, were 
some socialists associations still not unified in a single political party. Ibáñez’s supporters 
were the second group. The third group was that of the Communists. As was stated before, 
these were divided into two movements, one of which had joined the Third Communist 
International and had a strong influence from the South American Section of the 
International Communist Bureau [SAIB]593. Alessandri`s followers and the Communists 
had already organized the assault on a regimental barracks in Copiapó594
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Regarding the Naval General Staff claim that Ibañez or his supporters were also 
interested in destabilizing the Government, a recent monograph says: 
. This assault did not achieve a revolutionary outcome and did not spread sedition in 
other cities. Unfortunately the assault so infuriated Vallenar’s police detachment that it 
killed twenty ChCP members. Although this attempt failed, it was feared that other future 
mutinies could seriously destabilize the nation politically. 
‘No matter his reputation as a coup organizer, the personal documentation 
of Carlos Ibáñez disclosed and reviewed so far, do not imply in any way 
facts of that order in this period .... 596
 
' [1931-1937]. 
The above does not mean that Colonel Ibáñez was an active organizer of coups 
between 1924 and 1927. 
At the end of April 1932 the imprisoned naval mutineers started a new hunger strike 
lasting until the first days of May. Crónica and other anti Montero newspapers started an 
active campaign to pardon the convicted rebels. Their objective was also to discredit the 
government for precipitating the Naval Mutiny first by reducing salaries and then using 
harsh measures to crush it. That newspaper was clearly for Alessandri. As an example of 
the campaign against Montero’s Government it published in the first page of its editions 
between 29 April and 14 May news about the strike and relative to the support offered by 
unions and other organizations to the strikers. On 14 May it published the news about the 
eight Peruvian sailors executed due to their participation in a mutiny which occurred in that 
country, perhaps meaning that initially a group of Chilean rebels were condemned to the 
same penalty and then pardoned by pressures against Montero`s Government597
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The Peruvian mutiny of 1932, following a recent article598
During the Chilean hunger strike, Arturo Alessandri visited the striking imprisoned 
sailors. His attitude raises the question whether he visited the strikers because he considered 
that they had been excessively punished or he acted out of a sense of guilt for inciting the 
Latorre crewmembers to raise against Ibáñez’s regime, while he was an exile in Europe and 
this ship was in Devonport [see section 6.1], and later when his followers supported the 
mutiny in Concepción and Talcahuano. 
, had its origin in naval 
personnel linked to the Aprista Party who rose in arms aiming to impose its party ideals. 
This paper does not link the origin of this subversive movement to the Chilean events the 
previous year. 
Amid the increasing difficulties of the weak Montero Government and after the 
campaign described above, measures oriented to favour the condemned mutineers were 
adopted. The first measure adopted was to change the conditions of imprisonment for 
Ernesto González, Aníbal Marfán and Pedro Sanhueza. They were banished to distant 
places starting 4 May 1932 instead of remaining in jail. It is not known what were the 
criteria used by the Government which singled out just these three participants in the naval 
mutiny. 
A document elaborated by the SAIB599
The Central Committee of the ChCP stated in the introduction that after the naval 
mutiny the party must fight to prevent the influence of the bourgeois and petit bourgeoisie 
on the masses ‘to deviate them from the path to revolution’...‘Only with a fierce and open 
struggle against them, will the party conquer the vanguard position it deserves.... 
 on 4 December 1931 will be analyzed below 
because it shares the pessimistic view of the Naval General Staff that a rebellion against the 
Government was possible. The ChCP published this document because it was considered as 
an important tool for the political struggle in which this party was involved. 
600
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mentioning bourgeois groups. Then the introduction to the document underlines the 
meaning for the party of the recent events in the Navy and the necessity of taking a leading 
role in the approaching struggles.  
It is clear that the 1931 Naval Mutiny played an enormous role in the evolution of 
Communism in Chile and this might explain why authors of this political trend had 
assigned to this rebellion greatly more importance, exaggerating sometime the events. 
The SAIB also assigned an important role to this event when it wrote: ‘the great 
mass struggle taking place in Chile is the greatest in Latin America since the Mexican 
revolution’. For this reason, it instructed the ChCP to:  
‘be ready to direct the approaching struggles, organizing its liaisons with 
the exploited large masses in cities and countryside, creating a just tactic 
and fighting against deviations to the left or right601
 
’. 
To achieve this goal, the SAIB ordered its members to follow these tactics: 
‘The vast activity made by the party in support of the rebel sailors must be 
transformed into an organic influence among the crewmembers’…. [ship 
cells, fort cells]. ‘It must transform the thousands of sailors participating in 
that movement, who had been expelled from service, as propaganda agents 
and organizers of a revolutionary movement among the peasants and 
workers, in particular among the unemployed, as they are part of this 
group. The party must establish a strong liaison with those sailors who 
were expelled from service and those who remain in the ships. Party 
commissions with the youth must be created to work with the sailors, to 
have meetings and organize sailor’s committees. Through these 
organizations, literature about our party may be handed to the sailors to 
analyze the mutiny, without hiding our own mistakes. A great number of 
these sailors must be incorporated into our party. At the present time the 
party enjoys a great friendship and relationships with the petty officers 
directing the mutiny. This is a good achievement but it is totally 
insufficient. Directly and by means of these petty officers the party must 
establish close ties with the sailors themselves. Five hundred sailors among 
those expelled or those remaining must be convinced to join the party602
 
’. 
The ChCP took a long time to implement these goals. For the parliamentary 
elections scheduled to occur at the end of 1931, or the beginning of 1932, that was to 
replace the controversial ‘Thermal Springs Congress’, the party nominated Petty Officer 
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Alejandro Caldera Holm as a candidate in Valparaíso603
‘González protested by means of Valparaiso’s newspapers about this 
nomination. He claims that he would not permit his name to be used by 
communism since he does not have any relation with them and he does not 
share extremist and dissociate ideas, opposed to law and order and 
individual liberty’
. We must recall that he was an 
important figure in the rebellion on board the ships in Coquimbo. Something similar 
happened with Warrant Officer Class 2 Ernesto González Brión. We must recall that both 
of them were tried for their role as leaders of the mutiny and found guilty. It seems that the 
ChCP did not ask them, at least not the Warrant Officer, before nominating them as 
candidates because:  
604
 
.  
In the end the expected elections did not take place at that time. 
Because of a lack of reliable data, it is difficult to assess if the communists had 
much success recruiting the mutinous crewmen. At least, Astica became a member of the 
ChCP apparently in the years following the mutiny. There is no proof that González or 
Caldera did the same. Ernesto González won amnesty and later the nomination for 
governmental jobs in the second Alessandri presidency [1932-1938], demonstrating certain 
affinity with this political trend as will be discussed later. Schoolmaster Petty Officer Pedro 
Pacheco Pérez, one of the mutiny leaders in Talcahuano definitively joined the ChCP. In 
1933 he was a delegate attending a congress in Montevideo605 and was named as Mayor of 
Valparaíso606 in 1939, at the beginning of presidential term of Pedro Aguirre Cerda607
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Eduardo Grove Vallejos. He became Mayor of Viña del Mar608
Those who led the mutiny found another field of action in journalism. As mentioned 
before, in 1932 the two newspapers that strongly opposed Montero’s Government generally 
favoured Alessandri or Ibáñez. Crónica was one of those journals which carried González's 
articles. Astica had his writings published in La Opinión and later he started a collaboration 
with Frente Popular, a communist newspaper created at the end of the 1930s
. We mentioned in another 
chapter [see section 6.1] his arrival to Latorre in Devonport and his actions in Coquimbo 
during the mutiny.   
609
Crónica and La Opinión anti government editorials plus the dramatic economic and 
social situation disenchanted the public about the capacity of Montero’s Government to 
handle the situation. They also helped foment new military conspiracies which finally 
overthrew the government. 
.  
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11. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. 
 
11.1. The Chilean Communist Party after the mutiny. 
 
The ChCP’s attention immediately after the mutiny was centred on the presidential 
election to be held on 4 October 1931 already mentioned. When the results were known, 
favouring Juan Esteban Montero and showing scarce popular support for the two 
Communist candidates Lafertte and Hidalgo, the party turned its energy to taking advantage 
politically from the mutiny.  
Olga Ulianova based on a letter from the ChCP to SAIB on 24 October 1931, stated 
that the party was: 
‘trying to radicalize even more the movement, raising for the first time in 
Chile the slogan of an immediate  agrarian and anti imperialist revolution, 
as it has been called by the International, and calling for the creation of 
soviets in the popular neighbourhoods as well as the creation of self 
defence detachments. The presentation of all these slogans and the efforts 
made are indicative of the possibility that an immediate revolution was 
been taken seriously by the local communists and their cominterian 
advisor610
 
’. 
Such revolutionary optimism was inconsistent with the immediate reality, although 
unemployment and other effects of the serious economical crisis perhaps encouraged the 
communists' fantasies. The ChCP was not the only political group competing to attract the 
sympathy of the most affected people by the great depression. The Alessandrists were 
doing the same; different socialist and social democrat groups used the same language of 
the communists and they also enjoyed the sympathy of some members of the Armed 
Forces. Marmaduque Grove is perhaps the most remarkable example of this. During 1932 
these circumstances would be the origin of new sudden changes of government as will be 
covered later.  
 The SAIB sent to Chile a document on 4 December 1931, already quoted, called 
‘South American Bureau of the Communist International thesis about the grand struggle of 
the Chilean proletariat’ [see section 10.2]. It analyzed the naval mutiny and other important 
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subjects. It was circulated by the party as a printed pamphlet, adding its own commentaries 
such as the following:  
‘The sailor’s rebellion marks a high point in the history of the 
crewmembers in Latin America even though it was defeated. It will be a 
source of prolific lessons for the worker’s and peasant masses in this 
hemisphere. They will apply these teachings in the approaching great class 
struggles. The most valuable lesson coming out from these events is that 
even when the objective factors are mature, the peasant and worker’ 
revolution cannot be successful without a strong Communist Party 
schooled in Marxist Leninist doctrine and strongly bound to the great 
proletarian masses in cities and in the countryside611
 
’. 
Since then, the ChCP and its writers, journalists and historians had used the mutiny 
to perform a pedagogic effort, many times without sticking too much to the reality of the 
events. Instead of interpreting the events as a mutiny originated in a salary reduction they 
tried to convince their followers that it was a true revolution. In the following chapter this 
subject will be covered deeply. 
This trend was probably started by the SAIB when it wrote that the period when the 
mutiny took place was that: ‘of great Chilean masses’ struggles’…[and they were]…‘the 
most important taking place in Latin America after the Mexican Revolution612
A few lines later, the quoted report stated that the existing economic crisis 
produced:  
’. In our 
opinion, this is an exaggerated point of view since that revolution started important political 
changes in México while this did not happen in Chile.   
‘an intensification of the capitalism world crisis and an accelerated socialist 
construction in the Soviet Union as an integral part of the strong process of 
radicalization of the working class in all Latin American masses613
 
’. 
An analysis of Ibáñez’s presidency then followed in the SAIB document. It stated 
that this Government managed to escape the crisis for a while and repressed strongly the 
ChCP-influenced workers’ movement. It states that once the civilists took control in Chile:  
‘the masses' dissatisfaction with the policy of hunger following Ibáñez’s 
fall violently expressed itself by means of the sailor’s rebellion preceded by 
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a general strike in Valparaíso…’ [on 24 August]...‘and supported by 
solidarity strikes in the cities and by a beginning of solidarity from Army 
non-commissioned officers…614
 
’ [in the Maipo Regiment]. 
 Again, the point of view of SAIB seems exaggerated, considering the reality of the 
events. The solidarity strikes were not so important and the rebellion in the Maipo 
Regiment was aborted before it started. The real success of the ChCP was moving the 
Chilean public opinion in favour of moderating or even rejecting the sentences applied by 
the courts to the mutineers by putting the whole of the blame on the officers. In these 
actions, it had the support of socialists, social democrats and Alessandrists groups.   
These last three groups were the competitors of the ChCP for popular support in the 
political struggles of 1931 and 1932. The election on 4 October 1931 was one of the 
occasions in which these political forces faced each other. The SAIB states that Juan 
Esteban Montero’s triumph over Alessandri was attributable to the mutineers’ defeat by the 
Armed Forces under the direction of the civilists’ Government. 
The report then analyzedthe mutiny in depth and more realistically stating: 
‘the Chilean sailor’s movement no matter its support through the whole 
fleet, the solidarity from the proletariat and the hints of support from the 
Army was not a politically conscious movement nor did it become a 
revolution of all working masses in Chile615
 
’.  
Here SAIB does not share the ChCP view stated in the introduction of this 
document and quoted above. 
Then the SAIB’s report continued analyzing the attitudes and actions of the 
mutineers: 
‘the risen sailors did not have a sense of the deeply political character the 
mutiny was achieving and of its enormous importance as part of a 
revolutionary action of the big masses because it was spontaneous and 
lacked coordination with the Communist Party. This was caused by the 
lack of communist organizations within the Navy and of previous 
propaganda by the party. It is evident that the sailors, by themselves, could 
not have any notion, in such circumstances, about Communist Party 
importance as a decisive factor in the development of the revolutionary 
movement in Chile616
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In this last paragraph it is possible to perceive SAIB’s criticism with respect to the 
ChCP performance on those days. The document then goes to describe the strength factors 
that would transform the mutiny into a true revolution and that the events were 
insufficiently exploited by the ChCP due to tactical failures and its weak organization. 
Among those strength factors the report mentions the Government’s initial lack of decision 
and its fear of using the Armed Forces because they were contaminated by Ibañism. The 
ChCP and FOCH did not truly take advantage of these weaknesses.  
The actual events demonstrate that the Government initially abstained from using 
force because it preferred to negotiate through Admiral von Schroeders, advised by the 
Navy but, at the same time, it started organizing the use of this resource and it set it into 
action a few hours after the cessation of the negotiations. 
The following factor mentioned by SAIB`s report is the wide range of 
dissatisfaction about the political and economic situation which the CHCP did not 
capitalize upon;   
The enumeration of factors is completed in the report with the following: 
‘The decision of the fighting mass, its resistance to Government menaces 
and the attempts in transforming this rebellion into a revolution. This 
sailors’ spirit moved them to launch their manifesto….., stating the social 
revolution had started but they issued it when their demoralization had 
already started. Among Valparaiso’s workers and in other places there was 
a favourable spirit for starting an armed struggle but it lacked the 
organization. This is one of the most important factors. With a proper 
strategy it could have turned itself into an important driving force of the 
movement617
 
’. 
Again, a criticism from SAIB of the ChCP may be found in the above paragraph. In 
the opinion of the author of this thesis, there is no conclusive evidence that the statement in 
favour of a social revolution was issued by the mutineers themselves. When it was 
communicated, several delegations had been already on board including that of the FOCH 
and the Coquimbo communists and perhaps these external supporters pressed for such 
action, convincing the most radical mutineers. 
The strongest SAIB criticism of the ChCP is the following:   
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‘The lack of party influence among the mutineers resulted in the movement 
being directed only by the petty officers. Most of these men were selfless, 
courageous and sincere but, because of their class origins, they 
subordinated themselves to the bourgeoisie. These elements…’[the petty 
officers] …‘demonstrated less decision than the sailors [the ratings]. They 
slowed down the movement and ended up betraying its goals with non-
revolutionary solutions618
 
’. 
The authors of the paragraph quoted above are partially right because the majority 
of the petty officers seemed to be Ibáñez or Alessandri sympathizers. But among them there 
were some with very radical points of view like Alejandro Caldera-Holm, Carlos Cuevas-
Gallardo and Orlando Robles-Osses. The same is applicable to the schoolmasters like Pedro 
Pacheco-Pérez, Juan Riveros, Luis Henríquez-Acevedo and Ramiro Parada-Contreras 
holding the same rank of petty officer and mentioned in other chapters [see section 6.3 and 
chapters 8 and 9].  
The SAIB’s report criticized the mutineers, stating: 
‘The mutineers did not use the possibilities created to impose their 
demands on the Government and to block the mobilization of Ibañist armed 
forces against the revolutionary movement. In Talcahuano they permitted 
the officers to go ashore instead of keeping them under custody and using 
them as hostages. This revealed to the Government all the movement’s 
weaknesses and transformed itself in a force against it. For each sailor 
killed by the Government they should have made the Government 
responsible for the killing of ten officers by the mutineers619
 
’. 
The first criticism is not realistic: What could have been done by the mutineers in 
the ships at Coquimbo or locked inside the Naval Base at Talcahuano to avoid the Air 
Force and Army attack on the areas under the mutineer’s control? The Talcahuano’s 
mutineers allowed the officers to leave the ships because the Commander in Chief 
negotiated their liberty in exchange for giving the mutineers control of the vessels to sail to 
Coquimbo where they could manifest their support of the squadrons' crewmembers. When 
the negotiations took place the mutineers had no complaints about the officers and nobody 
had been killed yet. The wish of the mutineers at that stage was only to avoid a reduction in 
salaries.  
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Killing prisoners, the second idea expressed in SAIB’s quoted report, did not 
happen in both conflicting factions. It seems that only the ChCP party delegate sent to 
Talcahuano, Galo González, had this idea. The only violence that happened in the first days 
of mutiny were a few shots fired when Captain Hozven and Midshipman Leighton were 
taken into custody with no serious consequences. But there were mutineers with radical 
ideas. For example, a witness stated620
In the following paragraphs, SAIB adds more criticisms to other groups:  
 in Court Martial that Petty Officer Alejandro 
Caldera Holm belonging to Lynch went to the cruiser O’Higgins and made a speech inciting 
the crewmembers to kill the officers, but nobody followed him. At the end, those dead and 
wounded, which occurred in Coquimbo and Talcahuano, were few considering the total 
number involved and were the result of combat actions. 
‘The manoeuvres of the petit bourgeoisie parties (Hidalgo, Ugalde and 
others621) creating the illusion of the possibility of a peaceful arrangement 
and Alessandri’s position against the movement may have created within 
the mutineers (without communication with big cities) the idea that they 
were repudiated by the popular masses. The officers’ influence on the 
mutiny’s leaders and the great number of largely hesitating petit bourgeois 
elements in the leadership of the movement diminished its independence 
and the possibility of the sailors’ victory. They thought that the 
government, once the agreement was reached without blood shed, would 
arrange the problem. Due to this, they did not organize the mutiny’s 
defence (especially in Talcahuano) and this cost hundreds of sailor 
lives…622
 
’. 
Several statements are backed by facts in the above paragraph. The officers, 
although held in custody in their cabins, still could influence on the crews, in particular on 
the destroyers. This became more evident when the situation started to deteriorate from the 
mutineers' perspective. The leaderless elements in Talcahuano acted chaotically and their 
resistance against the Army’s attack did not last too long. Still, both sides sustained 
casualties as a result of the combat.  
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But in the above quotation there are also statements not sustained by the facts. For 
example, the mutineers did not lack communications with the big cities. Indeed, they sent 
and received many communications, copies of which were in the files of the later 
investigations. Another exaggeration is the number of sailors who lost their lives. They are 
not hundreds. In all there were about twenty dead people divided in equal parts between 
both of the fighting sides. These casualties occurred because the talks between the 
Government and the mutineers were broken off. If these dealings had been successful 
probably no one would have been killed.    
The SAIB criticizes the lack of coordination between the mutineers in the Navy 
with those in the Army or in Carabineros [affected by the same salary reduction] and with 
industrial and farming workers, concluding that: 
‘Due to deficiencies already named, the rebel sailors, far from taking their 
struggle for their demands ashore, disembarking forces to meet the workers 
masses, going to Valparaíso, to follow the struggle together with those 
masses, never even attempted even a resistance. This gave the enemy the 
opportunity to gather its forces while the sailors hesitated and awaited, as it 
was demonstrated when they liberated Admiral Campos and other officers 
to act as mediators with the Government, once von Schroeders broke off 
negotiations enabling  the Government to assume the offensive623
 
’. 
The above criticism must be analyzed recalling some facts already covered in 
previous chapters [see chapters 7 and 9]. The government did not unilaterally break off 
negotiations made through von Schroeders. When both sides made unacceptable demands 
the negotiations failed, no matter the warnings made to both parties by von Schroeders. It 
was not only the government’s fault. Nor could the mutineers sail to Valparaíso and other 
ports because the ships were short of fuel and food. Furthermore, disembarking mutineers 
in the face of opposition from the pro Government forces was not an easy task and needed 
discipline and good organization in the rebels. But they did not have it. 
SAIB insisted that the ChCP acted in accordance to the Comintern’s policy when it 
supported the mutiny and tried to spread it to the urban and rural workers and thus prevent 
the Government from destroying the movement. But it added the following criticism: 
‘The important role of the Chilean party in the recent events, has 
demonstrated clearly its organic weakness and its insufficient ties with the 
proletariat in big industries624
                                                 
623  Tesis sobre las grandes luchas del proletariado chileno, pp.16-19. 
’.  
 
624  Tesis sobre las grandes luchas del proletariado chileno, p.31. 
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Also it criticized the party’s: 
‘total lack of organization in the copper mines and its relative lack of 
organization in the nitrate and coal mines. It had little influence on the 
workers in those areas625
 
’. 
The analyzed document adds that something similar happened in the big cities’ 
industrial sectors and in the countryside, but the most serious problem was: ‘the inability of 
the party to bind itself to the sailors during the events’….. ‘showing that the lack of work 
among the soldiers and sailors is a great failure of the party’s job’.  
Once the critical analysis is finished, SAIB made recommendations to the ChCP: 
‘The vast solidarity activity done by the party in favour of the mutinying 
sailors must be transformed into an organic influence on the crewmembers 
(ship cells, fort cells). The ChCP must transform the thousand of sailors 
participant in the movement and expelled from the Navy into propaganda 
agents and activist of the revolutionary movement of workers and peasants. 
This should be done in particular with the jobless. Strong liaison should be 
made with sailors either expelled or remaining on board and we have to 
create youth’s party commissions to work with the sailors having meetings 
and integrating them into those commissions. We have to feed them with 
our literature and we have to hold self-criticism meetings without hiding 
our own mistakes. A great number of these sailors should be recruited by 
our party. At present the party enjoys a great sympathy among the petty 
officers who led the mutiny. This is good but insufficient. Either directly or 
by means of these petty officers the party should form a close tie with the 
sailors. Five hundred expelled sailors or those remaining in the Navy 
should be attracted as party members626
 
’. 
The ChCP tried to accomplish this programme but it suffered strong competition 
from other parties also trying to affiliate the former mutineers. These were the Alessandrists 
and the different socialist groups. There is no reliable data about the former crewmembers 
attracted by each different political organization. It is only known that Manuel Astica 
joined the ChCP and that Ernesto González enjoyed several different positions in the 
second Government headed by Arturo Alessandri [1932-1938]. The schoolmaster Pedro 
Pacheco Pérez appeared after the mutiny openly as a communist as has been mentioned.  
                                                                                                                                                     
 
625  Tesis sobre las grandes luchas del proletariado chileno, p.31. 
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One of the last SAIB’s report paragraphs is more precise in explaining the ChCP 
participation in the 1931 Naval Mutiny, stating: 
‘in the sailors’ rebellion, the party’s weakness became even more evident. This 
weakness being determined resulted in the movement's spontaneous initiation. 
And it was not organized by the party, no matter the fundamental party role in 
provoking it by means of general propaganda actions against the fascist 
dictatorship and hunger627
 
’. 
When SAIB mentions a fascist dictatorship, it is referring to Ibáñez’s Government 
opposed by the Alessandrists and a big majority of the communists. It is clear that the 
propaganda actions of this last group were oriented mainly to overthrow the Government 
that had caused the division of the ChCP and pressed it into clandestine life. But there is no 
evidence that this party had a policy to organize a mutiny. Nevertheless, and following a 
Comintern policy, once the rebellion began, the party decided to use it as a template for the 
future.  
 
11.2. Anther period of political instability in Chile. 
 
 Juan Esteban Montero’s Government encountered increasing difficulties during the 
first months of 1932. These problems in part resulted because the President’s personality 
was better suited for the academic life or for working as an attorney, than providing 
dynamic political leadership. To the above, the ambitions of different groups to grab power 
must be added, weakening his performance as a ruler. 
The Alessandrists, defeated in the elections held on 4 October 1931 but still 
ambitious to grab power after Ibáñez’s fall, still constituted a powerful political force. Nor 
did Ibáñez’s followers accept his sudden fall and his exile. In addition to the above there 
were Marxist organizations trying to overthrow the Government. The first one was the 
ChCP now acting openly. The communists detested Alessandri as well because he used the 
same rhetoric and some of their methods like influencing the worker’s unions. SAIB stated 
that Alessandri: 
‘On accepting his complete agreement with the present social 
order...cannot offer any solution to the present crisis....but due to his 
demagogic position, he is extremely dangerous since he intends to use the 
                                                 
627  Tesis sobre las grandes luchas del proletariado chileno, p.43. 
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masses either as a method of pressing for a compromise with Montero or 
even overthrowing him628
 
’.  
An emerging group but still divided was that of the socialists who opposed 
Montero’s Government.  
 The ChCP had to attract the workers who favoured Alessandri or Ibáñez or who 
belonged to socialists and social democrat groups, following the ‘United Front’ policy 
adopted by the last congresses of the Communist International and accepting the criticisms 
made by the SAIB after the Naval Mutiny. The 1932 Annual Report of the British Embassy 
at Santiago underlines the:  
‘atmosphere of discontent and disappointment arising from the failure of 
the newely-installed Montero administration to achieve any progress 
whatever in stemming the remorseless advance of the economic depression, 
the force of which was by that time beginning to make itself seriously felt 
on all sides629
 
’. 
 Montero’s’ overthrow occurred as a result of the alliance between socialists 
elements, among them Colonel Marmaduque Grove-Vallejos, the Air Force chief, the 
Ibañists and various officers belonging to Santiago’s military garrison. In addition to this 
coalition's opposition, the centre and rightist political parties did very little to defend the 
government which lacked the material resources to oppose a military movement.  
 On 4 June 1932, Colonel Grove initiated a subversive movement when the 
Government dismissed him after having proofs that he was conspiring while being in 
charge of the Air Force. Some Army members joined the movement. Alessandri offered 
himself to mediate in the conflict. He did this not because he supported Montero but due to 
his fear that a military caudillo such as Ibáñez or Grove might grab the presidency. His role 
as mediator had no success. General Carlos Vergara, commanding the Army, did not obtain 
the support of his subordinates to overcome Grove’s subversive movement. In face of this 
situation Montero resigned. The Navy had no relevant role in Montero’s fall. Before this 
event it had only stated a weak support to the Government, expressing that it lacked the 
material resources to oppose a military movement, as has been analyzed before in this 
thesis [see section 10.3]. 
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 A Government Junta headed by retired General Arturo Puga-Osorio took power. 
The other members were Carlos Dávila-Espinoza, an Ibañist and Eugenio Matte-Hurtado, a 
socialist. Colonel Grove reserved for himself the position of Minister of Defence. The 
majority of the new Government members belonged to Marxist groups which a year later 
fused to become the Partido Socialista de Chile [Chilean Socialist Party]. Its main 
difference with the ChCP was that it admitted members of different social classes. Several 
future important actors in Chilean politics, such as Salvador Allende-Gossens, became 
members of the Socialist Party along with Grove and Matte.  
The ChCP did not support the Government which replaced that of Montero because 
it considered that the new regime was militaristic and because the ‘United Front’ tactic 
approved by the last congresses of the Communist International did not allow for such 
alliances between parties. 
The new Government stated that a Socialist Republic has been established without 
defining it. It nonetheless adopted several populist measures. One was a broad amnesty 
benefiting the condemned participants in the Naval Mutiny. One of them, Manuel Astica, 
visited Carlos Dávila in La Moneda and the press underlined this fact. Sucesos magazine 
published a photograph with the caption:  
‘Manuel Astica-Fuentes a condemned sailor from last Septembers events, 
talks with Carlos Dávila at the Presidential Offices after obtaining his 
liberty, in accordance to the amnesty law dictated by the Junta de Gobierno 
to benefit the political convicted630
 
’. 
Von Schroeders stated631
A US intelligence report stated that strong social and political pressure forced the 
government to amnesty the mutineers and that: 
 that one of the first measures of the new Government was 
releasing those condemned for their participation in the mutiny and these people organized 
a demonstration in front of the Ministry of the Navy. Among other things they requested 
the creation of a single school unifying the Escuela Naval and the Escuela de Grumetes 
[the schools for officers and seaman apprentices].  
                                                 
630  ‘Manifestaciones del sentir popular ante la implantación de la república 
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‘The pardoning of these men occurred at approximately the same time as 
the mutiny in Perú which resulted in the quick suppression by the Peruvian 
authorities and execution of the leaders. This action of the Peruvian 
Government apparently astounded a large number of the Chileans. Various 
comments have been heard pertaining to this action....The socialist and 
radical elements do not hesitate to express utter condemnation of the action 
of the Peruvian authorities. Even members of the conservative and more 
stable elements of the Chilean society apparently feel that the action of the 
Peruvian Government in executing these men was rather strong632
 
’.  
TIME, the US magazine, devoted an article to the new Government quoting the 
following statement by Grove. This Colonel was concerned because he was characterized 
as a communist by his opponents, so he explained that: ‘We will use a steel hand in putting 
down Communist actions designed to create a substitute for . . . the present 
Government633
The ChCP again tried to achieve its political goals using the social turmoil after the 
frustrated opportunity of September 1931. It issued a manifesto published by the press on 6 
June 1932 requesting: ‘unemployment benefits, salary increases, reduction of working 
hours, dismissal of the police section in charge of political affairs, and providing weapons 
to the proletarians’. It stated also that: ‘only by pressing for ever increasing demands will 
the revolutionary process gain momentum leading to an anti-imperialist agrarian 
revolution
’. 
634’. One of the socialist factions existing at that time had stated two days before: 
‘We the socialists, do not want a superficial change in Government; we want and we shall 
obtain a transformation of the economy and the mode of production635
The above statements, although being difficult to be translated into actions, created 
a strong reaction among sectors opposed to the Socialist Republic and the effects would be 
perceived soon after.     
’. 
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Admiral Jouanne, the Navy’s Director General went to greet the new Minister of 
Defence in order to resign. Marmaduque Grove asked Jouanne to remain a few days in 
active duty: ‘until the bustle of the beginning days had faded636
Two visions coexisted in the so-called Socialist Republic. One was more moderate, 
defined by Dávila one month before arriving to power. Vial Correa synthesized it as 
follows:  
’.   
‘ in face of a private economy broken or at least without credit or buyers, 
national or foreign, we must substitute private activity or at least 
complement it by establishing a state run economy at a big scale637
 
’.  
Another more radical proposal was that of Alfredo Lagarrigue, the Minister of 
Finance who was a follower of Matte and Grove. He issued a plan which called for forty 
measures. A rejection of economic liberalism and the avoidance of the foreign capital 
participation in the national economy were among them. He assigned the State the role of 
organizing and directing the productive forces. The plan also called for state control of 
credit and the internal and external trade. It considered also the organization of state run 
enterprises as well as taxes on big fortunes and income. 
The populist policies called for by the so-called Socialist Republic caused concern, 
especially regarding the role of Eugenio Matte and Colonel Grove, both socialists, while 
the other members of the Junta de Gobierno were more favourable to Ibañism and were 
less radical. Carlos Dávila wanted to separate himself from his socialist colleagues because 
he had his own ambitions.  
One of the junta's proposed measures, that obliged the foreign owned banks to 
transfer all deposits in foreign currency to the Central Bank, disturbed foreigners.  
The political instability moved the British Chargé d’Affaires in Santiago to 
propose638
                                                 
636  Jorge Grove-Vallejos, Descorriendo el velo. Episodio de los doce días de la 
República Socialista, (Valparaíso: Editorial Aurora de Chile, 1933), p.23. 
 to his Government to send a Royal Navy warship to Chilean waters as a 
precaution against future events. The British Government accepted and sent HMS Durban, 
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a cruiser, from Bermuda to Callao, where it arrived on 14 June 1932. The Annual Report of 
the British Embassy in Santiago stated: 
‘To what extent the presence of HMS Durban at Callao affected the policy 
of the Chilean authorities cannot be stated with certainty, but it is believed 
it was not inconsiderable. HMS Durban remained in Peruvian waters until 
the middle of September’... of 1932 ...‘by which time it was agreed that the 
political situation was sufficiently quiet to permit of her proceeding south, 
calling at a few Chilean ports... 639
 
’. 
Jorge Grove takes care of the criticism about the extreme ideas of his brother 
Marmaduque Grove stating that the Minister of Defence was not a communist. 
Nevertheless, he accepted that some of his brother’s political actions aroused suspicion 
which his enemies used. He gave as an example his brother’s idea of erasing from the exit 
records of the punished Navy personnel the statement that they had taken part in a mutiny. 
He ordered as well the Employment Office to help them find a new job, given the high 
unemployment and misery of that period. ‘These measures of simple humanity resulted that 
the Minister’...[Marmaduque Grove]...‘was calumniated by his enemies classifying him as a 
communist640
Any measure favouring the mutineers was seen as suspicious, viewed with 
displeasure, or attributed to manoeuvres of the ChCP.  The latter may contain some truth 
given the orientation given to the ChCP by SAIB analyzed before. But in reality there was a 
sort of competition between Alessandrists, socialists and communists about which group 
won more benefits to those condemned for their participation in the Mutiny. Furthermore, 
within the new Government there was disagreement between the socialists and the Ibañists 
and this lead to a crisis.  
’.  
The populist and radical policies of the Socialist Republic soon caused a strong 
rejection. Given the Navy's traditional opposition to the left, Grove tried to impose his 
authority on this service by accepting the resignation offered before by Admiral Jouanne to 
become effective on 16 June, when the crisis in Government was evident.  
Grove then offered this position to Admiral von Schroeders but he refused. The two 
next senior officers in the Navy List were Admirals Chappuzzeau and Merino-Benítez. The 
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first one was discredited due to his behaviour during the Mutiny and the second one was the 
brother of Colonel Arturo Merino Benítez, an active conspirator favouring Ibáñez and a 
political enemy of the Minister of Defence. Finally, Marmaduque Grove selected Admiral 
Calixto Rogers-Cea. He was directed to travel by train from Talcahuano to Santiago but 
while on board he received the news about the fall of the Junta de Gobierno and Grove. 
Then Rogers was directed by Jouanne to return to his office as Commander in Chief of 
Talcahuano Naval Base. 
The Socialist Republic had a short life since it ended on 16 June 1932 when the 
Junta de Gobierno was toppled after being in power for only twelve days. The only action 
of the Navy in this event was the meeting held by Admiral Jouanne who took with him 
Admiral Julio Merino-Benítez and Captain Vicente Merino-Bielich. The three naval 
officers went to a meeting with the two socialists Eugenio Matte and Marmaduque Grove 
asking for their resignation: ‘due to their extremely advanced ideas and their lack of control 
of the popular masses641
Admiral Jouanne issued the following day a statement as the Navy head explaining 
its conduct. He said that the Navy kept itself away from movements changing government 
in certain periods. He stated that the Navy was not against: ‘new ideological social trends 
offering welfare to the people’. But now it was impossible to remain impartial against: 
‘anarchy, the loss of the principle of authority in the Republic and the weak attitude of the 
former Junta de Gobierno to fighting communism’. Then he added that the Navy agreed 
with the Army in eliminating this situation without changing the social principles supported 
by the former Junta de Gobierno. Jouanne states that this had been done to: ‘save the 
country’s prestige and the tranquillity of all its inhabitants
’.  
642
The deposed Junta de Gobierno was replaced with a new one containing Arturo 
Puga and Carlos Dávila as members. The replacement of socialist Arturo Matte as third 
member was by successive minor characters close to Dávila.  No matter the changes of the 
Junta de Gobierno third member, Dávila stayed always as in the prominent position, 
becoming the strongman.  
’. 
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The socialists who worked in the previous Government or those who supported the 
former Junta de Gobierno, such as Eugenio Matte and the two Grove brothers, 
Marmaduque and Jorge, were sent as internal exiles to Easter Island on board a Navy ship. 
The new Junta de Gobierno confirmed Admiral Jouanne in his post just as socialists and 
communists provoked riots in some cities. This unrest forced the fleet to sail to Valparaíso 
to disembark troops in support of the governmental forces643. This naval force had been 
reorganized and put under the command of Admiral von Schroeders to quell the political 
instability. Also to defend the new regime, Congress approved the law ‘For the Defence of 
the Republic’, that Vice President Trucco presented to Congress almost one year before644
On 8 July 1932 Carlos Dávila finally succeeded in displacing the other two 
members of the Junta de Gobierno to become the sole ruler of Chile under the title of 
Provisional President. One of his first actions was to nominate Rear Admiral Francisco 
Nieto-Gallegos as Minister of the Navy. This Ministry had been fused with the War 
Ministry in the past. Its recreation opened a debate in the Navy Board
. 
When the period of greatest danger ended, the Fleet was disbanded and the ships remaining 
in service were organized into two flotillas. 
645 about the 
continuity of the office of the Director General of the Navy or to return to the organization 
set in the period of President Ibáñez [1927-1931] when this command was eliminated. 
Admiral Jouanne resigned again, probably due to the above debate, but he later retracted his 
resignation when his post was maintained646
On 26 August 1932 an amnesty was given to the officers condemned by Court 
Martial. There were none in the Navy since Lieutenant Commanders Beytía and Valle, the 
two officers who had been convicted for dereliction of duty were absolved by a higher 
court. The law then benefited only Army officers condemned for their actions in the Maipo 
Regiment. 
. 
Dávila started having difficulties with the Armed Forces and with the Navy in 
particular. Both services preferred that he ended his Government because he ruled without 
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the balance of a parliament. The Armed Forces wanted the President of the Supreme Court 
to become President to call for a general election647
Dávila then resigned, handing over his position to General Bartolomé Blanche-
Espejo, his Minister of Interior on 13 September 1932. Blanche named Rear Admiral José 
Manuel Montalva-Barrientos as Minister of the Navy. Again, Admiral Jouanne thought that 
it was convenient to explain the Navy’s position by means a public statement. The desire to 
return to constitutional normality after successive changes in the State leadership since June 
1932 may be observed in the following quotation:  
, taking the country back to a 
constitutional normality. 
‘The Navy had tried by all means to keep the social peace, with high 
patriotic spirit, remaining silent and even with temporary loss of its public 
prestige. When Davila’s Government was toppled, it expressed the idea of 
naming the Minister of the Interior as Chief of State in order to observe the 
constitutional rules. This process named Bartolomé Blanche as Minister of 
the Interior and disregarding his rank, he became Provisional President. 
Facing the present events, the Navy insists and publicly proclaims this 
solemn statement. It will support the constitutional and civil rule which is 
in the process of being established again even using the force of its 
weapons648
 
’. 
Despite the fond hope of returning to normal government, a few days after Blanche 
became Provisional President a rebellion erupted in the Air Force and soon after in 
Antofagasta’s military garrison, forcing the Navy to organize again a naval force and put a 
squadron under the command of Real Admiral von Schroeders to prevent future 
disruptions. 
During the rebellion in Antofagasta pressure was placed on the Fleet to join that 
movement but its Commander in Chief refused, stating: 
‘If on this occasion I do not carry out my duty of loyalty to my 
superiors....I am sure that this would lead to the most ill fated 
consequences, not only the breakdown of discipline by disobeying the 
Director General of the Navy, but also because it would incline the Navy to 
one of the political factions when the Fleet had just gone through an 
extremely delicate period649
 
’ [meaning the Naval Mutiny]. 
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Blanche, who never wanted to run the nation decided to turn control over to the 
President of the Supreme Court of Justice, Abraham Oyanedel-Urrutia on 2 October 1932. 
With Chile having endured enormous instability, the Navy decided to move its 
headquarters to Valparaiso in order remove its officers from the intense political 
environment of the capital city. It must be recalled that the headquarters were moved to 
Santiago at the beginning of Ibáñez Government. The British Naval Mission advised 
against the movement to Valparaíso but it took place anyway at the end of 1932 due to the 
strong will of most of the Admirals650
The new government named retired Rear Admiral Arturo Swett-Otaegui
. 
651 as 
Minister of the Navy, who rapidly retired Admirals von Schroeders and Merino-Benítez, 
naming Rear Admiral Julio Allard-Pinto as Commander in Chief of the Fleet. Later, the 
retirement of Admiral Jouanne was announced. He was replaced as Director General of the 
Navy by Rear Admiral Calixto Rogers-Cea. Von Schroeders publicly criticized the Minister 
of the Navy for forcing him to retire652. Von Schroeder’s public statements and the 
retirement of other Admirals were ascribed to disagreement of the members of the Navy 
Board with the Minister in a British diplomatic report653
During the final days of Oyanedel’s Government a projected law was sent to 
Congress to award retirement pay to the crewmembers expelled from the Navy. This 
project was supported by the following Government and finally was approved 
demonstrating that there was a majority in favour of improving the mutineers’ situation 
even against the Navy’s opinion. 
.  
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11.3. Towards political stability. The end of an era. 
 
The presidential and congressional elections took place on 30 October 1932. The 
results were the following: 
 
CANDIDATE VOTES PERCENTAGE 
   
Alessandri 187,914 54.8 
Grove  60,858 17.7 
Rodríguez de la Sotta  47,207 13.8 
Zañartu  42,885 12.5 
Lafertte     4,128   1.2 
    Source: Vial v. V, p 243. 
  
Arturo Alessandri Palma, supported mainly by the liberal and radicals, again 
became Chief of State. The big surprise of the balloting was the high number of votes 
obtained by Marmaduque Grove who could not actively campaign because he was in 
internal exile on Easter Island arriving in Valparaíso only on the Election Day. Héctor 
Rodríguez de la Sotta was a candidate of the Conservative Party and Enrique Zañartu-
Prieto was the choice of another Liberal fraction. Elias Lafertte, a communist, did not win 
many votes showing that the popular vote mainly supported Grove, encouraging him and 
other socialist to create the Socialist Party of Chile in the following year. The new party 
drew on the same social base as the ChCP as well as the middle class. The ‘United Front’ 
policy of the Third Communist International was not successful in Chile [see section 6.2].  
Arturo Alessandri was in 1932 a more moderate politician than in 1920 when he 
became President for the first time. The initial actions of his second term as Head of State 
demonstrate this.  
Alessandri’s strong electoral victory showed that the electors had tired of so much 
political instability, especially during the Naval Mutiny of 1931 and which became more 
acute in 1932. In this period several Governments some lasting a few weeks or even a few 
days, followed one another. Alessandri’s victory represented a return to the traditional 
politics, ending the Socialist Republic experiment. Despite this defeat, socialism, somewhat 
diffused until then, had become part of the Chilean politics. 
On 20 December 1932, Alessandri, who would take over the Government a few 
days later and wanting to head a stable Government, called out of retirement Rear Admiral 
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Olegario Reyes del Río to offer him the position of Director General of the Navy. Reyes del 
Río held that position during all Alessandri’s period as President 1932-1938 leaving behind 
the period of sudden changes in the higher positions in the Navy.  
Another demonstration that the extreme political instability suffered by Chile had 
finished is that during Alessandri’s second administration the position of Minister of 
Defence was held only by Emilio Bello-Codesido. Also during the whole of Alessandri’s 
second term in office the War and Navy departments were kept under a single ministry. 
This stability does not mean that during this administration there was no political unrest but 
the Armed Forces were not involved in these troubles.   
The most visible effects of the Naval Mutiny of 1931 and the political instability of 
1932 started to fade away during Alessandri’s second Government. Still, from time to time, 
doubts arose that the Armed Forces might become political. Those who fear that the 
military might intervene in politics founded the ‘Milicia Republicana’. The creators 
belonged to different parties [except ChCP] sharing a personal view against militarism. It 
was a white guard composed of civilian volunteers supplied with weapons belonging to the 
Army and supported by President Alessandri. The existence of this organization caused 
uneasiness within the Army. Nevertheless, the Director General of the Navy seemed 
favourably disposed:   
‘The Navy and Army experience had been hard, no matter our sincere 
wishes of avoiding intervention in politics forever and dedicating ourselves 
to the improvement of our services, the public opinion still distrusts our 
intentions. There is doubt that the political virus had been totally banished 
from the minds of these services...This Director General, due to 
considerations that had been made regarding the Republican Militias, 
states: The National Navy considers that the formation of the ‘Milicia 
Republicana’ helps to maintain the health of the Republic…..considering 
them as a cooperative body in keeping social peace and internal 
tranquillity, enabling the President developing his work of national 
reconstruction654
   
’. 
The idea of creating a militia oriented to counteracting militarism was not new in 
Chilean history. One hundred years before in another unstable period the same type of 
organization had been used under the name of National Guard.    
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 An interesting event related to the Naval Mutiny was the support given to Warrant 
Officer Ernesto González by Alessandri`s Government. We must recall that this leader 
became a writer in Crónica, a newspaper financed by Alessandri as a candidate and 
devoted to destabilizing Montero’s Government [see section 10.3]. On reading González’s 
book it might be inferred that the idea of blaming the officers for the lack of discipline, 
culminating with the rebellion, may have been inspired by the speech made by Alessandri 
as a candidate on 19 September 1931. Although the reasons for the support of Gonzalez 
throughout Alessandri’s second Government cannot be totally confirmed, there are strong 
clues showing a privileged relationship between González and Alessandri described below. 
The relationship among them could have been started in Devonport as mentioned before in 
this thesis [see sections 6.1. and 6.3]. After the mutiny, of all the condemned men Ernesto 
González was the one most favoured by governmental decisions. Alessandri’s second 
administration awarded him a pension payment on 31 October 1933. One year later 
Alessandri favoured Gonzalez again sending him commissioned to Mexico with a 
Government salary in foreign currency to study how agricultural schools worked in that 
country. It is possible to question González's qualifications to serve in this position. Upon 
his return he was named as an agent in the Police, without any knowledge of investigative 
work. He was promoted to the rank of Police Inspector in Antofagasta a few days before 
the end of Alessandri’s Government on 30 April 1938. He stayed in service during 
President Aguirre Cerda’s Government and retired in 1941. It must be said that 
Alessandri’s second term in office was supported by the right wing parties and for a period 
by the Radical Party [of social democrat trend]. During this presidential period the ChCP 
was clearly in the opposition. González left his post in the Police in the next Government 
supported by the ‘Popular Front’ political alliance created by the ChCP following the 
orientation adopted by the Congress of the Communist International held in 1935. This 
shows that González far from being a communist as mentioned by some authors was an 
Alessandrist and enjoyed public positions during Alessandri`s second term in office. This 
did not happen with any other mutineer. 
As a consequence of the deep economic crisis of the 1930s which forced a drastic 
reduction in naval personnel as well the mutineers' dismissal, the Navy clearly declined in 
its operative capacity. This situation improved as time elapsed but when naval power was 
possible to be increased because the Chilean economic situation was better, the Second 
World War started and it was impossible to order new ships and weapons abroad. 
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This acute weakening of the Navy is one of the consequences of the period of 
indiscipline which occurred in the Chilean Armed Forces between 1924 and 1932. The 
Naval Mutiny of 1931 is no doubt the most serious event within it. The rebellion also 
influenced the strong success of Montero in the 1931 presidential election because he, as a 
candidate, guided the Government behind the scenes in its struggle against the mutineers, 
avoiding the danger of a violent revolution feared by the majority of the electors. 
In a wider context, the big changes occurring in Chile at the beginning of the 1930s 
were655
 The introduction of socialist ideas in Chile, the achievements of the first term of 
Alessandri in office and those of Ibáñez’s presidency, plus the influence of Armed Forces 
officers participating in the political movements of the 1920s initiated a strong role of the 
State in the economy. This was also provoked as a reaction to the deep crisis started at the 
end of the 1920s and resulted in the end of the liberal economic principles prevailing in 
Chile during the whole nineteenth century
: ‘the definite birth of a new cultural and political pole in the country and this was the left 
with a Marxist orientation’. The Naval Mutiny of 1931 is related to this important event in 
Chilean politics because it was used to promote and consolidate this new cultural political 
force.  
656
                                                 
655       Joaquín Fermandois Huerta, Mundo y Fin de Mundo. Chile en la Política Mundial 
1900-2004, (Santiago: Ediciones Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2005), 
p.112. 
. ‘In international economy policies, this meant 
stressing nationalism or the development ‘towards the inside’ as it was called in Latin 
America later. This orientation in the Chilean economic development remained until the 
1970s.  
 
656  Fermandois, p. 112. 
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AN INTERPRETATION 
 
12. THE CHILEAN NAVAL MUTINY OF 1931:  A REASSESSMENT. 
 
12.1. Background. 
 
 In section 1.2 a discussion about the literature covering the Chilean 1931 mutiny 
was introduced. In consequence of the analysis undertaken during this thesis a reassessment 
of earlier studies and interpretations is necessary. 
William Sater657
The evaluation of the information gathered during the research for this thesis 
enables the present author to differ from this interpretation due to the following. Admittedly 
Alessandri was not plotting a naval mutiny against the administration of Montero and 
Trucco because this Government had a provisional character and a Presidential election was 
scheduled. Then Alessandri could recover power without organizing a subversive 
movement. His candidacy competing with Montero for the presidency is a proof that he 
wanted to regain power by legitimate methods. 
 does not support the idea that Alessandri was plotting a naval 
mutiny while he was in exile in Europe.  
 Nevertheless the evidence cannot be completely disregarded that shows that an 
Alessandrist plot did seek to subvert Latorre and the rest of the Navy to topple the Ibáñez 
Government. The plotters could not anticipate that Ibáñez would fall due to other reasons. It 
is possible that once this conspiracy was under way it developed its own dynamic and 
finally erupted when the Ibáñez regime suddenly collapsed and when the issue of reducing 
the salaries was announced by the new authorities. Thus, Trucco’s [or Montero’s] 
administration suffered the consequences of an action originally initiated by Alessandri to 
destabilize Ibáñez’s Government.   
Regarding Carlos López’ opinion658
                                                 
657  Sater, 1980, p. 267. 
 that storekeeper ratings Manuel Astica-Fuentes 
and Augusto Zagal-Anabalón were the leaders of the mutiny, the evidence shows that these 
 
658  Carlos López-Urrutia, ‘The Chilean Naval Mutiny of 1931’, Revista Derroteros de 
la Mar del Sur’ n.d. 
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individuals, while important at the time of drafting the first subversive manifestoes, cannot 
be the main factors in causing the mutiny since they entered the Navy only a few weeks 
before it began: this was too short a time to permit them gain enough influence over the rest 
of the crews to initiate an event of such magnitude.   
The author believes, after the research done, that the mutiny was more a 
consequence of the political and economical situation than the result of actions of 
individuals like Astica, Zagal or even Warrant Officer González, no matter what was 
written by the press during the trials focusing the causes in individuals rather than in 
historical processes. The reason for this is understandable. Criminal trials are meant to 
punish individuals, not groups, and for journalists it is preferable to illustrate a story with 
the actions of certain characters rather than boring the public with the analysis of the deep 
root of the events. 
A discussion of the explanations of the mutiny by authors of the Marxist trend is 
mentioned in section 1.2 and will be further expanded in section 12.4. It is based in the 
evidence gathered and described during this thesis and mainly in sections 6.2 and 11.1. 
 
12.2. The author’s opinion. 
 
In the author’s opinion, non-Chilean elements also influenced the mutiny’s origin. 
First, it is proven that while Latorre’s modernization was taking place in Devonport Naval 
Dockyard, British communist workers went on board to perform their duties while they 
were under surveillance from the British security services. But there is no evidence of 
direct contact with the crew members who remained in Plymouth with the battleship. Of 
course there was a language barrier, but it must be taken into account as well the long stay 
of the ship in that naval base and the fact that officers and enlisted personnel had to be 
lodged ashore, in messes and barracks, living together with the British personnel of the 
same rank. This influence may have also occurred when the Chileans observed the events 
related to the HMS Lucia mutiny. This rebellion happened while Latorre and HMS Lucia 
                                                                                                                                                     
http://derroteros.peucultural.org.pe/textos/derroteros8/lopez.doc (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
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were in Devonport. The investigative proceedings were carried on in the Officers’ Mess at 
the Naval Base and were widely covered by the local newspapers. 
Before Latorre’s stay, many officers and enlisted men belonging to the Chilean 
Navy were in Great Britain because Scottish and English shipyards built six destroyers, 
three submarines, a submarine tender and two oilers between 1927 and 1929. This contact 
with the British happened immediately after the general strike which paralysed almost the 
whole country for ten days on May 1926. The strike began as a strictly labour dispute of the 
coal miners but it escalated when other unions, mainly the stevedores and transport 
workers, joined. Some argue that this movement had a revolutionary purpose but probably 
its importance, like that of the Chilean Naval Mutiny, was exaggerated for propaganda 
reasons and this may have impressed the Chilean crews of those ships when they were in 
Great Britain. 
Various non-Chilean sources have clarified the role of international communism in 
the organization of the mutiny. These sources, used in conjunction with the Chilean 
materials, provided a clearer view about the participation of the ChCP in the mutiny’s 
closer origins.  
Also the Chilean and non-Chilean sources analyzed as whole enabled a better 
knowledge of the activities of the Chilean exiles in Europe who had the purpose of 
destabilizing Ibáñez’s Government, an action having unforeseen later effects when that 
Government had already ended. 
 
12.3. Similarities and differences between the Chilean naval mutiny and the 
Invergordon mutiny. 
 
As was mentioned in sections 1.2 & 6.2, a few days after the Chilean Naval Mutiny a 
similar event transpired in the British Atlantic Fleet while it was moored at the Scottish 
town of Invergordon659
                                                 
659  The following material has been researched to write about the Invergordon 
Mutiny: Bell and Elleman, ‘The Invergordon Mutiny’, Naval Mutinies of the 
Twentieth Century. An International Perspective, ed. by Christopher Bell and 
Bruce Elleman (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Report by Atlantic Fleet, A.F. 00145, 
9 NOV 1931, p.4. NA. ADM 178/129; Anthony Carew, The lower deck of the 
.  
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The most important similarity is that the Invergordon Mutiny happened when Great 
Britain was also suffering from the same economic crisis as Chile. The British Government 
also ordered a salary reduction but this order was not disseminated through the regular 
channels due to a problem with the official mail. For this reason the crews only learned of 
this news by means of the press when the ships arrived at port for a break. After the news 
published by the newspapers was disseminated, a communication from the Admiralty 
arrived. It had some irritating phrases leading the naval personnel to think that the high 
command was doing nothing to correct the problem. A report from that time states: 
‘Influenced possibly by the example and success of the direct action by 
Trades Union ashore, the Men decided to draw attention to their case 
seizing  the opportunity for the dramatic refusal of duty which was 
presented by the sailing of the fleet on the following morning660
 
’. 
The above reasoning is useful to understand the type of mutiny that happened at 
Invergordon.  It was a sit-in [or tools down] strike, when the workers refuse to fulfil their 
duties but nonetheless stay in their working places. Such type of behaviour was not really a 
mutiny in the sense described by Bell and Ellerman661
In the Chilean and British cases, the influence of the industrial workers procedures 
is evident upon the conduct of the crew members. Professor Geoffrey Till states that since 
crewmembers came from an industrialized working class, they were by no means immune 
to the views and expectations of their former colleagues ashore and for this reason they 
adopted similar behaviour 
. Several union tactics were involved 
in the Chilean case, but the mutineers scaled up the conflict to a higher level than in the 
British case by taking the officers into custody and locking them on board the ships in 
Coquimbo. In ships and shore establishments in Talcahuano and in Valparaíso they acted 
by seizing certain units and schools without imprisoning the officers.  
662
                                                                                                                                                     
Royal Navy, 1900-1939: the Invergordon mutiny in perspective (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1981); Kenneth Edwards, The Mutiny at 
Invergordon (London: Putnam, 1937); Allan Coles &Ted Briggs, Flagship Hood. 
The Fate of Britain´s Mightiest Ship, (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1990). 
. The Valparaiso general strike on 24 August, may have 
 
660  Report by Atlantic Fleet, A.F. 00145, 9 NOV 1931, p.4. NA. ADM 178/129. 
 
661  Bell&Elleman, p.3. 
 
662  Geoffrey Till in: Bell&Elleman, p. xvii. 
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influenced the mutineers in the sense mentioned by Till. It occurred one month after 
Ibáñez’s fall. His Government suppressed this type of social expression of dissatisfaction 
during 1927-1931[see section 11.1]. 
It is also convenient to add a comment about the use of tactics belonging to labour 
disputes at the time of the mutiny. There are two chapters in this thesis entirely devoted to 
the pre 1931 political turmoil in Chile and its impact on the Armed Forces [section 2.2 and 
Chapters 3&4]. In this troubled period officers belonging to the services participated in 
political issues in a clear violation of the law. They created committees and ‘Juntas’ 
[boards] to press their superiors to adopt political reforms and participated in meetings to 
remove or name authorities. On certain occasions, the officers expressed opinions 
collectively by means of letters and telegrams. The enlisted men participating in the mutiny 
claimed that they only followed the example given by the officer’s illegal way of acting. 
And they used this argument in court and through the press as an extenuating circumstance 
or an excuse for their own seditious behaviour.  
The British report said that one of the factors that facilitated the mutiny in the Royal 
Navy was the concentration of ships at Invergordon: no mutiny happened in other fleets 
because they were dispersed among different ports. The Mediterranean fleet is an example 
even though it too endured a salary reduction. In Coquimbo and Talcahuano the 
concentration facilitated the development of the rebellion, but in Valparaíso probably the 
dispersion was a reason that fewer ships and shore establishments joined the mutiny. 
Another similarity between both mutinies is the possible external influence, not 
fully proven in this thesis in the Chilean case. The British report noted: 
‘There is a wide difference of opinion as to whether any outside 
organization actually controlled the outbreak, but, so far, no direct evidence 
of this is forthcoming. In any case, inside the Fleet an organization quickly 
became effective among a large number of discontented men in all ships. 
The absence of outside interests at Invergordon and the opportunities for 
subversive meetings undoubtedly helped the growth of this 
organization663
 
’. 
In both cases there were earlier symptoms of discontent which the officers and the 
Commanding Officers failed to discern. In the British case, however, a shorter time elapsed 
                                                 
663  Report by Atlantic Fleet, A.F. 00145, 9 NOV 1931, p.5. NA. ADM 178/129.  
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between the surfacing of the symptoms and the mutiny. In short, the symptoms were clearer 
in Invergordon than in Coquimbo. 
An important difference between both mutinies is that in the British case the Senior 
Officer in the Atlantic Fleet664
The British report states that early information about the reduction’s extension and 
an investigation of the deprivations that the measure would cause to the crewmembers was 
necessary. Then the presentation of the results to the Admiralty might have prevented the 
men’s participation in indiscipline. But this did not happen according to the First Sea Lord 
because the Cabinet forbade an early circulation of the news about the salary reductions 
until the decision to make it public. In the Chilean case, there was no such prohibition but 
instead there was an erroneous dissemination of the real scope of the reductions and there 
was no official communication to the Armed Forces commands by the Government. These 
measures would have prevented the Chilean crewmembers learning of the reductions by 
reading the confusing and imprecise newspaper reports. 
 sent a message to all ships stating that he understood the 
problems affecting the crewmembers with the salary reductions and that he would present 
this situation to the Admiralty. He also noted that he would send his Chief of Staff to 
London to report the results of the research being done by the Commanding Officers about 
the hardships caused by the salary reductions. In the Chilean case, the Commander in Chief 
of the Active Squadron requested his higher command for precise information about the 
extent of the reductions but he did not tell his subordinates about the actions he had started 
when he received the initial news about the salary cuts. In the Instruction Squadron, the 
Commander in Chief would have written a letter to his higher command but he did not 
communicate to his subordinates any of the actions by which he was attempting to 
minimize the problem. On the contrary, when he lectured his men, he told them about the 
necessity of accepting the reduction of salaries to help the country in its financial problems. 
Another interesting subject covered in the British report is the influence of naval 
schoolmasters:  
‘through whose hands are passed all ratings from boys to Leading Seamen. 
Their opportunities for good or bad influences are enormous and it is 
                                                 
664  The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet Admiral Michael Hodges was sick 
in a hospital since this force left the home bases located in Southern England to 
perform exercises in Scotland. 
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regrettable that some, if not many of these Schoolmasters are frequently of 
a type which is frankly socialist in outlook665
 
’. 
In the Chilean case, the schoolmasters had an important participation influencing the 
mutineers, particularly in Talcahuano, as was explained in a previous chapter [see sections 
8.1&8.2]. Even being very young and having joined the Navy not long before the rebellion, 
their influence was notorious because they were teaching young sailors. Schoolmaster 
Pedro Pacheco-Pérez is a significant example. He worked in the Talcahuano Naval Base 
School of Seaman Apprentices. He took a significant leadership position during the mutiny. 
Years later he was named Mayor of Valparaíso as a member of the ChCP as explained in 
another chapter [see section 10.2]. 
The British document also described the difficulties in finding the proper way of 
representing grievances within the disciplinary system. It stated that the failure of enlisted 
men to present their grievances or demands, forced them to used union methods which 
allowed extremists to become the group's spokesmen. This observation applies also to the 
Chilean case where the crewmembers made no formal demands before the mutiny although 
the reduction in salaries caused great concern. The only exception was that of O’Higgins 
petty officers who told the Executive Officer of this ship that it was necessary to meet the 
Commanding Officer to analyze the salary reductions. As said in a previous chapter [see 
section 7.1], this meeting was postponed until the reception on board of official news about 
the salary problem. But the mutiny erupted while the arrival of the official information was 
still expected. 
González states 666
The main difference between the British and the Chilean example is how the crisis 
was handled. In Great Britain the mutiny did not increase because the Admiralty and the 
Government rapidly addressed the cause of the unrest. And since Commanding Officers 
and officers remained free, they could still influence the mutineers by letting them know 
 that the officers expressed their concerns about the salary 
reductions to Captain Hozven but that the Commanding Officer did nothing to address this 
subject to his superiors, regardless of an earlier promise to do so. If true, his failure to act 
was not investigated by the Court Martial.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                 
665  Report by Atlantic Fleet, A.F. 00145, 9 NOV 1931, p.14. NA. ADM 178/129.   
 
666  González, p.7. 
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that their grievances would be taken into account. In some units, the mutineers only refused 
to take the ships out of harbour. Two capital ships went to sea without suffering any act of 
indiscipline. In the rest of the ships, Commanding Officers assisted by other officers 
finished the preparations for sailing. Christopher M. Bell  write: 
‘These displays of determination, combined with further assurances that the 
men’s grievances would be heard and the sight of other ships preparing for 
sea, had the desired effect. Around 9:30 p.m., the ships of the Atlantic Fleet 
began sailing out of the Cromarty Firth667
 
’. 
In the Chilean case, the officers on board the ships at Coquimbo could exert little 
influence over the mutineers once they were overwhelmed and locked in their cabins, 
although they tried to overcome this situation by trying to contact certain loyal 
crewmembers. The attempt made by the Commander in Chief of the Talcahuano Naval 
Base to dissuade the mutineers failed and when the Commanding Officers of ships and 
shore establishments became aware of this failure they did not attempt to convince their 
crews to remain obedient. They rather dedicated their efforts to delivering their commands 
in an orderly way and abandoning ships and units with the rest of the officers, without 
further attempt to change the mutineers’ minds. The mutiny ended in Chile because the 
Government, after several days, decided to use force. Additionally, the logistical problems 
on board caused problems for the crew, creating a dispute among the rebels.   
Another difference between the two mutinies was that the Admiralty launched an 
investigation to understand the reasons producing the indiscipline in order to prevent a 
repetition of these events. During this investigation, according to Bell and Elleman: ‘No 
evidence surfaced to link the mutiny to subversive activities by the British Communist 
Party, which had apparently been taken completely by surprise668
                                                 
667  Bell&Elleman, p.183. 
’. In Chile, the 
investigation was done very rapidly and mainly oriented to punishing the participants, 
thinking only of the dissuasive effect of sanctions. Awkwardly no one sought to discover 
the root causes of the rebellion. Moreover, until the research done for this thesis, the Navy 
never opened its archives in the more than the seventy five years that have elapsed since the 
mutiny. This refusal facilitated the publication of stories containing serious factual mistakes 
and exaggerations and prevented the use of this material as a case study. 
 
668  Bell&Elleman, p.183. 
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The conclusion of the author of this thesis is that in Chile, besides avoiding the 
investigation of the deep causes of the mutiny only a feeble consideration was given to the 
participation of civilians as instigators and accomplices, although there were strong clues 
deserving a more accurate investigation by the prosecutors.  
This occurred because penal processes were immediately started oriented to the 
determination of individual responsibilities of those committing crimes with the purpose of 
inflicting penalties. The case deserved another type of investigation, such as the one done in 
UK by order of the Board of the Admiralty mentioned before. The consequence of this 
inadequate procedure in such a serious event is that no clear idea of the deep roots of the 
mutiny remained in the historical memory of the Chilean Navy. The lesson that could have 
been obtained from a serious study of this case could have prevented or facilitated the 
handling of other episodes of collective indiscipline that occurred in the following years. 
The most remarkable cases took place in 1963 in the School of Engineering and more 
seriously in 1973 when a group of the Fleet crewmembers were organizing the seizure of 
the ships claiming that they wanted to avoid an officers’ movement against Allendes’s 
Government669
 
. 
12.4 Author's interpretation of this thesis 
  
 This thesis has tried to investigate beyond the conclusions reached by other authors. 
To achieve this goal, the author has studied Chilean and non-Chilean primary sources in 
order to analyse the role of naval officers in politics, a topic which existing literature has 
tended to ignore [see section 1.2]. 
 Employing these materials, we can write better informed narrative of the political 
events of the 1920-1931 period [see Chapters 3 to 6] hich leads to the conclusion that the 
active political participation of the Navy’s officers was one of the causes of the Naval 
Mutiny of 1931. Studying these materials made it possible to set the record straight, 
disregarding stories unsupported by the facts but used instead to advance political interests.  
                                                 
669  This mutiny is the main subject of Jorge Magasich’s book [Los que Dijeron No]. 
Another author is one of the mutineers: Patricio Barroilhet, Memorias de un 
Marino Constitucionalista, (Santiago: Editorial Mosquito Comunicaciones. 
Santiago.2005).  
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The study of these years also showed the negative influence of the political caudillos of the 
1920s. There is substantial evidence that Alessandri, or his followers, met the Latorre’s 
officers and probably petty officers while it was docked in Devonport, in hopes of plotting 
a revolt against Ibáñez. Nor did Ibáñez hesitate to manipulate the Navy’s leadership or 
attract dissatisfied groups within this service, such as the engineers, to achieve his political 
goals.  In short, both politicians substantially weakened the discipline of this service. 
Certainly this was an unforeseen effect. Surprisingly, the mutiny occurred when both 
caudillos were out of power. As a result of the rebellion, the Chilean population, and the 
Navy in particular, suffered from the misguided actions of both important men. 
 Using the criteria of Elihu Rose670, and of Christopher Bell and Bruce Elleman 
a. All phases of such type of phenomenon took place in Chile during 
September 1931. The catalytic event was a salary reduction badly 
communicated by the Government. 
[see 
section 1.3], the events which happened in Chile during the first week of September 1931 
were clearly a mutiny since:  
b. Other pre-requisites enabling qualifying this event as a naval mutiny of 
promotion of interests occurred as well. Nevertheless, the events have also 
some characteristics of a political mutiny following those author’s criteria 
because in addition of seeking an improvement in their problems, the 
participants' second manifesto to the Government tried to force political 
changes. 
c. Contrary to Patricio Manns’s allegations, the 1931 mutiny did not seek to 
seize power or to produce long term revolutionary changes. There is only 
one phrase in the mutineers' manifestoes indicating that they sought a social 
revolution672
                                                 
670  Rose, pp. 561-574. 
. And this phrase was promulgated after the Government 
threatened that it would use force against the rebels. This menace of violence 
radicalized the mutineers, forcing them to state that they would launch 
 
671  Bell&Elleman, p.266. 
 
672   Message from Latorre (Estado Mayor) to Government, 6 SEP 1931. CG, v.2 (V), 
p. 30. BUPERS. 
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revolutionary acts. But by that time they lacked the means of fulfilling their 
threat and very few crewmembers were willing to follow their orders. 
d. The mutiny’s strong emotional impact and the coverage it received in the 
press for several months, influenced national politics, such as blaming 
Montero’s regime for the maltreatment of the mutineers. Another indirect 
result was a spurt in the popularity of the non-communist Marxist groups 
[several socialists groups] and a split in the conservative party, leading to the 
formation of a Christian Socialist faction which, while opposed to economic 
liberalism, was also deeply anti-communist. Later, a group of young men 
belonging to this sector created a Christian Democrat Party that began to 
support a more socially aware form of conservative politics. Bernardo 
Leighton-Guzmán, who was a young leader of the Association of Catholic 
Students in 1931, together with other students belonging to the civilist 
movement, travelled to Coquimbo to convince the mutineers to avoid 
violence and to urge the port’s people to oppose the mutineers. For this 
reason, he met Admiral von Schroeders and once the officer returned to 
Santiago, Leighton sent a letter to the mutineers and went on board Latorre 
to talk to them. There is no evidence that Leighton helped end the mutiny [he 
used the term Revolution673
e. Courts Martial tried and convicted most of the mutineers. Higher courts 
confirmed most of the original sentences but they did commute the death 
penalties. Within a few days of the trial and during his unsuccessful 1931 
campaign, Arturo Alessandri Palma became one of the first politicians 
requesting an amnesty for them. Later and during his second presidency 
[1932-1938] he named the former Warrant Officer Ernesto González-Brion 
]. Leighton subsequently became an important 
politician after the creation of the Christian Democrat Party, serving as a 
Member of Parliament and Minister of the Interior [1964]. During his long 
political life he never mentioned the mutiny as a direct influence in his 
political thought. 
                                                 
673  Otto Boye, Hermano Bernardo: Cincuenta años de vida política vistos por 
Bernardo Leighton, (Santiago de Chile: Andros, 2006), ch. IV. Also in:  
http://hermanobernardo-o.boye.blogspot/2006/08/capitulo-iv.html. 
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to various government’s positions. By 1935, the Comintern supported the 
policy of the ‘Popular Front’ including collaboration between Alessandri’s 
followers and the communists. Alessandri’s generosity toward González 
leads one to think that both men may have become involved while Latorre 
stayed in Devonport and Alessandri was plotting against Ibáñez, but it is 
unlikely that at that time the communists supported this action because the 
policy adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 of ‘class 
against class’ was effective and it did not allow joint actions between the 
ChCP and other political groups. This last reasoning disregards the idea of a 
communist participation in the origin of the mutiny. But in 1932 and later, 
when fascism became a threat to the communists, it is plausible that they 
supported all measures in favour of the condemned mutineers, acting in this 
sense together with the Alessandrists and socialists, when the policy of the 
‘Popular Front’ was closer to being adopted by Comintern, enabling joint 
actions with political parties not affiliated to this international organization. 
Why then do some authors insist in calling this event in Chilean history a 
Revolution? Why today, after eighty years, is this term still used in common language to 
characterize those events? 674
                                                 
674  The first author using this term was the already quoted José Manuel de la Cerda in 
his 1934 book. The most recent uses of the word revolution to characterize the 
Naval Mutiny of 1931 are in three books quoted in this thesis: Manns, La 
Revolución de la Escuadra edited in 1972 and 2002, Magasich, Los Que Dijeron 
No, 2008, and Bravo-Valdivieso, La Sublevación de la Escuadra y el Período 
Revolucionario 1924-1932, edited in 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2010. 
. One of the reasons is the similarity between the Coquimbo 
mutiny and that which occurred on board the Russian battleship Potemkin publicized by the 
1925 film of Sergei Eisenstein produced to extol the Bolshevik Revolution. It is unknown if 
this classic film, outstanding for its artistic innovations, was shown in Chile before the 
The term also is used in that sense in newspapers and magazines. A few examples 
are: ‘La Revolución de la Escuadra de 1973, La Nación, 6 April 2008, 
and  ‘¿Nunca más un golpe en Chile?’, Punto Final, 21 November to 4 December 
2006. 
Several articles published mainly in Internet do the same. For example: ‘A 
propósito de los héroes y la Armada: La Revolución de la Escuadra de 
1931’, Piensa Chile, www.piensachile.com/content/view/7125/6/ acceded 4 AUG 
2010 and ‘A propósito de los héroes y la Armada, la Revolución de la Escuadra de 
1931. Luis Emilio Recabarren, www.luisemiliorecabarren.cl/?q=node/2107, 
accesed 4 August 2010. 
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Naval Mutiny of 1931 but it has been since. Robert Zabrosky 
‘The Potemkin case has been kept alive in modern memory by filmmakers, 
poets, artist and composers......Western historians have treated the 
Potemkin mutiny as an isolated incident that does not warrant closer 
examination. By contrast, the mutiny was widely documented and 
celebrated in Soviet historiography’. 
in a detailed analysis of this 
subject wrote: 
 
Another widely celebrated example was that of the cruiser Aurora, a survivor of the 
battle of Tsushima. This ship, on 25 October 1917, opened fire thus starting the assault on 
the Winter Palace in Saint Petersburg. This event began the October Revolution. Olga 
Ulianova676
Various authors, such as Manns, use the naval mutiny of 1931 to create the ethos of 
the Chilean communism.  In dealing with the Naval Mutiny of 1931, as Manns does, left 
wing authors [see section 1.2] use: ‘History as a way of legitimating actions and as a base 
for the coherence of a group’
 writes: ‘The Russian Revolution was quite popular in Chile, especially among 
the members of the Chilean Worker’s Socialist Party that affiliated with the Third 
Communist International, thus transforming itself into the ChCP in 1922’. 
677. The cover of the first edition of Manns's book closely 
resembled the posters advertising the Potemkin film. Olga Ulianova writes: ‘The burden of 
the symbols has an influence in using the word Soviet in the same manner as the movement 
in the Navy was denominated by some of the media as the Chilean Potemkin678
 El Siglo, the ChCP newspaper also published a commentary
’. 
679
                                                 
675  Robert Zabrosky in: Bell&Elleman, p. 9. 
 in May 1961, signed 
by Luis Enrique Délano, praising Sergei Einseistein’s movie and saying how important this 
film was for the leftist intellectuals. By that time, the enlisted personnel of the Naval 
School of Engineering were involved in acts of indiscipline and some of them were being 
prosecuted. The ChCP used similar arguments to advocate their release as those used with 
the imprisoned mutineers thirty years before. El Siglo was widely used in this new 
 
676  Ulianova, 2007, p.321. 
 
677  Eric Ranger Terence Hobsbawm, The Inventing of the Tradition. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.13. 
 
678   Ulianova, 2007, p.321. 
 
679  ‘Potemkin’, El Siglo, 25 May 1961, p. 3. 
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campaign. Marxist oriented parties were very important by that time in Chilean politics. In 
1961 the ChCP and the Socialist Party, plus other leftist political allies increased their 
percentage of the balloting in consecutive elections. They captured 22.1% of the electorate 
in 1961680 and they thought that electing a president in the future was not impossible. This 
goal was achieved by this coalition almost ten years later with the election of Salvador 
Allende-Gossens in 1970 with 36.3% of the votes681
In 1961, as well, El Siglo published a commemorative article covering a whole 
page, and signed by Manuel Astica which concluded:    
. 
‘No matter that the rebellion of the enlisted men in the Navy [in which I 
had the honour to participate as the Secretary of the Staff] was repressed, 
the movement of the working class, on the contrary, found a stimulus in it 
to build its unity for struggling and creating a more humane and fair 
society682
 
’.  
 This author believes that the behaviour of the ChCP and its writers and journalists 
demonstrates that they were using the mutiny to create a left wing ethos and this is a 
conclusion as a result of the research done.   
Because the 1931 naval mutiny served as a tool of propaganda, it may also explain 
why it became the object of exaggerations and unsubstantiated interpretations. The 
mutiny’s participants did not intend to start a revolution. Their aim was to convince the 
authorities to eliminate the unpopular measure of reducing the salaries at a time of serious 
economic crisis. The Government and the naval authorities performed poorly their duty of 
informing the men in detail about the extension and applicability of the reductions, leading 
to profound uncertainties and fears in the ship companies before the mutiny. In this 
atmosphere, collective acts of indiscipline were one of the options available for the lower 
deck personnel. Possibly, there was a minority of the mutineers who exploited these fears to 
achieve revolutionary goals. But the events proved that they were not a majority and that 
the rebellion did not lead to a revolution.  
                                                 
680  Collier & Sater, p.308. 
 
681  Collier & Sater, p.333. 
 
682   Manuel Astica, ‘30 años de la insurrección de la Armada’, El Siglo, 10 SEP 1961, 
p.3. 
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In the Chilean case, what really happened was that the ChCP and SAIB estimated 
that the country was undergoing an increasing political and social crisis between July 1931 
and October 1932. They believed that this crisis could end in a revolution and due to this, 
they saw a similarity between the Chilean Mutiny and the rebellion of the cruiser Aurora in 
1917. But these two events were only superficially alike. The 1932 election results, 
although showing an increase in popularity of socialism, also demonstrated that the liberal 
and social democratic parties were still powerful, leading to a second Alessandri 
administration [1932-1938] and that the revolution dreamed by the communists was not 
feasible at that time. This election also showed stagnation in the number of communist 
electors, if it is compared with the 1931 election. It seems that revolution envisaged by the 
communists was not an event to be achieved shortly and this path was soon abandoned. 
Both the Socialist and Communist parties later joined the Radical Party in a centre left 
democratic government during the 1938-1946 period, when the policy of ‘United Front' 
was advocated by Comintern. 
The conservative sectors of the Chilean society during the 1930s saw a clear 
communist influence in the Naval Mutiny of 1931. Their newspapers and writers stated 
consistently that the rebellion was initiated by the communists and that some of their 
leaders were members of this party before the mutiny. The sources demonstrate that this is 
not true. The conservative belief about the communist participation was enhanced by the 
fact the successive Governments of that period enacted several measures in favour of the 
mutineers to mitigate or even cancel the penalties, yielding to a campaign magnified by the 
ChCP. For the conservatives, the communist campaign was a demonstration that they were 
the mutiny’s instigators. And in these efforts, the communists were supported by persons 
like the Minister of Defence Marmaduque Grove whom the conservatives considered a 
communist. Another fact opening the way for suspecting communist participation was that 
some mutineers joined leftist parties including the ChCP. But this last action was the result 
of a communist policy of recruiting new members for the future, members who could 
influence the Armed Forces’ personnel if the political situation would evolve towards a 
revolution. The sources demonstrate that they joined the ChCP after the mutiny and not 
before. 
The fact that the mutiny spread from Coquimbo to far distant bases encouraged 
some people to believe that it benefited from detailed planning. This thesis does not support 
this idea. If there was any plotting before the insubordination, it was ill structured and some 
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actions were really improvised. The rebellion spread very fast due to a reason different 
from good planning. Latorre had advanced communication systems (installed in 
Devonport) permitting a speedy dissemination of instructions and slogans. Thus, the 
authorities could not effectively stop the rebels from sending manifestoes to their 
supporters in the Naval Bases of Valparaíso or Talcahuano. A better control of the radio 
stations ashore would have prevented the use of this important resource by the mutineers. 
Another characteristic of this mutiny that does not confirm a careful previous 
planning is the treatment given to the officers by the rebels. Only in the ships anchored in 
Coquimbo were the officers surprised asleep and locked inside their cabins. On board the 
ships in Talcahuano, the officers abandoned their units after becoming aware of the attitude 
of the Commander in Chief of that Base following a vain attempt of this Admiral to 
convince the rebellious personnel to obey orders. The rebels took no action to retain the 
officers on board and sailed with the ships towards Coquimbo. In the shore establishments 
of Talcahuano and Valparaíso, the officers went away without any opposition from the 
mutineers. The way the mutineers handled the officer’s destiny demonstrates that they did 
not have a coordinated command structure, a fact strongly criticized by the SAIB after the 
events. 
The rebellion in the Chilean Navy on 1931 culminated a period of insubordination 
in the Armed Forces which started in 1924 when military and naval officers assumed a role 
in the political leadership in the coup which brought down the parliamentary regime.  
Although naval officers were less involved in the coup than the Army, they nevertheless 
did participate over a long period in politics. Their behaviour more closely resembled those 
of politicians or union members rather than officers of an armed forces service. In that 
hectic period there were collective representations, telegrams of support or rejection, 
meetings devoted to political analysis, lobbying in favour of nominating certain authorities, 
and other types of actions. This validates the lower deck’s argument that they followed the 
bad example set by the officers. 
Part I of this thesis covers this subject in detail supporting the above conclusion by 
means of sources such as published and unpublished memoirs written by witnesses of that 
period and British Embassy reports, never used before for this purpose. This research 
proves that the mutineers’ claim that they followed the bad example set by the officers is 
sustainable and not only an excuse to avoid harsh punishment when prosecuted in Court 
Martial for their wrongdoings. The space devoted in later chapters to the subject of political 
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factors (such as the participation of the ChCP) in the origin of the mutiny must not diminish 
the importance of the bad state of discipline affecting the armed services at the end of the 
Ibañez Government as a relevant cause of this sedition. 
Since 1931, the Navy has not suffered from such an extreme act of indiscipline. 
Mutinies, as Bell and Elleman argue, are a type of collective indiscipline caused by sailors' 
wretched living conditions or poor educational level as happened eighty years ago in Chile 
and elsewhere. The author believes that it is unlikely that a similar phenomenon may occur 
in a state with sound institutions, within the constitutional normality ruling the Chilean 
political environment nowadays, where grievances may be adjudicated more easily.  
Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that societies change and new type of 
conflict or other expression of uneasiness may occur, existing characteristics of social 
behaviour that are permanent such as wrath after a badly communicated reduction of 
benefits.  
Due to the last considerations, the study of mutinies, such as that of 1931 may be 
enlightening for naval leaders and politicians, although it happened in a distant past, when 
Chile was under very different political and social conditions. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS. 
A1. Evaluation of the situation made by the consulting board [Navy Board] on the 
night of 1/ 2 September 1931. 
 
‘Considering the factual situation already produced on board, it is considered that: 
1. A solution should be sought that, preserving Government’s authority and the return 
to discipline, would settle the matter with the Navy’s crews. 
2. It is recommended to adopt a calm solution, avoiding leading the crews to violent 
acts difficult to evaluate in its future implications. 
3. The above is recommended because the country’s condition is favourable for other 
services to adopt the same behaviour as the crews’. 
4. By all means, avoid using force against force because the consequences may not be 
foreseen’. 
 
Source: [Von Schroeders, 1933, p.17] 
 
A2. First mutineers’ manifesto. 
 
The Navy crewmembers’ manifesto 
 
On the night of 31 August to 1 September 1931, the Navy’s Crews, until now 
essentially obedient and never deliberating no matter the changes in political passions, had 
observed that all these manoeuvres had driven the country every day more deeply into 
disorganization, discredit and insolvency. The mentioned manoeuvres were being 
considered as toys in political passions and being used for raising and overthrowing 
governments. 
 282 
 
Today, the Navy’s Crews inspired in the noblest and most wholesome purposes of 
national good, driven by an irrepressible fervour, without disregarding their peacetime 
duties and their obligation to defending the fatherland in case of external war, are using its 
sacred right of thinking and state in front of the country the following agreements, after the 
above statements: 
The crews do not rise against their officers who are respected, nor against discipline 
that would be maintained with iron will, nor against the country who must trust the crews, 
but against the present lack of capacity and the political and fratricide passions close to 
going beyond control.  
Making the above preamble, we consider: 
1. It is a patriotic duty forced the Navy’s Crews to avoid accepting squandering 
and depreciations in the country’s Treasury, due to the present Government’s incapacity 
and the lack of honesty of the previous administrations. 
2. That the present government had only used the same policy of their 
predecessors, with an absolute lack of initiative and understanding to solve economic 
problems. For these reasons we agree on: 
First: Not accepting for any reason that the government in charge of the 
administration and country’s peace should force the less affluent to suffer 
cuts and sacrifice in their already modest life to balance situations created by 
bad governing people and to cover a deficit created by constant errors and 
lack of probity in the ruling classes. 
Second: The empowered authorities will request the extradition of the absent 
politicians to be tried under the Law in order to establish responsibilities.  
Third: The Government, in compliance with its duties of watching over the 
sacred rights of all citizens [civilian, military and naval] and for the in 
defence of the liberty, must avoid by all means the creation in the conscience 
of masses of an attitude hostile to the Armed Forces. 
Fourth: The Navy’s Crews, in their firm purpose that their rights and 
aspirations are considered, demand that both squadrons remain anchored in 
this bay until there is a satisfactory resolution regarding the problems 
presented to the Government’s consideration. 
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Fifth: While a single crewmember stays on board a Chilean warship, its guns 
will never be aimed against the brothers within the people.  
Sixth: With the purpose of allowing the country to resolve its problems, the 
Navy’s Crews concede a period of forty eight hours to answer satisfactorily 
the demands contained in this document. 
Seventh: At the same time, we wish to state that we have not been influenced 
by anarchists’ ideas and that we would not tolerate anything threatening to 
plunge the country into the abyss of social disintegration. We are not solely 
defending ourselves, but we also wish to help our fellow citizens suffering at 
present from deprivation caused by governmental incapacity. 
 
 Coquimbo, 1 September 1931. 
 
Date and time of radio message transmission:  01 SEP 1931. 16:30.  
Reception time    : 16:55 
Source: von Schroeders, pp. 6-8.  
 
A2. Second mutineers’ manifesto. 
 
Second radio message sent by the Crews received in Santiago almost at midnight 1 
September 1931. 
 
What is needed by the navy’s crews? 
 
Resources favourable to the people:  
While until now the Government had limited itself to reduce expenditures by cutting 
public servants' salaries and abolishing employment and public posts, no action had 
been attempted demonstrating any interest in changing the present financial 
situation. We suggest the following ideas: 
1. Set a prudent period in which the government would cease paying the 
external debt for the sole purpose of establishing the internal financial order of the 
country during that period. 
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2. To subdivide the productive land with the purpose of creating more 
producers and national owners.  
3. Gathering a capital of three hundred million pesos or more within the Credit 
Agencies, Government Agencies and Army and Navy Benefit Associations to invest 
in productive industries to provide work to the unemployed. Among such activities, 
should be mentioned building homes for workers, enlarging factories, etcetera. To 
avoid excessive imports of foreign articles, we make a patriotic call to all Chilean 
millionaires to supply funds to the Government, in the form of a loan, to enable 
organizing job creating industries. 
4. Economies. Closing the following schools for two years: Seaman 
Apprentices, Torpedo, Telecommunications, Naval Gunnery and Machinists’. 
Eliminate from the Navy the auxiliary officers and the Arsenal guards. This last 
group could be replaced by Petty Officers who had remained long periods at sea. 
Reduce the compulsory military service or draft to one year. Tax heavier, in 
proportion to the area, the land not cultivated. Demand that the Government Agency 
in charge of regulating banking reduces the interest rate of capital deposited in 
banks to 2% for deposits of more than $10.000, to make this capital be invested in 
productive activities. Free clothing: the naval personnel should be given free 
uniforms as in the Army. 
5. Food supplies: reduce milk; reduce fat by 20%; increase tea by 2 grams, and 
more sugar to every man’s food allowance. In the rest of articles, return to the 
allowance valid on 31 August. 
6.  Retirement Law. Delete the last Orders of Council keeping valid only table 4 
of Order of Council number 3743 dated on 23 December 1927. This document set 
the salary scale based on retirement after serving twenty years or voluntarily 
retirement after serving fifteen years. 
7.  Promotion and Navy Lists. Promotions shall be made in accordance to the 
former Regulation number four, personnel at present having stayed in excess in their 
ranks, shall be promoted at once.  
8. Salaries. We accept income tax current until 31 July. The reason for this is 
that our personnel have higher expenses because they have to stay far from home 
due to their type of career and life is becoming more expensive. 
 285 
9.  Return to service. Captain Arístides del Solar Morel shall be returned to 
active duty from retirement.  
Source: von Schroeders, pp. 14-16.  
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APPENDIX B: SHIPS AT COQUIMBO ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1931 
 
ACTIVE SQUADRON R.Adm Campos 
Chief of 
Staff    Cdr. Daroch 
     
TYPE NAME  CLASS 
COMMANDING  
OFFICER 
Cruiser O´Higgins Flag Ship Elswick Capt. Díaz 
Destroyer Hyatt  Serrano Cdr. Becerra 
Destroyer Videla  Serrano Cdr. Aylwin 
Destroyer Aldea  Serrano 
Cdr. 
Bahamondez 
Destroyer Riquelme  Serrano Cdr. Yánquez 
     
Tug Gálvez    
Tug Artillero    
 
 
INSTRUCTION SQUADRON Capt. Hozven 
Chief of 
Staff    Cdr. Obrecht 
     
TYPE NAME  CLASS 
COMMANDING  
OFFICER 
Battleship Latorre Flag Ship Dreadnought Capt Hozven 
Destroyer Serrano  Serrano Cdr. Gallardo 
Destroyer Orella  Serrano Cdr. Huber 
Destroyer Lynch  1914 destroyer Cdr. Ward 
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APPENDIX C: SHIP AND SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS IN TALCAHUANO ON 1 
SEPTEMBER 1931 
 
1. Flag Officer. R.Adm. Roberto Chappuzeau-Cienfuegos  
2. Arsenal. Capt. José A. Goñi-Germain 
3. IV Section Arsenal. Cdr. Antonio Alviña-Vergara 
4. School of Naval Gunnery. Cdr. Gastón Nef -Videau [18 students only]. 
5. Gunnery and Ammunition Depot. Cdr. Luis Ramírez-Ossa 
6. Coastal Artillery Talcahuano. Cdr. Fidel Alviña-Vergara 
6. Naval Hospital. Lt Cdr. Surgeon Jorge Soto-Moreno 
7. School of Seaman Apprentices. Cdr. Jorge Guillermo Troncoso-Palacios. This school 
had a crew of 274 men. 115 were students. The rest belonged to the staff and a few 
students of a course of boatswains. There was also a sailing frigate used as a school of 
merchant marine officers dependent on this establishment. It had 32 students. 
8. School of Machinists. Engineer Cdr. Plutarco Aedo-Sepúlveda 
9. School of Torpedo and Electricity, Torpedo Depot. Cdr. Guillermo Ilabaca- León 
10. Submarine Depot. Lt Cdr. Danilo Bassi-Galleguillos 
11. Cruiser Chacabuco, destroyers Williams and Uribe.  Lt Cdr. Alfredo Caces-Ramírez [he 
was the Executive Officer of this group of reserve ships; the Commanding Officer was 
the Arsenal CO] 
12. Cruiser Prat. Lt. Cdr. Carlos Mewes-Ortiz [Another reserve ship] 
13. Patrol Ship Micalvi. Lt Cdr. Pedro Espina Ritchie 
14. Destroyer Riveros. Cdr.  Jorge Guillermo Troncoso-Palacios [he was also the 
Commanding Officer of the School of Seaman Apprentices]. This ship was inside one of 
the dry docks] 
15. Cruiser Blanco Encalada. Cdr. Gastón Nef-Videau [serving as well as Commanding 
Officer School of Naval Gunnery]. This was a training ship for engineering midshipmen.  
16. Submarine Tender Ship Araucano. Cdr.  Muñoz-Valdés. [Commander in Chief 
Submarine Squadron]       
17. Submarine Thompson. Cdr. Sady Ugalde-Urquieta 
18. Submarine Simpson. Lt. Cdr. Gustavo Silva-Silva 
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19. Submarine Fresia H5. Lt. Cdr Alberto Julio-Miranda 
20. Submarino Quidora H4. Lt. Cdr Gustavo Toro-Gertosio 
21. Submarino Guacolda H1. Lt Cdr Gustavo Virgilio- Aguirre 
22. Patrol Ship Leucotón. Lt Cdr Guillermo Calvo-Le Beuffe 
23. Destroyer Condell. Cdr. Víctor Ramm-Seibt. This ship was part of the Instruction 
Squadron but was undergoing maintenance in Talcahuano. 
24. Patrol Ship Sibbald. Lt Cdr. Auxiliary Fleet. Luis Olave-Escobar 
25. Submarine O’brien. Lt Cdr. Alfredo Schulz-Gamboa. This ship was being repaired and 
could no sail at that time. 
26. Submarines Guale, Tegualda and Rucumilla. Lt. Cdr.  CC Danilo Bassi-Galleguillos 
[also Commanding Officer Submarine Depot]. These submarines were being repaired.  
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APPENDIX D: SHIPS AND SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS IN VALPARAÍSO ON 1 
SEPTEMBER 1931. 
 
NAVAL BASE 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 
  
Radm. Francisco 
Nieto-Gallegos 
CHIEF OF STAFF   
Capt. Daniel 
Valenzuela-
Lafrenz 
 
SHIPS 
   
Type Name  
Commanding 
Officer 
Oiler Rancagua At Valparaíso 
Cdr. Miguel 
Bahamondez -
Torrejón 
Oiler Maipo Sailing to  Panamá  
Tug Galvarino At Valparaíso  
Training Ship Baquedano Abroad  
    
SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS    
    
Naval Academy   
Capt. Julio 
Allard-Pinto 
Telecommunications Depot   
Cdr. Emilio 
Merino-Lemus 
School of Telecommunications   
Cdr. Emilio 
Merino-Lemus  
School of Mechanics   . 
Coastal Artillery Group and 
School of Coastal Artillery 
  
Capt. Rodolfo 
Turenne-Badilla 
Silva Palma Barracks   Lt Cdr. Fernando 
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Aranda-Osorio 
Naval Hospital    
Radm [Ret.] 
Bracey-Wilson 
Radio Station Las Salinas   
Cdr. Emilio 
Merino-Lemus 
Radio Station Playa Ancha    
Arsenal    
Cdr. Juan 
Gerken- Mahn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 291 
APPENDIX  E: MEMBERSHIP OF OFFICERS’ COMMITTEES OR JUNTAS 
 
COMMITTEE NAMED IN NAVAL CLUB, VALPARAISO 
Source: [Bennet. N.d. p.81] 
 
7 September 1924 
 
Rear Admiral Gómez-Carreño, Rear Admiral Engineer Diógenes-Córdova, Captain Carlos 
Ward- Rodríguez, Commander Abel Campos- Carvajal, Lieutenant Commander Luis 
Muñoz- Artigas, Lieutenant Enrique Cordovez- Madariaga, Lieutenant Commander Supply 
Corps Carlos Zeggers and Engineer 1st. class Tadeo Miqueles 
 
THE MEMBERS OF THE NAVAL AND MILITARY JUNTA 
 
The names of the officers of this committee changed with time and there is no unanimity 
among sources on this point. But the following is one commonly accepted: 
 
NAVAL OFFICERS INCORPORATED ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1924  
Source: [Bennett, p.81] 
 
Commanders Olegario Reyes del Río, Benjamín Barros-Merino, Lautaro Rosas-Andrade, 
Carlos Jouanne de la Motte du Portail, Julio Dittborn-Torres and Luis Escobar-Molina. 
Reyes, Barros and Rosas are the only named in another source [Donoso, p.398] 
 
THE WHOLE LIST 
Source: [Bennett, p.81] 
 
Colonels Arturo Ahumada and Fernández Pradel; 
Lieutenant Colonels Salinas, Ewing, Blanche, Díaz and Charpin 
Majors Canales, Mujica, Puga, Viaux, Grove, del Pozo, Grasset, Ibáñez, Sáez y Vergara 
Captains Moreno, Fenner, Aguirre, Vásquez, Cabrera, Toro, Millán 
Lieutenents Urízar, Bravo, Lazo, Calvo and Zúñiga.  
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To these officers of the Army and Carabineros [see Definitions] it must be added Police 
Chief Dinator. 
 
Commanders Ditborn, Barros Merino, Jouanne and Escobar were the Navy’s 
representatives. 
 
The names quoted are those most frequently appearing in the historiography. It must 
be underlined that Ibáñez was the leader ‘in the shadows’. The Army officers Alfredo 
Ewing Acuña, Bartolomé Blanche Espejo, Pedro Charpin Rival, Óscar Fenner Marín, Juan 
Millán Iriarte and Alejandro Lazo Guevara must be taken into account because of their 
important and long political participation, especially when Carlos Ibáñez ruled the country. 
Carlos Sáez Morales had an interesting participation within the Army and he wrote the 
already quoted book. This source may be used trustily due to its soundness and because the 
writer was a personal witness of many events inside this Junta.  
The members belonging to the Navy did not have a relevant participation in national 
politics except Olegario Reyes del Río who returned to the Navy in the 1930s as Director 
General with the rank of Rear Admiral. The writer of the 11 September manifesto was 
Captain Óscar Fenner who was an attorney. 
 
MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF 23 JANUARY 1925 
Source: [Monreal, p.258] 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ibáñez 
Lieutenant Colonel Marmaduque Grove 
Captain Sócrates Aguirre 
Captain Manuel Hormazábal 
DELEGATES 
Captain Alejandro Lazo [Cavalry School] 
Captain Carlos López [Ministry of War] 
Captain Enrique Zúñiga [Army Aviation] 
Captain Óscar Fenner [Carabineros] 
Captain Fernando Cabezón [Tacna Regiment] 
Captain Armando Vásquez [Cavalry Group] 
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Captain Sócrates Aguirre [Pudeto Regiment] 
Captain Amaro Pérez [Cazadores Regiment] 
Lieutenant Adolfo Ballas [Buin Regiment] 
Lieutenant José Jara [Valdivia regiment] 
Lieutenant Luis Alarcón [Railway Regiment] 
Lieutenant Deleskar Iribarren [Signals Regiment] 
Lieutenant Manuel Hormazábal [Military Academy] 
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GLOSSARY 
                                                         
 
Abominable clique or ‘execrable camarilla’. This was a group of civilian politicians with 
close ties with Alessandri. The revolutionary Army officers considered that this group had 
an immense power and were responsible of unethical manoeuvres and corruption. 
 
Carabineros. At that time it was a cavalry troop of the Army dedicated to police tasks, 
specially in rural areas while the ‘Policías’ acted mainly in urban areas. Ibañez, as a 
President in 1927, turn Carabineros into a national police, independent of the Army and 
absorbing the ‘Policías’ while Alessandri, in his second term, created a civilian police 
oriented to criminal investigation known until now as ‘Policía de Investigaciones’. 
 
Comintern or the Communist International (also known as the Third International) was an 
international communist organization founded in Moscow in March 1919. The International 
intended to fight ‘by all available means, including armed force, for the overthrow of the 
international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a 
transition stage to the complete abolition of the State683
 
’. Though this stated purpose, the 
Comintern functioned chiefly as an organ of Soviet control over the international 
communist movement. 
Civil War of 1891. This internal conflict is called sometime “Revolution of 1891. This 
author prefers calling it a civil war although some political restructuring took place after it, 
since two different entirely Chilean armies and navies were organized fighting successive 
combats between January and August 1891. 
 
                                                 
683  Security Service MI5, ‘History: The Communist Threat’, 
<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-communist-threat.html> (accesed 19 July 
2010) 
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Chilean Names. In Chile, as in Spain and other Spanish speaking countries the full name 
of a person is given in the following order: Christian Name, father’s family name and at the 
end mother’s family name. If it is necessary to quote a person’s name in an abbreviated 
form, the Christian name followed by the father’s family name is used. For example Arturo 
Alessandri-Palma will be quoted as Mr Alessandri or Arturo Alessandri (not Arturo Palma). 
The Spanish full spelling of names will be respected in this thesis and usually the full name 
will appear at the first time and the abbreviated form in the following quotations. 
 
Coastal Gunners [Artilleros de Costa]. They manned the Coastal Artillery Forts and were 
in charge of internal security of the Naval Bases. 
 
Director General de la Armada. Literally ‘Navy’s Director General’. It was the top 
position in the Chilean Navy at that time and it was served usually by a Vice Admiral, the 
highest rank of those days. Later (1927), President Ibáñez eliminated this position and the 
senior naval officer became the Inspector General. 
 
Governor. The Chilean provinces at that time were ruled by an ‘Intendente’ but this term 
has been translated as ‘Governor’ in the absence of a better one. 
 
La Moneda. The Santiago’s Presidential Palace so called because it was a mint in the 
colonial times. 
 
Minister of the Interior. In Chilean constitutional tradition, this Minister is the senior 
member of the Cabinet and if the President is absent by any reason [e.g. trips, illness] he 
becomes the Chief of the State with the title of Vice President. In Chile, there is no elected 
permanent Vice President. Several presidents, to designate their successor until a new 
election would take place, used this mode. This Minister excerpts supervision over the 
police. 
 
Naval and Military Junta or ‘Junta Militar y Naval. A committee formed by junior 
officers belonging to both services of the Armed Forces and the Police in September 1924 
with the objective to influence politically [see names in Appendix E]. Not to be confused 
with the Government Junta or ‘Junta de Gobierno’, a committee of three flag officers 
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who assumed the executive power due to the resignation of president Alessandri in 
September 1924. Another Junta de Gobierno was formed after the coup of 23 January 1923. 
 
Navy Board. In the Chilean Navy this had as members all the flag officers present in 
Valparaiso where the naval headquarters are located. It had an advisory role until 1925. It is 
said that admiral Montt used a phrase that summarized this: ‘After hearing that Naval 
Board, my resolution is…’. 
 
Navalism was an idea authored by Alfred T. Mahan, a naval historian. It held that 
economic power and a strong navy were what made a nation great. The navy is necessary to 
protect the markets, raw materials, and merchant marine necessary for a strong economy. 
Thus, a strong navy and naval bases are required to maintain a strong economy and 
guarantee economic expansion. This concept was popular throughout the US, Germany, 
and Japan.  
 
 ‘Sabre’s Rattling’ or ‘Ruido de Sables’. Demonstrations of disagreement expressed in 
the Chilean Senate public galleries by Army officers rattling with the sabres they normally 
wore at that time, as part of their uniforms. 
 
Unión Nacional. A political coalition between the Conservative Party and liberal groups. 
The other coalition was the Alianza Liberal supporting Arturo Alessandri in the 1920 
election. This latter political alliance included more leftist liberal groups plus the Radical 
and the Democrat Party. 
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Home Office (HO). 
HO 144  Disturbances: Payments from Russia in aid of 
the General Strike. 
7985: General Strike, May 1926: publications 
likely to cause mutiny, sedition, disaffection, 
etc.;  
7985: Order under Emergency Regulations, 
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Chilean Navy archival sources. 
 
Proceedings of the Navy Board. Chilean Naval Archives. 
 
Officers records. Chilean Navy Bureau of Personnel 
(BUPERS) archives. 
 
Proceedings and other documents related to court martial 
and administrative processes. Chilean Navy Bureau of 
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The sources of this type are quoted as in the following 
example: 
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These sources are documents (mainly Court Martial 
proceedings) until now kept by Dirección General de Personal 
de la Armada in Viña del Mar, Chile, and at the end of this 
thesis will be transferred to Museo Naval y Marítimo de 
Valparaíso (Archivo Histórico de la Armada). 
These documents are bound in volumes listed below in the 
following tables. 
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TABLE I. FILES ORIGINALLY BELONGING TO NAVAL COURT VALPARAÍSO. 
 
 
 
Vol. 
 
COVER INFORMATION 
 
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS 
 
 
PAGES 
V1(V) JUZGADO NAVAL DE 
VALPARAÍSO. CAUSA 
CRIMINAL POR LOS 
SUCESOS ACAECIDOS 
EN LA ESCUADRA. (456 
M) 
Contiene el proceso instruido por el 
Fiscal CN Enrique Cordovez Madariaga 
en contra de la tripulación amotinada del 
acorazado Latorre y la Sentencia del 
Consejo de Guerra de San Felipe. 
Proceedings in Court Martial sitting in 
San Felipe. Mutinied Latorre's 
personnel. Prosecutor: Cdr. Enrique 
Cordovez. Includes verdict. 
461 
V2(V) SENTENCIA DEL 
CONSEJO DE GUERRA 
CRUCERO O’HIGGINS 
( 456 L) 
 
   
 
Contiene el Proceso instruido en por el 
Fiscal CF Gastón Kulcewsky en contra la 
tripulación amotinada del crucero 
O’Higgins y la Sentencia del Consejo de 
Guerra de La Serena. 
Proceedings in Court Martial sitting in 
La Serena. Mutinied O’Higgins 
personnel. Includes verdict. Prosecutor: 
Cdr. Gastón Kulcewsky. 
   572  
V3(V) DICTAMEN DEL 
FISCAL.(456 I) 
Investigación administrativa instruida 
por el Fiscal CN Julio Allard Pinto en 
contra de los Oficiales de las Escuadras 
de instrucción, de Evoluciones y del 
Apostadero Naval de Valparaíso. Incluye 
solamente la Vista Fiscal y una 
indagación de la conducta del CN(R.) 
Carlos Frödden-Lorenzen (ex Ministro 
de Marina y del Interior). 
Administrative Investigation by 
Prosecutor: Captain Julio Allard. Ships 
anchored in Coquimbo Officers. Shore 
establishments of Valparaíso officers. 
Investigation about Captain Carlos 
Frödden-Lorenzen (Former Minister of 
the Navy) actions. Prosecutor’s 
summary. 
48 
V4(V) CUADERNO ANEXO N°4 
(456C) 
 
Causa Judicial instruida por el Fiscal 
Osvaldo Prieto por los sucesos ocurridos 
en las Escuadra de Evoluciones y de 
Instrucción surtas en Coquimbo. 
486 
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Proceedings of Criminal Investigation 
against officers of ships anchored in 
Coquimbo by Prosecutor: Osvaldo 
Prieto. 
 
V5(V) CUADERNO ANEXO N°5 
(456D) 
Actas del Consejo de Guerra instruido en 
contra de los Oficiales en la Escuela de 
Comunicaciones de Viña del Mar (no 
incluye la sentencia) 
Proceedings in Court Martial sitting in 
Viña del Mar. Judgement of officers not 
including verdict.  
 
1046 
V6(V) CUADERNO ANEXO N°6 
(456E) 
Actas del Consejo de Guerra instruido en 
contra de los oficiales en la Escuela de 
Comunicaciones de Viña del Mar 
(incluye la sentencia). 
Proceedings in Court Martial sitting in 
Viña del Mar. Judgement of officers 
including verdict. 
 
801 
V7(V) JUZGADO NAVAL DE 
VALPARAÍSO CAUSA 
CRIMINAL  
AMOTINAMIENTO DE 
LAS TRIPULACIONES. 
 (456 A). 
Contiene solamente declaraciones sobre 
los sucesos en las reparticiones de 
Valparaíso. Fiscal CN Julio Allard P.). 
Statements about actions on Shore 
Establishments in Valparaíso. 
Prosecutor: Captain Julio Allard. 
 
352 
V8(V) APOSTADERO NAVAL 
DE VALPARAÍSO. 
CONSEJO DE GUERRA 
TRIPULACIÓN. (456B) 
Contiene el proceso instruido por el 
Fiscal CF Marcial Sanfuentes en contra 
de la tripulación  amotinada de la 
Escuela de Comunicaciones, Cuartel N°2 
Silva Palma y los buques Aldea, 
Riquelme, Serrano, Lynch, Orella y 
Rancagua. 
Proceedings of Criminal Investigation by 
prosecutor: Commander Marcial 
Sanfuentes. 
Mutinied personnel belonging to Escuela 
de Telecomunicaciones, Cuartel N°2 
Silva Palma and Aldea, Riquelme, 
Serrano, Lynch, Orella y Rancagua. 
 
288 
Total pages:       4,054. 
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TABLE II. FILES ORIGINALLY BELONGING TO NAVAL COURT VALPARAÍSO. 
 
  
 
Vol. 
 
COVER INFORMATION 
 
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS 
 
 
PAGES 
V1(T) SUMARIO ADMINISTRATIVO 
(OFICIALES) 
 
Instruido por el Fiscal Osvaldo 
Prieto Castro. Incluye Dictamen 
del Fiscal. Contiene declaraciones 
y dictamen del Fiscal. 
Administrative Investigation by 
Prosecutor: Osvaldo Prieto Castro. 
Talcahuano’s officers. 
 
363 
V2(T) CAUSA ADMINISTRATIVA 
PARA ESTABLECER LA 
ACTUACIÓN DE LOS EE CC. 
 
Fiscal CC Guillermo Calvo. 
Administrative Investigation about 
civil employees by Prosecutor: 
Guillermo Calvo. 
 
155 
V3(T) INFORMES ORIGINALES DE 
LOS JEFES Y OFICIALES DEL 
GRUPO AC. 
 
Partes y oficios. 
Reports and documents about 
Coastal Artillery officers. 
90 
V4(T) ANTECEDENTES VARIOS  (N° 
1) 
 
Contiene cartas, telegramas, 
mensajes (radios) de carabineros e 
investigaciones sumarias 
administrativas desarrolladas para 
determinar la participación de 
gente de mar en los hechos. 
Miscellaneous items: telegrams, 
messages, Administrative 
Investigations of non 
commissioned personnel. 
206 
V5(T) ANTECEDENTES VARIOS  (N° 
2) 
 
Contiene cartas, telegramas, 
mensajes (radios) de carabineros e 
investigaciones sumarias 
administrativas desarrolladas para 
determinar la participación de 
gente de mar en los hechos. 
Miscellaneous items: telegrams, 
messages, Administrative 
Investigations of non 
commissioned personnel. 
276 
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V6(T) ANTECEDENTES VARIOS  
(N°3) 
 
Contiene declaraciones 
manuscritas bastante ilegibles. 
Miscellaneous items: Illegible 
handwritten statements. 
154 
V7(T) ANTECEDENTES VARIOS  
(N°4) 
 
Contiene declaraciones 
manuscritas bastante ilegibles. 
Miscellaneous items: Illegible 
handwritten statements. 
170 
V8(T) LISTA DE DECLARACIONES. 
 
Solamente es un listado gente de 
mar (y unos pocos oficiales) que 
prestaron declaraciones que 
estarían en v.13(T) y v.14(T). 
It is only a List of Statements in 
v.13 (T) and v.14 (T). 
13 
V9(T) VISTA FISCAL Proceso instruido en contra de las 
tripulaciones amotinadas en 
Talcahuano por el fiscal CF Luis 
Ramírez Ossa. 
Proceedings of Criminal 
Investigation against Talcahuano’s 
mutinied by prosecutor: 
Commander Luis Ramírez-Ossa.  
38 
V10(T) CONSTITUCIÓN DEL 
CONSEJO DE GUERRA 
PRESIDIDO POR EL AUDITOR 
NAVAL FERNANDO REYES 
UGARTE. 
 
Acta de constitución del Consejo 
de Guerra y otros documentos 
procesales. 
Act of Constitution of Court 
Martial in Talcahuano. 
Presiding Judge: Fernando Reyes 
Ugarte. 
6 
V11(T) ACTA DEL CONSEJO DE 
GUERRA (TRIPULACIÓN)  
(456 K) 
 
Contiene declaraciones de reos y 
testigos. 
Statements by witnesses and 
defendants in Court Martial 
mutinied personnel Talcahuano. 
146 
V12(T) SENTENCIA DEL CONSEJO 
DE GUERRA (TRIPULACIÓN) 
(456J) 
Contiene solamente la sentencia. 
Court Martial for enlisted 
personnel. Verdict only. 
56 
V13(T) SUMARIO JUDICIAL TOMO I 
(OFICIALES). (456F) 
Contiene declaraciones de 
oficiales de Talcahuano. 
Proceedings of Criminal 
Investigation. Statements by 
officers. Talcahuano. 
358 
V14(T) SUMARIO JUDICIAL TOMO II 
(OFICIALES).(456G) 
 
Proceedings of Criminal 
Investigation. Statements by 
officers. Talcahuano 
154 
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V15(T) SUMARIO JUDICIAL TOMO III 
(OFICIALES). (456H). 
IN CD 115 
V16(T) DICTAMEN DEL FISCAL 
(TOMO IV) (OFICIALES)  
Dictamen del Fiscal en Causa 
Judicial contra Oficiales. 
Prosecutor’s summary. 
Talcahuano’s officers. 
 
44 
V17(T) CAUSA 366 (OFICIALES). 
NOTIFICACIONES 
 
Contiene además decretos de 
amnistía. FALTA. 
Notifications. Talcahuano’s 
officers. 
 
6 
V18(T) CUADERNO DE 
COMPETENCIAS 
Proceso contra oficiales de 
Talcahuano. 
Proceedings of Criminal 
Investigation, jurisdictional 
dispute. 
 
28 
V19(T) ANEXO A PARTES DE 
TALCAHUANO 
Partes de los Comandantes de 
buques y Jefes de Reparticiones y 
de otros oficiales. 
Commanding Officers Reports. 
Other Officers Reports. 
 
206 
V20(T) ANEXO B  BITÁCORAS 
BUQUES TALCAHUANO 
Extractos de bitácoras de buques y 
reparticiones. 
Talcahuano ships. Log Books 
summaries. 
 
53 
V21(T) ANEXO C DOCUMENTOS 
VARIOS TALCAHUANO 
Oficios, mensajes y otros 
documentos emitidos por el 
Apostadero Naval (T). Oficios y 
partes del Ejército y de oficiales 
navales que actuaron junto al 
Ejército en Talcahuano. 
Documents issued by Talcahuano 
Naval Base: letters, messages.  
Army reports regarding naval 
officers action’s with this service 
in Talcahuano. 
 
118 
V22(T) ANEXO D TELEGRAMAS E 
INFORMES  
De buques de Valparaíso y 
Talcahuano. 
Telegrams and reports regarding 
ships (Talcahuano and Valparaíso) 
 
68 
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V23(T) ANEXO E INFORMACIONES 
DE PRENSA 
Recortes de diarios de Concepción 
y Talcahuano con noticias de la 
zona y de otras ciudades. 
Talcahuano and Concepción 
newspapers clippings. 
59 
V24(T) ANEXO F CALIFICACIONES 
OFICIALES TALCAHUANO 
Fotocopias de Calificaciones 
Anuales. 
Annual reports of Talcahuano 
officers (copies).  
 
247 
V25(T) ANEXO G ORDENES DE 
VÍVERES TALCAHUANO 
Algunos documentos firmados por 
amotinados. 
Official documents signed by 
mutineers. 
 
87 
                Total pages:                3,216.
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TABLE III. FILES ORIGINALLY BELONGING TO DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DEL PERSONAL 
DE LA ARMADA (BUPERS) REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS. 
 
Vol. COVER INFORMATION SUMMARY OF CONTENTS PAGES 
DP 
1 
ÍNDICE DE 
ANTECEDENTES DEL 
AMOTINAMIENTO EN 
VALPARAÍSO Y BUQUES 
Colección de listas elevadas por los buques y 
reparticiones proponiendo expulsar o mantener 
en servicio a personal de gente de mar aplicando 
la Orden Ministerial N° 64 del 22 de septiembre 
de 1931. Versión digital. 
Ships and Valparaiso’s shore establishments. List 
of non commissioned personnel classified for 
application of administrative punishments 
according to Order N° 64 22 September 1931. 
Digital version . 
 
533 
DP 
2 
ÍNDICE DE 
ANTECEDENTES DEL 
AMOTINAMIENTO EN 
TALCAHUANO  Y 
BUQUES 
Listas elevadas por los buques y reparticiones 
proponiendo expulsar o mantener en servicio a 
personal de gente de mar aplicando la Orden 
Ministerial N° 64 del 22 de septiembre de 1931. 
Lista de personal de los buques de Talcahuano 
que se amotinaron, fueron a Coquimbo y después 
se rindieron en Valparaíso y que fue enviado a 
Talcahuano por ferrocarril. Lista de personal de 
otros buques y reparticiones que se embarcaron 
en los buques que fueron a Coquimbo 
amotinados. Lista del personal que permaneció 
detenido en la Cárcel de Chillán y en el 
Regimiento O’Higgins. Versión digital. 
 
Ships and Talcahuano’s shore establishments. 
List of non commissioned personnel classified 
for application of administrative punishments 
according to Order N° 64 22 September 1931. 
List of Talcahuano’s personnel travelling to 
Coquimbo in mutinied ships. 
List of imprisoned personnel sent by train from 
Valparaíso to Talcahuano. 
List of personnel imprisoned in different jails. 
Digital version. 
 
 
648 
 
Total pages:         1,181. 
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Militar, 1932). 
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Apostadero Naval de Magallanes [sobre los sucesos 
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de mayo 1925. (Transcription from an unpublished 
typewritten report. Chilean Navy Archives. Valparaiso) 
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